Opinion
HHDCV186098524S
11-15-2018
Kevin KULINSKI v. ANDERSON TURF IRRIGATION et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Cesar A. Noble, J.
Before the court in this motor vehicle accident case is the motion of the defendant, Anderson Turf Irrigation, Inc. (Anderson), to strike the second and third court of the complaint of the plaintiff, Kevin Kulinski. Anderson claims that Connecticut law imposes no vicarious liability upon it to pay statutory damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 for the reckless conduct of its employee in the operation of its motor vehicle as asserted in the second count, nor does it impose a vicarious liability to pay punitive damages for the same conduct as alleged in the third count. The court agrees and strikes the second count of the complaint and any claim for common-law punitive damages derived from the third count.
Section 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a or 14-227m, subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n or section 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner’s operation of the motor vehicle."
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that on May 11, 2018, he was a passenger in a vehicle that was struck by another vehicle owned by Anderson and operated by Keith Gillespie (Gillespie), its employee, who was in the course of his employment with Anderson. The plaintiff asserts that the accident and his resulting injuries were proximately caused by Gillespie’s tortious conduct. The plaintiff’s six-count complaint asserts vicarious liability against Anderson for Gillespie’s negligence (first count), statutory recklessness pursuant to § 14-295 (second count) and common-law punitive damages (third count). Anderson moves to strike the second and third counts of the complaint on the authority of Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 840-41, 836 A.2d 394 (2003), which held that General Statutes § 52-183 does not abrogate the common-law doctrine that an owner of a motor vehicle is not vicariously liable for punitive damages resulting from the driver’s reckless operation of its vehicle. Both parties agree that there is no appellate decision addressing the issue of vicarious liability for the statutory punitive damages recoverable under § 14-295 but both argue the more persuasive authority is found in the decisions of the Superior Court which favor their clients. The plaintiff agrees that the proposition reiterated in Matthiessen bars him from recovering punitive damage flowing from the reckless conduct alleged in the third count but claims, correctly, he is otherwise entitled to recover compensatory damages for such reckless conduct.
The complaint also contains claims against the administratrix of Gillespie’s estate.
Section 52-183 provides: "In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption."
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).
This court adopts the reasoning of those decisions of the Superior Court which have held that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Matthiessen that rejected "the imputation of vicarious liability for punitive damages under § 52-183, applies equally well to § 14-295." Collete v. Forgotch, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-15-6056303, 2016 WL 785551, *4 (February 2, 2016, Elgo, J.) (61 Conn.L.Rptr. 825, 827). This is because the plain language of the statute unequivocally indicates that liability for multiple damages attaches only to the operator of the vehicle and not the potentially vicariously liable owner. Id., 2; Rivera v. Webb, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-14-6042296-S, 2014 WL 396707 (July 8, 2014, Kamp, J.) (58 Conn.L.Rptr. 478, 480). Moreover, the statute does not clearly and plainly express an intent to abrogate the common law so as to overcome the presumption that it did not have such a purpose. Collete v. Forgotch, supra, 828; see also Hronis v. EBO Logistics, LLC, 641 F.Supp.2d 139, 141 (D.Conn. 2009). The court is persuaded that these reasons amply support the conclusion that § 14-295 does not abrogate the common-law prohibition against imposing vicarious liability for punitive damages. The second count is therefore stricken.
As to the third count, which asserts Anderson is vicariously liable for Gillespie’s recklessness conduct, the plaintiff correctly asserts that an owner of a motor vehicle is liable, under principles of respondeat superior, for compensatory damages arising out of the reckless conduct of the operator of the vehicle. Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 840. The demand for relief, which requests statutory and common-law punitive damages, however, does not specify the counts from which such damages are requested. To the extent that common law punitive damages are sought via the third count, then that claim is also stricken.
The plaintiff agreed at the time of oral argument to amend his demand for relief such that it identifies the count from which the right to each relief requested is sought.
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the motion to strike as to the second count and any claim for common law punitive damages as to the third count.