Opinion
14-22-00448-CR
03-11-2025
EX PARTE GUILLERMO GAYOSSO, Appellant
On Appeal from the 506th Judicial District Court Waller County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 22-02-17997
Panel consists of Justices Wilson, Hart, and McLaughlin.
OPINION ON REMAND
Tonya McLaughlin, Justice
On remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals, we consider whether the trial court reviewed the public safety report required by the Damon Allen Act. This court previously concluded that the trial court did not err in denying habeas-corpus relief and setting bond at $250,000. Ex parte Gayosso, No. 14-22-00448-CR, 2023 WL 3530828, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 18, 2023) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Gayosso I). As part of its analysis, this court considered sua sponte whether the trial court complied with the Damon Allen Act, observed that the record was silent as to whether the trial court reviewed the public safety report, but ultimately determined the trial court considered all the required statutory factors including appellant's criminal background. Id. at *3 n.3. Concluding this court erred because it did not "consider the complete record that was before the trial court in determining whether the bail determination was an abuse of discretion," the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated our prior decision and remanded for further proceedings. Ex parte Gayosso, 685 S.W.3d 100, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (Gayosso II).
See Damon Allen Act, 87th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 11, § 5, arts. 17.021, .022, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 3937, 3939-3940 (codified as Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 17.021, .022).
We hold that this court erred in Gayosso I by raising compliance with the Damon Allen Act sua sponte. Because the issue was not preserved, it should not have been addressed. But given the unique procedural background of this case, which has already raised the questions of error and harm, we requested that the trial court make findings of fact as to whether the trial court reviewed the public safety report so that we could determine the complete record before the trial court. The trial court filed findings of fact establishing that the public safety report was not reviewed. Therefore, the trial court erred. This error was harmless because appellant's substantial rights were not affected. The trial court, otherwise, properly considered appellant's criminal history, immigration status and all the other required considerations. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting bond.
I. Damon Allen Act
The Damon Allen Act created a "public safety report system," developed and maintained by the Office of Court Administration of the Texas Judicial System, which compiles background information about defendants for use by magistrates at article 17.15 bail hearings. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 17.021, .022. A magistrate shall "consider the public safety report before setting bail[.]" Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.022(d)(1). The Court of Criminal Appeals made clear that a trial court must review the public safety report in making decisions about a defendant's bail: "If the trial court did not consider the public safety report required by statute, then it erred, though the court of appeals might be able to consider the issues of preservation and harm." Gayosso II, 685 S.W.3d at 102-03.
The public safety report system must contain the following information, which is the only information that may be included in a public safety report:
(1) "the requirements for setting bail under Article 17.15;"
(2) "the defendant's name and date of birth or, if impracticable, other identifying information, the cause number of the case, if available, and the offense for which the defendant was arrested;"
(3) "information on the eligibility of the defendant for a personal bond;"
(4) "information regarding the applicability of any required or discretionary bond conditions;" and
(5) the criminal history of the defendant in summary form, including information about:
(A) previous convictions;
(B) pending charges;
(C) previous sentences imposing confinement;
(D) convictions or pending charges for:
(i) offenses involving violence as defined by Article 17.03; or
(ii) offenses involving violence directed against a peace officer; and
(E) any previous failures of the defendant to appear in court after release on bail.Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.021(b), (d)(3).
A. Preservation
In its previous opinion, this court raised and considered: (1) whether the Damon Allen Act applied and (2) whether the trial court reviewed the public safety report in compliance with the Damon Allen Act. Gayosso I, 2023 WL 3530828, at *3 n.3. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has tasked this court with considering preservation and harm, we begin with preservation.
No party raised compliance with the Damon Allen Act on appeal. This court should not have sua sponte raised the issue. Failure to review a public safety report is not a structural or fundamental error, nor does the statute require courts of appeal to confirm that a trial court has reviewed the public safety report. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 17.021, .022; cf. Cruz v. State, 698 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (addressing statute requiring trial court to hold ability-to-pay inquires and holding that they are "not fundamental to the adjudicatory system"). Ordinarily our analysis of this issue would end here because the issue was not preserved for appeal, but we consider error and harm as it has now been raised and discussed in this case.
B. Error
Because the appellate record was silent as to whether the trial court reviewed and considered the public safety report, on remand, we abated the appeal for the trial court to make findings of fact on the issue. We specifically requested findings addressing (1) whether the trial court considered the public safety report and if so (2) whether the report still exists, and, if the report does not exist, (3) when it was destroyed.
The trial court returned its findings of fact confirming that it did not review the public safety report at the June 2022 hearing. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred. See Gayosso II, 685 S.W.3d at 102.
The presiding trial judge explained that he had not received his training to use the public safety report system in June 2022. However, this explanation did not foreclose the possibility the trial court could have reviewed the report with the assistance of the Office of Court Administration or another authorized user in the county.
C. Harm
Under the applicable harm analysis, we disregard the trial court's error if it did not affect appellant's substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). "Analogizing this situation to one in which the trial court has failed to consider a presentence investigation report in assessing punishment, we assess the effect that the trial court's error had on its bail decision by considering the entire record, the nature of the evidence supporting the bail decision, the character of the error . . . and how the error might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case." Ex parte Delong, 686 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2024, no pet.); see generally Whitelaw v. State, 29 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (discussing that error in failure to order preparation of presentence investigation report is subject to review for harm); Smith v. State, 223 S.W.3d 690, 695 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (noting that "the violation of a mandatory statute does not, by itself, call for the reversal of a conviction").
As discussed in Gayosso I in more detail, the trial court received evidence at the hearing that appellant had no previous criminal history. There was evidence that appellant was not a citizen of the United States and was subject to an immigration hold. There was also evidence in the form of affidavits of appellant's good character and work ethic. The trial court had appellant's identifying information. The public safety report would have told the trial court of appellant's criminal history, of which, there was evidence at June 2022 hearing.
The trial court had from other sources some, if not all, of the information that would have been in the public safety report, and appellant was not harmed by the trial court's not having the remaining information. In this situation, the only harm that could have resulted to appellant from the lack of a report would have been if the report showed that appellant had no prior criminal history and if the trial court set a higher bond because it mistakenly believed that appellant had a more extensive criminal history than he did. The evidence before the trial court in June 2022 was that appellant had no criminal history. Therefore, the lack of a public safety report did not harm appellant by resulting in a higher bond. Accordingly, the trial court's failure to consider the public safety report did not affect appellant's substantial rights.
II. Bond Determination
We turn now to the merits of the appeal. Appellant argued that the trial court erred by: (1) denying relief pursuant to article 17.151 because the State did not make a prima facie case that it was ready for trial within the statutory 90-day time period, and (2) the State was not ready for hearing within the 90-day time period provided in article 17.151. Our analysis and conclusions with respect to issues 1 and 2 were not implicated by the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion and remain unchanged. Gayosso I, 2023 WL 3530828, at *1-3.
In issue 3, appellant argued the trial court abused its discretion by setting bond at $250,000. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, we previously concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting bond in the amount of $250,000. Gayosso I, 2023 WL 3530828, at *6. Having now reviewed the full record before the trial court, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court reviewed all evidence required by Code of Criminal Procedure 17.15, which was discussed in detail in Gayosso I. See id. at *4-5; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15. Our previous analysis of the evidence presented at the June 2022 hearing and conclusions remain unchanged.
We overrule issue 3.
III. Conclusion
Having overruled all of appellant's issues, the order of the trial court is affirmed.