Opinion
No. 05-09-01295-CV
Opinion Filed January 6, 2010.
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 10, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. MA04-42608.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, MURPHY, and MYERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2004, following appellant's guilty plea to assault involving family violence, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed appellant on community supervision for one year. On August 6, 2009, appellant filed a petition for non-disclosure pursuant to section 411.081 of the Texas Government Code. There is a docket sheet entry dated September 18, 2009 that states, "Petition for nondisclosure is denied." However, the record does not contain an order denying the petition for non-disclosure.
Due to the absence of an order and the fact that this Court has previously determined it had no jurisdiction over an appeal from an order denying a petition for non-disclosure, we directed the parties to file letter briefs addressing our jurisdiction over the appeal. Neither appellant nor the State filed letter briefs. For the reasons set out below, we conclude we have no jurisdiction over this appeal.
Appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments and such interlocutory orders as the legislature deems appealable. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Ruiz v. Ruiz, 946 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ). A docket sheet entry is a memorandum made for the convenience of the trial court and the court clerk. Bailey-Mason v. Mason, 122 S.W.3d 894, 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). Docket sheet entries are inherently unreliable because they lack the formality of judgments and orders. Id. Thus, a docket sheet entry alone is insufficient to constitute a judgment or decree of the court. Id.
Moreover, even had there been an order, we conclude we have no jurisdiction over this appeal. Section 411.081 of the government code does not specifically provide this Court with jurisdiction over an order denying a petition for non-disclosure. See generally Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 411.081 (Vernon Supp. 2009); see Huth v. State, 241 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh'g); Browning v. State, 2009 WL 294909, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam); Rado v. State, 2007 WL 1816886, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 27, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); Crowder v. State, 2007 WL 1829648, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 26, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). Further, nothing in the record reflects any amount in controversy that would provide the Court with general appellate jurisdiction. See generally Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (Vernon Supp. 2009); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.220(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The only amount involved was the filing fee for the petition, which cannot be used to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (amount in controversy); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.220(a) (same); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 411.081(d) (filing fee for petition for non-disclosure); see also Huth, 206 S.W.3d at 208; Browning, 2009 WL 294909, at *1; Rado, 2007 WL 1829648, at * 1; Crowder, 2007 WL 1816886, at ** 1-2. Thus, we conclude we have no specific statutory or general jurisdiction over this appeal.
We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.