Opinion
October 26, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kuffner, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the existence of testimony favorable to the defendant does not require a contrary result since the jury is free to accept or reject part or all the evidence of a party (see, People v Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196; People v Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233; People v Schaffer, 80 A.D.2d 865). It is well settled that the resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v Mitchell, 167 A.D.2d 356; People v Bossett, 157 A.D.2d 734). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15; People v Althorne, 155 A.D.2d 604).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the court's charge on identification was inadequate because it failed to provide the jury with detailed instructions to assist them in evaluating the accuracy of the sole complaining witness's identification of the defendant as one of the perpetrators of the crime (see, People v Daniels, 88 A.D.2d 392). Although desirable, a detailed charge on the issue of identification is not required as a matter of law (see, People v Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273, 279; People v Beasley, 114 A.D.2d 415, 416; People v Smith, 100 A.D.2d 857, 858). "A Judge who gives a general instruction on weighing witnesses' credibility and who states that identification must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt has made an accurate statement of the law" (People v Whalen, supra, at 279).
Here, although the court's charge on identification may not have been as extensive as the one suggested by the Daniels case (People v Daniels, supra, at 402), it was more than "bare bones" and adequately focused the jury's attention to the necessity of carefully evaluating the identification testimony. Nor does the inadvertent and isolated statement by the court that "the identity of the defendant as the person who committed the crimes charged must be shown to you in a way as to preclude the reasonable possibility of mistake" require reversal since the court clearly and unequivocally told the jury that it must be "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the identity of the accused as the one who committed the crimes" (see, People v Vasquez, 176 A.D.2d 444; People v Velez, 169 A.D.2d 661; cf., People v Bonaparte, 98 A.D.2d 778).
We have reviewed the defendant's other contentions and find that they do not require reversal. Mangano, P.J., Sullivan, Balletta and O'Brien, JJ., concur.