Opinion
April 13, 1992
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County (Orenstein, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the trial court deprived her of a fair trial by coercing her codefendant, Jerome Smalls, to testify against her under the threat that he would be resentenced to a longer term of imprisonment. She argues that the court, by this action, violated its duty of impartiality. We disagree. The defendant has no standing to complain of the trial court's interactions with her codefendant except so far as her own right to a fair trial might have been implicated. We note that "[t]here is nothing unfair about requiring a defendant to testify against another, at least where * * * the other is already under indictment for the same crimes" (People v Grant, 99 A.D.2d 536). In any event, the defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice to her as a result of any alleged bias on the part of the court. Because none of the conduct of which the defendant complains took place before the jury, she cannot now argue that the court had become an irrelevant subject of the jury's focus (see, People v De Jesus, 42 N.Y.2d 519, 523), had made manifest to the jury its opinions as to the witnesses' credibility, or the guilt or innocence of the defendant (see, People v Russo, 46 A.D.2d 904, affd 41 N.Y.2d 1091), or that the jury was generally prevented from arriving at an impartial verdict on the evidence (see, People v Moulton, 43 N.Y.2d 944). Moreover, in summation, the defendant's counsel quoted extensively from the codefendant Smalls' testimony wherein he claimed sole responsibility for the crimes and admitted to coercing the defendant into driving the car. The prosecution, on the other hand, was required to establish the defendant's criminal conduct. Thus, on this record, the defendant was not denied a fair trial by the court's treatment of Jerome Smalls.
The defendant further claims that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged or any lesser included offense because no rational juror could have concluded that the defendant was aware of, or in a way ratified or consented to her codefendant's use of force, much less to the use of a weapon in her codefendant's commission of a robbery. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15).
Contrary to the defendant's assertions, the facts reveal more than mere presence at the scene and provide a sufficient basis for the jury's verdict since the conclusion of guilt is consistent with, and flows naturally from them (People v Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196, 202; People v Ramos, 166 A.D.2d 468, 469; People v Johnson, 162 A.D.2d 620; People v Herring, 149 A.D.2d 731, 734; People v Turner, 141 A.D.2d 878, 879). The defendant's knowledge of her codefendant's criminal purpose and the awareness that her acts assisted him in achieving that purpose is demonstrated by her admissions concerning Smalls' statement to her at the Mobil station that he intended to "get some money", his statement to her at the florist shop that he was going to "do" the store, and by her willingness to share in the proceeds of the crimes. By driving Smalls away from the scenes of the crimes after seeing the proceeds, the defendant demonstrated her awareness that she was assisting Smalls in making a successful getaway with those proceeds (see, People v Casmento, 155 A.D.2d 229; People v Mercado, 114 A.D.2d 377, 379; cf., People v Ingram, 71 N.Y.2d 474, 480, n 2). Therefore, the circumstances of this case support the conclusion drawn by the jury that the defendant shared a "`community of purpose'" with her codefendant (People v Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830, 832; People v Whatley, 69 N.Y.2d 784; People v Ramos, supra, at 469; People v Johnson, supra, at 620; People v Herring, supra, at 734; People v Turner, supra, at 879).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Harwood, Balletta and Copertino, JJ., concur.