ther, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find that the trial evidence was legally sufficient to permit a trier of fact to conclude that defendant was guilty as an accomplice of robbery in the first degree (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621;see also Penal Law § 160.15). Rather than showing mere unwitting presence at the scene, the evidence compellingly proved that defendant directly and knowingly aided and participated in this robbery, and his conduct and the surrounding circumstances — including his statements to police — fully support the inference that he knew of his cohorts' plan to forcibly steal property and shared their intent to do so (see People v. Valderrama, 285 A.D.2d 902, 903-904, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 659; see also People v. Jackson, 44 N.Y.2d 935; People v. Smalls, 289 A.D.2d 152, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 641; People v. Gage, 259 A.D.2d 837, 838-839, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 876; People v. Huntley, 259 A.D.2d 843, 846, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 972; People v. Johnston, 182 A.D.2d 707, 708, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 833). The People were not required to prove that defendant personally possessed the deadly weapon or was aware in advance that Kirton or Jones were armed (see People v. Gage, supra; see also People v. Lewis, 277 A.D.2d 1010, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 736). Thus, there is no merit to defendant's claim that there was an inconsistency in the jury's verdict acquitting him of criminal use of a firearm in the first degree (Penal Law § 265.09 [a]), but convicting him of robbery in the first degree.
While there is no "mandatory catechism" (People v. Beasley, supra, at 488) to fulfill the trial court's duty of "further inquiry" where the defendant's factual recitation negates or is inconsistent with an essential element of the crime — such as defendant's criminal intent (see, People v. Lopez, supra, at 666-668), at a minimum the record of the subsequent plea proceedings must reflect that defendant's expressed misapprehension of the nature of the charges was corrected or explained, or that defendant's responses to the court's subsequent questions removed the doubt about defendant's guilt (see, id., at 666; People v. Serrano, supra, at 310; People v. Washington, supra, at 256; People v. Murphy, supra, at 954-955). While the prosecution may well possess evidence from which a jury could infer defendant's larcenous intent and intentional aiding in this robbery (see, e.g., People v. Truesdell, 70 N.Y.2d 809;People v. Jackson, 44 N.Y.2d 935; People v. Johnston, 182 A.D.2d 707,lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 833), defendant's statements at the plea were inconsistent with and negated these elements. Accordingly, the issue of the sufficiency of defendant's plea falls within the narrow exception to the preservation requirement, and defendant's plea must be vacated and the matter remitted to County Court (see,People v. Lopez, supra, at 666-668).
Specifically, the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to establish that the driver of the vehicle from which the defendant emerged before allegedly robbing a gas station attendant was "another person actually present" so as to support the defendant's conviction for robbery in the second degree under count one of the indictment (see, Penal Law § 160.10; People v Dennis, 146 A.D.2d 708, affd 75 N.Y.2d 821; see also, People v Johnston, 182 A.D.2d 707; People v Moses, 162 A.D.2d 311; People v Casmento, 155 A.D.2d 229). The defendant's contention with respect to the legal sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to count two of the indictment (see, Penal Law § 160.10 [a]) is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245), and, in any event, is without merit.
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit (see, CPL 710.30; People v Delgado, 80 N.Y.2d 780; People v Johnston, 182 A.D.2d 707; People v Schiliro, 179 A.D.2d 693; People v Cuba, 154 A.D.2d 703; People v DeArmas, 106 A.D.2d 659, 660). Sullivan, J.P., Balletta, O'Brien and Copertino, JJ., concur.