Summary
holding father's testimony that family could provide for child "if need be" was insufficient to meet father's burden because father did not present any evidence of an agreement with another to provide care for child on father's behalf
Summary of this case from In re T.J.I.L.Opinion
01-22-00106-CV
12-20-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF H.A., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 308th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2020-05703
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Countiss and Rivas-Molloy.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Julie Countiss Justice
In this accelerated appeal, appellant, father, challenges the trial court's order, entered after a bench trial, terminating his parental rights to his minor child, H.A.,in the private termination suit of appellees, mother and stepfather (collectively, "appellees"). In his sole issue, father contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that he knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and an inability to care for H.A. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of appellees' petition and termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of H.A.
See Tex. R. App. P. 28.4.
At the time the trial court entered its order terminating father's parental rights, H.A. was about five-and-a-half years old.
See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
We affirm.
Background
In their petition for termination and adoption, filed on January 28, 2020, appellees alleged that they were married. Mother was the biological mother of H.A., stepfather was the stepfather of H.A., and father was the biological father of H.A. According to appellees, termination of father's parental rights to H.A. was warranted because father voluntarily left H.A. alone or in the possession of another without providing adequate support for H.A. and remained away for a period of at least six months, father had failed to support H.A. in accordance with his ability during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of appellees' petition, father knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and an inability to care for H.A. for not less than two years from the date appellees' petition was filed, and termination of father's parental rights was in H.A.'s best interest. Appellees also alleged that it would be in H.A.'s best interest for stepfather to adopt H.A. Appellees requested that the trial court terminate father's parental rights to H.A. and permit stepfather to adopt H.A.
Father answered, generally denying the allegations in appellees' petition.
At trial, mother testified that she was H.A.'s biological mother and father was H.A.'s biological father. H.A. was almost five-and-a-half years old, and father had not seen her since she was one-and-a-half years old. In other words, father had not seen H.A. in about four years. Father had not been present in H.A.'s life. H.A. did not "have any idea who" father was. According to mother, father "vanished" when H.A. was about one-and-a-half years old and she did not know where father went. Father did not reach out to her at all. By father "not being present," he had abandoned H.A. Father was "never in [H.A.'s] life."
Mother also testified that father had never paid any child support for H.A. and had never provided financial support for H.A. Father did not provide H.A. with food or clothing. After H.A. was born, mother lived with her parents, and mother's parents helped her care for H.A. H.A. did not know father as her "[d]addy" even at that time. Father "would come around whenever he wanted to," but "[i]t was never consistent." Mother and H.A. never lived with father, and father never provided mother or H.A. with a place to live. Further, father never had an "actual residence"; instead, he would "hop[] from house to house to house." Mother noted that father's sisters had reached out to her in the past, but only around Christmastime, and they had never contacted her about H.A.'s birthdays. Mother had not facilitated any visits between father's side of the family and H.A.
Mother testified that at the time of trial, father was incarcerated "for drugs." Father had received a sentence of confinement for ten years related to his "drug charge." While incarcerated, father had not reached out to mother to speak to H.A. He had not sent cards or letters or made telephone calls. Father had done "[a]bsolutely nothing."
Mother stated that she did not believe that it was in H.A.'s best interest for father to be part of H.A.'s life, and it would not be in H.A.'s best interest to be around father because father had "be[en] charged with drugs" and it was "his second offense, his second felony [offense]." Mother noted that previously, after H.A. was born and before mother and father had ended their relationship, father was found to have narcotics in his car, which was the same car that he would use to pick up mother and H.A. Mother was concerned about H.A.'s safety if she was to be around father. Mother did not think it was in H.A.'s best interest to be reintroduced to father- "someone that had possession of drugs," "with two drug felonies"-and she did not want father around H.A. Mother and father ended their relationship after father "got popped with [his] first [narcotics] charge."
As to stepfather, mother testified that H.A. knew stepfather as "Daddy." If H.A. was to be asked, "Who is your Daddy?," she would identify stepfather. (Internal quotations omitted.) Stepfather had been in H.A.'s life since she was one-and-a-half years old. Stepfather was the only provider that H.A. had ever known. Mother requested termination of father's parental rights to H.A.
Stepfather testified that he had been married to mother for three years, and he and mother had been in a relationship for four years. Stepfather had been supporting H.A. for the past four years, and he planned to continue supporting H.A. Stepfather viewed H.A. as his daughter and that would never change. Stepfather recalled that at the beginning of his relationship with mother, during a storm, H.A. needed medicine and stepfather got it for her. According to stepfather, father had never paid child support for H.A. Father had not seen H.A. in four years.
Stepfather also stated that H.A. had brothers and sisters and had a family with mother and stepfather. Stepfather had one biological child from a previous relationship, and he and mother had two biological children together. Stepfather believed that a good father has a good relationship with his child and does what is best for his child "at all cost[s]."
Stepfather further testified that he was a vice president and part owner of an oil and gas company. He received a yearly salary. He and mother had a house with four bedrooms and two bathrooms.
When asked about his criminal history, stepfather stated that "a DWI" in 2017 was dismissed and he was "not guilty." And when asked if he had been previously "arrested for [the offense of] assault for bodily injury to a family member," stepfather stated that "[i]t was dismissed as well." Stepfather noted that he had been honorably discharged from the military, and the two criminal charges against him that had been mentioned at trial had been dismissed. He was "not guilty" of those criminal offenses. Stepfather had never been convicted of a criminal offense.
Father testified that he was H.A.'s biological father, and at the time of trial, he was incarcerated in a correctional facility in north Texas. In August 2019, he was sentenced to confinement for ten years for the criminal offense of possession of a controlled substance. He was scheduled for release in 2029, but he stated that he was eligible for parole every year. According to father, he might be released on parole in February 2022. Father noted that he had previously received "[f]ive years deferred probation for another possession of controlled substance" criminal offense, and he was "on probation" for that offense when he received the second charge for the criminal offense of possession of a controlled substance for which he was currently incarcerated.
Father stated that he last saw H.A. in 2018. Father had not provided H.A. with any support in the last three years because he had been incarcerated. Father had not tried to reach out to mother while he had been incarcerated. Father's family had not supported H.A. while father was incarcerated. Father had not set up child support payments for H.A.
Father stated that before he was incarcerated, he "placed" H.A. in a daycare where his aunt worked, and he paid for H.A.'s daycare. He had also purchased clothing and milk for H.A. He and mother "were going to purchase a mobile home together," but then he was charged with his first criminal offense for possession of a controlled substance. Before he was incarcerated for the first criminal offense, father saw H.A. "[e]very week."
After he was released from confinement, father intended to "get back into" H.A.'s life and to make child support payments. Father requested that the trial court not terminate his parental rights to H.A.
At trial, the trial court took judicial notice of a May 8, 2020 adoption evaluation. The adoption evaluation stated that mother had been H.A.'s primary caretaker since H.A.'s birth. H.A. was cared for in her home by mother and stepfather. Stepfather provided health insurance for H.A. through his employer. The adoption evaluation noted that H.A. stood near stepfather during a portion of the group interview for the evaluation and stayed close beside stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship during the interview. H.A. was in good health and current on her immunizations. She appeared well cared for by mother and stepfather. H.A. reported that she liked to play in her room and spend time with her grandmother, and she stated that stepfather taught her about sports.
According to the adoption evaluation, H.A. lived in a home with mother and stepfather, with stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship and mother and father's first biological child. At the time of the evaluation, the family had lived in the home for two years. The home had four bedrooms, two-and-a-half bathrooms, a kitchen, a living room, a dining room, a garage, and a fully-fenced backyard. Each child had their own bedroom. The home was comfortably furnished, clean, and organized. There were no pets or firearms reported to be in the home. The pantry and refrigerator contained ample food, and there were working smoke detectors in the home. The children's bedrooms contained appropriate toys and were colorful and well organized.
As to stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship, who was eight years old at the time of the evaluation, the adoption evaluation noted that he reported that he was a good student. He "t[ook] his role as the big brother seriously and help[ed]" mother with his younger siblings. Stepfather's biological son had chores to do in the home, like taking out the trash. He reported that stepfather would "give[] him three chances when he misbehave[d] and the[n] w[ould] escalate to a time out if needed to or take away a toy." He stated that stepfather taught him "how to listen, feel calmer, [and] take deep breath[s] and try again if [he] g[ot] angry." (Internal quotations omitted.) Mother taught him "[h]ow to stay patient." (Internal quotations omitted.) The adoption evaluation noted that mother and father's first biological daughter, who was one year old at the time of the evaluation, appeared healthy, happy, and well cared for by mother and stepfather.
Mother was pregnant with her and stepfather's second biological child at the time of the adoption evaluation.
As to mother, the adoption evaluation stated that mother and father began a relationship in 2013. H.A. was born during their relationship in August 2016, and mother and father's relationship ended in 2017. Mother and stepfather began their relationship in December 2017, and they were married in September 2018. Mother and stepfather's first biological daughter was born in April 2019. Stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship lived in the home with mother, stepfather, and H.A., and H.A. was "deeply attached to him." H.A. was also attached to mother and stepfather's first biological daughter.
According to mother, H.A. had only known stepfather as her father, and she "naturally relate[d] to him as her father." To discipline the children, mother stated that mother and stepfather "talk[ed] to the children."
Mother reported that father had never helped financially with H.A. and "was in and out of prison with two drug convictions." Mother and stepfather reached out to father to "encourag[e] him to interact with [H.A.] prior to his second incarceration," and father responded that "a 10-year stint ain't shit" and H.A. would "be o.k. with [him] not seeing her." (Internal quotations omitted.)
Mother described stepfather as hard working and smart and stated that they had a "good marriage." Stepfather had financially provided for H.A. since mother and H.A. began living with him in 2018. Mother and stepfather had lived in their home for two years at the time of the evaluation and were in the process of purchasing it.
As to father, the adoption evaluation stated that father had not provided anything for H.A., and he had not seen H.A. in person since March 2018. Father did not have regular employment. Father was "reported to be in good health with the exception of drug use."
As to stepfather, the adoption evaluation remarked that his biological son from a previous relationship was born in 2012. Stepfather had served in the military from 2009 to 2015 and received an honorable discharge. Stepfather was employed as a vice president at a company. There did not appear to be gaps in stepfather's employment history.
The adoption evaluation also stated that stepfather reported that he was "shaped by [his] dad not being around" and he "let [his] children know [that he] always loves them." (Internal quotations omitted.) He tried to teach them "right from wrong and how to be a good person." (Internal quotations omitted.) Stepfather was "active with" H.A., and he took her and her siblings to the park. Their family "enjoy[ed] barbecues, birthday parties, trips to Kemah and Sea World[,] and taking road trips together." Stepfather stated that he had "always t[aken] care of" H.A. and nothing would change with adoption other than H.A.'s surname. (Internal quotations omitted.) Stepfather noted that H.A. was closely bonded with stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship.
As to mother, stepfather stated that he and mother were "a team." (Internal quotations omitted.) He and mother occasionally went out together without the children, and H.A.'s maternal grandmother would babysit for the children, but usually "they d[id] family things with all the children included."
As to father, stepfather recalled reaching out to father to "facilitate a meeting between [him] and [H.A.] at [a] Chuck[] [E.] Cheese [restaurant]," but father declined and "had no interest in seeing" H.A.
As to his criminal history, stepfather reported that "the assault charge [from] 2011" was dismissed. And he was not required to attend anger management classes at the time, but he chose to do so. Related to "the DWI from 2017," stepfather stated that "he refused to take the breathalyzer when driving home from a party because he knew he had been drinking," but the trial court "saw no probable cause." (Internal quotations omitted.) Stepfather chose to take "[a] driving class and an alcohol class" "on his own" because "being in the military t[aught] [him] to address things on [his] own." (Internal quotations omitted.) As to stepfather's criminal history, the adoption evaluation noted a charge for the criminal offense of driving while intoxicated from December 2017 that was dismissed and a charge for the criminal offense of "[a]ssault to cause bodily injury to a family member" from 2011 that was dismissed.
In the final remarks, the adoption evaluation stated that stepfather had known and helped care for H.A. since she was fifteen months old. Father was often incarcerated and never appeared to have interest in H.A. Father last saw H.A. in March 2018 and had never provided financially for her.
At the time of the evaluation, mother and stepfather had a one-year-old biological child and were expecting another biological child in a few months. Stepfather and H.A. were bonded and wanted to formalize their bond through adoption and a change of H.A.'s surname. H.A. displayed a close attachment to stepfather and to stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship, and stepfather appeared "suitable and capable." Should the trial court terminate father's parental rights to H.A., adoption would be in H.A.'s best interest and was recommended by the adoption evaluation.
Standard of Review
A parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody, and management" of his child is a constitutional interest "far more precious than any property right." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "the interest of [a] parent[] in the care, custody, and control of [his] child[] . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] Court." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court has concluded that "[t]his natural parental right" is "essential," "a basic civil right of man," and "far more precious than property rights." Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (internal quotations omitted). Consequently, "[w]e strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent." In re E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012).
Because termination of parental rights is "complete, final, irrevocable and divests for all time that natural right . . ., the evidence in support of termination must be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent's rights." Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. Clear and convincing evidence is "the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Because the standard of proof is "clear and convincing evidence," the Texas Supreme Court has held that the traditional legal and factual standards of review are inadequate. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264-68.
In conducting a legal-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights case, we must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, is such that the fact finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the matter on which the parties moving for termination bore the burden of proof. Id. at 266. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we "must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so," and we "should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible." In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). But this does not mean the Court must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Because of the heightened standard, we must also be mindful of any undisputed evidence contrary to the finding and consider that evidence in our analysis. Id. If we determine that no reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, we must hold the evidence to be legally insufficient and render judgment in favor of the parent whose rights were sought to be terminated. Id.
In conducting a factual-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights case, we must determine whether, considering the entire record, including evidence both supporting and contradicting the finding, a fact finder reasonably could have formed a firm conviction or belief about the truth of the matter on which the parties moving for termination bore the burden of proof. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002). We should consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
Sufficiency of Evidence
In his sole issue, father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights to H.A. because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that he knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and an inability to care for H.A. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of appellees' petition and termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of H.A. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q), (b)(2).
In order to terminate the parent-child relationship between father and H.A., mother and stepfather, as the parties moving for termination, must have established, by clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated in Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of H.A. See id. § 161.001(b); Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987) (both elements must be established). "Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest." In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).
A. Criminal Conviction and Confinement Without Provision of Care for H.A.
In a portion of his sole issue, father argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and an inability to care for H.A. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of appellees' petition because the record "only reflects repeated mentions of a charge and [a] conviction of a criminal offense," "there was no [court] order for support for" H.A., and there was "conflicting testimony about what support [father] had provided prior to his incarceration." See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q).
Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination of parental rights on clear and convincing evidence that a parent "knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in the parent's: (i) conviction of an offense; and (ii) confinement or imprisonment and [an] inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date of [the] filing [of] the petition." Id.
Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) "fills a gap" in the bases for termination by allowing a prospective analysis of the anticipated care of a child while a parent is incarcerated and an opportunity for intervention to avoid neglect of a child during a prolonged incarceration. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 360; see also In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 118 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); In re D.J.H., 381 S.W.3d 606, 612 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, no pet.). The provision exists not to mete out additional punishment on parents for their criminal conduct, but to "ensure that [a] child will not be neglected" while her parent is away in prison. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 360; see also In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 118; In re A.R., 497 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015, no pet.). Thus, if a parent is convicted and sentenced to serve at least two years' confinement and will be unable to provide for his child during that time, Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) allows for the termination of parental rights to ensure that the child will not be neglected. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 360; see also In re A.R., 497 S.W.3d at 503. The primary focus of section 161.001(b)(1)(Q)-like section 161.001 generally-is the protection of the child's best interest. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 360; see also In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 118.
The requirement of clear and convincing evidence of an "inability to care for the child" is not met on the mere showing of prolonged incarceration. In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 118; see also In re D.J.H., 381 S.W.3d at 611 n.3. "Otherwise, the termination of parental rights could become an additional punishment automatically imposed along with imprisonment for almost any crime." In re E.S.S., 131 S.W.3d 632, 639 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); see also In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 118. Therefore, evidence of a two-year incarceration is only the first of a three-step analysis. See In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 118.
In the first step, the parties moving for termination must produce evidence of criminal conduct by the incarcerated parent that results in confinement for two or more years. Id. at 119. The burden of production then shifts to the incarcerated parent. Id.
In the second step, the incarcerated parent must produce some evidence of how he would provide care for the child during the period of confinement or that the incarcerated parent has arranged with another person for that person to provide care for the child during the period of confinement. Id.
If the incarcerated parent seeks to meet the burden of production with evidence that another person will care for the child during the period of confinement, the incarcerated parent must prove the proposed caregiver's agreement to provide the care. Id.; see also In re E.S.S., 131 S.W.3d at 640 ("[Incarcerated parent] met his burden of production regarding how he would arrange for the care of [child] in that the agreement reached by the parties included naming [parent's] mother and brother possessory conservators with visitation rights.").
The Texas Supreme Court has held that an incarcerated parent relying on another's provision of care to avoid termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) must demonstrate that the care is being provided on behalf of the parent, not out of an existing duty or inclination to care for the child. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 110-11; see also In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 119; In re D.L.A., No. 04-18-00182-CV, 2018 WL 4412506, at *9 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Sept. 18, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("The care must be offered by a person who agrees to assume the incarcerated parent's obligation to care for the child during the incarceration." (internal quotations omitted)); cf. In re I.G., No. 13-18-00114-CV, 2018 WL 3062581, at *4 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding grandparents' care as part of "working relationship" with incarcerated parent met parent's burden to produce "some evidence as to how he would arrange to provide care for the children during his incarceration").
An incarcerated parent cannot meet his burden merely by producing evidence that there is a non-incarcerated parent or grandparent who is willing and able to care for the child; instead, the incarcerated parent must present evidence that the alternative caregiver is providing care on behalf of the incarcerated parent. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 110-11; see also In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 119; In re D.Z.R.-M., No. 14-13-01084-CV, 2014 WL 1390289, at *9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence of aunt's care did not meet incarcerated parent's burden because aunt's care was "on her own behalf, rather than agreeing to assume the [parent's] obligation to care for the [c]hild while the [parent] [was] incarcerated").
If the incarcerated parent's burden of production is met, the third step shifts the burden to the parties seeking to terminate parental rights. In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 119-20; In re S.R., No. 13-15-00114-CV, 2015 WL 3657747, at *2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Those parties then have the burden of persuasion to show by clear and convincing evidence that the incarcerated parent's provision or arrangement for care would not adequately satisfy the incarcerated parent's duty to the child. In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 120; In re S.R., 2015 WL 3657747, at *2; In re D.J.H., 381 S.W.3d at 611 n.3.
Mother and stepfather, as the parties moving to terminate father's parental rights in this case, had the initial burden to show that father had been confined for more than two years since the date they petitioned to terminate his parental rights to H.A. Mother testified that father, at the time of trial, was incarcerated for a "drug felon[y]" related to "possession of drugs." And father admitted that he was incarcerated at the time of trial. He testified that, in August 2019, he was sentenced to confinement for ten years for the criminal offense of possession of a controlled substance. See, e.g., Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.115-.118, 481.121; see also In re H.O., 555 S.W.3d 245, 248-49, 251 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (noting trial court found parent knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction and confinement and terminated parental rights, where parent pleaded guilty to offense of possession of controlled substance); In re D.L.B., No. 09-14-00185-CV, 2014 WL 4755489, at *4-6 (Tex. App.- Beaumont Sept. 25, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence sufficient to support trial court's finding that parent knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in her conviction and confinement, where parent convicted of "two counts" of possession of controlled substance and received sentence of confinement for five years "for each count"). Father stated that he was not scheduled for release from confinement until 2029.
Mother and stepfather filed their petition for termination on January 28, 2020, and father still had more than two years' confinement remaining at that time. Although father testified that he would be eligible to be released on parole in February 2022, father's testimony recognized that there was no guarantee that he would be granted parole in February 2022, and father presented no evidence to support any belief that he would receive parole in February 2022. See In re H.O., 555 S.W.3d at 252-53 (evidence sufficient to support trial court's finding that parent would remain incarcerated two years from date termination petition filed, although incarcerated parent presented evidence that he would be eligible for parole). Further, even if father did receive parole in February 2022, mother and stepfather filed their petition to terminate father's parental rights on January 28, 2020, and father still had more than two years' confinement remaining at that time. See In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 120. Thus, we conclude that mother and stepfather met their initial burden of establishing a two-year period of confinement following a conviction. Id. at 119. Because mother and stepfather met their initial burden, the burden shifted to father to produce some evidence of his ability to care for H.A. during his period of incarceration or an agreement with another to provide care for H.A. on his behalf. See id. at 121. Father asserts in his briefing that there was no court order for child support and he had provided milk and clothing for H.A. before he was incarcerated. And he testified that his family could provide for H.A. "if need be." But father did not produce any evidence at trial that he was able to care for H.A. during his period of confinement, and father did not present any evidence of an agreement with another to provide care for H.A. on father's behalf. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 110 ("Absent evidence that the non-incarcerated parent agreed to care for the child on behalf of the incarcerated parent, merely leaving a child with a non-incarcerated parent does not constitute the ability to provide care."); In re B.D.A., 546 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) ("The record demonstrates that [the incarcerated parent] ha[d] not adequately cared for or supported the children and that he ha[d] made no arrangements for their care during his incarceration . . . . He did not make any efforts to produce some evidence as to how he would provide or arrange to provide care for the children during his incarceration."); see also In re A.T.M., No. 13-21-00008-CV, 2021 WL 2584402, at *10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("There was no evidence that any person had ever taken care of the child on [the incarcerated parent's] behalf in the past, nor was there any evidence that any person would be able to adequately care for the child on [the incarcerated parent's] behalf in the future." (internal footnote omitted)).
See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (stating parent's testimony concerning his parole eligibility was "barely more than conjecture"); In re J.L.V., No. 09-19-00316-CV, 2020 WL 1161098, at *8 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("[Incarcerated parent's] testimony about the possibility of parole [was] mere speculation and [did] not prevent [the] factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that he would be incarcerated for longer than two years . . . ."); In re H.O., 555 S.W.3d 245, 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) ("Although the availability of parole is relevant to determining whether a parent will be released from confinement within two years of the filing of the termination petition, [m]ere introduction of parole-related evidence . . . does not prevent a factfinder from forming a firm conviction or belief that the parent will remain incarcerated for at least two years" (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)); In re K.R.L., No. 14-10-00187-CV, 2010 WL 4069351, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 19, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining although parent anticipated early release, his belief was speculative, and he provided no documentation to trial court to support his belief).
Father does not appear to have received parole in February 2022 as he was still incarcerated during the pendency of this appeal. See In re J.G.W., 54 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.) ("An appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in the same or related proceeding involving the same or nearly the same parties.").
Instead, father admitted that he had not seen H.A. since 2018 and he had not provided any support for H.A. in the last three years. He had not set up child support payments for H.A., and his family had not supported H.A. while he was incarcerated. Father stated that he intended to pay child support and "get back into" H.A.'s life once he was released from confinement, but based on father's testimony, that means he did not intend to pay child support for H.A. or "get back into" her life until potentially as late as 2029. See In re A.G.D., No. 07-15-00201-CV, 2016 WL 316879, at *4 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Jan. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting "care" not defined in Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) and explaining "courts have interpreted it to encompass both financial and emotional support"); see also In re B.M.R., 84 S.W.3d 814, 818-19 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (although parent testified that he "would participate in [his] child's life through letters and phone calls" while incarcerated, noting parent, prior to incarceration, rarely saw child, failed to utilize his numerous visitation opportunities afforded to him in divorce decree, and parent had history of making little contact with his other children).
Mother testified that father had not seen H.A. in four years. Father had not reached out to her at all. He had "vanished" when H.A. was about one-and-a-half years old and was "never in [H.A.'s] life." Further, father had never paid any child support for H.A. and had never provided financial support for H.A. He did not provide H.A. with food or clothing. While incarcerated, father had not reached out to mother to speak to H.A.; he had not sent cards or letters. He had done "[a]bsolutely nothing." See In re A.G.D., 2016 WL 316879, at *4 (noting "care" not defined in Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) and explaining "courts have interpreted it to encompass both financial and emotional support").
The May 8, 2020 adoption evaluation, which the trial court took judicial notice of at trial, stated that mother and stepfather cared for H.A. Cf. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 110 (evidence non-incarcerated parent cared for child "d[id] not show that she agreed to care for [child] on [incarcerated parent's] behalf, particularly where . . . she [was] seeking to terminate [incarcerated parent's rights]" (emphasis omitted)); see also In re R.K.P.-R., No. 10-21-00265-CV, 2022 WL 172381, at *3 (Tex. App.-Waco Jan. 19, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("Cases discussing the incarcerated parent's provision of support through other people contemplate that the support will come from the incarcerated parent's family or someone[, other than the non-incarcerated parent,] who has agreed to assume the incarcerated parent's obligation to care for the child." (internal quotations omitted)). Father had not provided anything for H.A. He had not seen H.A. in person since March 2018. Mother reported that when she and stepfather reached out to father to "encourag[e] him to interact with [H.A.] prior to his second incarceration," and he responded that "a 10-year stint ain't shit" and H.A. would "be o.k. with [him] not seeing her." (Internal quotations omitted.) Stepfather also reported reaching out to father to "facilitate a meeting between [him] and [H.A.] at [a] Chuck[] [E.] Cheese [restaurant]," but father declined and "had no interest in seeing" H.A.
We conclude that father did not meet his burden to produce evidence of an ability to care for H.A. while incarcerated or an agreement of another person to care for H.A. on father's behalf. Thus, mother and stepfather had no burden to prove that the arrangement for care proffered by father would not satisfy his duty to H.A. See In re H.O., 555 S.W.3d at 253.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that father knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and father had an inability to care for H.A. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of appellees' petition. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). And, viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that father knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and father had an inability to care for H.A. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of appellees' petition. See id.
Further, we conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any disputed evidence in favor of a finding that father knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and father had an inability to care for H.A. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of appellees' petition. And any disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact finder could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that father knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and father had an inability to care for H.A. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of appellees' petition.
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that father knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and father had an inability to care for H.A. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of appellees' petition. See id.
We overrule this portion of father's sole issue.
B. Best Interest of H.A.
In the remaining portion of his sole issue, father argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of H.A. because mother admitted that she "had not attempted to facilitate a relationship [with father] and his family," no one "asserted that [father] had actually ever done anything to hurt or endanger" H.A., and father had been convicted of "a non-violent [criminal] offense." See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2).
The best-interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child. See In re M.A.A., No. 01-20-00709-CV, 2021 WL 1134308, at *20 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet.). It is presumed that the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is in her best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d at 383.
There is also a strong presumption that the child's best interest is served by maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Thus, we strictly scrutinize termination proceedings in favor of the parent whose rights are sought to be terminated. See In re M.A.A., 2021 WL 1134308, at *20; In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2013, no pet.).
In determining whether termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of H.A., we may consider several factors, including: (1) the desires of H.A.; (2) the current and future physical and emotional needs of H.A.; (3) the current and future emotional and physical danger to H.A.; (4) the parental abilities of the parties seeking custody; (5) whether programs are available to assist those parties; (6) plans for H.A. by the parties seeking custody; (7) the stability of the proposed placement; (8) the parent's acts or omissions that may indicate that the parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse for the parent's acts or omissions. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647.
These factors are not exhaustive, and there is no requirement that the parties seeking termination of father's parental rights prove all factors as a condition precedent to the termination of parental rights. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; see also In re C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.) ("[T]he best interest of the child does not require proof of any unique set of factors nor limit proof to any specific factors."). The absence of evidence about some of the factors does not preclude a fact finder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child's best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 122.
The same evidence of acts and omissions used to establish grounds for termination of parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) may also be relevant to determining the best interest of the child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647. The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interest of the child. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); see also Cuellar v. Flores, 238 S.W.2d 991, 992 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1951, no writ) (trial court "faces the parties and the witnesses, observes their demeanor and personality, and feels the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record").
The record shows that mother has been H.A.'s primary caretaker since H.A.'s birth. At the time of trial, H.A. was cared for in her home by mother and stepfather. H.A. was almost five-and-a-half years old at the time of trial, and father had not seen her since she was one-and-half years old-or for about four years. Mother testified that father had not been present in H.A.'s life. According to mother, father "vanished" when H.A. was about one-and-half years old, and mother did not know where father went. Father had essentially abandoned H.A., and he was "never in [H.A.'s] life." H.A. did not "have any idea who" father was. See In re J.S.B., Nos. 01-17-00480-CV, 01-17-00481-CV, 01-17-00484-CV, 2017 WL 6520437, at *17 & n.41 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 17, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding evidence sufficient to support best-interest finding where child had spent majority of life living away from parent).
Mother also testified that father had never paid child support for H.A., and he had never provided financial support for H.A. He had not provided H.A. with food or clothing. After H.A. was born, mother lived with her parents, and mother's parents helped her care for H.A. H.A. did not know father as her "[d]addy" even at that time. Father "would come around whenever he wanted to," but "[i]t was never consistent." Mother and H.A. never lived with father, and father never provided mother or H.A. with a place to live. Father never had an "actual residence"; instead, he would "hop[] from house to house to house." See In re L.J.H., No. 05-21-00183-CV, 2021 WL 4260769, at *16 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("A parent's conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child's physical and emotional well-being."); In re L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019 WL 1523124, at *18 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (in affirming trial court's finding that termination of parental rights in child's best interest, considering that "there [was] no evidence in the record that [parent was] able to provide [her] children with a safe and stable home"); In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46, 60 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (parent who lacks ability to provide child with safe and stable home is unable to provide for child's emotional and physical needs).
In contrast, H.A. identified stepfather as her "Daddy." See In re S.H., No. 01-22-00255-CV, 2022 WL 17254956, at *21 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (considering, in determining evidence sufficient to support trial court's best-interest finding, that child referred to placement parents as "Mom" and "Dad" (internal quotations omitted)). Stepfather had been in H.A.'s life since she was one-and-half years old. According to mother, stepfather had been the only provider that H.A. had ever known. Mother and stepfather had been in a relationship for four years and had been married for three years. H.A. lived in a home with mother, stepfather, stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship, and mother and stepfather's two biological children. Stepfather testified that H.A. had brothers and sisters and had a family with him and mother. Stepfather had supported H.A. for the past four years, and he planned to continue supporting H.A. Stepfather provided health insurance for H.A. through his employer, and he had full-time employment. See In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d 346, 356 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (stability of proposed placement important consideration in determining whether termination of parental rights in children's best interest); In re G.A.C., 499 S.W.3d 138, 141 (Tex. App.- Amarillo 2016, pet. denied) ("[A] child's need for permanence through the establishment of a stable, permanent home has been recognized as a paramount consideration in determining best interest." (internal quotations omitted)); Adams v. Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 280 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (stating it was in children's best interest to be raised in consistent, stable, and nurturing environment); see also In re M.R.H., No. 07-15-00089-CV, 2015 WL 3463025, at *4 (Tex. App.-Amarillo May 26, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering as evidence of placement family's ability to care for child that foster father was gainfully employed).
The adoption evaluation, which the trial court took judicial notice of at trial, stated that mother and stepfather lived in a four-bedroom home, with two-and-a-half bathrooms, a kitchen, a living room, a dining room, a garage, and a fully-fenced backyard. The home was comfortably furnished, clean, and organized. There were no pets in the home and no firearms. The pantry and refrigerator contained ample food, and there were working smoke detectors in the home. See In re S.H., No. 01-22-00255-CV, 2022 WL 17254956, at *21 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (considering positive "home assessment" and condition of placement family's home in holding evidence sufficient to support trial court's best-interest finding); In re J.M., 156 S.W.3d 696, 708 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient to support trial court's best-interest finding where "[t]he evidence show[ed] the [placement] parents' home [was] stable").
According to the adoption evaluation, which the trial court took judicial notice of at trial, H.A. was healthy and well cared for. She was current on her immunizations. See In re A.A., No. 02-17-00307-CV, 2018 WL 771972, at *6 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering evidence child's placement family was meeting her medical needs); In re D.A., No. 02-15-00213-CV, 2015 WL 10097200, at *6 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Dec. 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering in a best-interest review that children were thriving in their grandmother's care, she provided for their essential needs, and she wanted to adopt them and provide them with a permanent and stable home). H.A. had her own bedroom, as did her other siblings. Her bedroom contained appropriate toys and was colorful and well organized. H.A.'s siblings appeared to be happy, healthy, and well cared for as well. H.A. was closely bonded with stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship. See In re G.J.A., No. 13-22-00209-CV, 2022 WL 3092177, at *8 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 4, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (in holding sufficient evidence to support trial court's best-interest finding, considering evidence showed that children were thriving in current placement, placement was meeting all of the children's needs, children called their foster parents "mom and dad," and children were bonded with foster family (internal quotations omitted)); In L.W., 2019 WL 1523124, at *18 (considering child's bond with placement family's other children in holding evidence sufficient to support trial court's best-interest finding).
In the adoption evaluation, stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship reported that he was a good student. He "t[ook] his role as the big brother seriously and help[ed]" mother with his younger siblings. Stepfather's son had chores to do in the home, like taking out the trash. He reported that stepfather would "give[] him three chances when he misbehave[d] and the[n] w[ould] escalate to a time out if needed to or take away a toy." He stated that stepfather taught him "how to listen, feel calmer, [and] take deep breath[s] and try again if [he] g[ot] angry." (Internal quotations omitted.) Mother taught him "[h]ow to stay patient." (Internal quotations omitted.)
Stepfather was "active with" H.A., and he took her and her siblings to the park. Stepfather reported that he was "shaped by [his] dad not being around" and he "let [his] children know [that he] always loves them." (Internal quotations omitted.) He tried to teach them "right from wrong and how to be a good person." (Internal quotations omitted.) Their family "enjoy[ed] barbecues, birthday parties, trips to Kemah and Sea World[,] and taking road trips together." Stepfather stated that he had "always t[aken] care of" H.A. and nothing would change with adoption other than H.A.'s surname. (Internal quotations omitted.)
In the final remarks of the adoption evaluation, it stated that stepfather had known and helped care for H.A. since she was fifteen months old. In contrast, father never appeared to have an interest in H.A. and had not seen her since March 2018. Stepfather and H.A. were bonded and wanted to formalize their bond through adoption and a change of her surname. See In re S.H., 2022 WL 17254956, at *14 ("A child's bond with his placement family implies that the child's desires would be fulfilled by adoption by the placement family."); In re M.S., No. 02-20-00147-CV, 2020WL 6066400, at *9 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct. 15, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence child bonded with adoptive placement family and happy living with them weighed in favor of terminating parental rights). H.A. displayed a close attachment to stepfather and to stepfather's biological son from a previous relationship, and stepfather appeared "suitable and capable." Should the trial court terminate father's parental rights to H.A., the adoption evaluation stated that adoption would be in H.A.'s best interest and was recommended. See In re T.M.R., No. 13-21-00144-CV, 2021WL 4998438, at *7 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("A factfinder may consider the consequences of [the] failure to terminate parental rights and may also consider that the child's best interest may be served by [the] termination so that adoption may occur."); see also In re J.P.-L., 592 S.W.3d 559, 562 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied) ("Under our current statutory scheme, as between a parent and a child, only one may prevail: the child."). As to father's criminal history, father testified that he was incarcerated at the time of trial related to the criminal offense of possession of a controlled substance. See In re O.J.P., No. 01-21-00163-CV, 2021 WL 4269175, at *19 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Illegal narcotics use by a parent supports a conclusion that the child's surroundings endanger his physical or emotional well-being."); In re L.F., No. 02-19-00421-CV, 2020 WL 2201905, at *7 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent's "drug use was the most significant danger to the [children's] well-being"); In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ("Illegal drug use creates the possibility that the parent will be impaired or imprisoned and thus incapable of parenting."); see also In re S.H., 2022 WL 17254956, at *18 ("Criminal activity that exposes a parent to the potential for incarceration is relevant to the trial court's best-interest determination."); In re T.L.S., No. 01-12-00434-CV, 2012 WL 6213515, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence of parent's criminal history may support trial court's finding termination of parental rights in children's best interest). In August 2019, father had been sentenced to ten years' confinement related to the possession-of-a-controlled-substance criminal offense. See E. B. v. Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-18-00427-CV, 2018 WL 6056959, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 20, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("A parent's current and future incarceration is relevant to his ability to meet the child's present and future physical and emotional needs . . . ."); In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) ("[W]hen a parent is incarcerated, he or she is absent from the child's daily life and unable to provide support to the child, negatively impacting the child's living environment and emotional well-being."). While incarcerated, father had not reached out to mother to speak to H.A. He had not sent cards or letters or made telephone calls. According to mother, father had done "[a]bsolutely nothing." Father noted that he had previously received "[f]ive years deferred probation for another possession of controlled substance" criminal offense, and he was "on probation" related to that offense when he received the second charge for the criminal offense of possession of a controlled substance for which he was currently incarcerated. See In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) ("As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of [the] child."); see also In re S.H., 2022 WL 17254956, at *15 (evidence of parent's past misconduct can be used to measure a parent's future conduct).
Father admitted at trial that he had not seen H.A. since 2018. He also stated that he had not provided H.A. with any support in the last three years because he had been incarcerated. Father had not tried to reach out to mother while he had been incarcerated, and father's family had not supported H.A. while father was incarcerated. Father had not set up child support payments for H.A.
Father stated that after he was released from confinement, he intended to "get back into" H.A.'s life and to make child support payments. But see In re K.C., No. 02-19-00293-CV, 2020 WL 370573, at *8 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence sufficient to support best-interest finding when it showed that it would not be in the child's best interest to deprive her of a stable, loving, permanent family for several years "based on the mere possibility that [parent] will be able to establish a healthy relationship with [her]"). But the adoption evaluation noted that mother and stepfather had reached out to father to "encourag[e] him to interact with [H.A.] prior to his second incarceration," and father responded that "a 10-year stint ain't shit" and H.A. would "be o.k. with [him] not seeing her."(Internal quotations omitted.)
Stepfather also recalled reaching out to father to "facilitate a meeting between [him] and [H.A.] at [a] Chuck[] [E.] Cheese [restaurant]," but father declined and "had no interest in seeing" H.A.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of H.A. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2). And viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of H.A. See id. We further conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any disputed evidence in favor of finding that termination of father's parental rights was in H.A.'s best interest and any disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact finder could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of H.A.
We overrule the remaining portion of father's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.