Opinion
02-23-00139-CV
08-14-2023
In the Interest of M.M., a Child
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. CCL1-FM2019-1024
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dana Womack Justice
I. Introduction
In this private termination case brought by Appellee B.C. (Mother) against Appellant D.M. (Father), Father appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his daughter M.M. (Molly). The trial court found that Mother had proved two conduct-based termination grounds against Father and that the termination of his parental rights was in Molly's best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (Q), (2). In his sole issue on appeal, Father argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's best-interest finding. Because legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court's best-interest finding, we will affirm the trial court's termination order.
We use aliases to refer to the child, her family members, and others connected to this case. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8(b)(2).
Father does not explain in his brief whether he contends that the evidence is legally insufficient, factually insufficient, or both; rather, he simply complains that the evidence is "insufficient." Indeed, Father's prayer requests only that we reverse and render (suggesting that he is challenging only legal sufficiency), but he sets forth only the factual sufficiency standard of review. In the interest of justice, we will analyze the evidence for both legal and factual sufficiency. See In re P.H.R., No. 01-14-00101-CV, 2014 WL 7474207, at *7 n.7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (analyzing evidence for both legal and factual sufficiency "in the interest of justice" because it was unclear from the appellant's brief whether she was complaining that the evidence was legally insufficient, factually insufficient, or both); In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) ("Because [the appellant] does not make it clear from his brief whether he is challenging the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence, we will address both."); see also Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (noting that the statement of an issue includes every subsidiary issue that is fairly included and citing Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(f)).
II. Background
A. Before Molly was born, Father was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and was incarcerated.
In 2000, when Father was eighteen, he was charged with aggravated sexual assault for an incident involving a thirteen-year-old girl. Father testified that he did not know that the victim was only thirteen, explaining that she had told him that she was eighteen. Father pleaded guilty to that offense, and he was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision (DACS) for ten years. In 2002, Father's DACS was revoked, and he was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Father testified that he served eight years before he was paroled in 2010. At some point while Father was in prison, he married Mother.
The record is unclear why Father's DACS was revoked in 2002. Father testified that it was revoked because he "got a DWI." Father's criminal history- which was admitted into evidence at the termination trial-indicates that he was arrested and convicted of driving while intoxicated in 2001. That record also reflects that in 2001, he was arrested and convicted of evading arrest on multiple occasions and of failing to stop and give information. A document attached to his judgment revoking DACS, however, listed only the following alleged community-supervision violations: (1) Father was alleged to be present at a mall and a movie theater-premises where children commonly gather, (2) Father was alleged to have admitted to looking at a pornographic magazine, (3) Father was alleged to have traveled outside the county where he was supposed to remain, (4) Father was alleged to have failed to perform certain required community-service hours, and (5) Father was alleged to have failed to pay certain fees relating to his DACS.
B. Molly was born, and Father was incarcerated a year later.
Molly was born in June 2013-approximately three years after Father was paroled. For the first year of Molly's life, she lived with Father and Mother, often in a house that they shared with Father's sister. Father's sister described Molly as a "normal, happy kid" during that time, and she stated that she did not have any concerns with Father as a parent.
In June 2014-around Molly's first birthday-Father returned to prison. Father remained in prison until July 2018. Molly and Mother continued to live "off and on" with Father's sister until Molly was about four years old.
The record is unclear why Father returned to prison.
C. Father spent time with Molly following his release from prison, and Mother was concerned with one of Father's video calls with Molly.
Following his release from prison in 2018, Father lived by himself and visited Molly pursuant to an expanded standard possession order. He stated that he and Molly were "pretty active" on the weekends when he had possession. He testified that they had enjoyed traveling to various museums and to Texas State parks, that they had traveled to visit other relatives, and that they had gone camping. At the termination trial, photos and videos depicting Father and Molly on these excursions were admitted into evidence. When asked about the photos depicting these excursions, Mother stated that she did not believe that Father was "a bad father" when he exercised visitation, but she said that she did think that he was a "bad father . . . [i]n a sense" due to his repeated incarceration.
At some point-which is unclear from the record-Mother and Father divorced.
The photos and videos seem to indicate that Molly was having a good time with Father on these excursions.
At the termination trial, Mother also testified about an incident that allegedly occurred during a video call between Father and Molly in October 2020-while Father was not incarcerated. Mother stated that Father was showering in the bathroom during that call with the phone "propped up." When Mother realized that Father was in the shower, she "slammed the computer shut," ending the call. Mother stated that Father was "naked with video on" during the call, although she acknowledged that she saw Father only from the waist up and that she did not see his "genitals." Mother was unsure what Molly saw during the call.
Father had a different view of the incident. He explained that he had woken up at 3:00 a.m. that day to participate in the call and that it had been very cold in his house because the heating unit had gone out. According to Father, he sat on a bench toward the back of the shower and turned on the hot shower to warm himself. Father testified that he wore a t-shirt and shorts during the call. Mother admitted that she did not make a police report following this incident, stating that she "just didn't let [Molly] see [Father] in video again."
Molly and Mother were living outside the United States when this incident occurred, and there was a significant time-zone difference between them and Father.
Father stated that the water did not hit him, explaining that the shower was large and that the bench was toward the back.
D. Father was placed on DACS for failure to comply with sex-offender registration, his DACS was later revoked, and he was incarcerated once again.
In 2019, Father was charged with failure to comply with sex-offender registration. According to Father, his failure to register was due to "just a misunderstanding on dates." He pleaded guilty to that offense that same year, and he was placed on DACS for six years. In February 2021, Father's DACS was revoked, and he was convicted of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements and sentenced to eight years in prison. According to Father, his DACS was revoked because he had traveled from the county where he worked to another county to visit his wife and son-an action that was, according to Father, prohibited by his community-supervision terms and conditions. At the termination trial, Father testified, "I do not apologize for breaking those rules, and I never will." Father was sent back to prison in February 2021, where he remained during the March 2023 termination trial.
In August 2020, Father remarried. Father and his new wife share a son.
The judgment adjudicating Father's guilt reflected that the State had alleged the following community-supervision violations: (1) failure to remain within the supervising county as directed; (2) failure to complete community service as directed; (3) failure to seek, obtain, and maintain gainful employment; and (4) failure to support Father's "dependent child." That judgment also reflected that Father had pleaded "true" to the State's motion to adjudicate.
E. Mother married Daniel, Daniel helped provide for Molly and acted as a father figure in her life, and Daniel planned to adopt Molly.
In 2019, Mother married D.C. (Daniel). Mother, Molly, and Daniel have been living together since shortly before Mother married Daniel. Mother testified that they live together as a family, that Daniel has provided financial support for Molly, and that Daniel has provided health-insurance coverage for Molly. In contrast to Daniel's provision of financial support and health-insurance coverage for Molly, records admitted into evidence at the termination trial indicate that, as of October 2022, Father owed $5,903.29 in child support and $4,335.11 in medical support pertaining to Molly. Those records also reflect that Father has not made support payments for Molly since June 2021. Father admitted that he cannot make support payments for Molly while he is in prison, but he testified that he planned on getting caught up on the payments before Molly turns eighteen.
Mother described Molly's relationship with Daniel as a "[f]ather[-]daughter" relationship. Mother stated that Molly refers to Daniel as "Daddy"; that Molly "never talks about [Father]"; and that when Molly does talk about Father, she calls him "her dad." Daniel stated that he loves Molly and that he wants to become her father. He described his relationship with Molly as "[j]ust like a normal father and daughter relationship should be," noting that they "do things together every day if she's not busy with her extracurricular activities." Daniel testified that he planned on adopting Molly if the trial court were to terminate Father's parental rights. Daniel also stated that he was retired from the military and that Molly would be able to obtain certain benefits if he were able to adopt her, testifying that she would be able to receive tuition assistance for college, along with certain medical, dental, and vision benefits.
Daniel has two daughters from a previous marriage that he sees regularly pursuant to an expanded standard possession order. He stated that his daughters love Molly and that whenever his daughters are at his home, his youngest daughter and Molly are "inseparable."
Father testified that Molly would be eligible for certain benefits due to his status as a member of the Choctaw Indian tribe, stating that those benefits included free medical care, a clothing stipend, and tuition assistance. Father also indicated that Molly had not yet been enrolled in the Choctaw tribe, explaining that the process had been "put in motion" but that there was a "hangup" because he did not have Molly's "long form" birth certificate. While Father stated that Molly's "long form" birth certificate had "been in the mail for four and a half months," he offered no explanation for why he had waited so long to begin the process of enrolling Molly in the tribe. In the termination order, the trial court found that Molly "is an Indian Child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act due to her Choctaw Indian Heritage and . . . that [Father] is a registered member of the Choctaw Indian Tribe." See 25 U.S.C.A § 1901 et seq. The trial court further found that "the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma was duly notified of the trial and declined to intervene in this case."
F. Father was denied parole in November 2021; he has a new parole hearing in November 2024; and if denied parole, he has a September 2028 projected release date.
As noted above, Father was in prison at the time of the termination trial. Father testified that he had a parole hearing in November 2021 but that parole had been denied. The following reasons were listed by the parole board for denying Father's parole: (1) "the record indicates that the offender has repeatedly committed criminal episodes that indicate a predisposition to commit criminal acts upon release"; (2) "the record indicates the instant offense has elements of brutality, violence, assaultive behavior, or conscious selection of victim's vulnerability"; and (3) "the record indicates unsuccessful periods of supervision on previous probation, parole, or mandatory supervision that resulted in incarceration, including parole-in-absentia."
Father maintained that these were simply boilerplate reasons and that they were not specific to his case.
Father testified that his next parole hearing is in November 2024. Father stated that it was possible that he could be paroled in May 2024, explaining that the November 2024 date was more of a deadline and that he could be paroled up to six months prior to that deadline. If not granted parole, Father's projected release date is September 2028.
G. Procedural background
In May 2022, Mother filed her petition to terminate Father's parental rights as to Molly. In her petition, Mother sought termination of Father's parental rights as to Molly based on, among other things, the predicate termination grounds set forth in Subsections (E) and (Q) of Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (Q). Following a bench trial, the trial court signed an order finding that Father had engaged in conduct under Subsections (E) (endangering conduct) and (Q) (incarceration) and that termination of his parental rights was in Molly's best interest. Father appeals from that termination order.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of review
For a trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship, the party seeking termination must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parent's actions satisfy just one of the many predicate grounds listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the child's best interest under Section 161.001(b)(2). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re E. N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is clear and convincing if it "will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007.
Father does not challenge the trial court's predicate-ground findings.
To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged findings-here the best-interest finding-to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2). We assume that the factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See id. The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
We must perform "an exacting review of the entire record" in determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent-child relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due deference to the factfinder's findings and do not supplant them with our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). Here, we review the whole record to decide whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the termination of Father's parental rights to Molly is in her best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 18-19 (Tex. 2002).
B. Applicable law
Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child's best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child centered, focusing on the child's well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). Evidence that is probative of the predicate grounds under Section 161.001(b)(1) may also be probative of best interest under Section 161.001(b)(2). In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013); C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. We also consider the evidence in light of the following nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may apply in determining the child's best interest:
• the child's desires;
• the child's emotional and physical needs now and in the future;
• the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
• the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
• the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the child's best interest;
• the plans for the child by these individuals or by the individual seeking custody;
• the stability of the home or proposed placement;
• the parent's acts or omissions that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
• the parent's excuse, if any, for the acts or omissions.Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249; E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 807. These factors do not form an exhaustive list, and some factors may not apply to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just one factor may suffice in a particular case to support a finding that termination is in the child's best interest. Id. Indeed, "[t]he absence of evidence about some of [the Holley factors does] not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child's best interest, particularly if the evidence [is] undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child." Id. On the other hand, the presence of paltry evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id; In re C.G., No. 02-20-00087-CV, 2020 WL 4518590, at *7 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re J.B., No. 02-18-00034-CV, 2018 WL 3289612, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 5, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
C. Best-interest analysis
As to Molly's desires, she did not testify at the termination trial, and there is no evidence in the record of her desires regarding the termination of Father's parental rights. The record reflects that Molly appeared to be happy during the times when she was in Father's care, but it also reflects that she had a father-daughter relationship with Daniel. It further reflects that Molly referred to Daniel as "Daddy" and to Father as "her dad." We conclude that this factor is neutral and does not weigh against or in favor of the trial court's best-interest finding. See In re J.R., No. 02-18-00317-CV, 2019 WL 237740, at *10 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 17, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that "this factor weighed neither for nor against" the termination of the father's parental rights when his child did not testify at trial, there was no evidence in the record regarding his child's desires regarding placement, and the record reflected that his child was bonded with both him and the child's foster parents).
As to Molly's emotional and physical needs now and in the future and the emotional and physical danger to her now and in the future, the record reflects that Father has been incarcerated for approximately seven of the first ten years of Molly's life. That lengthy incarceration during the formative years of Molly's life threatened her emotional well-being and indicates that Father's relationship with Molly is not a proper one. See In re J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (stating that a parent's absence during the early years of a child's life due to incarceration threatens the child's emotional well-being and indicates that the parent's relationship with the child is not a proper one); In re K.L.P., No. 04-17-00253-CV, 2017 WL 4014613, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Sept. 13, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that a parent's inability to maintain a lifestyle free from arrests and incarcerations "subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability, ultimately endangering the child's physical and emotional well-being").
At the termination trial, Father testified that he had not seen Molly in person since July 2020. Father stated that he had not seen Molly in person after July 2020 because Mother had ignored his requests to see Molly and because he had not known where Molly lived. Mother testified that Father did not call Molly from July 2020 through January 2021. Father, however, produced records of numerous exchanges with Mother during that time period where Father had attempted to set up phone calls with Molly. Mother also testified that Father had not called Molly since he was incarcerated in February 2021. Father stated that he had sent Molly letters since 2014, maintaining that the "biggest gap" between sending her letters while he was incarcerated had been "[m]aybe two weeks." At the termination trial, Mother testified that some of the letters Father had sent recently contained what she thought were "inappropriate things," noting that Father had stated in a recent letter that "one day . . . he'[d] tell [Molly] everything; one day she'[d] know whose fault this is."
Further, the record does not reflect just one instance of criminal conduct by Father and one instance of incarceration. Rather, the record reflects numerous criminal episodes by Father and several periods of incarceration, which the trial court could have reasonably found constitute a course of conduct demonstrating that termination is in Molly's best interest. See In re A.M., No. 02-16-00208-CV, 2016 WL 7046858, at *5 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Dec. 2, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that while a parent's incarceration alone is insufficient to show that termination is in a child's best interest, it is evidence that a trial court may consider as constituting a course of conduct demonstrating that termination is in the child's best interest); Hampton v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Reg. Servs., 138 S.W.3d 564, 568-69 (Tex. App.- El Paso 2004, no pet.) (same).
Moreover, the record reflects that Father had been arrested in the past for aggravated sexual assault relating to an incident involving a thirteen-year-old girl. Mother expressed concern that Molly-who was almost ten at the time of the termination trial-was approaching the age of the victim in that case. Mother testified regarding an instance when Father was naked in a shower during a video call with Molly. While Father's account of this alleged incident was markedly different from Mother's, the trial court-acting as the factfinder-is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346. Given Father's past conviction of aggravated sexual assault involving a thirteen-year-old girl, his conviction for failure to comply with sex-offender registration, and the alleged shower incident, the trial court could have determined that Father posed a danger to Molly. See In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 743 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (holding that evidence of father's past inappropriate sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl was relevant to the jury's decision as to whether he posed a danger to his child). The trial court was entitled to find that these factors weighed in favor of terminating Father's parental rights to Molly.
As to the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, their plans for Molly, and the stability of their homes, the record reflects that Father was incarcerated at the time of the termination trial and that his projected release date is not until September 2028. If Father were not released until September 2028, Molly would be fifteen years old at the time of his release, and Father would have spent approximately twelve of those fifteen years in prison. While Father maintained that he could be released as early as May 2024, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Father would have to serve his entire sentence. See J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d at 56-57 ("Although it is possible Mother could be released early on parole, the trial court was permitted to consider that '[s]he could also serve [her] entire sentence and not be released' early.").
And while the record indicates that Molly appeared to be happy during the times when she was in Father's care, given Father's inability to maintain long stretches without incarceration, the trial court could have reasonably determined that even if Father were paroled in 2024, he could soon be back in prison, continuing to be absent from Molly's daily life to her detriment. See In re A.H., No. 02-21-00402-CV, 2022 WL 1682422, at *11 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("A factfinder may measure a parent's future conduct by [his] past conduct."); In re M.L.G.J., No. 14-14-00800-CV, 2015 WL 1402652, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("While imprisonment alone is not a basis to terminate a parent's rights, it is an appropriate factor to consider because when a parent is incarcerated, he . . . is absent from the child's daily life and unable to provide support to the child, negatively impacting the child's living environment and emotional well-being.").
In contrast to Father's absence in Molly's life, Daniel has been active in her life since he married Mother in 2019. Both Mother and Daniel testified that he has a father-daughter relationship with Molly. Molly refers to Daniel as "Daddy," and Daniel loves her and wants to become her father. Daniel has financially supported Molly since he married Mother, and he has provided health-insurance coverage for Molly. Daniel stated that he planned to adopt Molly if the trial court were to terminate Father's parental rights and that if he were to adopt her, Molly would be entitled to certain benefits stemming from his past employment with the military. The trial court was entitled to find that these factors weighed in favor of terminating Father's parental rights to Molly. See In re D.D., No. 07-19-00392-CV, 2015 WL 1402652, at *3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Feb. 19, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("[T]he instability associated with having a parent who is incarcerated influences a child's need for permanence, which is a paramount consideration for the child's present and future physical and emotional needs.").
In his brief, Father acknowledged that Molly "is a normal, happy, healthy child with no emotional problems." As to Molly's emotional health, Mother testified that she had not yet taken Molly to counseling because she did not think that Molly was "old enough" for it but that she had plans to request counseling for Molly at Molly's next doctor visit.
Father, on the other hand, was behind on child-support and medical-support payments for Molly at the time of the termination trial and admitted that he could not make support payments for her while he was in prison.
As to the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote Molly's best interest, the record reflects that Molly could be eligible for certain benefits by virtue of Father's enrollment in the Choctaw Indian tribe. Father stated that these benefits include, among other things, free medical care, a clothing stipend, and tuition assistance. The record also reflects, however, that if Daniel were to adopt Molly, she would be eligible for certain benefits by virtue of Daniel's past military service. Daniel stated that these benefits include, among other things, tuition assistance for college, along with certain medical, dental, and vision benefits. The record does not reflect any comparison between the respective benefits available,and there is no other evidence in the record pertaining to any other programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote Molly's best interest.We conclude that this factor is neutral and does not weigh against or in favor of the trial court's best-interest finding. Cf. In re J.G.S., 550 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2018, no pet.) (holding that this factor was neutral because there was no evidence of any programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody).
Father states in his brief that "[t]hese two sources of benefits seem to be about equivalent."
In discussing the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody, Mother mentions in her brief that she is intent on seeking counseling for Molly and that Molly is registered for extracurricular activities. But we see no argument or evidence to suggest that Molly's access to counseling and extracurricular activities would hinge on the trial court's termination decision. See In re C.E.P., No. 01-19-00120-CV, 2019 WL 3559004, at *20 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] Aug. 6, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Factor five is neutral. There is no evidence about programs available to the Department or to the foster mother. The evidence about [the child's] therapy while in the foster placement does not indicate whether it is program-assisted or provided by the foster mother only.").
As to Father's acts or omissions that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one and Father's excuse, if any, for such acts or omissions, Father contends in his brief that "his incarceration should be considered as a valid excuse for the time he has missed with [Molly]." We disagree. Father admitted at trial that he was incarcerated as "a result of [his] conscious and deliberate conduct." See In re E.B., No. 02-22-00205-CV, 2022 WL 17172340, at *9 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Mother was incarcerated because of her own actions. It is difficult to excuse Mother for her lack of stability based on her incarceration when that incarceration was the consequence of her own choices."); see also J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (considering, rather than excusing, parent's history of irresponsible choices in best-interest determination). The trial court was entitled to find that these factors weighed in favor of terminating Father's parental rights to Molly.
D. Best-interest conclusion
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's best-interest finding, and giving the appropriate deference to the factfinder's findings, we hold that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and Molly is in her best interest, and we therefore hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's best-interest finding. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; In re H.A., No. 01-22-00106-CV, 2022 WL 17813760, at *14 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] Dec. 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 (holding that absence of evidence pertaining to some of the Holley factors does not preclude a factfinder from finding that termination is in the child's best interest when evidence exists to support other Holley factors). Based on our exacting review of the entire record and giving due deference to the factfinder's findings, we likewise conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's best-interest finding. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18-19. Accordingly, we overrule Father's sole issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Father's sole issue, we affirm the trial court's termination order.