Opinion
05-22-00587-CR
03-18-2024
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F- 1976100-N
Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KEN MOLBERG JUSTICE
A jury convicted appellant Dennis Jimenez Hernandez of capital murder. Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the trial court automatically sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In two issues, appellant argues (1) the evidence to support his conviction was insufficient and (2) we should modify the judgment to reflect appellant pleaded not guilty. The State argues the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction but agrees we should modify the judgment as appellant requests and in other ways.
See Tex. Penal Code § 12.31(a)(2) ("An individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony in a case in which the state does not seek the death penalty shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for . . . life without parole, if the individual committed the offense when 18 years of age or older.").
Because we conclude the evidence was sufficient, we overrule appellant's first issue. We sustain appellant's second issue and the State's cross-point to the extent that we order the judgment modified to correct the errors identified by appellant and the State. We overrule the State's request to abate this appeal to allow the trial court to correct the judgment. We affirm the judgment as modified.
I. Background
On November 14, 2019, the State charged appellant with capital murder in an indictment that alleged appellant, on or about June 16, 2019, in the County of Dallas, State of Texas, did
unlawfully then and there intentionally cause the death of ANDY LONGORIA, an individual, hereinafter called deceased, by STABBING [HIM] WITH A SHARP OBJECT AND AN UNKNOWN OBJECT, A DEADLY WEAPON, THE EXACT NATURE AND DESCRIPTION OF WHICH IS UNKNOWN AND UNKNOWABLE TO THE GRAND JURY, and [appellant] was then and there in the course of committing and attempting to commit the offense of ROBBERY of said deceased.
In his brief, appellant describes several facts as undisputed, including that "Longoria died as a result of [fourteen] stab wounds [appellant] had inflicted . . . that resulted in Longoria's having bled to death."
Appellant testified during the guilt/innocence phase at trial. Appellant admitted he stabbed Longoria with a pocketknife, and when asked why he stabbed Longoria, appellant answered, "Because [Longoria] was - because he was on top of me. He was trying to abuse me, so I defended myself." According to appellant, the stabbing occurred during a 30-40 second physical struggle in which Longoria tried to "rape" or "abuse" him while appellant was sleeping on Longoria's sofa. Appellant testified Longoria attacked him with the knife, but that he was able to wrestle the knife away from Longoria and then use it to stab him.
When describing the moments immediately after the stabbing, appellant testified he washed his hands, grabbed Longoria's phone, wallet, and keys to Longoria's vehicle, left quickly and immediately, and drove away in Longoria's car. Appellant threw away Longoria's phone, wallet, and debit card in an alley and later sold Longoria's car for $200. Appellant testified he tried to cross the border into Mexico on a bus "because [he] was afraid the police were looking for [him] and [he] did not know what to do." Appellant stated he gave Border Patrol a fake name when they stopped him from crossing.
Witnesses at trial testified appellant needed money to take care of his pregnant girlfriend. A friend of Longoria's testified that a few hours before his death, Longoria complained appellant had been asking him for money to support his pregnant girlfriend. Appellant's sister testified that appellant did not have a steady job. And during his testimony, appellant stated he had planned to break off his relationship with Longoria on the night that he ended up stabbing him to death because he wanted to spend more time with his girlfriend.
Appellant, however, denied having an intent to steal anything, denied taking cash, and denied having a plan to hurt Longoria. He testified he is a peaceful person, but during rebuttal, the State called one of appellant's former girlfriends, who testified appellant hit her in the head and the eye and choked her. She described appellant as abusive and controlling.
The trial court instructed the jury on capital murder, murder, robbery, aggravated robbery, and self-defense. The jury found appellant guilty of capital murder. Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the trial court automatically sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and entered judgment consistent with the jury's guilty verdict, except that the judgment form was titled "Judgment of Conviction by Court-Waiver of Jury Trial." In the portion of the judgment stating, "Plea to Offense," the judgment also incorrectly stated, "GUILTY[.]"
Appellant filed a motion for new trial alleging the verdict was "contrary to the law and evidence." The trial court overruled the motion.
The trial court certified appellant's right to appeal, and he timely appealed.
II. Issues and Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the evidence
In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and asks us to reverse the judgment or vacate it and render an order of acquittal. While he does not specifically challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on any particular element of the offense, the thrust of his argument is that "the record fails to contain evidence that the guilty verdict of [his] having killed Longoria without justification was rational to the high degree of certainty required by the beyond-a-reasonable doubt burden of proof the State had to meet." We disagree.
1. Standard of review and applicable law
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a rational jury could find each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of a witness's testimony and the weight to assign that testimony. Id. at 319; Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Thus, the jury can believe all, some, or none of a witness's testimony. Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855. If the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Further, we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally under this standard. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant's guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a defendant's guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
As charged in this case, a person commits the offense of capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of unlawfully appropriating property with the intent to deprive the owner of property, and with the intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Id. § 29.02(a)(2).
The court of criminal appeals held that a murder is committed "in the course of committing" an offense listed in section 19.03(a)(2) when it is committed in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the offense. McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (citing Riles v. State, 595 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). The court of criminal appeals further noted in McGee that the Court "has held numerous times that this aggravating element is sufficiently proven if the State proves the robbery occurred immediately after the commission of the murder." McGee, 774 S.W.2d at 234 (citations omitted). Thus, a robbery occurring immediately after a murder will support an inference that the murder was committed in the course of committing the robbery. See Cooper v. State, 67 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (robbery case following McGee, 774 S.W.2d at 234); see also Ibanez v. State, 749 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (holding nexus requirement for capital murder involving murder in course of robbery same as nexus requirement in robbery offense between assault and theft). Even in the absence of any other evidence of a nexus between murder and robbery, the "natural inference allowed by McGee" will support a conviction. See Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 224.
To prevail on a claim of self-defense with the use of deadly force, a defendant must prove: (1) he would have been justified in using force against the other person; and (2) it was reasonable to believe that "deadly force [was] immediately necessary [for protection] against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force." Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a). A person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree that person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself from another's use or attempted use of unlawful force. Id. § 9.31(a). Deadly force is "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury." Id. § 9.01(3).
In a claim of self-defense, the defendant bears the burden to produce some evidence that supports his claim of self-defense. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Once a defendant produces some evidence raising the issue of self-defense, the State bears the burden of persuasion to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were not justified. Id.; Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). To meet its burden of persuasion, the State is not required to produce additional evidence. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. The burden of persuasion requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If the jury finds the defendant guilty, it has made an implicit finding against any defensive theory raised by the defendant. Id. at 914; see also Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; London v. State, 325 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2008, pet. ref'd) (holding a jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding rejecting the defendant's self-defense theory).
Accordingly, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's implicit rejection of his self-defense claim, "we look not to whether the State presented evidence which refuted appellant's self-defense testimony, but rather we determine whether after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt." Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19.
2. The evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction and the jury's rejection of his self-defense claim.
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding of the essential elements of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt; appellant concedes the evidence is undisputed that he intentionally stabbed Longoria, causing his death. We agree. During appellant's testimony, he admitted intentionally stabbing Longoria multiple times. And the medical examiner testified Longoria bled to death as a result of his fourteen stab wounds.
Additionally, appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict that he caused Longoria's death in the course of committing robbery. Instead, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's rejection of his self-defense claim. This is consistent with his requesting a self-defense instruction at trial since "a defensive instruction is only appropriate when the defendant's defensive evidence essentially admits to every element of the offense including the culpable mental state but interposes [a] justification to excuse the otherwise criminal conduct." Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore, we examine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's rejection of appellant's claim that he acted in self-defense.
At trial, appellant claimed he did not "plan" to rob Longoria. Yet during his testimony, he admitted he took Longoria's cash-filled wallet, cell phone, and car as he fled the scene. On appeal, appellant does not argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict that he caused Longoria's death in the course of committing robbery. The theft of property occurring immediately after an assault gives rise to an inference that the assault was intended to facilitate the theft. See Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 224 Accordingly, even assuming appellant had no motive or intent to steal any of Longoria's property before or during the murder as appellant suggested at trial, because appellant stole Longoria's property immediately after murdering him, there is sufficient evidence that appellant murdered Longoria "in the course of committing theft." Id.
Appellant testified that as he slept on Longoria's living room sofa, he awoke with Longoria on top of him attempting to remove his pants. According to appellant, Longoria demanded appellant engage in sex with him and when he refused, Longoria brandished a switchblade and attacked him. Appellant claimed he was acting in self-defense when he disarmed Longoria and stabbed him to death. The evidence, however, supports the jury's rejection of appellant's claim he was forced to immediately use deadly force against Longoria to protect himself from Longoria's use of deadly force. See Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(a).
For instance, appellant testified he stabbed Longoria from a seated position because Longoria was on top of him. Yet, the medical examiner testified Longoria's stab wounds were inflicted in a downward angle. And according to the medical examiner, stab wounds inflicted by a person in a seated position onto a person above him, would likely result in upward stab wounds on the victim's body.
Additionally, the jury heard testimony from a friend of Longoria whom he called the night he was killed. Longoria's friend told the jury that Longoria sounded very scared and screamed, "[C]all the police. [Appellant] is going to kill me. Call the police."
We also note appellant testified Longoria was determined to have sex with him to the point of brandishing a switchblade in an effort to force him to engage in sex. However, appellant testified Longoria had never forced himself on appellant during the entirety of their four-year-long relationship. Further, the jury saw photos of Longoria, when he was found by police, lying lengthwise on the sofa, fully clothed from the waist down with his pants buttoned up and his belt buckled.
A rational juror could have inferred from the angle of Longoria's stab wounds, the content of Longoria's phone call to his friend for help, Longoria's history of not demanding sex from appellant during their entire four-year relationship, and Longoria's full state of dress at the time of his death, Longoria did not attack appellant with deadly force and thus, appellant's use of deadly force against Longoria was not justified. See Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a).
Moreover, a rational juror could have viewed appellant's actions following the stabbing as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. The jury learned that after appellant stabbed Longoria to death, he washed his hands, took Longoria's wallet filled with cash, locked Longoria's front door as he left Longoria's home, and fled in Longoria's car. Appellant admitted he took Longoria's cell phone, so Longoria "could not call anyone" for help, and that he never called Longoria to check on him. And when appellant learned law enforcement was looking for him, he attempted to flee to Mexico using a fake name. The jury could have interpreted this testimony as evidence of appellant's consciousness of guilt. See Hammock v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 918 n.33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (observing evidence of a consciousness of guilt includes secretive actions, flight after an offense, and attempts to hide evidence).
Finally, from the witnesses' testimony, the jurors could have found appellant had a motive to kill and rob Longoria-his desire to obtain Longoria's property to support his pregnant girlfriend. Appellant testified he had planned to end his relationship with Longoria the very night he killed him so he could spend more time with his pregnant girlfriend. A friend of Longoria's testified that a few hours before his death, Longoria complained appellant had been asking him for money to support his pregnant girlfriend. The same friend testified Longoria was carrying cash the night appellant killed Longoria. Longoria's sister testified appellant was always "bugging" Longoria for money and would get upset if Longoria did not give him money. She also testified appellant stole money from Longoria. And appellant's sister told the jury appellant did not have a stable job. Given the evidence of appellant's desire to end his relationship with Longoria and his need for money to support his pregnant girlfriend, the jury could have reasonably inferred appellant murdered Longoria to steal his money and property to support his pregnant girlfriend and not because Longoria attacked him with a knife to obtain sex.
In our review, we defer to the jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, and the jury in this case could have found the elements of the charged offense of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt and disbelieved appellant's claim of self-defense. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 910 (holding as the fact finder and judge of the credibility of the witnesses, the jury was free disbelieve the testimony tending to show the victim had been the aggressor, thereby rationally determining the appellant's use of deadly force was not immediately necessary); Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd) (noting defendant's testimony does not conclusively prove a claim of self-defense because the jury could reject the testimony). We overrule appellant's first issue.
B. Errors in the judgment
In his second issue, appellant argues we should reform or modify the judgment to reflect appellant pleaded not guilty. The State agrees with appellant and points out other errors in the judgment as well.
1. Applicable law
We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so. Tex.R.App.P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd) (en banc). The record supports the requested modifications and we, therefore, agree with appellant and the State that the judgment must be corrected.
2. Corrections to the judgment
Appellant and the State ask this Court to modify the judgment to accurately reflect appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charged offense of capital murder. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.01 § 1(3). We agree the judgment should be corrected to reflect appellant pleaded not guilty.
Additionally, in what it describes as a cross-point, the State asks we abate the appeal to allow the trial court to remedy the multiple errors in the judgment. The State points out pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.01, the judgment was required to contain the following missing elements: (1) the case was tried by a jury; (2) the verdict of the jury; (3) the jury was charged by the court; (4) the evidence was submitted to the jury; (5) the jury found appellant guilty of the offense as charged in the indictment, and (6) that there was no plea bargain as to appellant's sentence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. § 1(4)-(7), (20). We deny the State's request to abate this case to the trial court, but we agree the judgment should be corrected to contain the information set out above.
Finally, the State requests we modify the judgment to reflect the statutorily correct sentence of life without parole. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.31 (a)(2). We agree.
Accordingly, we modify the judgment to reflect (1) appellant pleaded not guilty to the charged offense, (2) the case was tried by a jury; (3) the verdict of the jury; (4) the jury was charged by the court; (5) the evidence was submitted to the jury; (6) the jury found appellant guilty of the offense as charged in the indictment, (7) there was no plea bargain as to appellant's sentence; and (8) appellant's sentence is life without parole.
III. Conclusion
We overrule appellant's first issue, sustain appellant's second issue, sustain the State's cross-point in part, and affirm the trial court's judgment as modified herein.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
to reflect (1) appellant pleaded not guilty to the charged offense, (2) the case was tried by a jury; (3) the verdict of the jury; (4) the jury was charged by the court; (5) the evidence was submitted to the jury; (6) the jury found appellant guilty of the offense as charged in the indictment, (7) there was no plea bargain as to appellant's sentence; and (8) appellant's sentence is life without parole.
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.