Opinion
HHDCV156056303
02-02-2016
Jeremy Collette v. Matthew Forgotch et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nina F. Elgo, J.
Before this court is a motion filed by the defendant, Bill's Landscaping, LLC, which seeks to strike counts five, six and seven of the plaintiff's complaint. In his complaint, the plaintiff, Jeremy Collette, is also suing the defendants, Matthew Forgotch and Christopher Levesque, who are co-workers with the plaintiff, all of whom are in the employ of Bill's Landscaping (defendant or defendant-employer). The action, which arises out of an incident in which the plaintiff was pinned between a Bobcat and a pickup truck operated by Forgotch and Levesque respectively, also alleges that the defendant is vicariously liable for the reckless conduct alleged as to Forgotch and that the defendant negligently entrusted the operation of the Bobcat vehicle to Forgotch. The defendant claims with respect to counts five and six that Connecticut common law prohibits imposing vicarious liability on an employer for an employee's reckless conduct. As to count seven, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim should be stricken on the ground that it fails to allege an essential element of that claim.
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). " If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). On the other hand, " [a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER GENERAL STATUTES § 14-295
Although not specifically pled by the plaintiff, the parties agree that the construction of General Statutes § 14-295, which is the basis for the plaintiff's claim for multiple damages, is the relevant issue before this court.
Although Practice Book § 10-3(a) states in relevant part that " [w]hen any claim made in a complaint . . . is grounded on a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by number, " the plaintiff does indicate that counts five and six of his complaint are based on Forgotch's violation of General Statutes § § 14-218a, 14-222, and 14-227a. Moreover, the defendant references these statutes in his memorandum of law in support of the motion to strike, and the plaintiff, in his memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to strike, acknowledges that his claims in counts five and six are brought under § 14-295. Considering the parties' legal arguments before this court, no prejudice has resulted from the plaintiff's failure to specifically reference § 14-295.
General Statutes § 14-295 states that " [i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle."
The above provisions provide for double or treble damages against a party who has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle resulting in injury or damages to the plaintiff. In order to impute a theory of vicarious liability to non-operator owners, as the plaintiff urges against the defendant employer, this court would have to import meaning beyond the express language of the statute. The plaintiff argues that the provision's second sentence, which specifically excludes owners of rental or leased vehicles from such damages, allows this court to conclude that the legislature intended that all other non-operator owners of vehicles could be vicariously liable for double or treble damages. Having considered the rules of statutory construction, a plethora of Superior Court authority wrestling with these provisions, as well as legislative history and the evolution of the statute itself, this court is not persuaded that the legislature intended any such remedy.
While this court acknowledges a plethora of support for the plaintiff's view among the Superior Courts, the recent, and more persuasive, authority is premised upon the plain language of the statute and holds that statutory double and treble damages under § 14-295 cannot be vicariously imposed on an employer.
See, e.g., Goss v. Wright, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-05-5001164-S (March 15, 2006, Lopez, J.) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 882) (denying motion to strike on grounds that had legislature intended to exclude owners of motor vehicles from liability it would have done so and reading § § 14-295 and 52-183 together permits imposing double and treble damages against employer); see also Welcome v. Ouelette-McGregor, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-01-0811039 (November 21, 2002, Hennessey, J.) (33 Conn. L. Rptr. 454) (rejecting argument that employer cannot be held vicariously liable for multiple damages based on conduct of employee); Rylo v. Gainey Transportation Services, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 01-0383149-S, (September 12, 2001, Stevens, J.) (granting motion to strike second count because common-law punitive damages cannot be imposed on employer based on vicarious liability, but denying motion to strike third count because multiple damages under § 14-295 can be imposed based on vicarious liability pursuant to § 52-183);
See, e.g.,
In authorizing double or treble damages against a party who has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle, the statute expressly refers to the mental state of the operator/driver. See, e.g., Rivera v. Webb, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-14-6042296-S (July 8, 2014, Kamp, J.) (58 Conn. L. Rptr. 478) (plain language of statute unequivocally indicates that liability for multiple damages only attaches to operator of vehicle, and not its potentially vicariously liable owner). Moreover, as acknowledged by our Supreme Court in Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 827 n.6, 836 A.2d 394 (2003), as well as other Superior Courts, such damages are punitive in character.
In discussing the jury award in
The punitive character of double and treble damages afforded in § 14-295 serves a deterrent purpose. In a thoughtful discussion of the history of § 14-295, the court in Hopwood v. Sciarretta, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV-01-0075934-S (July 11, 2002, Lager, J.) (32 Conn. L. Rptr. 474), granted a motion to strike the plaintiff's count against an employer-owner based on vicarious liability under its provisions, recognizing the penal, as well as remedial, purpose of the statute and the fact that provisions imposing liability for punitive damages against an owner/employer was at one point available and then repealed.
The 1797 act and its successors specifically imposed liability upon the owner of the vehicle when the operator was unable to pay punitive damages for which he had been found liable. Under the act, a plaintiff could bring a writ of scire facias to collect the punitive damages from a master for the actions of his servant . . . The statute remained essentially the same until 1905 when it was amended to impose substantial restrictions on the injured person's ability to recover against the owner. The restrictive statute was then repealed in 1921 without a replacement, but in 1925 the legislature enacted a statute which imputed liability to the lessor of a motor vehicle for the conduct of the operator of the motor vehicle . . . No similar provisions imposing liability on the owner of a vehicle for the conduct of an operator have come forward to the present day § 14-295 .
The legislature clearly could have chosen to continue to impose liability under these circumstances, but it did not. " A cause of action derived from statute cannot be judicially expanded to apply to situations for which the legislature has declined to provide relief . . . The language of § 14-295 speaks only of multiplied damages against those who drive recklessly." (Citation omitted.) Clark v. Gallup, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. 074117 (June 13, 2001) (Sferrazza, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 655). This is consistent with the penal and remedial purposes of the statute which allow an additional award to a plaintiff not for compensation for injury but " as a reward for securing the punishment of one who has committed an offense which the legislature deems to be a public wrong." Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 537, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).(Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnotes omitted.) Hopwood, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-01-0075934-S (32 Conn. L. Rptr. 474, 477).
Ironically, the current version of § 14-295, which operates specifically to immunize owners of rental or leased motor vehicles for double or triple damages, and whose enactment by Public Act 03-250 will be discussed infra, has spawned much of the litigation, like the one before this court, around the issue of all other non-operator owners.
Against the backdrop of this history and considering the punitive purpose of the provisions of § 14-295, the court in Welton v. Ferrara, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-5014334-S (March 18, 2008, Bellis, J.) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 211, 215, *21) rejected imposing vicarious liability for non-operator owners, observing that " Section 14-295 of the statutes unambiguously applies to vehicles operated by a defendant . . . The purpose of statutory punitive damages is to deter egregious conduct and imposing them in [this] case could not serve to deter the owner from conduct in the manner of operation of the motor vehicle by the driver which, albeit wrongful, the owner did not cause or have reason to know about or expect."
As most superior courts have acknowledged in grappling with this issue, the Matthiessen court's construction of General Statutes § 52-183 is critical to considering whether vicarious liability for multiple damages may attach in § 14-295. Indeed, cases post- Matthiessen have reflected the trend toward finding no vicarious liability for multiple damages against non-operator owners. The Matthiessen court noted that, at common law, there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages and, to impose such damages, the legislature must have clearly abrogated the common law. Id., 837-39. After assessing § 52-183 and its legislative history, the court held " that § 52-183 does not abrogate the common law principle that punitive damages may not be assessed against parties whom the law holds vicariously liable for the acts of others." Id., 843.
General Statutes § 52-183 states that " [i]n any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption."
The owner of the vehicle in
See, e.g.,
The plaintiff argues that the court's holding in Matthiessen addresses only punitive damages and, therefore, does not definitively resolve the question as to whether or not statutory double or treble damages can vicariously be imposed on an employer-owner. See Caulfield v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 31 Conn.App. 781, 786 n.3, 627 A.2d 466, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 913, 632 A.2d 688 (1993); see also Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald and Co., infra, 275 Conn. 72, 93-99, 881 A.2d 139 (2005) (distinguishing punitive damages from statutory multiple damages). The plaintiff's argument, however, misunderstands the relevance of Matthiessen . The court's reasoning in Matthiessen, which rejected the imputation of vicarious liability for punitive damages under § 52-183, applies equally well to § 14-295. In light of the common-law principle against vicarious liability for punitive damages, this court cannot read by implication into the construction of § 14-295 what the legislature failed expressly to state: that all non-operator owners may be liable for double or treble damages based on the reckless conduct of its agents.
In
Also shedding light on this principle is our appellate court in Stohlts v. Gilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 867 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 873 A.2d 1000 (2005). The Stohlts court acknowledged that, at common law, there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages, but nonetheless recognized an exception to this general principle. Id., 654. Specifically, the court adopted the exception as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: " 'Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if, (a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or (d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.' 4 Restatement (Second) Torts, § 909 (1979); see also Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 378-80, 42 A. 67 (1899)." Id. Therefore, Stohlts stands for the proposition that, under limited circumstances, an employer can be held vicariously liable at common law for punitive damages so long as the defendant employer is not simply " an innocent party" who is " only liable vicariously." Id., 654. Instead, the plaintiff must allege and demonstrate that the employer actually controlled the actions of his agent and thereby was directly responsible for the employee's conduct. See id. (evidence revealed that employer " was the person controlling the harassment, " " it was his instructions that were being followed, " and " [he] was instructing his agents on the course of action to be taken against the plaintiffs"); see also Nahass v. Schumacher, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-13-6015754, (July 12, 2013, Devine, J.) (denying motion to strike where complaint alleged, inter alia , employer-owner of school bus " ratified or approved of the action of [employee], " " authorized [employee] to drive its bus in a reckless manner, " and " [employee] was unfit to be a school bus driver and [the employer] . . . was reckless in employing or retaining him").
Various decisions of the Superior Court have discussed this exception within the context of assessing statutory or punitive damages against an employer premised on a theory of vicarious liability. See, e.g.,
Moreover, this court is not persuaded by the plaintiff's claim that the construction of the statutory damages provisions pursuant to General Statutes § 31-72, as interpreted by the court in Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 881 A.2d 139 (2005), is relevant here. In that case, the defendant employer challenged, inter alia, an arbitration award that awarded a former employee double damages and attorneys fees under General Statutes § 31-72. Id., 88. While the court in Harty articulated a distinction between statutory damages and punitive damages, subsequent courts have required a finding of " bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness" on the part of the employer before double damages or attorneys fees may be awarded under § 31-72. See, e.g., Saunders v. Firtel, 293 Conn. 515, 530, 978 A.2d 487 (2009) (" Although § 31-72 does not set forth a standard by which to determine whether double damages should be awarded in particular cases, it is well established . . . that it is appropriate for a plaintiff to recover attorneys fees, and double damages under [§ 31-72], only when the trial court has found that the defendant acted with bad faith, arbitrariness or unreasonableness"), quoting Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, Inc., 285 Conn. 716, 724, 941 A.2d 309 (2008).
At the time
In a particularly well-reasoned and developed analysis, the court in Reis v. Hendel, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-6016353-S (September 7, 2011, Sheldon, J.) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 526, 529, *14), also concluded that " there is nothing in the language of § 14-295 that suggests that the legislature intended to abrogate the common-law rule or impose vicarious liability on owner/employers for the conduct of reckless employees. [B]y its plain language, § 14-295 applies only to an operator of a vehicle, and not to its nonoperating owner."
In rejecting the same proposition posed by the plaintiff in Reis, the court observed that " [a]lthough the legislature may eliminate a common law right by statute, the presumption that the legislature does not have such a purpose can be overcome only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly expressed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moreover, " the last sentence of § 14-295, concerning the owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle, does not change this analysis . . . Indeed, § 14-295 by its own terms applies only to vehicles operated by a defendant. Second, neither party has directed the Court to any legislative history of § 14-295 that indicates the legislature intended to impose vicarious liability for punitive damages or to abrogate the common-law rule against such liability." Id.
The Reis court also concluded that while it need not turn to legislative history to discern the true meaning of the statute, it nevertheless pointed out the legislative history of the statute was of no help to the plaintiff. Indeed, as the Reis court observed, the commentary in the legislative history of Public Act 03-250, which amended § 14-295 to add the second sentence, is " all directed to the single-minded objective of immunizing the owners of rented and leased motor vehicles from paying multiple damages based vicariously upon the conduct of those who leased or rented their motor vehicles." Id., (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 526, 530, *21). Notably entitled " An Act Concerning Vicarious Liability for Persons Renting or Leasing Certain Motor Vehicles, " Public Act 03-250 simply expresses no intention of going beyond its express purpose of addressing the concerns of owners of rented and leased motor vehicles.
The court in
In considering the aforementioned decisions from the Superior Court, this court finds that the plain language of § 14-295, as well as the reasoning in Matthiessen and Stohlts, compel this court's conclusion that the plaintiff may not seek double or treble damages based solely on the theory of vicarious liability.
The motion to strike counts five and six is granted.
NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
The defendant also moves to strike count seven, which is the claim that the defendant negligently entrusted the operation of the vehicle to defendant Forgotch. The defendant claims that the plaintiff has failed to plead a legally sufficient claim of negligent entrustment and, thus, the count should also be stricken.
" The elements of a claim for negligent entrustment are well established. 'The essential elements of the tort of negligent entrustment of an automobile [are] that the entrustor knows or ought reasonably to know that one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought to reasonably anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence, and such incompetence does result in injury . . . Liability cannot be imposed on a defendant under a theory of negligent entrustment simply because the defendant permitted another person to operate the motor vehicle . . . Liability can only be imposed if (1) there is actual or constructive knowledge that the person to whom the automobile is loaned is incompetent to operate the motor vehicle and (2) the injury resulted from that incompetence.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Griffin v. Larson, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV 02 0079364, (August 18, 2004), (Lager, J.), citing Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 520, 165 A. 678 (1933)." Kaminsky v. Scoopo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-08-6002084-S (July 30, 2008, Bellis, J.) (46 Conn. L. Rptr. 82, 82-83).
The defendant argues that the plaintiff failed to allege that the plaintiff's injuries were the result of the defendant Forgotch's incompetence, instead alleging that the plaintiff's injuries were a result of the defendant-employer's negligence in entrusting the Bobcat to Forgotch. Although technically the plaintiff has not precisely pled this claim to conform to the elements of a negligent entrustment action, it is clear from the allegations that the relevant elements have been alleged in the count. Indeed, this court is not entirely persuaded that the failure to allege that Forgotch's incompetence, as opposed to the defendant-employer's negligent entrustment of the Bobcat to the allegedly incompetent Forgotch, caused the plaintiff's injuries is of any meaningful significance for purposes of a motion to strike. Indeed, our courts have observed that " if the complaint puts the defendant on notice of the relevant claims, then a plaintiff's failure specifically to allege a particular fact or issue is not fatal to his claim unless it results in prejudice to the defendant." Machado v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 364, 371, n.7, 972 A.2d 724 (2009). Considering the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the motion to strike count seven is denied.
CONCLUSION
Having considered the defendant's motion to strike, the court grants the motion as to counts five and six and denies the motion as to count seven.
Santillo v. Arredono, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 442323 (March 21, 2001, Blue, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 458) (denying motion to strike and noting that " [t]he legislative reference to damages for recklessness in § 52-183 can reasonably be read as encompassing double or treble damages imposed under § 14-295").
Rudeen-Monighetti v. Aqua Pool & Patio, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-14-6052278-S (April 22, 2015, Wiese, J.) (60 Conn. L. Rptr. 218) (holding that § 14-295 does not abrogate common-law prohibition on imposing punitive damages on party based on vicarious liability and Stohlts v. Gilkinson, supra, 87 Conn.App. 634, is inapplicable when complaint does not allege exception); Rivera v. Webb, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-14-6042296-S (July 8, 2014, Kamp, J.) (58 Conn. L. Rptr. 478) (holding that plain language of § 14-295 indicates that multiple damages only attaches to operator of motor vehicle, not potentially vicariously liable owner, and § 14-295 does not clearly abrogate common law); Horwath v. Owens, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-12-6015467 (March 6, 2014, Swienton, J.) (57 Conn. L. Rptr. 730) (plain language of § 14-295 indicates that statutory damages can only be assessed against operator of motor vehicle); Sandman v. DeCaprio III, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6015724-S, (May 20, 2013, Mullins, J.) (adopting rationale from Hronis v. EBO Logistics, LLC, 641 F.Supp.2d 139 [D.Conn. 2009], reasoning that § 14-295 does not abrogate common law and § 14-295 applies only to operators); Moncrieffe-West v. Transportation General, Inc., Superior Court, judicial District of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6012915 (December 6, 2010, Burke, J.) (51 Conn. L. Rptr. 96) (noting that § 14-295 does not abrogate common-law rule prohibiting vicarious liability for punitive damages); Zwicker v. Sabetta, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-5008853-S (February 1, 2008, Skolnick, J.T.R.) (46 Conn. L. Rptr. 9) (language of § 14-295 indicates that punitive damages cannot be assessed against non-operator and Stohlts exception was inapplicable when facts supporting exception were not pleaded).
Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 827 n.6, 836 A.2d 394 (2003), the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that " [a]lthough the jury expressly found that Don Vanech 'either deliberately or with reckless disregard violated either (a) General Statutes § 14-218a (traveling unreasonably fast for conditions) of (b) General Statutes § 14-222 (reckless driving) and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing [the plaintiff's] injuries, ' the jury nevertheless elected not to award the plaintiff punitive damages under § 14-295." (Emphasis added.)
Matthiessen, was the father of the alleged tortfeasor. " Although the plaintiff originally had alleged that Nicholas Vanech [the father] was liable under General Statutes § 52-182, the so called 'family car doctrine, ' the case ultimately was tried and presented to the jury under § 52-183, not § 52-182. Thus, punitive damages were imputed to Nicholas Vanech pursuant to § 52-183, and not pursuant to the family car doctrine." Id., 836 n.14. Because the defendants failed to adduce evidence rebutting the agency presumption contained in § 52-183, " the jury was obliged to conclude . . . that [the tortfeasor] was acting as the employee and agent of [her father], and during the course of her employment, when the vehicle she was operating struck the plaintiff's vehicle." Id., 838. Thus, Matthiessen ultimately addressed whether an employer-owner of a vehicle could be held vicariously liable for punitive damages based on an employee's reckless conduct in operating a vehicle.
Welton v. Ferrara, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-5014334-S (March 18, 2008, Bellis, J.) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 211) (" Indeed, the trend of post- Matthiessen decisions indicate that, " by its plain language, § 14-295 applies only to an operator of a vehicle, and not to its nonoperating owner.")
Caulfield v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 31 Conn.App. 781, 782, 627 A.2d 466, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 913, 632 A.2d 688 (1993), the Appellate Court addressed whether statutory multiple damages under § 14-295 were recoverable under an uninsured motorist provision of an automobile insurance policy. Unable to distinguish itself from binding precedent from the Connecticut Supreme Court, the court held that such damages were not recoverable under an uninsured motorist provision of an automobile policy. Id., 788.
Rudeen-Monighetti v. Aqua Pool & Patio, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-14-6052278-S (April 22, 2015, Wiese, J.) (60 Conn. L. Rptr. 218) (exception did not apply); Esposito v. Osinski, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6017917-S, (November 26, 2012, Young, J.) (exception may apply, but plaintiff did not allege that defendant controlled driver's conduct); Villard v. Shoreline Pools Service, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-10-6007372-S (August 19, 2011, Tobin, J.) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 482) (plaintiff did not allege facts implicating the exception).
Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 881 A.2d 139 (2005) was decided, General Statutes § 31-72 stated in relevant part that " [w]hen any employer fails to pay an employee wages in accordance with the provisions of sections 31-71a to 31-71i, inclusive, or fails to compensate an employee in accordance with section 31-76k . . . such employee . . . may recover, in a civil action, twice the full amount of such wages, with costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court . . ." (Emphasis added.) This statute was amended in 2015 by Public Act 15-86, § 2. The statute currently states in relevant part that " [w]hen any employer fails to pay an employee wages in accordance with the provisions of sections 31-71a to 31-71i, inclusive, or fails to compensate an employee in accordance with section 31-76k . . . such employee . . . shall recover, in a civil action, (1) twice the full amount of such wages, with costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Welton, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-07-5014334-S (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 211, 214, *18), following a thorough recitation of the history of § 14-295, also included legislative history underscoring the driving force behind the provision specifically to relieve owners of rental and leased vehicles from liability, observing that " [t]he House and Senate bills which form the predicate for the language articulated in the public act, and eventually in the statute, demonstrate that the decision to exclude lessors and rental companies from liability, unless they were the operators of the vehicle, was in direct response to the threat of large leasing companies leaving the state of Connecticut. The fear was that, without the passage of the amendment, the leasing companies would be exposed to significant liability in the form of punitive damages. See 46 S. Proc., Pt. 14, 2003 Sess., pp. 4161 et seq." (Emphasis in original.)