Opinion
NNHCV176075786
10-25-2018
Carol Delaney-Ridolfi et al. v. Michael Rodriguez et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Ozalis, Sheila A., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
OZALIS, J.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 5, 2018, the plaintiffs, Carol Delaney-Ridolfi and William Ridolfi, filed a Revised Complaint against the defendants, Michael Rodriguez and Mega Mechanical Systems Corp. (Mega Mechanical), alleging the following facts. On September 6, 2016, Delaney-Ridolfi was operating her vehicle and slowing to stop for traffic when a vehicle operated by Rodriguez, and owned by Mega Mechanical, rear-ended her and pushed her into another vehicle. The plaintiff alleges that Rodriguez caused the collision in that he, inter alia, failed to keep and maintain a safe distance, operated the vehicle at a rate of speed too fast for the traffic conditions, and operated the vehicle while distracted. The plaintiffs’ complaint sounds in negligence, statutory recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, common-law recklessness, and loss of consortium as against each defendant.
Presently before the court is Mega Mechanical’s Motion to Strike Counts Five and Six of the Revised Complaint, as well as the corresponding prayer for double or treble damages and punitive damages. Count Five is titled "§ 14-295 Recklessness" as against Mega Mechanical. The plaintiffs allege that Rodriguez drove the vehicle with the authorization and permission and under the direction and control of Mega Mechanical, as its agent, apparent agent, servant and/or employee. The plaintiffs allege that Mega Mechanical, as the owner of the vehicle, is liable and responsible for the reckless actions of Rodriguez pursuant to General Statutes § 52-183. Count Six is titled "Recklessness" as against Mega Mechanical. The plaintiffs repeat and re-allege that Rodriguez drove the vehicle with the authorization and permission and under the direction and control of Mega Mechanical, but add that Mega Mechanical was aware of Rodriguez’s history and propensity for driving at an excessive speed and in a reckless manner They allege that Mega Mechanical knew or should have known that permitting Rodriguez to drive would place others at a substantial risk of serious injury. They allege that the collision and the plaintiffs’ resulting injuries were due to the recklessness of Mega Mechanical for directly permitting Rodriguez to operate a motor vehicle.
Mega Mechanical filed the present Motion to Strike on May 7, 2018, along with a supporting memorandum of law. Mega Mechanical moves to strike Count Five on the ground that the claim is legally insufficient because it attempts to hold Mega Mechanical vicariously liable for Rodriguez’s allegedly reckless conduct. Mega Mechanical also moves to strike Count Six as legally insufficient because the count attempts to make a claim for reckless entrustment, which is not a legally recognized cause of action. Consequently, Mega Mechanical moves to strike the prayer for double or treble damages for the statutory recklessness claim, and punitive damages and attorneys fees for the reckless entrustment claim.
On July 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the Motion to Strike and a supporting memorandum of law, arguing that they have sufficiently pleaded statutory and common-law recklessness as against Mega Mechanical. Mega Mechanical filed a reply brief on July 6, 2018. Oral argument was heard on this motion on August 27, 2018.
II.
DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § 10-39(a) provides that a party wanting to contest the legal sufficiency of a complaint, counterclaim, cross claim or any counts contained therein or a prayer for relief, the joining of two or more causes of action or the legal sufficiency of an answer may file a motion to strike." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 87 Conn.App. 257, 269, 865 A.2d 488, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 916, 871 A.2d 372 (2005). "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "Practice Book ... § 10-39, allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded." Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
"In ruling on a motion to strike the trial court is limited to considering the grounds specified in the motion." Meredith v. Police Commission, 182 Conn. 138, 140, 438 A.2d 27 (1980). "[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ... [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). "A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
A. Statutory Recklessness
Mega Mechanical first argues in its Motion to Strike that Count Five impermissibly attempts to impose vicarious liability upon Mega Mechanical for the alleged statutory reckless conduct of Rodriguez pursuant to General Statutes § 52-183.
Plaintiff has alleged a statutory recklessness claim against Rodriguez pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. Section 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a or 14-227m, subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n or section 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner’s operation of the motor vehicle."
"Recklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater ... than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent ... More recently, we have described recklessness as a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts ... It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 832-33.
Mega Mechanical relies on Matthiessen and its holding that "§ 52-183 does not abrogate the common-law principle that punitive damages may not be assessed against parties whom the law holds vicariously liable for the acts of others" in support of its Motion to Strike Count Five and its corresponding prayer for relief. Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 843. The plaintiffs counter that § 52-183 does impose vicarious liability upon the owner of a vehicle and that Matthiessen is distinguishable because the claim in Matthiessen should have been brought pursuant to General Statutes § 52-182, the family car doctrine, rather than § 52-183. The plaintiffs further argue that Mega Mechanical is not only liable for the reckless conduct of Rodriguez, but is also culpable for its own reckless conduct due to the exception to the common-law rule as adopted in Stohlts v. Gilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 654, 867 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 873 A.2d 1000 (2005), and argue that double and treble damages are available pursuant to § 14-295.
General Statutes § 52-183 provides: "In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption."
In Matthiessen, our Supreme Court considered whether § 52-183 allowed a plaintiff to recover punitive damages from the owner of a vehicle for the operator’s reckless conduct. See Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 837. "[A]t common law, there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages ... and ... under that common-law doctrine, the owner of a motor vehicle is not vicariously liable for punitive damages resulting from the driver’s reckless operation of the vehicle." (Citations omitted.) Id. The court concluded that there is nothing in the statutory language or legislative history of § 52-183 to suggest that the legislature intended to abrogate this common-law rule. Id., 843. "Section 52-183 does nothing more than create a rebuttable presumption of [an agency] relationship between the owner and the operator of a motor vehicle, namely, an employer-employee relationship, which, under the common-law principle of respondeat superior, renders the owner vicariously liable for compensatory damages arising out of the negligent and reckless conduct of the operator, but not vicariously liable for punitive damages stemming from that conduct." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 840. The Supreme Court further held that "[t]here is nothing in the statutory language [§ 52-183] to suggest that the liability of the vehicle’s owner for the negligent or reckless conduct of the vehicle’s operator is any greater than that of an employer for the tortious conduct of his employee. Because an employer is not vicariously liable for punitive damages arising out of the conduct of his employee, we see no reason to conclude that § 52-183 impliedly gives rise to such liability on the part of a nonoperator owner of a motor vehicle." Id., 840-41.
Nevertheless, our Appellate Court recognized an exception to Matthiessen in Stohlts v. Gilkinson, supra, 87 Conn.App. 654. Stohlts involved a dispute between abutting property owners. Id., 637. Although the defendant lived in California, the trial court found that the defendant had "orchestrated or instructed" his cousin and his attorney to harass the plaintiffs i an effort to drive them from their property. Id., 638. The alleged harassment included attempting to make the plaintiffs purchase a right-of-way to access their property, filing a false survey on the land records, and placing boulders to block the plaintiffs’ driveway and deny them access to their property. Id., 637-38. The Appellate Court summarized the common-law vicarious liability rule and Matthiessen as holding that it is "improper to award punitive damages against someone who is innocent and, therefore, only liable vicariously. We do not believe this is such a situation and, thus, apply the exception stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if, (a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or (d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 654. The exception was applicable in Stohlts on the basis of "credible evidence that [the defendant] was the person controlling the harassment. It was his will that was being imposed, and it was his instructions that were being followed ... [H]e was apprised of all matters and was instructing his agents on the course of action to be taken against the plaintiffs. Additionally, it was [the defendant] who filed a false survey on the land records. [The defendant] was not an innocent party in this matter, and we will not conclude that he is not liable for punitive damages." Id., 654-55.
While no Connecticut appellate court has addressed the issue of whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for statutory damages assessed pursuant to § 14-295, a number of superior courts have considered the issue. See Villard v. Shoreline Pools Service, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-10-6007372-S (August 19, 2011, Tobin, J.) (52 Conn.L.Rptr. 482, 484). "[A] strong trend has developed in favor of applying Matthiessen ’s broader holding to claims brought under § 14-295, thereby barring the recovery of punitive damages against parties who are only vicariously liable for the acts of others." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Collette v. Forgotch, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-15-6056303 (February 2, 2016, Elgo, J.) (61 Conn.L.Rptr. 825, 828). (a claim will be stricken seeking statutory damages from an owner or employer unless the plaintiffs "allege and demonstrate that the employer actually controlled the actions of his agent and thereby was directly responsible for the employee’s conduct"); Young Jin Jun v. Scianna, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-13-6014680-S (June 19, 2014, Brazzel-Massaro, J.) ("[The owner’s] sole involvement in this action is giving the [operator] permission to drive the car owned by her. These allegations do not create any other involvement and clearly should limit the complaint to the vicarious liability").
In the present case, the plaintiffs allege in Count Five that Rodriguez was Mega Mechanical’s agent, servant, and/or employee, and that Mega Mechanical, "acting through" Rodriguez, caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. This court finds that Count Five sounds in vicarious liability. Accordingly, this court follows Matthiessen and applies the common-law rule that an owner cannot be vicariously liable for punitive damages, and agrees with the Superior Court cases holding that § 14-295 does not abrogate this rule. Further, although the plaintiffs argue that they have alleged a direct claim of recklessness against Mega Mechanical, the plaintiffs’ allegation that Rodriguez drove the vehicle with Mega Mechanical’s authorization and under its direction and control does not rise to the level of recklessness contemplated in Stohlts . There are no allegations that Mega Mechanical authorized the doing and the manner of the allegedly reckless act, or that Mega Mechanical "instructed" or "orchestrated" Rodriguez’s allegedly reckless driving.
Based on the foregoing, Mega Mechanical’s Motion to Strike Count Five is granted. Further, because the relief sought cannot be legally awarded, Mega Mechanical’s Motion to Strike the corresponding prayer for double or treble damages is granted.
B. Reckless Entrustment
Mega Mechanical next moves to strike Count Six of the Revised Complaint on the ground that it is legally insufficient because it sounds in reckless entrustment. Mega Mechanical argues that there are no Connecticut cases that recognize reckless entrustment of a motor vehicle as a viable cause of action. The plaintiffs object to this characterization of Count Six, and argue that they are in fact making a direct claim of common law recklessness against Mega Mechanical. Plaintiffs contend that the Revised Complaint states that Mega Mechanical was aware of Rodriguez’s history and propensity for reckless driving and operation of his vehicle at excessive speeds, and knew or should have known that permitting Rodriguez to operate a motor vehicle placed those around him at substantial risk of serious injury and would create a high likelihood of accident and injury to other motorists, including the plaintiff. The plaintiffs argue that these allegations implicate two of the Stohlts exceptions, namely, (a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him. The plaintiffs characterize this latter exception as one of reckless supervision, not reckless entrustment.
The count does not, as the plaintiffs argue, implicate the first Stohlts exception, as there are no allegations that Mega Mechanical authorized the doing and the manner of the allegedly reckless driving. Nor does the count sound in reckless supervision or implicate the second Stohlts exception. The plaintiffs have provided no appellate authority recognizing a claim for reckless supervision or holding that knowledge of an employee’s history of or propensity for speeding or reckless driving constitutes reckless conduct on the part of the employer.
"A cause of action for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle has existed in Connecticut since 1933 ..." Anastasia v. Mitsock, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-05-4012156-S (December 5, 2006, Jones, J.) (42 Conn.L.Rptr. 496, 498). "When the evidence proves that the owner of an automobile knows or ought reasonably to know that one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought reasonably to anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence, and such incompetence does result in such injury, a basis of recovery by the person injured is established. That recovery rests primarily upon the negligence of the owner in entrusting the automobile to the incompetent driver." Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 520, 165 A. 678 (1933). "Liability cannot be imposed on a defendant under a theory of negligent entrustment simply because the defendant permitted another person to operate the motor vehicle ... Liability can only be imposed if (1) there is actual or constructive knowledge that the person to whom the automobile is loaned is incompetent to operate the motor vehicle and (2) the injury resulted from that incompetence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anastasia v. Mitsock, supra, 42 Conn.L.Rptr. 498.
In the present case, the plaintiffs similarly allege that Mega Mechanical knew or should have known that permitting Rodriguez to operate a motor vehicle placed those around him at substantial risk of serious injury, but allege that this constituted reckless rather than negligent conduct. Accordingly, this court finds that Count Six sounds in reckless entrustment. See Nahass v. Schumacher, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-13-6015754-S (July 12, 2013, Devine, J.) (allegation that defendant "knowingly permitted a potentially dangerous driver to operate a school bus full of children" supported plaintiff’s theory of reckless entrustment); Anastasia v. Mitsock, supra, 42 Conn.L.Rptr. 498 (allegations that defendant had knowledge of wife’s drinking but allowed her to drive vehicle in reckless disregard of just rights and safety of others sounded in reckless entrustment).
The remaining issue, therefore, is whether reckless entrustment is a legally cognizable cause of action. "While Connecticut appellate courts have long recognized the cause of action for negligent entrustment ... there is no appellate authority recognizing a cause of action, for reckless entrustment. Meanwhile, the trial courts that have addressed the issue [of recognizing reckless entrustment] have repeatedly ruled that no such cause of action is recognized in Connecticut ... In deciding not to recognize a new cause of action for reckless entrustment, courts have reasoned that [a] cause of action for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle has existed in Connecticut since 1933, but courts in this state have yet to uphold a cause of action in reckless entrustment of a motor vehicle ... The judicial trend in this jurisdiction, therefore, is to not recognize a new cause of action for reckless entrustment, and the plaintiff has not provided any legal authority recognizing the new cause of action from this or any other jurisdictions." DelPrete v. Senibaldi, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6024795-S (September 16, 2014, Wilson, J.); see also Gomez v. Flores, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV- 10-6001533-S (February 16, 2011, Vacchelli, J.) (52 Conn.L.Rptr. 583, 584) (granting motion to strike reckless entrustment claim); Anastasia v. Mitsock, supra, 42 Conn.L.Rptr. 498 (same).
This court agrees with the line of Superior Court cases declining to recognize reckless entrustment as a cause of action. Accordingly, Mega Mechanical’s Motion to Strike Count Six is granted. Further, because the relief sought cannot be legally awarded, Mega Mechanical’s Motion to Strike the corresponding prayer for punitive damages is granted.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mega Mechanical’s Motion to Strike Counts Five and Six of the Revised Complaint dated March 5, 2018, as well as the corresponding prayer for double or treble and punitive damages, is granted.