Opinion
24-CV-01674 (MMG)
07-24-2024
TIFFANY MINOTT, Plaintiff, v. GOOGLE LLC, Defendant, v. MELISSA WASHINGTON and FRANCISCO MUNDACA, Movants.
OPINION & ORDER
MARGARET M. GARNETT, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is a dispute in which Plaintiff's former attorneys are seeking to assert a “charging lien” on this matter for attorneys' fees under New York state law. For the reasons that follow, The Washington Law Firm PLLC and The Spiggle Law Firm are both entitled to charging liens under New York Judiciary Law § 475.
The Washington Law Firm PLLC's motion to fix a charging lien is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $22,400. The Spiggle Law Firm has asserted its right under its retainer agreement with Plaintiff to arbitrate any fee disputes, and as such, The Spiggle Law Firm's motion for an order fixing the specific amount of the charging lien is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
FACTS
Plaintiff Tiffany Minott (“Plaintiff” or “Minott”) commenced this action against her former employer, Google LLC (“Defendant”), by filing a complaint on March 5, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1. Due to filing deficiencies, Plaintiff re-filed the complaint on March 7, 2024. See Complaint, Dkt. No. 5 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff asserted that Defendant had discriminated against her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. See id. ¶¶ 75-164. The Complaint was filed by one of Plaintiff's former attorneys, Francisco Mundaca of The Spiggle Law Firm (“TSLF”), who also signed the Complaint. See id.
Plaintiff had retained a different law firm, The Washington Law Firm PLLC (“WLF”), since December 1, 2022, to represent her with respect to her employment discrimination claims against Defendant; WLF had investigated Plaintiff's allegations, participated in pre-litigation discussions with Defendant, represented Plaintiff before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”)-including by drafting an EEOC Charge-and drafted a complaint on behalf of Plaintiff pleading a claim of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Ex A. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶¶ 2-8 (Declaration of Melissa Washington); Ex B. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-2 (Notice of Appearance by Washington in EEOC proceeding dated March 5, 2023); Ex C. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-3 (EEOC Charge of Discrimination dated January 9, 2023); Ex D. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-4 (communication from Washington to EEOC dated September 7, 2023); see also Dkt. No. 12 (“WLF's Mot.”) ¶¶ 1-4.
On December 14, 2023, WLF entered a co-counsel agreement with TSLF to represent Minott in litigation and share attorneys' fees; the firms added claims to and edited the complaint. Ex A. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶¶ 9-11; see also WLF's Mot. ¶¶ 5-6.
On March 29, 2024, an attorney from a different law firm, Arce Law Group, P.C., filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 10. Plaintiff terminated TSLF's representation “without cause” on March 25, 2024, see Dkt. No. 11 (“TSLF's Mot.”) ¶ 7, and she terminated WLF's representation “without cause” on April 4, 2024. See Ex. A. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶ 12; see also WLF's Mot. ¶ 9.
By separate letters dated April 8, 2024, TSLF and WLF each informed Plaintiff's new attorneys that they were asserting liens in the amount of $25,479.50 (for TSLF) and $35,045.00 (for WLF) for outstanding legal fees, and they likewise informed Defendant's counsel that they were asserting charging liens. See Ex. 1 to TSLF's Mot., Dkt. No. 11-1; Ex. 2 to TSLF's Mot., Dkt. No. 11-2; Ex. A to WLF's Mot., Dkt. No. 12-1; Ex. B to WLF's Mot., Dkt. No. 12-2.
On April 11, 2024, Mundaca filed a motion to withdraw as Plaintiff's attorney in this action. See TSLF's Mot. Mundaca also sought an order that a lien be placed on the matter pursuant to New York Judiciary Law § 475 (“§ 475”) in the amount of $25,479.50. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.
Subsequently, on April 16, 2024, Melissa Washington of WLF, who had not previously noticed an appearance on the docket, also filed a motion to assert a charging lien under § 475 in the amount of $35,045.00, in addition to the time WLF spent and would spend in pursuing a lien for attorneys' fees. WLF's Mot. at ¶¶ 12-13.
In its brief in support of the motion, WLF indicated that it had mistakenly requested a sum of $35,045.00 in its motion, but it should have asserted a sum of $35,245.00. See Dkt. No. 17 (“WLF's Mem.”) at 19 n.2.
The Court granted Mundaca's motion to withdraw as Plaintiff's attorney and ordered a briefing schedule with respect to Mundaca's and Washington's motions for a charging lien. See Dkt. No. 13. The motions are now fully briefed before the Court.
Several supporting documents, including timesheets and retainer agreements for legal services, were filed in camera, with the Court's permission, because they contain privileged and confidential information. The documents sent by WLF and TSLF were provided to Plaintiff's current counsel, and the documents sent by Plaintiff's current counsel were provided to WLF and TSLF; the documents were not provided to Defendant's counsel.
ENTITLEMENT TO CHARGING LIEN
I. Legal Standard
“A charging lien is an equitable interest in a client's cause of action.” Villar v. City of New York, 546 F.Supp.3d 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). “[§ 475] governs attorneys' charging liens in federal courts sitting in New York. Moreover, the Second Circuit has ‘long recognized that the lien created by section 475 . . . is enforceable in federal courts in accordance with its interpretation by New York courts.'” Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted) (quoting In re Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1991)). Federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over motions to fix charging liens under § 475. See id. at 445-48.
§ 475 provides:
From the commencement of an action . . . the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his or her client's cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, determination, decision, award, settlement, judgment or final order in his or her client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come; and the lien cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment, final order or determination. The court upon the petition of the client or attorney may determine and enforce the lien.§ 475.
“The prerequisites to the creation of a charging lien are well-settled; as a result of the attorney's efforts, (1) the client must assert a claim, (2) which can result in proceeds (3) payable to or for the benefit of the client.” DeCastro v. Kavadia, No. 12-cv-01386 (JMF), 2018 WL 4771528, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3. 2018) (quoting In re Schick, 215 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under New York law, a discharged attorney is “statutorily entitled to a charging lien on any monetary recoveries obtained by the former client in the proceedings in which the attorney had rendered legal services.” Ramgoolie v. Ramgoolie, No. 16-cv-03345 (VEC) (SN), 2020 WL 1989292, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2020). Thus, to establish a charging lien, “there must be asserted a claim which can eventuate in there being proceeds payable to, or assets recoverable by, the client as a result of the efforts of the attorney.” Stair v. Calhoun, 722 F.Supp.2d 258, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Rosewood Apartments Corp. v. Perpignano, No. 99-cv-04226 (NRB), 2005 WL 1084396, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Antonmarchi v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, 678 F.Supp.2d 235, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“A charging lien is a security interest in the favorable result of litigation, giving the attorney equitable ownership interest in the client's cause of action[.]” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Charging liens under § 475 are only available for the “attorney of record.” See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency, 140 F.3d at 450. This can be established, for instance, where the attorney participates on the client's behalf in a legal proceeding or has his or her name “affixed to the pleadings, motions, records, briefs, or other papers submitted in the matter.” Picciolo v. State, 732 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (2d Dep't 2001). Courts have also held that an attorney who appeared on behalf of a client before the EEOC but did not appear in a subsequent court litigation is entitled to a charging lien because the lien attaches to the plaintiff's “cause of action”-the claim for employment discrimination. See Sellick v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, No. 15-cv-09082 (RJS), 2017 WL 1133443, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017) (“[The plaintiff's] federal suit was of a logical sequence from the EEOC proceeding, since a Title VII plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC or with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice.” (internal marks and citations omitted)); see also Mason v. City of New York, No. 13-cv-07139 (PKC), 12-cv-05885 (PKC), 2016 WL 2766652, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2016) (because the charging lien attaches to the client's cause of action, where the attorney had represented the plaintiff in a different case arising from the same events, the attorney was entitled to a charging lien in the instant case because the action is in “logical sequence” with the other action, and both arose from the same events and alleged nearly identical claims).
Further, an attorney who was terminated by the client is entitled to a charging lien so long as the attorney was not discharged for good cause. See Pettiford v. City of Yonkers, No. 14-cv-06271 (JCM), 2020 WL 1331918, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020). The attorney does not need to be the counsel of record at the time the judgment or settlement fund is created in order to be entitled to a lien under § 475. See Klein v. Eubank, 87 N.Y.2d 459, 462 (1996).
II. Application
Plaintiff does not dispute that either WLF or TSLF are entitled to a charging lien; rather, Plaintiff only disputes the proper amount of the charging liens. See Dkt. No. 28 (“Pl.'s Opp.”) at 1. The Court finds that WLF and TSLF are entitled to charging liens.
First, Plaintiff has asserted employment discrimination claims that could result in proceeds payable to Plaintiff, either through a settlement offer or a judgment that includes a financial award. See Stair, 722 F.Supp.2d at 267.
Second, the former attorneys took action to represent Plaintiff on the very claims that could result in monetary recoveries for the Plaintiff, and they were not terminated for cause. Id. TSLF's attorney, Mundaca, appeared on behalf of and represented Minott in this action. See, e.g., Compl. (signed by Mundaca). TSLF asserted (and Plaintiff does not dispute) that TSLF was terminated by Plaintiff without cause. See TSLF's Mot. ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 15 (“TSLF's Mem.”) at 2. As such, TSLF is entitled to a charging lien under § 475. WLF appeared on behalf of and represented Minott in the underlying EEOC proceeding against Defendant and engaged in prelitigation communications with Defendant on behalf of Minott. See generally Ex A. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-1; Ex B. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-2; Ex D. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 174. WLF's work in representing Minott in the proceeding was in “logical sequence” with Minott's employment discrimination action presently before the Court, and WLF was also involved in preparing the Complaint in this action. See Ex. A. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶¶ 8-11. As such, although no attorneys from WLF appeared in this action on behalf of Minott or signed the Complaint or other filings on behalf of Minott, WLF is still entitled to a charging lien. See Sellick, 2017 WL 1133443, at *5. Furthermore, Minott terminated WLF “without cause,” a fact Plaintiff does not dispute. See Ex. A. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶ 12; see also WLF's Mot. ¶ 9. Thus, WLF is entitled to a charging lien under § 475.
LIEN AMOUNT
I. Legal Standard
Under § 475, “a discharged attorney may recover the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered, determined at the time of the discharge and computed on the basis of quantum meruit. The theory of quantum meruit, rather than the retainer agreement, is the basis for determining the amount at which to fix the charging lien. Although a court is not bound by the parties' retainer agreement, it may still use such agreement as guidance in determining the reasonable value of the services provided.” Stair, 722 F.Supp.2d at 268-69 (internal citations omitted); see also DeCastro, 2018 WL 4771528, at *3.
In determining the fee, courts should consider the rate a reasonable, paying client would pay and use that rate to calculate the “presumptively reasonable fee.” Stair, 722 F.Supp.2d at 269 (citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008)). Courts should consider the hourly rates typically employed in the district in which the reviewing court sits. See id. at 273.
Among other factors, courts should consider “the difficulty of the matter, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the time reasonably expended on those services, the quality of the performance by counsel, the qualifications of counsel, the amount at issue, and the results obtained (to the extent known).” Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 148 (2d Cir. 1998); see also DeCastro, 2018 WL 4771528, at *3.
Determining the reasonable value of an attorney's services is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Winkfield v. Kirschenbaum & Phillips, P.C., No. 12-cv-07424 (JMF), 2013 WL 371673, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2013). Hours that the court finds excessive, redundant, or vague are to be excluded, and courts have discretion to simply deduct a percentage of hours from the fee application. See Wang v. Shun Lee Palace Restaurant, Inc., No. 17-cv-00840 (VSB), 2022 WL 2712851, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2022).
II. The Spiggle Law Firm
TSLF is seeking a lien in the amount of $25,479.50. TSLF asserts that it entered into a co-counsel agreement with WLF on December 14, 2023, and a retainer agreement with Minott on December 19, 2023. See TSLF's Mem. at 1; Ex. 1 to TSLF's Mem. (retainer agreement submitted for in camera review). TSLF is seeking fees for the work performed by three attorneys, four paralegals, and two legal assistants. See Dkt. No. 31 (“TSLF's Reply”) at 10-11. The firm filed in camera with the Court a copy of its retainer agreement with Minott, as well as a copy of its time entries. Unlike WLF, TSLF did not include affidavits or declarations regarding the experience of its employees, although it did set forth additional information about the titles and experience of its employees in its reply brief. See TSLF's Reply at 10-11. TSLF also argued on reply that, in light of Plaintiff's concession on the right to a charging lien but objection regarding the requested amount, its retainer agreement with Plaintiff requires that such fee disputes be submitted to arbitration, and that Plaintiff should not be permitted to use this Court to abrogate that portion of the agreement. See id. at 2-4.
For the reasons explained above, TSLF, an attorney of record who was terminated by Plaintiff without cause, is entitled to a charging lien under § 475. See J.K.C. v. T.W.C., 966 N.Y.S.2d 812, 816 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (holding that a fee dispute subject to arbitration did not preclude enforcement of a charging lien) (citing Moody v. Sorokina, 856 N.Y.S.2d 755 (4th Dep't 2008)). However, Section 13 of TSLF's retainer agreement with Plaintiff provides that any fee dispute “shall be submitted to binding arbitration before the District of Columbia Bar's Attorney-Client Arbitration Board,” and TSLF has asserted its right to enforce that arbitration agreement as to the amount of any charging lien. See TSLF's Reply at 2-4; Ex. 1 to TSLF's Mem. ¶ 13 (retainer agreement between Minott and TSLF submitted for in camera review). Here, as explained above, Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that TSLF is entitled to a charging lien; rather, Plaintiff disputes the appropriate amount of the lien. Accordingly, although the Court grants TSLF's motion for a charging lien, the Court will not determine the precise amount of that lien. That portion of TSLF's motion is denied without prejudice, subject to either the parties' agreement on the proper amount of the lien or the determination of an arbitrator as provided in the retainer agreement. See, e.g., Petrosyan v. Directv Grp., Inc., No. 08-cv-01566 (NGG), 2009 WL 2045693, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2009) (request for determination of amount of charging lien denied without prejudice to resolution of fee issue through arbitration, as per retainer agreement); contra Emile v. Ethical Culture Fieldston School, No. 21-cv-03799 (JPO), 2024 WL 1216473, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2024) (retainer agreements provided for resolution of fee disputes through arbitration, but there was no fee dispute); see also J.K.C., 966 N.Y.S.2d at 81516, 825 (where the retainer agreement provided for arbitration in the event of a fee dispute, the court declined to award a charging lien for other reasons but awarded a retaining lien and noted that the amount of the lien was subject to arbitration); Gelwan v. Youni Gems Corp., No. 653656/13, 2014 WL 3924624, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 2014) (where the plaintiff and nominal defendant asserted claims against the defendants, inter alia, for an attorney's charging lien, and where the relevant retainer agreement allowed for arbitration of fee disputes, granting a motion to compel arbitration with respect to the charging lien), affirmed in part, 59 N.Y.S.3d 10, 11 (1st Dep't 2017) (“To the extent [the cause of action that] seeks a charging lien . . . addresses services covered by the retainer agreement, the arbitration clause in the retainer agreement must be enforced[.]”).
III. The Washington Law Firm
WLF is seeking a charging lien of a total of $42,150 for 94 hours, consisting of $35,245 for attorney and support work, as well as additional fees for the time spent asserting its lien. See WLF's Mem. at 19-20.
WLF asserts that it began representing Minott on December 1, 2022 (for a total of around 16 months) in connection with her employment discrimination claims against Defendant. Id. at 1-3, 20. The firm is seeking compensation for the work performed by three attorneys as well as an employee who serves as WLF's Director of Operations and Administration. Id. at 8.
WLF's retainer agreement with Minott, which was executed on December 1, 2022 and was in connection with pre-litigation discussions with Defendant and the EEOC proceeding (not litigation), provided that Minott would pay a specified contingency fee on any settlement or WLF's actual attorneys' fees, whichever was higher. See Ex. A. to Affidavit of Jesse Weinstein at 1 (retainer agreement between WLF and Minott submitted for in camera review). The agreement further provided that if Minott terminated the firm without good cause, WLF was entitled to payment at its regular hourly rates, which the agreement stated was $550. Id. at 2.
WLF submitted its timesheets to the Court in camera, and it attached to its brief various exhibits, including declarations by the three WLF attorneys who worked on Plaintiff's matter and a declaration by Marjorie Mesidor, an attorney outside of WLF who has experience as an employment law litigator and who asserted her belief that the rates charged by WLF in this matter are fair and reasonable. See generally Ex. A to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-1; Ex. E to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-5; Ex. F to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-6; Ex. G to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-7.
In Washington's declaration, she asserted that in preparing WLF's instant submissions before the Court, she omitted several time entries (amounting to “approximately 5-10 hours of time”) that she felt were duplicative or where tasks took longer than expected, and that she ensured the entries were accurate, including by cross-referencing them with emails and phone logs. See Ex. A. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶¶ 25-26.
A. Rates
i. Melissa Washington
Washington has more than 15 years of experience in plaintiff-side employment law; she was previously a partner at Outten & Golden, LLP, and she founded WLF in 2021. See Id. ¶¶ 13-14. She has been recognized professionally for her work, is a member of the National Employment Lawyers Association (among other associations), and has had speaking engagements at various employment law conferences. Id. ¶¶ 15-18. Washington's current rate is $650 an hour, and in her declaration, Washington stated that other clients pay WLF this rate for her work when the firm performs hourly work. Id. ¶ 1. WLF asserts that this rate should be used in calculating the lien. See id. ¶ 21; WLF's Mem. at 11.
As noted above, WLF's retainer agreement with Minott provided for an hourly rate of $550. See Ex. A. to Affidavit of Jesse Weinstein at 2. WLF acknowledges that the retainer agreement lists Washington's hourly rate as $550 but argues that the Court should use Washington's current rate, not its historic rate. See WLF's Mem. at 11-12. In opposing WLF's calculations, Plaintiff asserts that $650 an hour is not on par with attorneys who have similar experience to Washington and that a more appropriate rate is $300 an hour. See Pl.'s Opp. at 1516.
The Court begins with the rate provided in the retainer agreement, entered into just over 18 months ago, with the consent of both parties: $550 per hour. Considering Washington's 15 years of experience in employment law, her relative seniority, and prevailing market rates, while also keeping in mind the relatively straightforward nature of the case (involving an eight-page EEOC Charge, see Ex. C to WLF's Mem., and a 35-page, multi-count complaint, see Compl.), the Court finds that $550 an hour is reasonable for Washington's work. See, e.g., Torres v. City of New York, No. 18-cv-03644 (LGS) (KHP), 2020 WL 6561599, at *2, 5 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2020), report and recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 4883807 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2020) (in a “straightforward employment discrimination case,” a rate of $600 an hour (not the proposed $695) was reasonable for the lead lawyer, who had more than two decades of experience); see also Stair, 722 F.Supp.2d at 268-69 (courts may use a retainer agreement as guidance in determining the reasonable value of services provided).
ii. Ivey Best
Ivey Best is a 2020 law school graduate from Cumberland School of Law; she previously worked for other employment law firms, including Haynes & Haynes, P.C. in Birmingham, Alabama and TSLF, where she charged clients $400-$415 an hour. See Ex. E to WLF's Mem. (Declaration of Ivey Best), Dkt. No. 17-5 ¶¶ 1-4. She began working at WLF as an associate attorney in December 2023, and her current hourly rate is $450 an hour. See id. ¶ 5. WLF asserts that $450 is a reasonable rate for Best's work. See WLF's Mem. at 12-13. Plaintiff argues that $200 an hour is a more appropriate rate. See Pl.'s Opp. at 17.
In a matter before the Northern District of Alabama following a jury trial, that court awarded Best $225 an hour as a first-year associate at a different law firm in January 2022 (where Best's attorney billing rate was not challenged). See Miles v. Walmart Assocs., Inc., No. 19-cv-00756 (CLM), 2022 WL 275520, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2022). An increase in Best's rate since that time is warranted. See Wang, 2023 WL 5022758, at *2-3 (in connection with a wage and labor action, finding that, where the court had found two years prior that a reasonable rate for an associate with six years of experience was $455, a rate of $540 for that same associate (two years later) was appropriate in the pending case).
The Court finds that considering Best's four years of experience as an employment law attorney, her limited role in this case (consisting primarily of work in asserting the instant charging lien, as described below), the rate Best has charged to other paying clients, and prevailing market rates, a rate of $350 an hour is reasonable.
Plaintiff points to cases where, in one, the court found that $250 to $275 an hour was reasonable for an associate with two to four years of experience, and in another, the court noted that a rate between $150 and $275 was usual for a junior associate at a law firm specializing in civil rights. See Pl.'s Opp. at 17 (citing Angulo v. 36th Street Hosp. LLC, No. 19-cv-05075 (GBD) (SLC), 2020 WL 4938188, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4936961 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2020); DeCastro v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-03850 (RA), 2017 WL 4386372, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2017)). Given the time that has elapsed between those opinions and now, $350 an hour is a reasonable rate.
iii. Katlyn Palmatier
Katlyn Palmatier is an attorney who graduated from Cardozo Law School in 2023. See Ex. F to WLF's Mem. (Declaration of Katlyn Palmatier), Dkt. No. 17-6 ¶¶ 1, 3. She joined WLF as a law clerk in May 2023, and then as an associate attorney after she was admitted to practice. See id. ¶ 6. WLF asserts that $350 is a reasonable rate for Palmatier's work. See WLF's Mem. at 13-14. Plaintiff argues that Palmatier was admitted to the New York Bar on December 11, 2023, and that all of the work Palmatier performed (except the work performed with respect to the motion for a charging lien now before the Court) was performed before she was admitted to practice. See Pl.'s Opp. at 17-18. Plaintiff asserts that Palmatier should be awarded an hourly rate of $100, “on par with her limited employment law experience.” Id. at 18.
The Court confirmed this by reviewing Palmatier's bar admission record.
Upon reviewing Palmatier's timesheets, Plaintiff is incorrect that all of the work performed by Palmatier except work related to asserting the charging lien was performed before she was admitted to practice. The timesheets show that Palmatier performed work related to this case after she was admitted to practice, unrelated to the charging lien.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff, however, that $350 an hour is unreasonable for work Palmatier performed while she was a law clerk, before she was admitted to practice on December 11, 2023. The Court finds that a rate of $150 an hour is reasonable for work performed by Palmatier when she was a law clerk. See, e.g., Torres, 2020 WL 6561599, at *5 (in an opinion from four years prior, finding $100 to be reasonable for law clerks); Williams v. Epic Sec. Corp., 368 F.Supp.3d 651, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that $150 an hour is consistent with the hourly rate for law clerks in the Southern District) (collecting cases).
As for Palmatier's work following her admission to practice, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that this work should be billed at the rate of a law clerk and finds that $250 an hour is reasonable for a new attorney. See Torres, 2020 WL 6561599, at *5 (awarding $250 an hour for junior associates); Kastrati v. M.E.G. Rest. Enters., Ltd., No. 21-cv-00481 (KHP), 2023 WL 180043, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2023) (in an employment discrimination case, finding $300 reasonable for a junior associate who graduated from law school in 2020 and worked on the matter from December 2020 to February 2021).
iv. Jennifer Davis
Jennifer Davis joined WLF in 2022 as the Director of Operations and Administration; she performs case management and administrative tasks, among other tasks. Ex. A to WLF's Mem. ¶ 22. WLF asserts that $150 an hour is a fair rate for Davis's work. See WLF's Mem. at 14-15. Defendant argues that a rate of $100 is more appropriate. Pl.'s Opp. at 28.
Courts in this District have found that $150 to $200 is reasonable for paralegal work. See 1979 Family Trust Licensor, LLC v. Darji, No. 19-cv-04389 (VEC), 2020 WL 9596279, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020) (collecting cases). Considering prevailing market rates and the work performed in this case, the Court finds that a rate of $150 is reasonable.
B. Hours Billed
As explained above, both WLF and TSLF sent timesheets for their work to the Court in camera. Plaintiff made a slew of arguments challenging the reasonableness of the hours billed.
i. Miscounting of Hours Billed
At the outset, WLF overcounted the hours billed and thus miscalculated its fees. WLF stated in its memorandum that Washington billed 27.7 hours and that Best billed 16.2 hours on this matter. However, the Court reviewed the timesheets submitted by WLF in camera and calculated the hours billed by each attorney by adding each time entry. The Court subtracted two time entries by Palmatier (for .4 hours) and Best (for .1 hours) from April 1, 2024, and April 16, 2024, respectively, that included a parenthetical indicating “No charge.”
Based on the Court's review, Washington actually billed 26.1 hours (not 27.7 hours), and Best billed 15.9 hours (not 16.2 hours). WLF correctly asserted that Palmatier billed 46.7 hours and Davis billed 3.4 hours. See WLF's Mem. at 20.
ii. Time Billed for Asserting Charging Lien
Among Plaintiff's many arguments, Plaintiff argues that any time spent by the firms in attempting to recover fees for their motions to withdraw and assert a lien should be excluded. Pl.'s Opp. at 12. WLF did not dispute this argument in its reply, but it had argued in its brief in support of its motion that “[c]ourts in New York have included ‘fees on fees' in charging liens, particularly when the client agreed to such terms in the retainer agreement.” WLF's Mem. at 19 (citing Valentini v. 326 E. 30th St. Owners, Inc., 173 N.Y.S.3d 479 (Sup. Ct. 2022)). But unlike in the case cited by WLF, see Valentini, 173 N.Y.S.3d at 479, its retainer agreement with Minott does not provide (and WLF cannot point to) language allowing for such “fees on fees.”
Indeed, time spent on a motion to assert a charging lien was not in furtherance of obtaining a favorable judgment on Plaintiff's behalf, and thus it is not properly the subject of the charging lien. See Stair, 722 F.Supp.2d at 271 (collecting cases); Wang, 2022 WL 2712851, at *4; Pettiford, 2020 WL 1331918, at *7. The Court will therefore not count the hours billed after April 4, 2024 (when Plaintiff terminated WLF) that are related to WLF's motion presently before the Court.
Upon reviewing the timesheets, the Court eliminates the following hours billed that were spent asserting a charging lien: .7 hours billed by Washington between April 5, 2024 and April 16, 2024; 13.6 hours billed by Best between April 10, 2024 and April 23, 2024; and 1.2 hours billed by Davis between April 5, 2024 and April 11, 2024. (Palmatier did not bill after April 4, 2024.)
As such, the Court considers 25.4 hours billed by Washington; 2.3 hours billed by Best; 46.7 hours billed by Palmatier; and 2.2 hours billed by Davis.
iii. Other Arguments
Plaintiff also made a number of other arguments, including that the hours were excessive and duplicative (including as between WLF and TSLF), that the case was overstaffed, and that excessive hours were billed by more junior members of the team. See Pl.'s Opp. at 9-10.
Having reviewed the time entries submitted by WLF, the Court finds that the hours billed are reasonable. The time entries did not include duplicative work. Indeed, Washington represented in her affirmation that she reviewed the time entries for accuracy and discounted five to ten hours that she felt were duplicative or took more time than needed. See Ex. A. to WLF's Mem., Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶¶ 25-26.
Additionally, having also reviewed time entries submitted by both firms, the Court does not find duplicative billing as a result of the co-counsel arrangement between TSLF and WLF. WLF alone represented Plaintiff with respect to her Complaint before the EEOC, and TSLF did not begin its representation until December 2023. While this Court does not remark on the reasonableness of TSLF's time entries (as that will be determined by the arbitrator if the parties cannot agree), it notes that the work conducted by both firms does not appear duplicative. Nor is the Court persuaded by Plaintiff's argument that WLF engaged in duplicative correspondence with Plaintiff. See Pl.'s Opp. at 10. Plaintiff cited an instance in which Palmatier, Davis, and Washington billed for correspondence with Plaintiff regarding the same topic; each individual only billed .2 hours, and Washington's communication occurred on a separate day. The Court does not find the entries duplicative.
The bulk of the time was billed by Palmatier, a more junior attorney with a lower billing rate, who spent time, inter alia, representing Minott before the EEOC and drafting the complaint. Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, it is appropriate, commonplace, and typically in the client's interest for work to be delegated to more junior attorneys, who perform tasks under the overall supervision of senior attorneys. See Torres, 2020 WL 6561599, at *7 (“[W]ork should be delegated to the most junior person able to perform the task under overall supervision by the lead attorney on the case.”).
Moreover, the matter was not overstaffed. The Court finds that in a matter that spanned around 16 months, work by three attorneys and an employee performing administrative work is reasonable. Not every employee worked actively on the litigation throughout this time; for instance, Washington billed since the time WLF's representation commenced in December 2022. Palmatier began billing on this matter in August 2023. Best did not begin billing until December 2023, and the bulk of her work was spent in connection with asserting a charging lien, which the Court has discounted. Thus, WLF's work on this matter was primarily done by two attorneys (Washington and Palmatier), and indeed, the bulk of the work was performed by Palmatier, a junior attorney. The Court finds the staffing on this matter reasonable.
Plaintiff's conclusory argument that because Palmatier is a junior attorney, her hours are inflated and include time for “learning experiences” is unpersuasive. See Pl.'s Opp. at 10. Junior attorneys may take more time to perform tasks than experienced counsel, but this does not mean that their time entries are inflated; indeed, the longer time they may take to perform tasks is reflected in their lower hourly rates. See Ng v. King Henry Realty, Inc., No. 16-cv-00013 (PAE) (JCF), 2016 WL 6084074, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016) (new attorneys take longer to perform some tasks, as is accounted for in their billing rates, and a review of the new attorneys' records showed no excessive time training or learning relevant areas of law). Nothing suggests that Palmatier's time entries are inflated, and she has not billed time for training. The Court declines to reduce the hours Palmatier billed.
Plaintiff also argues that time entries for internal discussions and correspondence or for communications with co-counsel should be excluded altogether. Pl.s' Opp. at 10. The Court declines to do so. Some internal communications are necessary in representing a client, and the Court finds that the time WLF spent on internal communication is limited and entirely reasonable, considering that WLF represented Minott for around a year and a half. See Ryu v. Hope Bancorp, Inc., No. 18-cv-01236 (JSR) (KHP), 2020 WL 9886310, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020) (declining to reduce 3.2 hours of internal communications), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 6287487 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2020).
Plaintiff further argues that fees should be reduced because WLF engaged in block billing and submitted vague time entries. Specifically, Plaintiff points to entries by Palmatier and Washington that Plaintiff argues were too vague and included block billing. Pl.'s Opp. at 11. The time entries are not vague. After careful in camera review, the Court finds that the descriptions are sufficiently detailed. Specifically, Plaintiff points to five entries by Palmatier that Plaintiff argues fail to detail the specific legal issues Palmatier was researching, as well as five entries by Washington that Plaintiff argues fail to detail “the nature or purpose of the correspondence” in which Washington was engaged. See Pl.'s Opp. at 11-12. But Plaintiff quoted only part of Palmatier's entries in arguing that the descriptions are vague; a review of the time entries themselves provides more detail regarding her work. Additionally, while Plaintiff is correct that five of Washington's entries that Plaintiff flagged (which related to correspondence conducted by Washington) lack detail, those entries are for short amounts of time (between .3 and .5 hours) and include sufficient minimal detail for the Court to ascertain the reasonableness of the entries.
With respect to Plaintiff's argument that WLF engaged in improper block billing, the Court notes that there is no rule against block billing; rather, counsel must provide enough information and specificity for the Court to assess the reasonableness of the hours billed. See DeCastro, 2017 WL 4386372, at *9. WLF's time entries contain very little block billing; Plaintiff flags two entries by Palmatier (for 5.9 hours and 2.3 hours) that Plaintiff argues contain block billing. See Pl.'s Opp. at 11; see also Ex. L to the Affidavit of Jesse S. Weinstein at 3-4 (timesheets filed in camera). But the descriptions list multiple small tasks performed as part of one overall task, and they are specific enough that the Court is able to understand the entries and determine the reasonableness of the hours billed. See Wise v. Kelly, 620 F.Supp.2d 435, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (adopting report and recommendation in which the Court declined to reduce time entries that identified tasks conducted related to a single, general task, such as filing or preparing a brief).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Court should not award a fee for Davis for any “purely clerical tasks,” but failed to identify any tasks that Plaintiff believes are purely clerical. See Pl.'s Opp. at 18. The Court has reviewed the time entries and declines to further reduce Davis's hours billed.
C. Summary of Charging Lien
Applying the rates and reductions outlined above, the Court awards WLF a charging lien in the total amount of $22,400, as follows:
Timekeeper
Rate
Hours
Total
Melissa Washington
$550.00
25.4
$13,970.00
Ivey Best
$350.00
2.3
$805.00
Katlyn Palmatier (Before Admission)
$150.00
43.8
$6,570.00
Katlyn Palmatier (After Admission)
$250.00
2.9
$725.00
Jennifer Davis
$150.00
2.2
$330.00
Overall, a lien of $22,400 for approximately 16 months of work by WLF in connection with this matter is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, the Court GRANTS IN PART WLF's motion to assert a charging lien under § 475, in the amount of $22,400. The Court GRANTS TSLF's motion to assert a charging lien under § 475 against this action, in an amount to be determined by arbitration; as such, the portion of TSLF's motion seeking an order fixing the precise amount of the charging lien is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Dkt. Nos. 12 and 39.
SO ORDERED.