Summary
In Elia Cos, 511 Mich. at 74-75, the Court recognized that a plaintiff may amend and properly verify a complaint within the deadline in MCL 600.6431, but a plaintiff must still comply with the statute's requirements to avoid dismissal when suing the state.
Summary of this case from Wurster v. Univ. of Mich. RegentsOpinion
No. 162830
05-02-2023
ELIA COMPANIES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN REGENTS, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Foley & Lardner LLP, Detroit (by Jason Conti ) for Elia Companies, LLC. Brooks Wilkins Sharkey & Turco PLLC, Birmingham (by Keefe A. Brooks ) for the University of Michigan Regents.
Foley & Lardner LLP, Detroit (by Jason Conti ) for Elia Companies, LLC.
Brooks Wilkins Sharkey & Turco PLLC, Birmingham (by Keefe A. Brooks ) for the University of Michigan Regents.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except Bernstein and Bolden, JJ.)
Per Curiam. At issue is whether plaintiff's claims must be dismissed due to plaintiff's failure to timely comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 of the Court of Claims Act (the COCA). We hold that they must. In concluding to the contrary, the Court of Appeals erred by applying this Court's decision in Progress Mich v Attorney General to reason that plaintiff could "correct any defect in its complaint in order to comply with [the requirements of MCL 600.6431 and MCL 600.6434 ] during the pendency of the proceedings and in accordance with the court rules" even after the one-year period set forth in MCL 600.6431 had expired. Progress Mich pertained to a distinct statute-of-limitations issue and did not purport to detract from our jurisprudence requiring complete compliance with MCL 600.6431 to avoid dismissal of claims against the state. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of summary disposition in favor of defendant. We deny plaintiff's application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant.
MCL 600.6401 et seq.
Progress Mich v Attorney General , 506 Mich. 74, 94, 97-98, 954 N.W.2d 475 (2020).
Elia Cos., LLC v Univ. of Mich. Regents , 335 Mich App 439, 459, 966 N.W.2d 755 (2021).
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2013, plaintiff, Elia Companies, LLC, entered into a 10-year lease with defendant, the University of Michigan Regents, to obtain space at the Michigan Union, where it would establish a coffee shop. In March 2017, defendant disclosed its plans to renovate the Union. According to plaintiff's complaint, the parties’ lease required that they negotiate a relocation of the leased premises. Plaintiff asserts that, rather than enter into good-faith negotiations, defendant sent it a long list of relatively old grievances on April 17, 2018, and terminated the lease on April 20, 2018, based on plaintiff's alleged default. Defendant ordered plaintiff to vacate the premises, and plaintiff was barred from entering the building.
In August 2018, plaintiff filed an action in the Washtenaw Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract, violations of Michigan's anti-lockout statute, breach of covenant for quiet possession, constructive eviction, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Defendant, over plaintiff's objection, filed a notice of transfer removing the case to the Court of Claims pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3) and MCL 600.6419(1) of the COCA. Defendant ultimately moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10), arguing, in pertinent part, that plaintiff's entire action must be dismissed because plaintiff failed to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 of the COCA. The Court of Claims agreed and dismissed plaintiff's case pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
MCL 600.6431(1) states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, a claim may not be maintained against this state unless the claimant, within 1 year after the claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against this state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies." MCL 600.6431(2) then sets forth the requirements for the claim or notice required under Subsection (1).
The Court of Claims also reasoned that most of plaintiff's claims would have been independently subject to dismissal as a matter of law because they were torts barred by governmental immunity, duplicative, or controlled by the lease contract.
Plaintiff appealed as of right, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part in a published opinion. The panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's ancillary claims on governmental-tort-immunity grounds but reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's contract claim. In doing so, the Court of Appeals relied on this Court's decision in Progress Mich to hold that plaintiff could verify its complaint as required by MCL 600.6431(1) by filing an amended, verified complaint in the ordinary course of the proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the one-year period for filing a verified notice or claim set forth in that statute had lapsed. Defendant sought leave to appeal the reinstatement of plaintiff's contract claim in this Court. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Elia Cos , 335 Mich App at 459-460, 966 N.W.2d 755.
Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by upholding the Court of Claims’ dismissal of its claim alleging statutory conversion, MCL 600.2919a, and its claim that defendant violated the anti-lockout statute, MCL 600.2918. Plaintiff also argued that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied tort immunity under the governmental tort liability act (the GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. , even though defendant's leasing of the commercial space to plaintiff was a proprietary function excluded from the GTLA's immunity, see MCL 691.1413.
A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Issues of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo.
Maiden v Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999).
Fairley v Dep't of Corrections , 497 Mich. 290, 296, 871 N.W.2d 129 (2015).
III. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, we reject plaintiff's argument that it was not required to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 because plaintiff initially filed suit in the circuit court rather than in the Court of Claims. As this Court held in Christie v Wayne State Univ , all parties with claims against the state, except those exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself, must comply with the requirements of MCL 600.6431. This includes claims initiated in the circuit court. Plaintiff did not timely comply with this provision, as it failed to file, in the office of the clerk of the Court of Claims, "a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim" within one year after its claims accrued.
Christie v Wayne State Univ. , 511 Mich 39, 993 N.W.2d 203 (2023).
MCL 600.6431(1). Plaintiff argues that it satisfied the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 with an affidavit from Zaid Elia, plaintiff's managing member, which was filed with plaintiff's November 2018 response to defendant's first motion for summary disposition. While the affidavit was signed and verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths, we agree with the Court of Claims that the affidavit was neither a "written notice of intention to file a claim" nor a "written claim." We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Claims that
[t]he affidavit did not state an intent to file a claim in [the Court of Claims], nor was it the "claim" itself. Nor was the affidavit "file[d] in the office of the clerk of the court of claims," see § 6431(1), in a way that would indicate it was intended to put defendant on notice of a claim. Rather, it was attached at the end of a response to a dispositive motion, and it was intended to offer evidentiary support for the assertions plaintiff made in its briefing. A document offered as evidentiary support to a responsive brief does not satisfy the purposes of the notice requirement. See [McCahan v Brennan , 492 Mich. 730, 744 n 24, 822 N.W.2d 747 (2012) ] (describing the purposes served by the notice required in § 6431).
The Court of Appeals excused plaintiff's failure to timely comply with MCL 600.6431, citing Progress Mich to conclude that plaintiff could "correct any defect in its complaint in order to comply with [the requirements of MCL 600.6431 and MCL 600.6434 ] during the pendency of the proceedings and in accordance with the court rules" even after the one-year period set forth in MCL 600.6431 had expired. This was in error and contrary to our jurisprudence. As we explained in Christie , this Court has stated that adherence to the conditions set forth in MCL 600.6431 is necessary "to successfully expose the defendant state agencies to liability." In the context of the GTLA, this Court in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm held that the 120-day notice provision in MCL 691.1404 of the GTLA "was constitutional," that "no ‘saving construction’ was necessary or allowed," and that "the engrafting of [a] prejudice requirement onto the statute was entirely indefensible." Five years later, this Court held in McCahan v Brennan that the reasoning of Rowland equally applied to the notice provision in MCL 600.6431 of the COCA, holding that "statutory notice requirements must be interpreted and enforced as plainly written and ... no judicially created saving construction is permitted to avoid a clear statutory mandate." Ultimately, the Court concluded that the "[f]iling [of a] notice outside the statutorily required notice period does not constitute compliance with the statute." In 2015, in Fairley v Dep't of Corrections , this Court explained that, by enacting MCL 600.6431, "the Legislature has qualified a claimant's ability to bring a claim against the state by requiring that ‘the claim or notice shall be signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.’ " In holding that the plaintiffs’ claims had to be dismissed, the Court ruled that, when a "notice [is] either unverified but timely or untimely but verified, ... it fails to meet the conditions precedent to maintaining a suit against the [state]." Accordingly, under our well-established jurisprudence, a party bringing suit against the state must fully comply with the terms of MCL 600.6431, regardless of a finding of prejudice. Under this caselaw, plaintiff's failure to comply with MCL 600.6431 mandates the dismissal of its claims. This should have been the end of the Court of Appeals’ inquiry.
Elia Cos , 335 Mich App at 459, 966 N.W.2d 755.
Fairley , 497 Mich. at 298, 871 N.W.2d 129.
Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd. Comm , 477 Mich. 197, 211, 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007).
McCahan , 492 Mich. at 733, 822 N.W.2d 747.
Id. at 747.
Fairley , 497 Mich. at 298, 871 N.W.2d 129, quoting MCL 600.6431(1), as enacted by 1961 PA 236.
Fairley , 497 Mich. at 300, 871 N.W.2d 129.
Instead, the Court of Appeals applied this Court's decision in Progress Mich to conclude that plaintiff's claims need not be dismissed despite plaintiff's failure to timely comply with MCL 600.6431. But Progress Mich did not purport to detract from our jurisprudence requiring complete compliance with MCL 600.6431 to maintain a claim against the state. In Progress Mich , the plaintiff's original complaint filed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) failed to comply with the verification requirement of MCL 600.6434. Unlike in this case, the plaintiff in Progress Mich subsequently filed an amended and verified complaint well before the expiration of the one-year period set forth in MCL 600.6431. Thus, the Progress Mich Court was not tasked with considering whether a party can cure a defective complaint after that one-year deadline has lapsed. The distinct issue presented was whether the initial filing of the unverified complaint tolled the applicable statute of limitations to prevent dismissal of the case on statute-of-limitations grounds. This Court held that an unverified complaint can toll the 180-day FOIA limitations period, as "nothing in the language of [FOIA] suggests that the verification requirement of MCL 600.6434 (or MCL 600.6431 ) has any bearing on the question of when an action is commenced or whether the statutory period of limitations is tolled." The Court did not alter its previous holdings that compliance with MCL 600.6431 is required to avoid dismissal of claims against the state. The Court of Appeals thus misapplied the rationale of Progress Mich to excuse plaintiff's failure to comply with MCL 600.6431.
MCL 15.231 et seq.
MCL 600.6434(2) of the COCA provides that a party's complaint "shall be verified," and MCL 600.6434(3) and (4) provide instruction as to how the complaint shall be served and filed. The Court in Progress Mich stated that the "[d]efendant did not address verification under MCL 600.6434 separately from verification under MCL 600.6431, and while the statutes function slightly differently, there is no difference between their verification requirements." Progress Mich , 506 Mich. at 93, 954 N.W.2d 475.
Progress Mich , 506 Mich. at 98, 954 N.W.2d 475.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 mandates dismissal of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of summary disposition in favor of defendant. We deny plaintiff's application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant.
In light of our conclusion that plaintiff's claims fail due to plaintiff's failure to comply with MCL 600.6431, we need not consider the issues set forth in plaintiff's cross-appeal.
Clement, C.J., and Zahra, Viviano, Cavanagh, and Welch, JJ., concurred.
Bernstein, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case due to a familial relationship.
Bolden, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court considered it before she assumed office.