Opinion
2018-04811 Ind. 2332/15
12-01-2021
The People, etc., respondent, v. Charles Jordan, appellant.
Joseph W. Murray, Great Neck, NY (Joseph Z. Amsel and Bruce Cutler of counsel), for appellant. Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill and Danielle S. Fenn of counsel), for respondent.
Argued - October 29, 2021
D67829 C/afa
Joseph W. Murray, Great Neck, NY (Joseph Z. Amsel and Bruce Cutler of counsel), for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill and Danielle S. Fenn of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P. VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON ANGELA G. IANNACCI LARA J. GENOVESI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Richard Buchter, J.), rendered March 20, 2018, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and leaving the scene of an incident without reporting, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not err with respect to a Sandoval application (People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371). Although a defendant is entitled to an advance ruling on whether, and to what extent, the People may cross-examine him or her about prior crimes or bad acts that bear on credibility, veracity, or honesty (see People v Hayes, 97 N.Y.2d 203, 207), here, the People indicated that they did not intend to cross-examine the defendant about any prior crimes or bad acts. Contrary to the defendant's suggestion, he was not entitled to an advance ruling on what testimony might nevertheless open the door to such questioning (see People v Osorio, 49 A.D.3d 562, 563; People v Pacheco, 280 A.D.2d 685, 685-686).
Contrary to the defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in its handling of a jury note, the record reflects that the defendant had sufficient notice of the contents of the note, that the parties discussed the court's response to the note, and that the court responded meaningfully to the note (see CPL 310.30; People v O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 276-277; People v Jacaruso, 189 A.D.3d 1263).
"[T]he defendant's challenge to the Supreme Court's refusal to charge criminally negligent homicide as a lesser-included offense of murder in the second degree is foreclosed by the jury's verdict finding him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, and its implicit rejection of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree which had been submitted to it" (People v McGeachy, 74 A.D.3d 989, 989; see People v McIntosh, 33 N.Y.3d 1064, 1065; People v Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 180).
The defendant's sentence was neither illegal (see Penal Law §§ 70.25, 125.20[1]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600[2]; People v Taveras, 12 N.Y.3d 21, 27; People v Chambers, 257 A.D.2d 418), nor excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
MASTRO, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, IANNACCI and GENOVESI, J.J., concur