Opinion
November 1, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Beerman, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that an incriminatory statement he uttered to the arresting officer and the showup identification procedure conducted immediately prior to his arrest were the fruits of an illegal stop is without merit. Although the People did not make an adequate effort to demonstrate the factual basis for the information contained in the radio transmission broadcast to the arresting officer (see, People v Lypka, 36 N.Y.2d 210), we find that based upon the other information adduced at the hearing, the arrest of the defendant was lawful. The police are authorized to stop a vehicle and make inquiry upon "a reasonable suspicion that its occupants had been, are then, or are about to be, engaged in conduct in violation of law" (People v Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 563; see, People v Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234; People v Wade, 143 A.D.2d 703, 705; People v Adams, 123 A.D.2d 769). Here, the arresting officer's confirmation of the information he received in the radio transmission describing the make, model, and color of a vehicle which had been involved in a robbery, and its occupants, where the vehicle was observed within close temporal and geographical proximity to the robbery, provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the arresting officer's pursuit and ultimate stop of the vehicle (see, People v Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369; People v Mitchell, 143 A.D.2d 947, 948; People v Jackson, 134 A.D.2d 283, 284; People v Rivera, 124 A.D.2d 682; People v Ball, 121 A.D.2d 551, 552). Having been lawfully stopped, the defendant's spontaneous statement to the arresting officer as he emerged from the vehicle that he "didn't rob anybody", coupled with the complainant's identification of him as the assailant a few minutes later, provided the requisite probable cause for the defendant's arrest (see, People v Landy, supra; see, e.g., People v Mitchell, supra; People v Jackson, supra).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish his guilt of robbery in the second degree under the first count of the indictment. Specifically, the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to establish that the driver of the vehicle from which the defendant emerged before allegedly robbing a gas station attendant was "another person actually present" so as to support the defendant's conviction for robbery in the second degree under count one of the indictment (see, Penal Law § 160.10; People v Dennis, 146 A.D.2d 708, affd 75 N.Y.2d 821; see also, People v Johnston, 182 A.D.2d 707; People v Moses, 162 A.D.2d 311; People v Casmento, 155 A.D.2d 229). The defendant's contention with respect to the legal sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to count two of the indictment (see, Penal Law § 160.10 [a]) is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245), and, in any event, is without merit.
The defendant's contentions with respect to the adequacy of both the court's initial instruction to the jury and its supplemental instructions in response to the jury's inquiries with respect to the identification evidence adduced at trial are without merit (see, People v Perez, 77 N.Y.2d 928, 929; People v Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273, 279; People v Martinez, 186 A.D.2d 824, 825; People v Varrecchia, 186 A.D.2d 605, 606; People v James, 170 A.D.2d 694; People v Sorrentino, 138 A.D.2d 760; People v Robertson, 128 A.D.2d 815, 816; People v Daniels, 88 A.D.2d 392; see also, CPL 310.30; People v Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, cert denied 459 U.S. 847; People v Ellis, 183 A.D.2d 534, affd 81 N.Y.2d 854).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Sullivan, Ritter and Joy, JJ., concur.