Opinion
# 2015-015-056 Claim No. 125391 Motion No. M-86275 Cross-Motion No. CM-86702
05-26-2015
JACKSON v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Erwin Jackson, Pro Se Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Roberto Barbosa Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
False Imprisonment claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where inmate had not yet succeeded in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 and the Senetnce and Committment Order directed his imprisonement.
Case information
| UID: | 2015-015-056 |
| Claimant(s): | ERWIN JACKSON |
| Claimant short name: | JACKSON |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 125391 |
| Motion number(s): | M-86275 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | CM-86702 |
| Judge: | FRANCIS T. COLLINS |
| Claimant's attorney: | Erwin Jackson, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Roberto Barbosa Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | May 26, 2015 |
| City: | Saratoga Springs |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds the claim is premature and fails to state a cause of action. Claimant cross-moves for the imposition of sanctions as the result of defendant's allegedly frivolous conduct in moving for summary judgment prematurely.
Claimant seeks damages arising from his continued imprisonment notwithstanding the sentencing judge's alleged failure to specifically direct his commitment to the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS).
The Department of Correctional Services and the Division of Parole were merged in 2011 to become the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (see L. 2011, ch 62, § 1, subpart A).
Claimant was convicted on nine counts of first degree robbery and one count of fourth degree conspiracy and was initially sentenced to a term of imprisonment on April 30, 2008. The sentence was vacated by the Appellate Division, Second Department, on the ground the County Court erred in finding that the People had not proven the claimant's two predicate violent felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and remitted the matter for resentencing (see People v Jackson, 65 AD3d 1164 [2d Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 939 [2010]). Claimant was resentenced as a persistent violent felony offender on October 26, 2009. Review of the sentencing minutes indicates that claimant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment on each of the counts for which he was convicted, and that the Sentence and Commitment Order directs claimant's commitment to DOCCS' (then known as the Department of Correctional Services) custody "until released in accordance with law" (defendant's Exhibit B).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant contends that insofar as a cause of action for wrongful confinement accrues only upon termination of the allegedly wrongful confinement, and claimant remains incarcerated pursuant to his sentence of imprisonment, his cause of action for false imprisonment is premature. With regard to claimant's cause of action for negligence, defendant contends that DOCCS acted in accordance with the Sentence and Commitment Order which is consistent with the sentence pronounced by the Judge following the decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department.
Claimant contends in opposition to the motion and in support of his cross motion that defendant's motion is procedurally defective in that this Court's preliminary conference Order directed that "any motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 is to be made returnable no later than 60 days after the filing of the note of issue" (claimant's Exhibit A).
"The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Such a showing must be made by the tender of proof in admissible form (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Failure to establish a prima facie showing requires denial of a motion seeking summary judgment, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Once the movant has made the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion "to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324).
As a threshold matter, resolution of claimant's false imprisonment cause of action would require review and annulment of the underlying Sentence and Commitment Order which the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to do (see Court of Claims Act § 9; Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231 [1988]; Green v State of New York, 90 AD3d 1577 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 901 [2012]; Hoffman v State of New York, 42 AD3d 641 [3d Dept 2007]; Guy v State of New York, 18 AD3d 936 [3d Dept 2005]; compare People ex rel. Hurley v Jubert, 56 AD3d 915 [3d Dept 2008]). As claimant is unable to relitigate the propriety of his confinement in a claim for money damages in the Court of Claims (Lublin v State of New York, 135 Misc 2d 419, 420 [Ct Cl 1987], affd 135 AD2d 1155 [1st Dept 1987], lv denied 71 NY2d 802 [1988]), the false imprisonment cause of action must be dismissed as a matter of law. Claimant's recourse is a habeas corpus proceeding in the Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR article 70, which he is apparently pursuing (see defendant's Exhibit C). In its present posture, however, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
A corollary of these well-settled principles is the rule that a cause of action for false imprisonment does not accrue until the date the confinement terminates (Bellissimo v Mitchell, 122 AD3d 560 [2d Dept 2014]; Charnis v Shohet, 2 AD3d 663 [2003]; Collins v McMillan, 102 AD2d 860 [2d Dept 1984]). As defendant correctly contends, therefore, commencement of the instant action is premature until claimant is released from prison.
Moreover, even without a jurisdictional impediment, the claim would be subject to dismissal on the merits. Where, as here, " 'a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged' " (Miller v State of New York, 124 AD3d 997, 999 [3d Dept 2015] [citation omitted]; Hudson v State of New York, 115 AD3d 1020, 1022 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 907 [2014]). The Sentence and Commitment Order here, being facially valid as set forth below, precludes imposition of liability for false imprisonment (defendant's Exhibit B).
To the extent claimant alleges a negligence cause of action, it too lacks merit as a matter of law. Claimant's commitment to DOCCS' custody was in accordance with the Sentence and Commitment Order directing his commitment to DOCCS' custody "until released in accordance with law" (defendant's Exhibit B). This directive was consistent with the Judge's sentence and complied with the applicable law (see Penal Law § 70.20; see also People ex rel. Hurley v Jubert, supra). As a result, defendant established its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the negligence cause of action as a matter of law (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center, supra).
Claimant's contention in opposition to the defendant's motion and in support of his cross motion for sanctions, that defendant's motion was prematurely interposed, misconstrues the Order setting forth the cut-off date for summary judgment motions. The Order of this Court dated January 29, 2015 directed that "any motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 is to be made returnable no later than 60 days after the filing of the note of issue" (claimant's Exhibit A). While the Order set a date beyond which a summary judgment motion may not be made returnable, it did not preclude summary judgment motions before that time.
Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgement is granted and the claim is dismissed. Claimant's cross motion is denied.
May 26, 2015
Saratoga Springs, New York
FRANCIS T. COLLINS
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Notice of Motion dated February 3, 2015;
2. Affirmation of Roberto Barbosa dated February 3, 2015 with Exhibits A through E;
3. Unsworn statement dated February 9, 2015 submitted in opposition to defendant's motion and in support of claimant's cross motion for the imposition of sanctions, with Exhibit A.