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In Miller, however, the inmate was convicted of a drug-related charge and, thus, was not subject to the Sex Offender Registration Act residency mandate.
Summary of this case from People v. Superintendent of Sullivan Corr. FacilityOpinion
01-15-2015
Robert MILLER, Respondent, v. STATE of New York, Appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Zainab A. Chaudhry of counsel), for appellant. Stoll, Glickman & Bellina, LLP, New York City (Nicole Bellina of counsel), for respondent.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Zainab A. Chaudhry of counsel), for appellant.
Stoll, Glickman & Bellina, LLP, New York City (Nicole Bellina of counsel), for respondent.
Before: McCARTHY, J.P., GARRY, LYNCH and CLARK, JJ.
Opinion
CLARK, J. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Court of Claims (Ferreira, J.), entered August 13, 2012, upon a decision of the court following a bifurcated trial in favor of claimant on the issue of liability, and (2) from a judgment of said court, entered May 7, 2013, upon a decision of the court in favor of claimant on the issue of damages. Beginning in October 2007, claimant was jailed as the result of a pending indictment charging him with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. In March 2009, he pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and was released from custody pending sentencing. On May 4, 2009, he was sentenced to a prison term of 1 ½ years to be followed by postrelease supervision of 1 ½ years. Claimant had served his prison sentence in full at that point, but was returned to custody for processing upon the understanding that he would be released the next day. Notwithstanding those assurances, he was held by the New York City Department of Corrections for several days and, on May 12, 2009, was transferred to the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS). DOCCS officials quickly realized that claimant had reached the maximum expiration date of his prison sentence, but failed to release him until June 3, 2009 so that they could finalize the conditions of his postrelease supervision.
Claimant thereafter filed a notice of claim alleging that defendant, through DOCCS, had violated various rights afforded him by the N.Y. Constitution, falsely imprisoned him and negligently subjected him to an unauthorized period of imprisonment. The Court of Claims conducted a bifurcated nonjury trial and, in August 2012, found defendant liable upon the wrongful confinement claim. The Court of Claims then heard evidence on the issue of damages and, in a judgment entered in May 2013, awarded claimant damages in the amount of $35,000 with statutory interest. Defendant now appeals from both judgments.
Dealing first with the issue of liability, in order to succeed on a claim of false imprisonment or unlawful confinement, claimant was required to show “that (1) defendant intended to confine him, (2) he was conscious of the confinement, (3) he did not consent to the confinement, and (4) such confinement was not otherwise privileged” (Hudson v. State of New York, 115 A.D.3d 1020, 1022, 981 N.Y.S.2d 479 [2014], lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 907, 2014 WL 2922238 [2014] ; see Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 97 N.Y.2d 78, 85, 735 N.Y.S.2d 868, 761 N.E.2d 560 [2001] ; Moulton v. State of New York, 114 A.D.3d 115, 119–120, 977 N.Y.S.2d 797 [2013] ). The first three elements have undoubtedly been satisfied and, accordingly, the question distills to whether claimant's confinement by DOCCS was privileged. The facts leading up to his detention are not in dispute and, after reviewing them, we agree with the Court of Claims that the confinement was not privileged.
Claimant was sentenced to a prison term as the result of his conviction and, “where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged” (Holmberg v. County of Albany, 291 A.D.2d 610, 612, 738 N.Y.S.2d 701 [2002], lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278, 773 N.E.2d 1016 [2002] ; see Jackson v. State of New York, 94 A.D.3d 1166, 1168, 942 N.Y.S.2d 238 [2012] ). That being said, DOCCS was “ ‘conclusively bound’ by the terms of the sentence and commitment order,” which unambiguously directed that claimant be released after 1 ½ years of confinement (Matter of McCullaugh v. DeSimone, 111 A.D.3d 1011, 1011, 974 N.Y.S.2d 306 [2013], quoting Middleton v. State of New York, 54 A.D.2d 450, 452, 389 N.Y.S.2d 159 [1976], affd. for reasons stated below 43 N.Y.2d 678, 401 N.Y.S.2d 65, 371 N.E.2d 827 [1977] ; see Matter of Murray v. Goord, 1 N.Y.3d 29, 32, 769 N.Y.S.2d 165, 801 N.E.2d 385 [2003] ). DOCCS continued to confine claimant after that period had ended and, given the absence of any order that required it to do so, its actions were not privileged (see Moulton v. State of New York, 114 A.D.3d at 122–123, 977 N.Y.S.2d 797 ; compare Donald v. State of New York, 17 N.Y.3d 389, 394, 929 N.Y.S.2d 552, 953 N.E.2d 790 [2011] [detention stemmed from valid process revoking postrelease supervision and was privileged, even though term of postrelease supervision itself was later found to be invalid] ).
Defendant's further contention, that the need to finalize the terms of claimant's postrelease supervision conflicted with the expiration of his prison sentence, and somehow authorized his continued detention under the terms of the sentence and commitment order, is not well taken. Claimant was not confined after the maximum expiration date of his prison sentence because of any “conflicting mandates” in the commitment order, but rather because DOCCS officials chose to hold him while they belatedly finalized the terms of his postrelease supervision (see Executive Law § 259–i[2] ; Penal Law § 70.45[3] ). Defendant's related contention that DOCCS officials acted within their discretion by confining claimant until those terms had been finalized is also without merit, as it is well settled that DOCCS has no jurisdiction to extend or modify a prison sentence (see People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198, 218, 899 N.Y.S.2d 76, 925 N.E.2d 878 [2010], cert. denied 562 U.S. 947, 131 S.Ct. 125, 178 L.Ed.2d 242 [2010] ; Matter of Garner v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 10 N.Y.3d 358, 362, 859 N.Y.S.2d 590, 889 N.E.2d 467 [2008] ; cf. Donald v. State of New York, 17 N.Y.3d at 395–396, 929 N.Y.S.2d 552, 953 N.E.2d 790 ). Thus, defendant was properly found liable.
Turning to the issue of damages, “[a]s a general rule, the measure of damages for false ... imprisonment is such a sum as will fairly and reasonably compensate the injured person for injuries caused by defendant's wrongful act, including damages for physical and mental suffering” (Woodard v. City of Albany, 81 A.D.2d 947, 947, 439 N.Y.S.2d 701 [1981] ; see Guion v. Associated Dry Goods Corp. [Lord & Taylor Div.], 56 A.D.2d 798, 798, 393 N.Y.S.2d 8 [1977], affd. 43 N.Y.2d 876, 403 N.Y.S.2d 465, 374 N.E.2d 364 [1978] ). According deference to the trial court's finding that claimant credibly described his experience during the period that he was wrongfully confined by DOCCS (see Smith v. State of New York, 121 A.D.3d 1358, 1358–1359, 995 N.Y.S.2d 329 [2014] ), we can only categorize that experience as Kafkaesque. Claimant was well aware that his prison sentence had expired, but DOCCS officials ignored his demands to know why he was being held, with claimant only learning of his release shortly before it occurred. Moreover, because of the interference of other inmates, he was unable to contact his family members and advise them of his ordeal. Claimant further lived in self-imposed isolation because of his fear of other inmates and, overall, the circumstances of his incarceration exacerbated his preexisting posttraumatic stress disorder. Defendant now argues that, notwithstanding the loss of liberty and mental torment endured by claimant during the three-week period that he was wrongfully confined, an award of $35,000 in damages was disproportionately high. After considering the facts of this case and the damage awards in comparable cases, we disagree and “find that the award ... does not deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation” (Kinge v. State of New York, 79 A.D.3d 1473, 1481, 915 N.Y.S.2d 186 [2010] ; see CPLR 5501[c] ; Martin v. State of New York, 39 A.D.3d 905, 908, 833 N.Y.S.2d 706 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 804, 840 N.Y.S.2d 764, 872 N.E.2d 877 [2007] ).
ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed, without costs.
McCARTHY, J.P., GARRY and LYNCH, JJ., concur.