Opinion
No. 427368
July 5, 2000
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Nicole Little, was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the vehicle in which she was a passenger collided with a vehicle operated by the defendant Camillo Bonesse and owned by the defendant Francesco Bonesse. She brings this action in two counts and seeks damages. Pending before the court is the defendants' motion to strike the second count. In the second count, the plaintiff alleges that Camillo Bonesse recklessly operated the vehicle and that both he and Francesco Bonesse are liable for the injuries thereby caused to the plaintiff. Based on these allegations, the plaintiff seeks to impose double or treble damages on both defendants pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295.
General Statutes § 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property."
I
The first ground the defendants assert in the motion to strike is that, in the second count, the plaintiff does not make distinct factual allegations of reckless or deliberate conduct. In the second count, the plaintiff alleges that Camillo Bonesse caused the accident:
"a. in that he operated his vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed in violation of Sec. 14-218a of the Connecticut General Statutes; b. in that he operated his vehicle recklessly in violation of Sec. 14-222 of the Connecticut General Statutes; c. in that he failed to act in a reasonable manner by operating his vehicle deliberately or with reckless disregard in violation of Sec. 14-218a and/or Sec. 14-222 of the Connecticut General Statutes."
"To support an award of punitive damages, the evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sorrentino v. All Seasons Services, 245 Conn. 756, 778, 717 A.2d 150 (1998). "Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts. . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence. . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them. . . . Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct. . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532, 542 A.2d 711 (1988).
In Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91, 139 A.2d 58 (1958), the Supreme Court, quoting Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 80, 14 A.2d 713 (1940), stated: "There is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on. . . . Simply using the word `reckless' or `recklessness' is not enough. A specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Here, other than the legal conclusion of recklessness, the only fact the plaintiff alleges is that Camillo Bonesse operated the vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a. As the court stated in Foxworth v. Juliano, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 524237 (November 4, 1993, Sheldon, J.) "The plaintiff's first specification of recklessness is that the defendant operated his vehicle in such a manner as to violate General Statutes § 14-218a and § 14-222, which respectively proscribe operation at an unreasonable speed and reckless driving. Though both of these statutes establish duties of care, the violation of which may be relied upon as the basis for a recovery in negligence, see, e.g., Kostiuk v. Queally, 159 Conn. 91, 94-95 (1970), neither describes conduct which by its very nature poses the sort of especially great danger to others which by necessary implication constitutes reckless and wanton misconduct. The use of the word `recklessly,' moreover, adds nothing of substance to the bare legal conclusion that the listed conduct is actionable as reckless and wanton misconduct. Id. See also Dumond v. Denehy, supra at 91. Absent a more particularized description of the manner in which the defendant is alleged to have violated either statute, the unadorned claim that he did so does not support the claim that this defendant engaged in especially dangerous and risky conduct, knowingly or otherwise."
General Statutes § 14-218a provides, in relevant part: "(a) No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state, or road of any specially chartered municipal association or any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105 . . . or on any parking area as defined in section 14-212, or upon a private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with this subsection, or upon any school property, at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of highway, road or parking area, the intersection of streets and weather conditions. The State Traffic Commission may determine speed limits which are reasonable and safe on any state highway, bridge or parkway built or maintained by the state, and differing limits may be established for different types of vehicles, and may erect or cause to be erected signs indicating such speed limits. The traffic authority of any town, city or borough may establish speed limits on streets, highways and bridges or in any parking area for ten cars or more or on any private road wholly within the municipality under its jurisdiction . . . . Any speed in excess of such limits, other than speeding as provided for in section 14-219, shall be prima facie evidence that such speed is not reasonable, but the fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than such limits shall not relieve the operator from the duty to decrease speed when a special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.
"(b) The State Traffic Commission shall establish a speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour on any multiple lane, limited access highways that are suitable for a speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour, taking into consideration relevant factors including design, population of area and traffic flow.
"(c) Any person who operates a motor vehicle at a greater rate of speed than is reasonable, other than speeding, as provided for in section 14-219, shall commit the infraction of traveling unreasonably fast."
The court finds the reasoning of Foxworth v. Juliano, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 524237, persuasive. While there undoubtedly are circumstances in which the operation of a vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed would be reckless, those circumstances must be alleged. Dumond v. Denehy, supra, 145 Conn. 91. The plaintiff did not do so here, and for that reason the second count is stricken.
II
The defendants also argue that even if the court construes the second count to have specifically plead recklessness, the second count should be stricken as to Francesco Bonesse. They base this argument on their assertion that Francesco Bonesse cannot be held liable for double or treble damages under General Statutes § 14-295 because he was not operating the vehicle.
As noted above, General Statutes § 14-295 provides, in pertinent part, that "the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222 . . . and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
It is true that, in the second count, the plaintiff also alleges, inter alia, that Francesco Bonesse owned the vehicle that was, at the time of the accident, being operated by Camillo Bonesse "within the scope of proper permission and authority to operate same and/or as a family car. . . ." It is also true that, even without this specific allegation, the general allegation that Francesco Bonesse was the vehicle's owner and that Camillo Bonesse was the operator actuates the provisions of General Statutes § 52-183. Section 52-183 provides: "In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption." In several decisions, judges of the Superior Court have held that by impressing this statute onto General Statutes § 14-295, double or treble damages may be awarded against a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Yantorno, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 78474 (August 18, 1999, Sheedy, J.) ( 25 Conn.L.Rptr. 377); Prezioso v. Greater Bridgeport Transit Authority, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 337357 (December 24, 1997) ( 21 Conn.L.Rptr. 274). In those decisions, the judges usually cite to Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 472 A.2d 306 (1984), and also reason that unless General Statutes § 52-183 intended to authorize the imposition of enhanced damages against a non-operator owner, the word "reckless" in the statute would be superfluous.
I respectfully disagree. In Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., the court was interpreting the provisions of General Statutes § 14-154a, the lessor liability statute. General Statutes § 14-154a provided that "[a]ny person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner." (Emphasis added.) Under General Statutes § 14-154a, the language authorizing the imposition of enhanced damages against a non-operator owner is far more explicit than that used in General Statutes § 52-183. As the court said in Gionfriddo; "we have repeatedly stated our view of the purpose of the statute. [It] cannot be regarded otherwise than as an expression of legislative judgment as to the extent — beyond the limitations of the general principles of respondeat superior and the family-car doctrine — to which the owner of a motor vehicle which he entrusts to another should be liable for the acts of the latter. . . . We have consistently construed the statute as imposing on one who rents or leases a motor vehicle to another the same liability as that of its operator, provided the vehicle, at the time in question, is being operated by one in lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental. . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 192 Conn. 284-85. Indeed, as detailed by the court in footnote 3 of Gionfriddo, for over 200 years, when the legislature has sought to impose such liability and damages on a lessor or owner it has done so explicitly. Moreover, the court's observation in Gionfriddo that § 14-154a extended liability "beyond the limitations . . . of the family car doctrine" is telling, because General Statutes § 52-183 is legislation closely analogous to the family car doctrine, presently codified at General Statutes § 52-182. See Trichilo v. Trichilo, 190 Conn. 774, 779, 462 A.2d 1048 (1983); Kurimai v. Malinosky, 17 Conn. Sup. 72, 73 (1950).
"The legislative roots of both General Statutes §§ 14-154a and 14-295 can be found in a statute enacted in 1797 known as `An Act to Regulate Stage and Other Carriage Drivers.' The statute provided in § 2 for the imposition of treble damages for injuries caused by one in violation of certain rules of the road; and in § 4 made the owner of the vehicle liable if the driver could not pay. The statute before [the Supreme Court] in Levick v. Norton, 51 Conn. 461 (1884), was substantially the same as the original act. The statute was retained without substantive change until 1905 when the legislature amended § 4 to limit owners' liability (1) to `actual' damages; and (2) to situations in which the driver was proved to be the owner's agent or the owner was proved negligent in his entrustment of the vehicle to the driver. The 1905 act further required the injured person to elect to proceed either against the owner for actual damages or against the driver for treble damages. Public Acts 1905, Ch. 216, § 4. The restrictive 1905 act was then repealed in 1921; Public Acts 1921, Ch. 334, § 26; and replaced in 1925 with a statute providing, in language similar to 14-154a, that `[a]ny person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased.' Public Acts 1925, Ch. 195, § 21. In 1929, the legislature amended the statute by adding the final phrase, `to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner.' Public Acts 1929, Ch. 256. This language has been retained without change through repeated statutory revisions and is currently codified as § 14-154a." Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 192 Conn. 287 n. 3.
The other argument made by judges in cases holding that § 52-183 authorizes the imposition of enhanced damages against non-operator owners is that unless the statute intended to authorize such damages, the inclusion of the word "reckless" in the text of the statute would have been superfluous. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Yantorno, supra, 25 Conn.L.Rptr. 379; Prezioso v. Greater Bridgeport Transit Authority, supra, 21 Conn.L.Rptr. 276. This is simply not so. That a reckless operator of a motor vehicle is the owner's agent does not imply, or even suggest, that the owner is liable for enhanced damages. See Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 379-80, 42 A. 67 (1899). The word "reckless" may have been included to cover cases where a plaintiff sued an operator only for recklessness, and the historical circumstantial evidence indicates that this was its purpose.
In Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, supra, 71 Conn. 379-80, the court stated: "In Cleghorn v. New York, C.H.R.R. Co., 56 N.Y. 44, 47, Chief Justice Church, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: `For injuries by the negligence of a servant while engaged in the business of the master, within the scope of his employment, the latter is liable for compensatory damages; but for such negligence, however gross or culpable, he is not liable to be punished in punitive damages unless he is also chargeable with gross misconduct.'
"In the case of Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107 . . . the court, laid down the rule . . . that `guilty intention upon the part of the defendant is required in order to charge him with exemplary or punitive damages. . . . Exemplary or punitive damages, being awarded, not by way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way of punishment of the offender, and as a warning to others, can only be awarded against one who has participated in the offense. A principal, therefore, though of course liable to make compensation for injuries done by his agent within the scope of his employment, cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages, merely by reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent upon the part of the agent.'" Maisenbacker has not been overruled.
At the time the statutory predecessor to General Statutes § 52-183 was enacted in 1935, a plaintiff who was a guest in a vehicle had to prove that the vehicle was operated recklessly in order to impose even compensatory damages on the operator. At that time, General Statutes (Rev. 1930) § 1628, "the guest statute," was extant, having been enacted in 1927. See Public Acts 1927, ch. 308 § 1. Under that statute, it was "incumbent upon the plaintiff, if he was to recover, to prove that the defendant in the operation of the car was guilty of conduct which `evinced a reckless indifference to the danger of injury to others.' Sadinsky v. Coughlin, 114 Conn. 585, 589, 159 A. 492; Riordan v. Gouin, 119 Conn. 235, 238, 175 A. 686." Ferris v. Von Mannagetta, 124 Conn. 88, 89, 198 A. 167 (1938). "That being so, no recovery could be had in the action upon the ground of negligence." Smith v. Furness, 117 Conn. 97, 101, 166 A. 759 (1933). The guest statute "denie[d] to a certain class of passengers in an automobile a right to recover compensation from the owner or driver for injuries received by reason of the negligence of either in its operation. . . . The purpose of this legislation was to deny a recovery for negligence against one transporting in his automobile a member of his family, a social guest, or a casual invitee in an action brought by the recipient of his hospitality. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 104-05, 183 A. 379 (1936).
See 1935 Supplement to Connecticut General Statutes § 1661c.
General Statutes (Rev. 1930) § 1628 provided: "No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of an accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others."
The guest statute was on the books for ten years, from 1927 to 1937. During its brief tenure, some might say terror, an unusual number of cases, for that time, construing or applying that law reached the Supreme Court. It was in this statutory context and legal environment that the legislature enacted what is now General Statutes § 52-183. The court must assume that in enacting that statute the legislature acted with knowledge of the "Guest statute" and its judicial construction and acted with an intent to create one consistent body of laws. Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336, 347, 684 A.2d 1181 (1996); Stern v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 246 Conn. 170, 180, 717 A.2d 195 (1998). While there is no illuminating legislative history to the legislation, given its vintage; New England Savings Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp., 246 Conn. 594, 601-02, 717 A.2d 713 (1998) (advent of comprehensive published legislative history did not occur in Connecticut until 1953); the circumstantial evidence renders it far more likely that the word "reckless" in General Statutes § 52-183 was intended to conform with basic liability under the guest statute than that it was intended to sanction the imposition of double or treble damages against non-operator owners under what is now General Statutes § 14-295. This court holds that § 52-183 does not explicitly or impliedly authorize the imposition of double or treble damages on a non-operating owner of a motor vehicle under General Statutes § 14-295.
General Statutes (Rev. 1930) § 1628 was repealed in 1937 by Public Acts, ch. 270 (1937 Supplement to the General Statutes § 351d).
See Ferris v. Von Mannagetta, supra, 124 Conn. 88; Grillo v. Bonauito, 123 Conn. 226, 193 A. 730 (1937); Bowen v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 122 Conn. 621, 191 A. 530 (1937); Staplins v. Murphy, 121 Conn. 123, 183 A. 398 (1936); Audia v. De Angelis, 121 Conn. 336, 185 A. 78 (1936); Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., supra, 121 Conn. 102; Rogers v. Doody, 119 Conn. 532, 178 A. 51 (1935); Riordan v. Gouin, supra, 119 Conn. 235; Bree v. Lamb, 120 Conn. 1, 178 A. 919 (1935); Chaplowe v. Powsner, 119 Conn. 188, 175 A. 470 (1934); Bradley v. Clarke, 118 Conn. 641, 174 A. 72 (1934); Vanderkruik v. Mitchell, 118 Conn. 625, 173 A. 900 (1934); Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 A. 323 (1934); Lucas v. Hickox, 117 Conn. 513, 169 A. 191 (1933); Sigel v. Gordon, 117 Conn. 271, 167 A. 719 (1933); Latham v. Hankey, 117 Conn. 5, 166 A. 400 (1933); Russell v. Parlee, 115 Conn. 687, 163 A. 404 (1933); Gage v. Chapin Motors, Inc., 115 Conn. 546, 162 A. 17 (1932); Sadinsky v. Coughlin, supra, 114 Conn. 585; Leete v. Griswold Post No. 79, American Legion, 114 Conn. 400, 158 A. 919 (1932); Potz v. Williams, 113 Conn. 278, 155 A. 211 (1931); Pozniak v. Evtushek, 112 Conn. 675, 151 A. 526 (1930); Maher v. Fahy, 112 Conn. 76, 151 A. 318 (1930); Nemoitin v. Berger, 111 Conn. 88, 149 A. 233 (1930); Meyer v. Hart, 110 Conn. 244, 147 A. 678 (1929); Asher v. H.S. Friedman, Inc., 110 Conn. 1, 147 A. 263 (1929); Kruy v. Smith, 108 Conn. 628, 144 A. 304 (1929); Grant v. McLelland, 109 Conn. 517, 147 A. 138 (1929); Bordomaro v. Senk, CT Page 9111 109 Conn. 428, 147 A. 136 (1929); Romansky v. Cestaro, 109 Conn. 654, 145 A. 156 (1929); Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240, aff'd, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1928).
The motion to strike is granted.
BY THE COURT
Bruce L. Levin Judge of the Superior Court