Opinion
DBDCV196032861S
11-26-2019
Dale M. SCHMUDE v. Jack B. STANTON
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
D’ANDREA, Robert A., J.
The defendant, Jack B. Stanton ("Stanton") has moved to strike the second count and prayer for relief no. 2 of the plaintiff Dale M. Schmude’s ("Schmude") complaint, which alleges that Stanton operated his motor vehicle recklessly and/or intentionally in reckless disregard for the safety of Schmude, causing an accident with Schmude on February 20, 2019. Schmude alleges that he was operating a vehicle owned by Nadine Schmude, in a northerly direction on Danbury Road, near its intersection with New Street, in the town of Wilton. Stanton was operating his motor vehicle in a southerly direction on Danbury Road, when he crossed the double yellow lines and entered Schmude’s lane of travel causing his vehicle to violently crash into Schmude’s vehicle head on in the northerly lane causing Schmude injuries.
It is alleged that Stanton was operating his vehicle recklessly and/or intentionally in that he operated his motor vehicle at an unreasonable, improper, and excessive rate of speed having regards to curves, width, traffic and use of said highway and intersections of said streets and the weather conditions then and there existing in violation of § 14-218a of the General Statutes and in violation of General Statutes and § 14-237 which were substantial factors in causing Schmude’s injuries in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s safety. More specifically, Schmude alleges that Stanton failed to operate his vehicle in his established lane; that he failed to drive right; failed to drive entirely within a single lane and moved from lane when such movement could not be made safely; he was operating his vehicle at an unreasonable, improper and excessive rate of speed having no regard to the curves, width, traffic and use of said highway; approached Schmude’s vehicle without reducing the speed of his vehicle nor did he have said vehicle under control; he was inattentive and failed to keep a proper lookout; he failed to drive only upon the right-hand roadway; in that he did have upon said vehicle brakes adequate and sufficient to slow or stop it and failed to apply his brakes reasonably in time to avoid a collision; failed to blow his horn or give timely warning of his approach; failed to stop or turn in time to avoid striking Schmude’s vehicle nor did he take evasive action; and he did not use the degree of care which a reasonable and prudent person would have used under the circumstances. As a result, the plaintiff was injured and suffered damages and is entitled to double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295.
DEFENDANT’S POSITION
Stanton claims that the complaint filed by Schmude fails to allege fact sufficient to state a claim of common-law or statutory recklessness. Schmude merely restates the allegations of count one of negligence with the addition of insufficient and conclusory labels of recklessness. Defendant claims that the plaintiff must allege and prove extreme conduct to sustain a claim of recklessness. The Supreme Court has stated that, "[recklessness] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ... [and] tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent ..." Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532-33, 542 A.2d 711 (1988). As a result, Connecticut courts have held that merely adding the term "reckless" to prior allegations of negligence is insufficient as a matter of law. "A plaintiff cannot transform a negligence count into a count for willful and wanton misconduct merely by appending a string of adjectives to allegations that clearly sound in negligence." Angiolillo v. Buckmiller, 102 Conn.App. 697, 705, 927 A.2d 312 (2007). "[t]he addition of the word ‘reckless’ and a citation to a statutory violation do not satisfy the specificity of pleading that is required to support a cause of action predicated on ... recklessness. Connecticut is a fact pleading state." Ruiz v. Lewinson, 2015 WL 2261342 at *3-4 (2015).
Next, the statutory recklessness statute, § 14-295, requires specific factual allegation rather than conclusory labels. While there is a split of authority among the Superior Court as to what degree of specificity is required to plead statutory recklessness under § 14-295, the more persuasive line of cases holds that the claimant must plead facts sufficient to set forth a common-law recklessness claim, and that merely claiming a violation of one of the statutes enumerated in General Statutes § 14-295 is insufficient. "It is not ... unreasonable to insist that something more than conclusory allegations be required of a plaintiff in order to elevate an ordinary negligence claim to one of [statutory] recklessness." Dorman v. Fitzgerald, 2015 WL 1379474 at *4-5 (2015). "[I]n asserting a claim under § 14-295, a plaintiff must not only satisfy the specific language requirements of § 14-295 but must also plead facts sufficient to set forth a common-law recklessness claim." Little v. Bonesse, 2000 WL 995492 at *2 (2000).
Stanton next claims that the second count fails to allege sufficient facts to support a common-law recklessness claim. It reincorporates the entirety of the negligence count, then concludes that the injuries and damages were a "result of the recklessness of the defendant" because he conducted himself "in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s safety." The second count repeats the allegations that Stanton operated his vehicle at an "unreasonable, improper, and excessive rate of speed" and adds no new allegations. Connecticut is a fact-pleading state and applying a label of recklessness to allegations of mere negligence is insufficient. "The reiteration of acts previously asserted to support a cause of action in negligence, without more, cannot be transformed into a claim of recklessness misconduct by mere nomenclature." Torres v. Am. Med. Response of Connecticut, Inc., No. CV 000802360, 2001 WL 1187155 at *3-4 (2001). Schmude has attempted to plead the legal language of recklessness without sufficient supporting factual allegations, and such allegations do not satisfy Connecticut’s fact-pleading standards for recklessness.
Finally, in the prayer for relief no. 2, Schmude claims punitive damages on the basis of common-law recklessness/statutory recklessness alleged in the second count. As the second count is insufficient under Connecticut law to state a claim of common-law recklessness or statutory recklessness, Schmude cannot claim punitive damages. To support an award of punitive damages, the evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights. Here, Schmude has failed to allege any conduct by Defendant that rises to the level of reckless, intentional or wanton violation of the rights of others. Common-law negligence does not support his claim for punitive damages, and Schmude fails to have a basis for punitive damages. Prayer for relief no. 2 seeking punitive damages must also be stricken.
The second count fails to state facts sufficient to state the claims of common-law and statutory recklessness, therefore, the court should grant the motion to strike the second count and the corresponding prayer for relief no. 2 seeking punitive damages.
PLAINTIFF’S POSITION
Stanton incorrectly maintains that the Schmude failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim for relief pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 and argues that there is no factual basis to support a claim for recklessness. Stanton cites cases which rely on Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 139 A.2d 58 (1958) and Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 542 A.2d 711 (1988) to support his position. However, the Dumond and Dubay cases dealt with a common-law action where it is clearly necessary to plead a cause of action grounded in recklessness separate and distinct from a negligence action. In Spencer v. King, 10 Conn.L.Rptr., No. 2, 48 (October 21, 1993), the court denied the defendant’s Motion to Strike as he held that General Statute § 14-295 merely requires a plaintiff to plead that another party violated certain statutes with reckless disregard in order for the trier of fact to consider awarding multiple damages. In Spencer, the plaintiff pled that the defendant, with reckless disregard, operated his vehicle in violation of General Statutes § § 14-218a and 14-222, two of the sections enumerated in § 14-295. Here, Schmude pled that Stanton operated his vehicle with reckless disregard in violation of § 14-218a and/or § 14-222. The Spencer court correctly held that this is all that is required under § 14-295 as said statute "does not require the same specificity of pleading which is required to support a cause of action predicated on recklessness." Id. at 49. "When the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction by the courts and statute will be applied as its words direct." Warkentin v. Burns, 223 Conn. 14, 22, 610 A.2d 1287 (1992). Furthermore, in Switek v. Fournier, 1 Conn. Ops. 839 (July 31, 1995), the Honorable Walter M. Pickett, Jr., in denying a similar motion to strike by held that a plaintiff claiming double or treble damages for injuries arising out of the reckless operation of a motor vehicle need only allege a statutory violation as set forth in General Statutes § 14-295 and need not plead facts that would support a claim for common-law reckless conduct. All that is clearly required under § 14-295 is that if the plaintiff pleads that another party has operated a motor vehicle deliberately or with reckless disregard in violation of certain statutory sections, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages. The statute does not require the same specifications of pleading as under common law which is required to support a cause of action predicted on recklessness. Schmude respectfully requests that the Court sustain his instant objection.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).
"[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ... [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ... Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). "If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint support a cause of action ... the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People’s Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). On the other hand, "[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
"[T]here is no specific appellate guidance regarding how to plead a claim [of recklessness] under § 14-295, and a Superior Court split exists on this issue. The split has often been described as falling into two groups." Martin v. LaQuerrre, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-13-6017265-S (December 18, 2013, Cole-Chu, J.). The majority view holds that a claim for statutory recklessness is legally sufficient so long as it alleges the language of General Statutes § 14-295, to wit, that the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the specific statutes enumerated within § 14-295, and further asserts that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries. Martin v. LaQuerrre, supra The majority view is based upon the notion that § 14-295 establishes a standard for recklessness by listing, within it, specific statutory violations that, if committed, rise to recklessness. See Hand v. Moore, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV-05-2BJ-4003873-S (September 26, 2005, Jennings, J.) (40 Conn.L.Rptr. 83); Estate of Chung v. Place Motors, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV560074-S (February 11, 2003, Hurley, J.T.R.) (34 Conn.L.Rptr. 140).
In contrast, the minority view requires the plaintiff to plead specific factual allegations above and beyond the facts that were pleaded in the negligence count. Colon v. SNET, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-01-0385673-S (May 22, 2002, Gallagher, J.); see Hopwood v. Sciarretta, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-01-0075934-S (July 11, 2002, Lager, J.) (32 Conn.L.Rptr. 474). "The reasoning of the minority view is that there is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. LaQuerrre supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-13-6017265-S.
CONCLUSION
This court is persuaded that the majority view is the appropriate position in this matter, and after application of the majority reasoning to this set of factual allegations, I find that the plaintiff has alleged a common-law and statutory recklessness claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, based on the analysis above, the defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.