Opinion
361451 362515
05-30-2024
MICHIGAN IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CENTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GOVERNOR, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED
Court of Claims LC No. 21-000208-MZ
Before: FEENEY, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this declaratory judgment action, defendant, the Governor of the State of Michigan, appeals by right in Docket No. 361415 and by leave granted in Docket No. 362515 the order of the Court of Claims denying its motion for summary disposition on various grounds. Plaintiff, the Michigan Immigrant Rights Center, brought this action seeking, generally, to establish that MCL 418.361(1), a provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., is unconstitutional, or that an opinion of this Court interpreting that provision was wrongly decided. Because plaintiff's complaint was untimely under MCL 600.6431(1), we reverse and remand for entry of an order of dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE
The substantive issues plaintiff advanced are not before this Court. Plaintiff is a nonprofit organization that provides resources to immigrants in Michigan. In 2017, it established a "Farmworker and immigrant rights" (FWIR) program to provide certain legal services. That program was immediately flooded by calls from undocumented alien workers who were being denied workers' compensation benefits, allegedly due solely to their immigration status. Plaintiff is not presently bringing suit on behalf of any of those workers, but rather on the basis of harms it claims it is suffering in the form of a drain on its resources, which ultimately forced it to hire additional personnel in 2019 specifically to deal with those calls. Plaintiff traces that drain to this Court's decision in Sanchez v Eagle Alloy Inc, 254 Mich.App. 651; 658 N.W.2d 510 (2003). In that case, this Court held that undocumented alien workers were "employees" for purposes of the WDCA, so they were both entitled to and constrained by the exclusive remedy provided by the WDCA for injuries suffered in the course of their employment. Sanchez, 254 Mich.App. at 654655, 659-667. This Court then held that, under MCL 418.361(1), benefits need not be paid to a person "whenever commission of a 'crime' prevents the person from obtaining or performing work," and the use of false documents to obtain employment constituted a "crime." Id. at 667672.
In relevant, part, MCL 418.361(1) states that employers need not pay certain benefits "for periods of time that the employee is unable to obtain or perform work because of imprisonment or commission of a crime."
This Court held that when the employer "learned of [the] plaintiffs' employment status and could not legally retain them as employees or find them other work, [the] plaintiffs became unable to obtain or perform work 'because of' the commission of a crime within the meaning of subsection 361(1)." Sanchez, 254 Mich.App. at 672-673. This Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to benefits up to the date when their "employment status" was discovered or determined, but that they were not entitled to benefits thereafter. Id. at 673-674. Nevertheless, if the "plaintiffs obtain proper permission to live and work in the United States, then subsection 361(1) would no longer operate to suspend their wage-loss benefits." Id. at 673.
Plaintiff filed suit in 2021, seeking a declaratory judgment (1) that the "commission of a crime" language in MCL 418.361(1) is unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable; (2) that Sanchez wrongly held that working while undocumented is itself a crime; and/or (3) that Sanchez was significantly curtailed by later precedent of our Supreme Court. Defendant moved for summary disposition on multiple grounds, most of which we need not discuss. In relevant part, defendant sought summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), asserting that MCL 600.6431(1) required plaintiff to file notice of intent to sue or to file its complaint within a year of the accrual of its claims, and plaintiff's claims accrued by 2019, so its complaint was untimely. The Court of Claims disagreed, reasoning that because plaintiff sought only prospective declaratory relief, MCL 600.6431(1) was inapplicable. We disagree.
Defendant also challenged plaintiff's standing, asserted that there was no "actual controversy," and asserted that plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Because we conclude that plaintiff's noncompliance with the notice requirements of MCL 600.6431(1) is dispositive, we need not address defendant's alternative arguments.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition and questions of constitutional law. Bauserman v Unemployment Ins Agency, 509 Mich. 673, 686; 983 N.W.2d 855 (2022) (Bauserman II). "A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) should be granted when the claim is barred by a statute of limitations, or other basis stated in that court rule." and "we accept the allegations of the complaint as true unless contradicted by documentation submitted by the moving party, and consider any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence submitted." Spine Specialists of Mich, PC v Memberselect Ins Co, Mich. App,; NW3d (2023) (Docket No. 358296); slip op at 2. This Court reviews de novo the interpretation of statutes and court rules, the availability of governmental immunity, and questions regarding jurisdiction. Highland Park v State Land Bank Auth, 340 Mich.App. 593, 598-599; 986 N.W.2d 638 (2022). "In considering the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint, we examine the entire claim, looking beyond procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim." Altobelli v Hartmann, 499 Mich. 284, 303; 884 N.W.2d 537 (2016).
III. PRINCIPLES OF LAW
MCL 600.6431(1) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a claim may not be maintained against this state unless the claimant, within 1 year after the claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against this state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.
With only one exception not at issue here, the requirements set forth in MCL 600.6431(1) apply to all claims brought against the state. Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich. 39, 55-57, 64-65; 993 N.W.2d 203 (2023). MCL 600.6431(1) is not a statute of limitations; rather, it sets forth a condition precedent to maintaining a suit against the state. Elia Cos, LLC v Univ of Mich. Regents, 511 Mich. 66, 69, 72-74; 993 N.W.2d 392 (2023). Plaintiff did not file a notice of intention to file a claim, but "MCL 600.6431 requires a claimant to file with the Court of Claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against the state within the specified time period." Chisholm v State Police, Mich. App,; NW3d (2023) (Docket No. 355691); slip op at 7 (emphasis in original). Compliance with either of those two requirements obviates the other. Id.
The sole exception is for claims for compensation brought under the Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA), MCL 691.1751 et seq. See Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich. 39, 49, 53; 993 N.W.2d 203 (2023), citing MCL 600.6431(5).
Generally, "[a] claim accrues, for purposes of the statute of limitations, when suit may be brought." American Federation of State, Co, and Muni Employees, AFL-CIO, Mich. Council 25 and Local 1416 v Bd of Ed of School Dist of City of Highland Park, 457 Mich. 74, 90; 577 N.W.2d 79 (1998); see also Cooke Contracting Co v Dep't of State Hwys (On Rehearing), 55 Mich.App. 336, 338; 222 N.W.2d 231 (1974). "Under the common law, a claim generally accrues when all of the elements of the cause of action have occurred and can be alleged in a proper complaint." Bauserman v Unemployment Ins Agency, 503 Mich. 169, 183 n 8; 931 N.W.2d 539 (2019) (Bauserman I). Under MCL 600.5827, a claim "accrues" "when all of the elements of the cause of action have occurred and can be alleged in a proper complaint," including harm suffered by the plaintiff. Sunrise Resort Ass'n, Inc v Cheboygan Co Road Comm, 511 Mich. 325, 336; 999 N.W.2d 423 (2023). A claim "accrues" for purposes of MCL 600.6431(1) "at the time the wrong upon which a claim is based was done" and "each element of the cause of action, including some form of damages, exists." Breiner v State, 344 Mich.App. 387, 405 n 5; 1 NW3d 336 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Limitations statutes do not apply to declaratory judgments as such" because "[l]imitations periods are applicable not to the form of the relief but to the claim on which the relief is based." Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation v Wayne Co, 450 Mich. 119, 128; 537 N.W.2d 596 (1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, "[d]eclaratory relief may not be used to avoid the statute of limitations for substantive relief." Id. at 129. "Claims for declaratory relief necessarily derive from claims for substantive relief because declaratory relief lies only in cases of 'actual controversy,' and not merely for abstract declarations of rights divorced from a factual context." Id. at 128. "[W]hen the statute of limitations would bar granting relief on the underlying substantive claim, it also bars the same claim when stated as one seeking declaratory relief." Tenneco Inc v Amerisure Mut Ins Co, 281 Mich.App. 429, 456; 761 N.W.2d 846 (2008). An "actual controversy" is required because, while a court may decide an issue before a loss or injury has yet occurred, courts may not decide issues that are "merely hypothetical or anticipated in the future." League of Women Voters of Mich. v Secretary of State, 506 Mich. 561, 586; 957 N.W.2d 731 (2020).
IV. APPLICATION
Plaintiff's claims are subject to the notice provision in MCL 600.6431(1), and plaintiff did not file its complaint within a year of the date when its claims accrued. Therefore, this case must be dismissed.
For purposes of resolving this appeal, we presume, although we do not decide, that plaintiff has standing and has articulated an actual controversy. Although a declaratory judgment action may be brought before harm occurs, a declaratory judgment action cannot be brought in the absence of an actual controversy. League of Women Voters, 506 Mich. at 586; Taxpayers Allied, 450 Mich. at 128-129. Notwithstanding some differences in phrasing, the caselaw set forth above establishes that, for purposes of statutes of limitations or for purposes of notice under MCL 600.6431(1), a claim "accrues" when all of the essential elements of a claim exist and a party can commence a valid lawsuit based on that claim. Sunrise Resort Ass'n, Inc, 511 Mich. at 336; Bauserman I, 503 Mich. at 183 n 8; American Federation, 457 Mich. at 90; Cooke Contracting Co, 55 Mich.App. at 338. Because an action seeking declaratory judgment cannot be brought until an "actual controversy" arises, it necessarily follows that in a declaratory judgment action, the claim "accrues" when an "actual controversy" arises. Therefore, such a claim "accrues" when a party's need for a judicial determination to guide its conduct stops being merely hypothetical or anticipated. See League of Women Voters, 506 Mich. at 586.
In other words, either plaintiff's claims "accrued" at some point before it filed its complaint, or plaintiff lacked standing. Presuming, without deciding, that plaintiff did not lack standing, the question is when its claims accrued. We reject defendant's arguments that those claims could have accrued earlier than 2017, because plaintiff's FWIR project did not yet exist before that time. However, a plain reading of the complaint shows that plaintiff knew no later than 2019 that it was suffering harm as a consequence of the issues it asserts in its claims, and certainly plaintiff was aware of its alleged claims by 2019 when it hired personnel specifically to address the calls it was receiving due to denials of workers' compensation benefits on the basis of immigrant status alone. It is not necessary to determine when plaintiff's claims accrued with greater detail, because plaintiff's complaint was filed in 2021 and therefore necessarily more than a year after its claims accrued.
Plaintiff argues that its complaint was nevertheless timely or excused from compliance with MCL 600.6431(1). First, plaintiff argues that its claims are based on an ongoing series of wrongful acts. Plaintiff is correct that a new cause of action can arise from each wrongful act. Twp of Fraser v Haney, 509 Mich. 18, 28-29; 983 N.W.2d 309 (2022). Bringing a new action requires a further discrete act, however, and cannot be pursued on the basis of continued harm suffered from a past act. Sunrise Resort Ass'n, Inc, 511 Mich. at 338-340; Mays v Governor, 506 Mich. 157, 185 n 10; 954 N.W.2d 139 (2020). Plaintiff alleges only ongoing harms. It has identified only two discrete instances of workers being denied benefits solely on the basis of their immigration status. More importantly, plaintiff's complaint clearly explains that its own harm comes from its inability to refer cases to private practitioners in the workers' compensation field, who are unwilling to accept such cases because of this Court's ruling in Sanchez, a situation plaintiff expects to be resolved by a judicial decision overturning Sanchez; in essence, a single act.
Aside from its argument that Supreme Court precedent conflicts with Sanchez, plaintiff has not alleged that any workers' compensation magistrates are applying Sanchez in an inaccurate manner that is unfaithful to this Court's holdings in that case. In other words, the allegedly wrongful application of the WDCA is derived from this Court's decision in Sanchez, or, possibly, from the passage of 103 PA 1985, which added the "commission of a crime" language to MCL 418.361(1). In effect, plaintiff is alleging ongoing consequences of allegedly wrongful acts committed many years in the past. That is precisely the kind of claim that the abolition of the "continuing harms doctrine" precludes. Plaintiff's cause of action accrued by 2019, no later.
Plaintiff also argues that MCL 600.6431(1) should not apply in any event because that statute constitutes a partial waiver of sovereign immunity, and no such immunity exists for claims seeking prospective equitable relief. There is no exception to sovereign immunity for claims merely because those claims seek prospective equitable relief, however.
Plaintiff relies on caselaw from the United States Supreme Court holding that "recognized a narrow exception" to the general immunity that states enjoy from suits "under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity;" "certain private parties" may "seek judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law." Whole Woman's Health v Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39; 142 S.Ct. 522; 211 L.Ed.2d 316 (2021), citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; 28 S.Ct. 441; 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Under this doctrine, "[a] party may institute suit in federal court against a state official in his official capacity for prospective relief, on the basis of a violation of federal law, but the Eleventh Amendment would bar any action seeking retroactive relief." Smith v Dep't of Pub Health, 428 Mich. 540, 587; 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.). The sovereign immunity the states enjoyed was fundamental to those states before the Constitution was ratified and was not affected by the Eleventh Amendment. Northern Ins Co of New York v Chatham Co, Ga, 547 U.S. 189, 193; 126 S.Ct. 1689; 164 L.Ed.2d 367 (2006). Michigan's sovereign immunity is derived from the common law in this state. McNair v State, 305 Mich. 181, 187; 9 N.W.2d 52 (1943). Although one Supreme Court Justice referenced Ex Parte Young in a plurality opinion, our Supreme Court never adopted it. Li v Feldt (After Second Remand), 439 Mich. 457, 469; 487 N.W.2d 127 (1992) (opinion by CAVANAGH, C.J.), overruled on other grounds by Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675; 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002). Therefore, whether a particular kind of claim is permitted by the Eleventh Amendment is not dispositive of whether that claim is permitted under a state's own sovereign immunity.
In the same plurality opinion, it was observed in passing that "[t]he distinction between the government's liability for prospective equitable relief and its liability for retrospective damages or compensation, and the principle that the former kind of liability is generally not barred by sovereign immunity, are fundamental to sovereign immunity law." Li, 439 Mich. at 469 (opinion by CAVANAGH, C.J.). This statement in Li is not binding, because it commanded no majority. Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Wright, 331 Mich.App. 396, 411 n 5; 952 N.W.2d 586 (2020). Furthermore, plaintiff takes it out of context. In Li, the issue was the existence or nonexistence of a common-law exception to governmental immunity for public nuisances or nuisances per se. See Li, 439 Mich. at 462 (opinion by CAVANAGH, C.J.), 478-483 (BOYLE, J., concurring), 484-485 (opinion by LEVIN, J.). The above quotation was made in the context of Chief Justice CAVANAGH's analysis culminating in the conclusion that, if any such exception had ever been recognized, it no longer existed. Id. at 466-474 (opinion by CAVANAGH, C.J.). Chief Justice CAVANAGH also did not purport to adopt a rule that the state was not immune to any lawsuit merely because the lawsuit sought prospective or equitable relief. Furthermore, our Supreme Court had by then already abrogated common-law sovereign immunity as anachronistic. Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich. 41, 45-51 (KAVANAGH, C.J.), 64 (WILLIAMS, J.); 247 N.W.2d 512 (1976). This Court eventually held that no trespass-nuisance exception to immunity exists for claims against the state, observing that sovereign immunity is now strictly statutory. Blue Harvest, Inc v Dep't of Transp, 288 Mich.App. 267, 273-276; 792 N.W.2d 798 (2010). If there had ever been a common-law exception to sovereign immunity for general claims seeking prospective or equitable relief, no such exception still exists.
This Court has recognized that "[g]overnmental immunity is not available in a state court action where it is alleged that the state has violated a right conferred by the Michigan Constitution." Duncan v State, 284 Mich.App. 246, 268-269; 744 N.W.2d 89 (2009). Our Supreme Court has also recognized "that governmental immunity was not a defense to allegations of constitutional torts and that damages may be recognized in appropriate cases." Bauserman II, 509 Mich. at 688. Such a scenario arises if a person has no other way to vindicate an alleged violation of a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. at 710-711. Parties generally may not assert a constitutional right on behalf of another person. People v Mahdi, 317 Mich.App. 446, 458-459; 894 N.W.2d 732 (2016); In re HRC, 286 Mich.App. 444, 458; 781 N.W.2d 105 (2009). Although plaintiff asserts that it is being harmed as a consequence of defendant's alleged wrongful interpretation or application of the WDCA, plaintiff has not asserted or identified any constitutional right of its own that defendant is allegedly violating. This exception to sovereign immunity is therefore inapplicable.
Finally, this Court must follow caselaw from our Supreme Court. Pellegrino v AMPCO Sys Parking, 486 Mich. 330, 352-354; 785 N.W.2d 45 (2010); Paige v Sterling Hts, 476 Mich. 495, 524; 720 N.W.2d 219 (2006). Our Supreme Court has unequivocally held that compliance with MCL 600.6431(1) is a precondition to any suit (other than claims under WICA) against the state. Christie, 511 Mich. at 64. We recognize that Christie had not yet been decided when the Court of Claims denied defendant's motion for summary disposition. Nevertheless, irrespective of the nature of the relief plaintiff seeks, this Court and plaintiff are bound by Christie. Because plaintiff did not file notice of intent to file its claim or file its complaint within a year of the accrual of its claims, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed.
The order denying defendant's motion for summary disposition is reversed, and we remand for entry of an order dismissing the case. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defendant, being the prevailing party, may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).