Opinion
Docket No. CR-010878-23BX
03-11-2023
The People of the State of New York, v. Samuel Martinez, Defendant.
For the People: Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx County (by: ADA Jazmine Langley) For the Defendant: Alix Duroseau, Jr., Esq.
Unpublished Opinion
For the People:
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx County
(by: ADA Jazmine Langley)
For the Defendant:
Alix Duroseau, Jr., Esq.
Hon. Yadhira González-Taylor, J.C.C.
Defendant Samuel Martinez moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency; or in the alternative, for an order: suppressing identification evidence; suppressing physical evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.20 (1) and CPL § 710.60 or, alternatively, granting a Mapp/Dunaway pre-trial hearing; precluding identification and statement evidence for which the People have not served notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30 (1) (b) and CPL §710.30 (1) (a), respectively; suppressing the results of defendant's breathalyzer test; requiring the prosecution to serve a Bill of Particular pursuant to CPL § 200.95 (5); precluding evidence of defendant's prior criminal history or bad acts pursuant to Sandoval; requiring the prosecution to disclose Brady and Rosario exculpatory evidence; directing the prosecution to disclose trial witnesses' names and pedigrees; and granting defendant's reservation of right to file additional motions.
Defendant further moves for an Order granting discovery and inspection pursuant to CPL § 240.40 (1), repealed as of January 1, 2020.
Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file and relevant legal authority, the Court:
DENIES defendant's motion for dismissal for facial insufficiency; and
GRANTS defendant's motion for Mapp/Dunaway/Johnson/Huntley pre-trial hearings; and
DENIES defendant's request or an order suppressing evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.20 (1) and CPL § 710.60; and
GRANTS defendant's application seeking the right to make further motions to the extent provided by CPL § 255.20 (3); and
REFERS defendant's request for an order precluding statement evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.30 (1) (a) and precluding evidence of defendant's prior bad acts or criminal convictions or, in the alternative, granting a Sandoval hearing to the trial court; and
DIRECTS the People to comply with their continuing discovery obligations pursuant to CPL § 245, including Brady and Rosario disclosures.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 19, 2023, defendant Samuel Martinez was arrested and charged with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") § 1212 (reckless driving), § 1192 (3) (driving while intoxicated), both misdemeanors, § 1192 (1) (driving while impaired), § 509 (1) (unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle), and § 600 (1) (a) (leaving the scene of an incident without reporting), all violations. Defendant refused to take the breathalyzer test. Defendant was arraigned on the misdemeanor complaint and released on his own recognizance.
On July 18, 2023, the prosecution filed their superseding accusatory instrument ("SSI"), after which the defendant was arraigned. After the prosecution filed a supporting deposition ("SD"), defendant was arraigned on the information at the August 23, 2023 court appearance.
The People filed their Certificate of Compliance (CoC") and Statement of Readiness on September 21, 2023, and at the discovery conference held on December 20, 2023, after defense counsel raised no objections, the court deemed the People's CoC valid. However, counsel requested a motion schedule to assert a facial sufficiency challenge and request omnibus relief. Defendant's motion was filed on December 28, 2023, and the People filed their opposition on February 8, 2024.
DISCUSSION
The factual allegations at bar, contained in the superseding information filed on July 18, 2023, provides in pertinent part that:
PO Yomibel Diaz of 43 PCT, Shield# 401, states that on or about May 19, 2023 at approximately 9:31 PM at the corner of Elder Aven [sic] and Watson Avenue, County of the Bronx, State of New York, [...]
Deponent is informed by OSCAR DELACRUZ-TEJADA, that at the above time and place, informant observed defendant operating a 2008 white GMC Yukon (New York License Plate #JAB1310), and defendant seated behind the steering wheel, engine running, headlights on, and moving on a public roadway.
Deponent is further informed by informant that the observed defendant drive said vehicle strike multiple parked cars along the roadway. Deponent is further informed by informant that defendant reversed into informant's vehicle causing significant damage to informant's vehicle. Deponent is further informed by informant that defendant then passed through two red lights before stopping and flee [sic] his vehicle on foot.
Deponent states that upon approaching the defendant, he observed the defendant to have a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath and slurred speech. Deponent further states that he was present at the administration of a chemical test analysis of defendant's breath, and defendant refused to take the test.
Deponent further states that he obtained an read a teletype printout of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, whose computers are tied to the New York City Police Department computer for the purposes of obtaining records, which records were made in the regular course of business and which are regularly made in the course of business within a reasonable time after the event or occurrence and said records show that the defendant was not a licensed driver. Deponent further states that defendant failed to produce a valid license.
Additionally, the People's SD, executed by the complaining witness, Oscar Delacruz-Tejada, on July 19, 2023, provides that:
I, OSCAR DELACRUZ-TEJADA say that I have read the complaint filed in the above-entitled action and attached hereto and that the facts stated in that complaint to be on information furnished by me are true upon my personal knowledge.
I. Applicable Standard for Facial Sufficiency Challenge
To meet the jurisdictional standard for facial sufficiency, a misdemeanor complaint "need only set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense" (see People v Smalls, 26 N.Y.3d 1064, 1066 [2015]; see also CPL § 100.40 [1] [b]; § 70.10). The accusatory instrument must set forth non-hearsay facts of an evidentiary nature which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged (see People v Suber, 19 N.Y.3d 247 [2012]; People v Dumas, 68 N.Y.2d 729 [1986]). It is well-settled that "mere conclusory allegations are insufficient [ ] and a purported information which fails to meet these requirements is fatally defective" (see People v Pamulo, 48 Misc.3d 1227 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51286 [U], **2 (Crim Ct, New York County 2015] [citations omitted] citing People v Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 136 [1987]).
II. The Parties' Arguments
Defense counsel asserts, inter alia, that the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient because it is conclusory in nature and fails to specify how defendant engaged in the conduct which has been alleged (affirmation of defendant's counsel at 19). Counsel further argues that identification, criminal history, statement, and physical evidence, including breathalyzer results, should be suppressed, or precluded because police officers lacked probable cause to arrest defendant or, alternatively, that defendant should be granted hearings to determine the admissibility of said evidence pursuant to Mapp /Dunaway/Johnson/Huntley and Sandoval (affirmation of defendant's counsel at 19-24). Lastly, defendant avers that the People should be compelled to comply with their disclosure obligations, including Brady/Rosario evidence (affirmation of defendant's counsel at 19-24).
The People maintain that the SSI establishes every element of the charged offenses with specificity, including the allegations that defendant was observed behind the wheel of his vehicle while striking multiple parked cars, and the deponent/police officer, to whom the civilian witness complained that his vehicle had been hit, observed defendant to have slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath, and subsequently verified that defendant was not licensed to drive by the State of New York (People's affirmation at 6). The prosecution argues that the SSI has given defendant sufficient notice to prepare a defense and prevent him from being retried for the same offenses (People's affirmation at 6). Lastly, the prosecution opposes defendant's request for an order to preclude and/or suppress evidence, or for hearings to decide preclusion and suppression, as well as defendant's reservation of rights to file additional motions; however, as to defendant's demand for a Bill of Particulars pursuant to CPL § 200.95, the People submit the date, time and location of the offenses, asserted as VTL § 1212, § 1192 (3), § 1192 (1), § 509 (1), and § 600 (1) (a) (People's affirmation at 6-16).
III. The Court's Analysis
It is well-settled that although the allegations in a criminal complaint must give rise to a prima facie case, courts have declined to give an accusatory instrument an overly technical reading (see People v Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569, 575 [2004]).
A. Driving While Impaired, VTL § 1192 (1)
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (1) provides that "[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to operate such vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol" (see VTL § 1192 [1] [emphasis added]). New York Criminal Jury Instructions ("CJI") further provides in pertinent part that "[t]he law does not require any particular chemical or physical test to prove that a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol," and included in the "surrounding facts and circumstances" a jury may consider are the defendant's physical condition and appearance, manner of speech and" the manner in which defendant operated the motor vehicle" as well as "the presence or absence of alcohol" (see CJI2d[NY] Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1], https://nycourts.gov/judges/cji/3-vtl/vtl_1192/1192[1].pdf [last accessed March 8, 2024] [emphasis added]).
The accusatory instrument alleges that the deponent/police officer was informed by the complaining witness that he observed defendant driving into multiple parked cars and that defendant reversed his vehicle into the witness's car, causing significant damage, before running two red lights and exiting his car to flee on foot. Deponent/police officer further reported that she observed defendant to have slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath, and then verified with the Department of Motor Vehicles that he was not licensed to drive.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, these factual allegations suffice to establish probable cause to believe that defendant operated his motor vehicle while impaired (see People v Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 427 [1979] ["It is evident from the statutory language and scheme that the question in each case is whether, by voluntarily consuming alcohol, this particular defendant has actually impaired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which he is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver"]. By any measure, the allegations that defendant drove his vehicle into several parked cars, reversed into the complainant's car with sufficient impact to have caused significant damage, then proceeded to drive through two red lights and exit to flee on foot, suggest that defendant lacked the physical and mental ability expected from a reasonable and prudent driver. Coupled with the observation that defendant's speech was slurred, and that a strong odor of alcohol emanated from his breath, we find that the VTL § 1192 (1) charge is facially sufficient.
B. Driving While Intoxicated (Common Law), VTL § 1192 (3)
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) provides that "[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition (see VTL § 1192 [3]). Known as common law intoxication, the prosecution must prove the charge with evidence that defendant imbibed alcohol "to the extent that he or she is incapable, to a substantial extent, of employing the physical and mental abilities which he or she is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver" and, thus, a jury may consider factors including "defendant's manner of speech, opinion testimony regarding defendant's sobriety, the presence or absence of alcohol, and the circumstances of any accident" (see CJI2d[NY] Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3], https://nycourts.gov/judges/cji/3-vtl/vtl_1192/1192[3].pdf [last accessed March 8, 2024] ["The law does not require any particular chemical or physical test to prove that a person was in an intoxicated condition")]; see also Cruz at 428).
Considered cumulatively, as with VTL § 1192 (1), the allegations at bar tend to demonstrate a prima facie case that defendant was incapable of employing the physical and mental capabilities expected from a prudent and reasonable driver where he is alleged to have struck multiple cars parked along the roadway, then reversed into the complainant's vehicle and without stopping- although the witness's sworn statement is that significant damage resulted from the impact- drove through two red lights, abandoned the car, and fled on foot from the scene of multiple accidents. Notwithstanding the absence of test results to confirm the deponent's observation that defendant's speech was slurred and that a strong odor of alcohol emanated from his breath, "[a] layman, including the defendant and those charged with administering the law, should be able to determine whether the defendant's consumption of alcohol has rendered him incapable of operating a motor vehicle as he should. Thus, even when no chemical test has been made of the driver's blood alcohol content, the statute provides reasonable warning of what is prohibited and sufficient standards for adjudication" (see Cruz at 428).
C. Reckless Driving, VTL § 1212
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212 provides that "[r]eckless driving shall mean driving or using any motor vehicle, motorcycle or any other vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power or any appliance or accessory thereof in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway. Reckless driving is prohibited. Every person violating this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor (see VTL § 1212; see also CJI2d[NY] Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212, https://nycourts.gov/judges/cji/3-vtl/vtl_1212/1212.pdf [last accessed March 8, 2024]["Intoxication, absent more, does not establish reckless driving. One can engage in reckless driving without being intoxicated and, conversely, one can drive while intoxicated without engaging in reckless driving. Evidence of an individual's intoxication and how that condition may have affected his or her ability to perceive and react to risks commonly encountered while operating a vehicle on a public highway may be relevant to prove reckless driving when that evidence is coupled with evidence of the manner in which the motor vehicle was being operated"]).
A charge of reckless driving will be held to be facially sufficient when the accusatory instrument demonstrates that the defendant operated the vehicle in a way that "interferes with or endangers the user of the highway through the failure to exercise reasonable care, reasonable caution or the reasonable foresight of a reasonably prudent and careful person" (see People v Grogan, 260 NY 138, 149 [1932]). The complaint must indicate how the vehicle was being operated at the time of the alleged offense. Additionally, reckless driving is more than the commission of a single traffic infraction (see People v Goldblatt, 98 A.D.3d 817 [3d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 N.Y.3d 932 [2012]).
As set forth in the SSI, the complainant observed defendant drive into multiple parked cars before he hit the complainant's own vehicle, reversing into the car with enough force to cause considerable damage, and then was observed running two red lights before fleeing on foot from the multiple collisions. Considered in the light most favorable to the People, the accusatory instrument alleges facts that reasonably infer that defendant operated his vehicle in disregard of the consequences for users of the public roadway especially where deponent observed him to have slurred speech and the strong odor of alcohol (see People v McKenzie, 52 Misc.3d 1217 [A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51187 [U], *4 [Crim Ct, New York County 2016] ["(T)he officer at the scene observed signs of defendant's intoxication, including that he had an odor of alcohol on his breath and person, that his eyes were red and watery, and that his speech was slurred. These allegations are sufficient, for pleading purposes, to show defendant's disregard of the consequences of his actions to others using the public highway"]).
D. Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle, VTL § 509 (1)
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 (1) provides that "[e]xcept while operating a motor vehicle during the course of a road test conducted pursuant to the provisions of this article, no person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state or upon any sidewalk or to or from any lot adjacent to a public garage, supermarket, shopping center or car washing establishment or to or from or into a public garage or car washing establishment unless he is duly licensed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter" (see VTL § 509 [1]).
The accusatory instrument provides that "[d]eponent further states that he obtained an read a teletype printout of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, whose computers are tied to the New York City Police Department [] and said records show that the defendant was not a licensed driver." Consequently, we find that the prosecution has established its prima facie burden for the charged offense (see People v Rivera, 32 Misc.3d 1209 [A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51215 [U], *4 [Crim Ct, New York County 2011]).
E. Leaving the Scene of an Incident without Reporting, VTL § 600 (1) (a)
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 (1) (a) provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person operating a motor vehicle who, knowing or having cause to know that damage has been caused to the real property or to the personal property [] before leaving the place where the damage occurred, stop, exhibit his or her license and insurance identification card for such vehicle [] to the party sustaining the damage, or in case the person sustaining the damage is not present at the place where the damage occurred then he or she shall report the same as soon as physically able to the nearest police station, or judicial officer (see VTL § 600 [1][a]; see also, People v Van De Cruze, 36 Misc.3d 1217 [A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51378 [U], *4 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2012]).
The witness's supporting deposition attests to the allegations of what he observed and how defendant struck and damaged his vehicle while he was seated inside, and that defendant fled the scene without acknowledging the complainant's presence. The prosecution has met its burden insofar as the charged offense is supported by non-hearsay evidence (see Van De Cruze at 4 ["The prima facie case for an information, in contrast, excludes only a particular type of incompetent evidence-hearsay-without restricting the People from utilizing other types of proof in order to commence a criminal proceeding"] citing CPL § 100.40[1][c]).
Accordingly, this Court finds that pursuant to CPL § 100.40 (1) (c) and § 100.15 (3), and the factual allegations provided within the four corners of the SSI and corroborated by the filing of the SD, that the accusatory instrument is deemed facially sufficient on all charged offenses.
IV. Defendant's Request for an Order Granting Other Relief
The Court denies defendant's request for an order suppressing statement, physical and identification evidence but grants defendant's motion for Mapp/Dunaway/Johnson/Huntley pre-trial hearings. Additionally, the Court grants defendant's request to reserve his right to make further motions to the extent provided by CPL § 255.20 (3).
The Court respectfully refers defendant's request for an order precluding statement evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.30 (1) (a) and precluding evidence of defendant's prior bad acts or criminal convictions or, in the alternative, granting a Sandoval hearing to the trial court.
The Court is persuaded that the prosecution has complied with defendant's demand for a Bill of Particulars pursuant to § 200.95 (5), however, the People are directed to comply with their continuing discovery obligations pursuant to CPL § 245, including Brady and Rosario disclosures.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendant's motion for dismissal of the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency is DENIED, and the Court:
GRANTS defendant's motion for Mapp/Dunaway/Johnson/Huntley pre-trial hearings; and
DENIES defendant's request or an order suppressing evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.20 (1) and CPL § 710.60; and
GRANTS defendant's application seeking the right to make further motions to the extent provided by CPL § 255.20 (3); and
REFERS defendant's request for an order precluding statement evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.30 (1) (a) and precluding evidence of defendant's prior bad acts or criminal convictions or, in the alternative, granting a Sandoval hearing to the trial court; and
DIRECTS the People to comply with their continuing discovery obligations pursuant to CPL § 245, including Brady and Rosario disclosures.
This constitutes the opinion, decision, and the order of the Court.