Summary
In Kaminsky v. Scoopo, supra, 46 Conn. L. Rptr. 82, the court granted a motion to strike a negligent entrustment claim under circumstances very similar to the present case.
Summary of this case from Morin v. MachroneOpinion
No. CV08-6002084S
July 30, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#106)
The matter presently before the court arises out of an April 20, 2006 motor vehicle accident. In her three-count complaint, the plaintiff, Rochelle Kaminsky, alleges that she sustained injuries and damages when the motor vehicle she was operating was struck by a vehicle owned by the defendant Donald Scoopo and operated by the defendant Gina Lynn Scoopo. The revised complaint is comprised of three counts. The first count alleges negligence, the second count alleges recklessness, and the third count alleges negligent entrustment as to Donald Scoopo.
On July 11, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to strike the third count of the complaint on the ground that the claim for negligent entrustment fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action. An objection was filed by the plaintiff on July 24, 2008. The matter was argued at short calendar on July 28, 2008.
Although the motion to strike was filed by both defendants, the third count was directed against the defendant owner only; as such, the court will refer to the movant in the singular.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 170, 709 A.2d 558 (1998).
"In ruling on a motion to strike, the trial court examines the complaint construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). When deciding the motion, "the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
In his memorandum of law in support of his motion to strike, the defendant posits that the facts pled do not support a claim for negligent entrustment. The defendant argues that the complaint merely makes conclusory statements, and fails to plead facts to support a legal theory that the defendant owner had either constructive or actual knowledge that the defendant operator was incompetent to operate a motor vehicle. In her objection, the plaintiff argues that the allegations in the complaint that the defendant operator failed to drive at a reasonable speed, failed to control her vehicle, failed to yield the right of way, ignored a red traffic control signal, and was inattentive should suffice to withstand a motion to strike a negligent entrustment cause of action as, according to the plaintiff's objection, "someone who is being careless and/or reckless, and driving in an erratic manner, is someone who should not be driving." While the court would be hard-pressed to disagree with that latter statement of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's argument fails to address the necessary elements of a cause of action for negligent entrustment.
Connecticut has long recognized the doctrine of negligent entrustment of automobiles. "When the evidence proves that the owner of an automobile knows or ought reasonably to know that one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought reasonably to anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence, and such incompetence does result in such injury, a basis of recovery by the person injured is established." Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 520, 165 A. 678 (1933). "An automobile, while capable of doing great injury when not properly operated upon the highways, is not an intrinsically dangerous instrumentality . . . and liability cannot be imposed upon an owner merely because he entrusts it to another to drive upon the highways." (Citations omitted.) Id. at 518. Nevertheless, "the owner may be liable for injury resulting from the operation of an automobile he loans to another, when he knows or ought reasonably to know that the one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it, by reason of inexperience or other cause, that the owner ought reasonably to anticipate the likelihood that in its operation injury will be done to others." (Emphasis added.) Id.
The elements of a claim for negligent entrustment are well established. "The essential elements of the tort of negligent entrustment of an automobile [are] that the entrustor knows or ought reasonably to know that one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought to reasonably anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence, and such incompetence does result in injury . . . Liability cannot be imposed on a defendant under a theory of negligent entrustment simply
because the defendant permitted another person to operate the motor vehicle . . . Liability can only be imposed if (1) there is actual or constructive knowledge that the person to whom the automobile is loaned is incompetent to operate the motor vehicle and (2) the injury resulted from that incompetence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Griffin v. Larson, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV 02 0079364 (August 18, 2004), (Lager, J.), citing Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 520, 165 A. 678 (1933).
The Greeley court, and its progeny, recognized that a principal feature of a cause of action for negligent entrustment is the knowledge of the entrustor with respect to the dangerous propensities and incompetency of the entrustee. Id. at 520. See, Donati v. Sullivan, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 030828572 (August 7, 2007) (Stengel, J.) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, where the allegations of the complaint did not allege facts bearing on the issue of the incompetency of the person to whom the car was loaned, and where the defendant's affidavit denied any knowledge of any dangerous propensities of the driver, and denied ever giving the driver permission to use the vehicle); Dervil v. Perez, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. 044001545 (September 12, 2005) (Lewis, J.T.R.) (granting motion to strike, where complaint alleged that the defendant knew or should have known that the driver was an incompetent reckless driver and that the driver would get involved in an accident, for the reason that the complaint did not allege "any facts suggesting that the defendant owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the defendant driver's dangerous propensities"); Griffin v. Larson, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, supra, (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, where defendant had borrowed the car from the vehicle owner and allowed driver to use it that morning to pick up coffee for a softball game, and where there was no evidence that defendant knew or should have known that driver was incompetent to operate the vehicle); Chung v. Place Motors, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 560074 (February 11, 2003) (Hurley, J.T.R.) [34 Conn. L. Rptr. 140] (granting motion to strike brought against lessor of vehicle, where complaint "failed to adequately plead facts sufficient to find knowledge of the entrustee's incompetence"); Plimpton v. Amerada Hess Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. 990169861 (September 27, 1999) (Karazin, J.) (granting motion to strike, where complaint failed to allege that the driver had any dangerous propensities, or that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of any dangerous propensities of the driver); Williams v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven (November 2, 1995) (Zoarski, J.) [15 Conn. L. Rptr. 380] (denying defendant's motion to strike where complaint alleged that the defendant leased the vehicle in question to a non-party lessee who in turn allowed the co-defendant to operate it; the court noted that the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant lessor entrusted the vehicle to one who was incompetent to operate it); Galloway v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 950371814 (September 26, 1995) (Corradino, J.) [15 Conn. L. Rptr.] (granting motion to strike, where complaint alleged that the defendant lessor negligently entrusted a vehicle to the co-defendant lessee because it failed to explain to the lessee that no one else could drive the vehicle, and the co-defendant lessee "was incompetent in allowing another to gain control of and negligently operate the (rental) automobile"; the court held that the complaint failed to allege that the defendant lessor knew or should have known of the co-defendant lessee's "incompetence" in permitting another to drive); Whitely v. Sebas, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. 90031783 (August 10, 1990) (Hartmere, J.) [2 Conn. L. Rptr. 296] (denying motion to strike negligent entrustment claim, where complaint alleged that the defendant knew his son was not fit to drive due to his past history of negligent driving).
Here, the plaintiff alleges in her complaint that the defendant operator "was not a responsible and safe driver . . . as herein alleged," referring to the alleged negligence of the defendant operator on April 20, 2006. The plaintiff further alleges in the complaint that the defendant owner knew or should have known of the defendant operator's irresponsible and unsafe driving and that he negligently entrusted a motor vehicle to her.
Admittedly, this is a close call. There is no specific allegation in the complaint suggesting a past history of incompetent driving or other dangerous propensities on the part of the defendant operator, nor is such a history necessarily implied from the allegations contained in the complaint. Instead, the allegations, even viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are that the defendant owner knew or should have known of the defendant operator's irresponsible and unsafe driving of April 20, 2006 — without alleging that the defendant operator had dangerous propensities or any incompetencies before that date.
The alleged negligence of the defendant driver on April 20, 2006 is not the determinative factor in an action for negligent entrustment. Instead, the proper focus is on whether the entrustor was negligent in entrusting a vehicle to an incompetent driver. Here, the allegations of the complaint fall short.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike is granted.