Opinion
No. 356368
04-21-2022
Kathryn M. RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HIRSHBERG ACCEPTANCE CORP. and Modern Financial Services Corp., Defendants-Appellees.
Curtis C. Warner, Chicago, for plaintiff. Maddin Hauser Roth & Heller, PC, Southfield (by Kathleen H. Klaus and Jesse L. Roth ) for defendants.
Curtis C. Warner, Chicago, for plaintiff.
Maddin Hauser Roth & Heller, PC, Southfield (by Kathleen H. Klaus and Jesse L. Roth ) for defendants.
Before: Ronayne Krause, P.J., and Murray and O'Brien, JJ.
Ronayne Krause, P.J. In this putative class action involving allegations of unfair debt-collection practices arising out of a miscalculation of postjudgment interest, plaintiff, Kathryn M. Rodriguez, appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, Hirshberg Acceptance Corp. (HAC) and Modern Financial Services Corp. (MFSC), under MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) and (C)(8) (failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1995, plaintiff used a credit card issued by nonparty First National Bank of Omaha (FNBO) to make a purchase, incurring a financial obligation of approximately $900. She did not fully repay her financial obligation for that purchase. She stopped making payments entirely in 2002. At some point, FNBO assigned the debt to nonparty LHR, Inc. On February 2, 2007, LHR assigned the debt to HAC. On September 7, 2007, HAC sued plaintiff in the 64th District Court, in Ionia County. HAC contended that the written contract was in plaintiff's possession or lost, so it did not attach a copy of any written contract. Instead, it attached an affidavit from its vice president, who calculated the unpaid balance of plaintiff's debt to be $6,241.20. HAC sought a judgment against plaintiff in that amount, plus interest, fees, and costs. Plaintiff did not respond to the complaint, and HAC obtained a default judgment against plaintiff. Thereafter, HAC obtained numerous writs of garnishment to collect the amount owed under the default judgment. Each writ of garnishment indicated that postjudgment interest was being added to the debt.
In 2018, plaintiff filed a putative class action against HAC in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Plaintiff alleged that HAC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 USC 1692 et seq. , and the Michigan regulation of collection practices act (RCPA), MCL 445.251 et seq. , by overstating how much plaintiff owed and by impermissibly inflating HAC's costs and the amount of interest it charged. Following a procedural error, the federal action was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff thereafter filed a putative class action in the Ionia Circuit Court, much of which was substantively identical to her prior federal complaint. However, plaintiff added MFSC as a defendant on the general theory that HAC and MFSC were inextricably intertwined entities; a claim that defendants also violated the Occupational Code, MCL 339.101 et seq. ; and claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants responded by removing the case to federal court. The federal court dismissed the FDCPA claims under the doctrine of res judicata, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, and remanded the case back to the state trial court.
Defendants then moved for summary disposition of plaintiff's class-action claims. Pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim), defendants argued that MCR 3.501(A)(5) precluded "actions" based on claimed violations of statutes that permitted recovery of statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and "actions" were defined by MCR 2.101 as being synonymous with lawsuits. Defendants further argued that because the RCPA and the Occupational Code both permit recovery of statutory damages, and neither contains a provision explicitly permitting class actions, plaintiff's class-action claims had to be dismissed irrespective of the fact that she also sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and actual damages. Defendants reasoned that plaintiff's remaining claims were for, at the most, less than $3,000 and therefore far below the circuit court's jurisdictional minimum amount of $25,000. Defendants therefore concluded that plaintiff's individual claims should be dismissed pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). Plaintiff contended that defendants’ motion was procedurally improper, that MCR 3.501(A)(5) was inapplicable because she was not seeking statutory damages exclusively, and that MCR 3.501(A)(5) was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. Lastly, plaintiff argued the trial court was required to maintain jurisdiction over her individual claims, either under MCR 3.501(B)(3)(e) if it refused to certify her class action or because she could prove individual damages over $25,000.
In her brief on appeal, plaintiff makes several statements about how much she was allegedly overcharged, possibly indicating claimed actual damages of close to $6,000.
After hearing the parties’ oral arguments and considering their briefs, the trial court agreed with defendants. The trial court entered an order dismissing plaintiff's class-action allegations with prejudice and dismissing plaintiff's individual claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. This appeal followed. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A grant or denial of summary disposition is reviewed de novo on the basis of the entire record to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) should be granted only when the complaint is so legally deficient that recovery would be impossible even if all well-pleaded facts were true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 119, 597 N.W.2d 817. Only the pleadings may be considered when deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Id. at 119-120, 597 N.W.2d 817. "A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) tests the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction." Mays v. Governor , 506 Mich. 157, 180, 954 N.W.2d 139 (2020) (2020) (opinion by BERNSTEIN , J.). Questions of jurisdiction are reviewed de novo as questions of law, and in deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), the court should consider the documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Henry v. Laborers' Local 1191 , 495 Mich. 260, 273, 848 N.W.2d 130 (2014).
The interpretation and application of statutes, constitutional provisions, rules, and legal doctrines are reviewed de novo. Estes v. Titus , 481 Mich. 573, 578-579, 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008) ; Toll Northville LTD v. Northville Twp , 480 Mich. 6, 10-11, 743 N.W.2d 902 (2008). "When interpreting statutes, our obligation is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed in the statutory language," with the presumption that unambiguous language should be enforced as written. Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc. , 468 Mich. 594, 597, 664 N.W.2d 705 (2003). Although "statutes must be construed to prevent absurd results, injustice, or prejudice to the public interest," Rafferty v. Markovitz , 461 Mich. 265, 270, 602 N.W.2d 367 (1999), the " ‘absurd result’ rule" may only be applied when statutory language is already found to be ambiguous, Gilbert v. Second Injury Fund , 463 Mich. 866, 867, 616 N.W.2d 161 (2000), or possibly when it is "quite impossible that the Legislature could have intended the result," Johnson v. Recca , 492 Mich. 169, 192-194, 821 N.W.2d 520 (2012) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Interpretation of a court rule follows the general principles of statutory construction. Grievance Administrator v. Underwood , 462 Mich. 188, 193-194, 612 N.W.2d 116 (2000). This Court has "a duty to interpret ... court rules as being constitutional whenever possible...." In re Sanders , 495 Mich. 394, 414, 852 N.W.2d 524 (2014).
III. DISMISSAL OF CLASS-ACTION CLAIMS
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by summarily disposing of her class-action claims on the basis of MCR 3.501(A)(5). In full, MCR 3.501(A)(5) provides:
An action for a penalty or minimum amount of recovery without regard to actual damages imposed or authorized by statute may not be maintained as a class action unless the statute specifically authorizes its recovery in a class action.
We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary disposition as to plaintiff's class-action claims.
A. SCOPE OF COURT RULE
The Michigan Court Rules do not clearly define "an action." However, MCR 2.101 provides that "there is one form of action known as a ‘civil action’ " and that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with a court." By implication, an "action" means an entire lawsuit. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has construed the terms "claim" and "action" while analyzing MCR 2.403(M)(1), concluding that "a claim consists of facts giving rise to a right asserted in a judicial proceeding, which is an action." CAM Constr. v. Lake Edgewood Condo. Ass'n , 465 Mich. 549, 554-555, 640 N.W.2d 256 (2002). "In other words, the action encompasses the claims asserted." Id. at 555, 640 N.W.2d 256. This Court has similarly concluded that "civil action" and "civil case" were interchangeable terms, both of which described "a broad category of legal actions, each of which can consist of one or more claims." Wilcoxon v. Wayne Co. Neighborhood Legal Servs. , 252 Mich.App. 549, 554-555, 652 N.W.2d 851 (2002). The apparent conclusion is that the preclusionary effect of MCR 3.501(A)(5) applies to entire lawsuits, not merely to individual claims within a lawsuit.
We note, however, that the parties appear to have tacitly agreed that the above apparent conclusion is not literally true: at no time did defendants argue that plaintiff's individual claims were precluded. We agree. Importantly, MCR 3.501(A)(5) appears within a rule expressly addressing class actions. By necessary implication, "an action," when read in context, means "a class action." In other words, when a statute provides for a minimum penalty irrespective of actual damages, no class action may be maintained on the basis of that statute. It is, in contrast, "quite impossible" that our Supreme Court intended MCR 3.501(A)(5) to forbid any lawsuit whatsoever based on such a statute. See Johnson , 492 Mich. at 193, 821 N.W.2d 520 Furthermore, our conclusion is supported by the staff comment to GCR 1963, 208.1(E), the similar predecessor statute:
This section is modeled on provisions such as N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) and Or.R.Civ.P. 32(L). Minimum measures
of recovery, unrelated to actual damages, found in some regulatory statutes (see, e.g. M.C.L.A § 445.360 [2]; M.S.A. 19.853[20][2], M.C.L.A. § 445.243 [2]; M.S.A. 19.655[53][2]) are designed to reduce the disincentive to bring actions challenging violations that results from the relatively small damages suffered by any individual. The class action device for bringing together many such claims achieves the same purpose, making the minimum damages provisions unnecessary. In addition, allowing recovery of the minimum damage as to each of a large number of class members might often impose an unreasonable and unintended penalty on a defendant.
Staff comments are not authoritative, but they nevertheless offer valuable insight. Law Offices of Jeffrey Sherbow, PC v. Fieger & Fieger, PC , 507 Mich. 272, 293 n 39, 968 N.W.2d 367 (2021). The genesis of the court rule was clearly a concern regarding unintended consequences of certain kinds of class actions only. In conclusion, claims based on violations of statutes that provide minimum damages in lieu of actual damages may not be brought as class actions, absent language in the statute expressly permitting such class actions.
B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COURT RULE
Plaintiff contends that MCR 3.501(A)(5) violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by impermissibly infringing the Legislature's domain of passing substantive laws and deciding whether to cap statutory damages. We disagree. Pursuant to Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2, "[t]he powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial" and "[n]o person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution." Our Constitution provides that "[t]he supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state." Const. 1963, art. 6, § 5. The Legislature, on the other hand, has "the power to make laws." Slis v. Michigan , 332 Mich.App. 312, 344, 956 N.W.2d 569 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he boundaries between [the branches of government] need not be airtight," and "the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence." Makowski v. Governor , 495 Mich. 465, 482, 852 N.W.2d 61 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, our Supreme Court "is not authorized to enact court rules that establish, abrogate, or modify the substantive law." McDougall v. Schanz , 461 Mich. 15, 27, 597 N.W.2d 148 (1999). Therefore, deciding the constitutionality of a court rule requires consideration of "whether the [court rule] addresses purely procedural matters or substantive law." Id.
Plaintiff contends MCR 3.501(A)(5) went beyond the Court's constitutional authority to create rules regarding practice and procedure and amounted to an amendment of substantive law in all statutes that allow for statutory minimum damages, do not cap those damages, and do not contain a specific statutory clause allowing or barring a class action to collect those damages. In particular, plaintiff claims the rule "strip[ped] away a substantive right of each putative class member to recover statutory monies under the plain language of" such statutes. However, the court rule does no such thing.
As discussed, the court rule in no way restricts the right of individuals to bring their own claims under such statutes. Class actions are, in part, a way for plaintiffs to recover despite having individually suffered harms too small to make a lawsuit economically viable. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin , 417 U.S. 156, 161, 94 S Ct 2140, 40 L Ed 2d 732 (1974). However, we note that under the RCPA and the Occupational Code, such individual claims, if successful, may entitle plaintiffs to reasonable attorney fees and court costs if the defendant's violation was willful. MCL 445.257(2) ; MCL 339.916(2). At least as applied to this matter, the availability of attorney fees and court costs in addition to statutory damages obviates the problem of individual lawsuits being intrinsically unviable. Furthermore, the court rule expressly states that it does not apply when the Legislature has specifically authorized class-action recovery in a statute. We presume the Legislature is aware of the language of the court rule, see Waterford Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed. , 98 Mich.App. 658, 666, 296 N.W.2d 328 (1980), especially because the Legislature did, in fact, specifically authorize class-action recoveries in other statutes in which minimum damages are available. See MCL 445.1681 (Mortgage Brokers, Lenders, and Servicers Licensing Act, MCL 445.1651 et seq. ); MCL 445.911 (Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MCL 445.901 et seq. ); MCL 445.815 (act regulating certain advertisements, MCL 445.811 et seq. ).
We conclude that MCR 3.501(A)(5) does not abrogate any substantive right granted by the Legislature, and it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
C. APPLICABILITY OF COURT RULE
A plaintiff who prevails in an action brought under the RCPA is entitled to "the amount of actual damages or $50.00, whichever is greater." MCL 445.257(2). A plaintiff who prevails in an action under the Occupational Code is similarly entitled to "the amount of actual damages or $50.00, whichever is greater." MCL 339.916(2). Both statutes therefore provide for "a penalty or minimum amount of recovery without regard to actual damages," MCR 3.501(A)(5), and the parties agree neither the RCPA nor the Occupational Code contain provisions specifically permitting class actions.
Plaintiff argues that MCR 3.501(A)(5) does not apply to her lawsuit because she and the other class members can prove they suffered actual damages. Plaintiff's argument is generally that MCR 3.501(A)(5) limits its applicability to cases exclusively seeking a penalty or statutory minimum damages. For example, she claims because she is also seeking actual damages, declaratory relief, and a permanent injunction, her class action is not barred under MCR 3.501(A)(5). However, as discussed, the court rule applies to the action , not to particular claims, other than the divide between individual and class claims. Furthermore, the count in plaintiff's complaint for violations of the RCPA and the Occupational Code sought relief in favor of both her and the putative class in the form of, among other things, "statutory and actual damages allowed under the RCPA and/or [the Occupational Code.]" Plaintiff clearly sought statutory minimum damages, where available, so she necessarily brought "[a]n action for a penalty or minimum amount of recovery without regard to actual damages imposed or authorized by" the RCPA and Occupational Code, which do not "specifically authorize[ ] recovery in a class action." MCR 3.501(A)(5).
Plaintiff argues that her separate claims for injunctive and declaratory relief should not be barred by MCR 3.501(A)(5). As discussed, the court rule does not preclude plaintiff from pursuing individual claims premised on violations of the RCPA and the Occupational Code, whether for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or money damages. Plaintiff did present a separate "declaratory judgment" count and a separate "permanent injunction" count in her complaint. However, the nature of a claim is not determined by the form or manner of presentation of a complaint but, rather, by considering the underlying substance of the complaint. Hurtford v. Holmes , 3 Mich. 460, 463 (1855) ; Norris v. Lincoln Park Police Officers , 292 Mich.App. 574, 582, 808 N.W.2d 578 (2011). Furthermore, a claim for equitable relief is not an independent, standalone cause of action; rather, it is a remedy that must be supported by a cause of action. Henry v. Dow Chemical Co. , 473 Mich. 63, 96-97, 701 N.W.2d 684 (2005). Plaintiff's requests for equitable relief premised on violations of the RCPA and the Occupational Code are not practically severable from her action for statutory minimum damages under the same statutes.
The jurisdiction of the circuit courts to hear claims for equitable relief is therefore irrelevant to the disposition of plaintiff's class-action claims under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, we need not address plaintiff's arguments regarding the jurisdiction of the circuit court to hear claims for injunctive or declaratory relief because those arguments pertain to her class-action claims.
D. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Plaintiff finally argues that defendants were not permitted to move for summary disposition of her class-action claims under MCR 2.116(C)(8) until she first moved to certify the class under MCR 3.501(B)(1). However, MCR 2.116(D)(4) provides that a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) "may be raised at any time, unless a period in which to file dispositive motions is established under a scheduling order entered pursuant to MCR 2.401." Furthermore, the only timing restriction on putative class-action defendants pertains to when those defendants may file notice regarding a plaintiff's failure to certify a class. MCR 3.501(B)(2). Otherwise, the court rules contain no such limitation on when a party can move for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). MCR 2.116(D)(4).
In sum, the trial court properly concluded that MCR 3.501(A)(5) applied to plaintiff's complaint and that she was barred from maintaining a class action, and the trial court then properly disposed of all class-action claims found in the lawsuit because they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
At oral argument, plaintiff suggested that consumers may be confused and disadvantaged by the application of MCR 3.501(A)(5), but that public-policy argument must be addressed by the Legislature, which, as discussed, could have authorized class actions under the RCPA or the Occupational Code but chose not to do so.
IV. PLAINTIFF'S INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by summarily disposing of her individual claims under MCR 2.116(C)(4), arguing that the trial court erred for several distinct reasons in determining that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. We disagree.
One of the reasons asserted by plaintiff is that the motion for summary disposition was procedurally improper. We have already discussed why we disagree with this argument.
A. JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
Plaintiff argues that she pleaded individual actual damages in excess of the circuit court's jurisdictional threshold of $25,000. Circuit courts in Michigan are courts of general jurisdiction by default, except when a constitutional provision or a statute confers exclusive jurisdiction upon another court. Meisner Law Group, PC v. Weston Downs Condo. Ass'n , 321 Mich.App. 702, 715-716, 909 N.W.2d 890 (2017). The circuit courts lack jurisdiction over actions in which the amount in controversy could not exceed $25,000, as determined at the outset of the proceedings on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 714-716, 909 N.W.2d 890. Generally, "in its subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry [a court] determines the amount in controversy using the prayer for relief set forth in the plaintiff's pleadings, calculated exclusive of fees, costs, and interest." Hodge v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. , 499 Mich. 211, 223-224, 884 N.W.2d 238 (2016). However, when deciding a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), which requires a court to consider evidence in the record, a circuit court must go beyond the pleadings to determine whether the amount in controversy could not exceed $25,000. Meisner Law Group, PC , 321 Mich.App. at 717-718, 909 N.W.2d 890. Furthermore, although an award of attorney fees provided by statute or by contract may be considered part of the amount in controversy, a reasonable estimate of the probable value of those fees should be provided by the party seeking those fees. See
Defendant argues that this is contrary to our Supreme Court's holding in Hodge , but that conclusion is not obvious. In Hodge , the plaintiff had affirmatively asserted that she sought damages of less than $25,000 but ultimately presented proof at trial of damages considerably in excess of that amount, and our Supreme Court held that the district court's jurisdiction should be assessed on the basis of the pleadings rather than the proofs. Hodge , 499 Mich. at 213-214, 219-220, 223-224, 884 N.W.2d 238. In this case, plaintiff requested statutory attorney fees on the face of her complaint. We think that Hodge does not preclude the inclusion of such attorney fees within the amount in controversy, so long as plaintiff provided a reasonable estimate of those fees, and so long as the estimate is made in good faith. See Krolczyk v. Hyundai Motor America , 507 Mich. 966, 966–967, 959 N.W.2d 720 (2021). In any event, we are required to follow Meisner Law Group, PC and ABCS Troy, LLC pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(1). Plaintiff suggested at oral argument that ABCS Troy has been overruled in part by Silverman v. Korn (On Remand) , 339 Mich.App. 384, 984 N.W.2d 536 (2021). However, Silverman did not address statutory attorney fees in the context of the amount in controversy but, rather, only addressed whether a corporation and individual could recover attorney fees when representing themselves under a contract fee provision. We are unpersuaded that Silverman is relevant to this matter.
ABCS Troy, LLC v. Loancraft, LLC , 337 Mich.App. 125, 133–141, 972 N.W.2d 317 (2021) ; Peters v. Gunnell, Inc. , 253 Mich.App. 211, 224 n 10, 655 N.W.2d 582 (2002).
Affording the maximum possible generosity to plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff has arguably claimed that she individually suffered actual damages of, at most, $6,000. As a result, plaintiff simply has not pleaded individual claims in excess of the jurisdictional amount to avoid the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court. MCL 600.8301(1).
In responding to defendants’ motion for summary disposition, plaintiff contended she could prove damages above the jurisdictional amount. She alleged she suffered special damages in the form of clearing the public record of misinformation about the amount of debt she owed defendants. Although plausible, plaintiff never offered any kind of estimate of those special damages, nor did she offer any specific evidence of those special damages. A party opposing summary disposition need not be able to immediately prove their case. Durant v. Stahlin , 375 Mich. 628, 645-647, 135 N.W.2d 392 (1965) ( SOURIS , J., concurring); Morales v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 458 Mich. 288, 304, 582 N.W.2d 776 (1998). However, a party opposing summary disposition must provide more than speculation or possibility. Meisner Law Group, PC , 321 Mich.App. at 723, 909 N.W.2d 890. Plaintiff has not provided more than a mere possibility. Plaintiff also argued that the attorney fees to which she could be entitled under the RCPA or Occupational Code would exceed the circuit court's jurisdictional minimum amount. However, plaintiff never provided the trial court with a reasonable estimate of what her probable fees would be to pursue her individual claims. See ABCS Troy, LLC , 337 Mich.App. at 140–141, 972 N.W.2d 317. On appeal, plaintiff asserts that, considering the entirety of the case, from drafting the complaint through a projected appeal in our Supreme Court, she could reasonably expect to incur attorney fees in excess of $25,000. We presume attorney fees would include those incurred in appellate proceedings, absent statutory language to the contrary. Bloemsma v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n (After Remand) , 190 Mich.App. 686, 690, 476 N.W.2d 487 (1991). Nevertheless, MCL 445.257(2) and MCL 339.916(2) both provide for "reasonable attorney's fees and court costs incurred in connection with the action." Under the circumstances of this case, "the action" would mean only plaintiff's individual claims, and "reasonable" fees and costs do not necessarily include all expenses incurred. Plaintiff would therefore clearly not be entitled to all of the attorney fees she may incur. In any event, plaintiff has merely offered a conclusory statement about what might be possible, without any supporting evidence and essentially conjectural reasoning. Mitcham v. Detroit , 355 Mich. 182, 203, 94 N.W.2d 388 (1959). We are unable to find support in the record or in plaintiff's arguments for the proposition that the amount in controversy, as to plaintiff's individual claims, exceeded $25,000.
B. CONTINUING JURISDICTION
Plaintiff also relies on MCR 3.501(B)(3)(e), which provides that "[i]f [class] certification is denied or revoked, the action shall continue by or against the named parties alone." The plain import of this court rule is that dismissal of plaintiff's class-action claims does not, by itself, require or permit dismissal of plaintiff's individual claims. However, nothing in this court rule specifies that the action cannot subsequently be dismissed for other reasons, such as a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, unlike plaintiff's previously discussed separation-of-powers argument, to construe MCR 3.501(B)(3)(e) as granting a circuit court subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that would not otherwise be within the circuit court's jurisdiction, merely because the complaint sought class certification, would violate the principle of separation of powers. See In re Gordon Estate , 222 Mich.App. 148, 153-154, 564 N.W.2d 497 (1997). Furthermore, such a construction would invite the kind of artful pleading and elevation of form over substance that courts in Michigan have long condemned. See Hurtford , 3 Mich. at 463. The trial court properly did not dismiss plaintiff's individual claims on the basis of its dismissal of plaintiff's class-action claims, and it recognized that plaintiff's individual claims likely would continue, albeit in district court. MCR 3.501(B)(3)(e) required nothing more of the trial court.
C. EQUITABLE JURISDICTION
We note that plaintiff has raised various arguments generally asserting that the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for declaratory or injunctive relief. For the reasons discussed, those arguments are irrelevant as to plaintiff's class-action claims. Plaintiff's request for relief does include remanding "her individual claims," including her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, to the trial court. However, we are unable to discern any substantive argument seeking to maintain any individual claims for injunctive or declaratory relief, and as discussed, we are not persuaded that plaintiff's requests for equitable relief can stand alone from her legal claims under the RCPA and the Occupational Code. We are therefore unpersuaded that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff's individual claims in their entirety for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
In any event, the general rule is that the district court lacks any jurisdiction over injunctive or equitable matters. MCL 600.8315. Nevertheless, the district court is not totally without equitable powers. The district court is a court of record, MCL 600.8101(1), and therefore it may declare the rights of parties to a controversy otherwise within its jurisdiction, MCR 2.605(A). Furthermore, "the district court has equitable jurisdiction and authority concurrent with that of the circuit court in," MCL 600.8302 (1), among other matters, "cases brought under chapter 84," which governs small claims, MCL 600.8302(2). When plaintiff's complaint was filed, the small-claims division had jurisdiction of up to $6,000. MCL 600.8401(c). Notably, plaintiff's complaint did not seek attorney fees for her equitable claims, and as discussed, $6,000 is the most that otherwise appears to potentially be in controversy. We are therefore equally unpersuaded by plaintiff's argument that she had no other venue in which to pursue her claims for equitable relief.
Affirmed.
Murray and O'Brien, JJ., concurred with Ronayne Krause, P.J.