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holding that when the appellant did not forward any claim that his claims implicated the legality of his sentence so as to be nonwaivable, his claims were subject to a finding of waiver for failure to sufficiently develop them
Summary of this case from Commonwealth v. JohnsonOpinion
No. 86 MAP 2021
05-16-2023
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Herman Albert ARMOLT, Jr., Appellant
Michael Oresto Palermo, Esq., Allen C. Welch Jr., Esq., for Appellant. Kerianne Lynn Baker, Esq., Merle L. Ebert Jr., Esq., Courtney Ellen Hair Larue, Esq., Sean Maurice McCormack, Esq., Daniel Jerome Sodus, Esq., Cumberland County District Attorney's Office, Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Appellee. Michelle Ann Henry, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Amicus Curiae Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg PA. Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia. Kevin R. Steele, Esq., Lisa Ann Swift, Esq., Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association.
Michael Oresto Palermo, Esq., Allen C. Welch Jr., Esq., for Appellant.
Kerianne Lynn Baker, Esq., Merle L. Ebert Jr., Esq., Courtney Ellen Hair Larue, Esq., Sean Maurice McCormack, Esq., Daniel Jerome Sodus, Esq., Cumberland County District Attorney's Office, Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Appellee.
Michelle Ann Henry, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Amicus Curiae Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg PA.
Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia.
Kevin R. Steele, Esq., Lisa Ann Swift, Esq., Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association.
BAER, C.J., TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.
Justice Dougherty delivers the Opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II(A), and III, and announces the Judgment of the Court.
OPINION
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY
We granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the criminal division of a county court of common pleas, i.e. , an adult criminal court, has jurisdiction to convict and sentence an adult for crimes committed as a juvenile. We also granted review to consider whether sentencing an adult to a term of imprisonment for crimes committed as a juvenile raises constitutional concerns. For the reasons that follow, we hold adult criminal courts possess jurisdiction over the prosecution of an individual who is over the age of twenty-one for crimes committed as a juvenile. Further, because we conclude appellant Herman Armolt has waived all constitutional claims, we do not reach the merits of those issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I. Background
The events leading to appellant's November 2018 arrest took place approximately three decades ago. In the late 1980s, appellant's mother became romantically involved with Harold Lindsey, a single father living with his two young daughters, C.L. and S.L. Soon after the relationship started, appellant's mother and three of her minor children — including appellant, his sister, and his younger brother — moved into Lindsey's home. Appellant's older brother moved into the home sometime later.
Shortly after moving into the Lindsey household, appellant and his brothers began physically abusing C.L. The abuse quickly escalated to sexual assault and, from the late 1980s until the early 1990s, appellant committed hundreds of sexual offenses against C.L. During this time, from approximately 1987 to 1994, appellant was ten through seventeen years old. According to C.L., the sexual assaults started when she was seven years old and continued daily until she was around the age of sixteen. N.T. Trial, 11/5/2019 at 87, 97.
In 1996, C.L. ran away from the Lindsey home to a friend's house, where she confided in the friend about the abuse she had endured. The friend convinced C.L. to report the abuse to the police. C.L. first spoke with a Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") Trooper, who took her to Children and Youth Services ("CYS"). According to C.L., however, CYS informed her it could not provide help since she lacked any visible physical injuries; C.L. was thus returned to her father's house, where the abuse continued. C.L. explained the abuse finally ended once she learned self-defense and used her defensive training to fend off a physical assault from appellant's mother. This incident resulted in C.L. moving out of the house.
In 1996, appellant would have been nineteen years old. See Verdict Slip, 11/7/2019 at 1 (reflecting jury's finding that appellant was born on March 3, 1977).
At trial, a PSP Trooper testified he found records indicating the PSP had investigated a runaway report for C.L. on April 29, 1996, but he was unable to locate a copy of the police report. Likewise, records from CYS from 1996 could not be located to confirm whether caseworkers had any interaction with C.L. at that time. As a CYS caseworker employed in 1996 explained, any report would have been expunged after 120 days if CYS determined the case to be unfounded or unsubstantiated. Moreover, even if substantiated, the CYS records would have been expunged once the victim turned twenty-three. See N.T. Trial, 11/7/2019 at 433.
Neither C.L. nor the above-mentioned entities took further action until 2016, when C.L. called the PSP to discuss her dispute with the Armolt brothers over the inheritance of certain property owned by Lindsey, who had recently passed away. This conversation ultimately led to C.L. disclosing the abuse she had endured years ago to PSP Trooper John Boardman. As part of his investigation, Trooper Boardman conducted multiple interviews with C.L., S.L., appellant, and his older brother and mother.
Appellant's younger brother passed away in 2013.
On July 18, 2017, Trooper Boardman presented the case to the Cumberland County District Attorney's Office. The Commonwealth initially declined prosecution. However, after Trooper Boardman presented the case for a second time on November 4, 2018, the Commonwealth agreed to pursue the charges at issue in this case. Soon after, on November 20, 2018, appellant was arrested and charged with one count of rape, two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and one count each of aggravated indecent assault and indecent assault. Appellant's older brother was charged with similar crimes and their cases proceeded to a joint jury trial after the trial court denied their pretrial motion seeking dismissal of their cases for pre-arrest/prosecutorial delay.
As of 2018, a prosecution for the offenses of, inter alia , rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, and indecent assault where the "victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense" could be commenced at any time before the victim "reache[d] 50 years of age." Act of Nov. 29, 2006, No. 179, 2006 Pa. Laws 1581 (Nov. 29, 2006), amended by 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5551(7) and 5552(c)(3) (effective Nov. 26, 2019). We observe C.L. was thirty-nine years old at the time of trial. See N.T. Trial, 11/5/2019 at 75.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of multiple witnesses. C.L. testified as described above. Similarly, Trooper Boardman testified as to his pre-arrest investigation as recounted above. The Commonwealth also introduced an expert, Ms. Amber Crawford-Wagman, who testified about the dynamics of sexual violence, victim responses to sexual violence, and the impact of sexual violence on victims during and after being assaulted. Among other things, Ms. Crawford-Wagman explained a child or adult survivor would not be expected to remember specific dates, times, and ages when recalling the violence that happened to them. See N.T. Trial, 11/6/2019 at 262-63.
Ultimately, the jury acquitted appellant of rape but convicted him of two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and one count each of aggravated indecent assault and indecent assault. Appellant's older brother was acquitted of all charges. Following the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report and an evaluation of appellant by the Sexual Offender Assessment Board ("SOAB") to determine whether he should be classified as a sexually violent predator, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment.
The SOAB determined appellant did not meet the criteria to be classified as a sexually violent predator and, further, that he is not subject to the registration requirements of SORNA because he committed the sexual offenses before 1996. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/26/2020 at 3 n.10.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court. In his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal, appellant raised the following issues: (1) "Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in retaining jurisdiction to try and sentence [a]ppellant as an adult for crimes that he committed as a juvenile"; and (2) "Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt[,] by conferring adult jurisdiction and imposing a four to eight-year prison sentence ... for crimes committed while [appellant] was a juvenile[,] violated the Equal Protection, Due Process[,] and Cruel and Unusual Punishment [C]lauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitution[s]." Appellant's Rule 1925(b) Statement, 5/4/2020 at 1.
See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Pa. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness."); U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); Pa. Const. art. I, § 13 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.").
In addressing appellant's first claim in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, wherein appellant argued his case should have been brought in, or transferred to, juvenile court, the trial court explained the Juvenile Act is only applicable to juveniles. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/26/2020 at 6, citing 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6322(a), 6303. Additionally, the court observed the Act defines a "child" as a person who "is under the age of 18 years" or was "under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense[ and] remains under the age of 21 at the time of adjudication." Id. at 7, quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court reasoned that under the plain language of the Juvenile Act, it was not permitted, let alone required, to transfer appellant to juvenile court because he was forty-two years old at the time of trial. See id.
Turning to appellant's second issue, the trial court determined appellant's equal protection and due process claims were waived because they were too underdeveloped to review. Accordingly, the court addressed only appellant's claim that his sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court explained that for juveniles convicted in adult court of nonhomicide offenses, only life sentences without the possibility of parole are prohibited under the federal Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See id. at 7-8, citing Commonwealth v. Lawrence , 99 A.3d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (" Graham [v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)] held that the Eighth Amendment required juveniles convicted of non-homicide offense[s] to have ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’ ").
The trial court further opined the offenses for which appellant was convicted are among the most serious non-homicide offenses, and that far more severe sentences imposed on other individuals for similar crimes have already been held by appellate courts to pass constitutional muster. The court also noted it had the discretion to impose consecutive sentences for the distinct offenses on which appellant was convicted but declined to do so in recognition of appellant's age at the time he committed the offenses. Specifically, the trial court explained:
Given the horrid nature of the acts inflicted on C.L., it would have been well within [the court's] province to impose consecutive sentences on the distinct offenses. Instead, in partial recognition of [appellant's] age at the time of the offenses , [the court] restrained [itself]. Had [appellant] been older and had these offenses been more recent, he would have a more substantial complaint. Nevertheless, despite his age and the passage of time , any lesser sentence would be nothing short of a final act of abuse perpetrated on C.L.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
In the Superior Court, appellant maintained his claims that only the juvenile court had jurisdiction to convict him of crimes he committed as a minor and that his trial and subsequent sentence violated the state and federal charters in multiple respects. For the first time before the Superior Court, appellant also claimed his sentence constituted an ex post facto punishment because he received a greater punishment than he would have received if he had been prosecuted as a juvenile.
In an unpublished memorandum opinion, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed. Regarding appellant's first issue, the Superior Court agreed with the trial court that the Juvenile Act does not apply to persons over the age of 21, based upon the plain language of the Act's definition of a "child." The intermediate appellate court additionally recognized the special treatment provided to offenders under the Juvenile Act is not a constitutional requirement but rather a matter of statutory grace afforded by the General Assembly. See Commonwealth v. Armolt , 459 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 240523, at *3 (Pa. Super., Jan. 25, 2021) (unpublished memorandum), citing Commonwealth v. Cotto , 562 Pa. 32, 753 A.2d 217, 223 (2000) ("[T]he special treatment provided to criminal offenders by the Juvenile Act is not a constitutional requirement. It is a statutory creation."). The Superior Court then reviewed its own precedent and found it directed a rigid interpretation of the Juvenile Act's definition of a "child." For example, in Commonwealth v. Anderson , 428 Pa.Super. 92, 630 A.2d 47, 49 (1993), the court held a defendant did not satisfy the Juvenile Act's definition of a "child" even though he committed the crimes at age sixteen and was not charged until age twenty-two. Notably, the Anderson court emphasized that the defendant's deliberate avoidance of the juvenile system resulted in his forfeiture of the benefits derived from the juvenile system. See id. at 50. However, the Superior Court later extended the Anderson court's rationale in Commonwealth v. Monaco , 869 A.2d 1026 (Pa. Super. 2005), and held it applied even where the defendant was not responsible for the delay in prosecution. More precisely, the court held aged-out offenders like appellant must be tried in adult criminal court "[a]bsent some improper motivation for the delay" in prosecution on the Commonwealth's part. Id. at 1029. Based on this jurisprudence, the Superior Court held appellant, who was forty-one years old when he was arrested, did not qualify as a "child" under the Juvenile Act. And because appellant did not identify any improper motive for the delay in prosecution, the court concluded he was properly tried and sentenced as an adult.
With respect to appellant's second issue — his combined constitutional claims — the Superior Court found it waived for failure to develop any meaningful discussion "with argument, applicable authority, and pertinent analysis." Armolt , 2021 WL 240523, at *4 Furthermore, the court determined appellant waived his ex post facto claim by not first raising it in the trial court or in his 1925(b) statement. As such, the court affirmed appellant's judgment of sentence.
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal in this Court, which we granted to consider the following questions, as phrased by appellant:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction to try and sentence [appellant] as an adult for crimes that he committed as a juvenile[?]
(2) Whether the trial court erred by conferring adult jurisdiction and imposing a four to eight-year prison sentence upon an individual for crimes committed while the individual was a juvenile[, violating] the Equal Protection, Due Process[,] and Cruel and Unusual Punishment clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitution[s?]
Commonwealth v. Armolt , ––– Pa. ––––, 267 A.3d 487 (2021) (per curiam ).
II. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
i. Arguments
Appellant broadly argues the significant differences between children and adults require a distinct inquiry into the propriety of sentencing a forty-two-year-old to prison for conduct he committed when he was as young as ten, particularly where the delay in prosecution was through no fault of his own and resulted in him losing the protections of the Juvenile Act. Appellant opines that it simply is not in the interests of justice to punish him now, as an adult, for crimes he "allegedly committed as a child." Appellant's Brief at 13. In support of his argument it was error for him to be tried in adult court, appellant notes the United States Supreme Court has recognized the federal constitution requires distinct and protective treatment for juveniles because of their unique characteristics. For example, appellant observes the High Court in Graham stated that "[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed." Appellant's Brief at 15, quoting Graham , 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Additionally, appellant highlights the High Court's explanations that "personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed," Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and "youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage." Eddings v. Oklahoma , 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).
Notwithstanding his characterization of his crimes as "alleged," we reiterate appellant was convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, at oral argument his counsel conceded there was "definitely a crime committed here." Oral Argument at 1:43:24-25, Commonwealth v. Armolt , J-53-2022 (Sept. 15, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FGPJjcbC6NQ. In any event, the present issue before us concerns only where the crimes should have been tried, not whether they were committed.
Appellant observes Pennsylvania has likewise recognized that adolescents have limited decision-making capabilities which sets them apart from older teenagers. For instance, he notes those under sixteen are prohibited from driving, are required to attend school, and are allowed to work only certain jobs with limited hours. See Appellant's Brief at 18. As well, appellant argues the Superior Court "has long noted the distinctions between juveniles and adults and juveniles’ amenability to rehabilitation." Appellant's Brief at 20, citing Commonwealth v. Haines , 222 A.3d 756 (Pa. Super. 2019) (defendant who was a juvenile at the time she committed sexual offenses was not required to register as a sex offender despite being convicted of those offenses as an adult).
Finally, appellant contends the cases relied upon by the Superior Court below demonstrate the unfairness of his prosecution and further support his position that it was improper for him to be tried as an adult for offenses he committed as a juvenile. Appellant submits the delay in his prosecution until he was an adult was not the result of his deliberate avoidance of the justice system, as in Anderson and Commonwealth v. Sims , 379 Pa.Super. 252, 549 A.2d 1280 (1988), where the defendant refused to reveal his age, and thus failed to avail himself of the opportunity to have his case transferred to juvenile court. Instead, appellant implicitly argues the rule described in Monaco — i.e. , that the Commonwealth may pursue adult charges against an individual who committed the offenses as a minor only if there was no improper motivation for the delay — should control here, and that it tips in his favor.
In this regard, appellant suggests the facts establish the Commonwealth had an improper motive for the delay in prosecuting his case. More specifically, he asserts the Commonwealth received the allegation from C.L. in 1996, when he was still a juvenile. If the Commonwealth had charged him in 1996, which appellant claims it "had ample opportunity to do[,]" he believes he ultimately would have been placed in the juvenile system. Appellant's Brief at 23. However, he continues, the Commonwealth did not charge him until over two decades later, immediately after he became involved in a family inheritance dispute with C.L. Appellant declares that when "considering the results," it "seems like" the Commonwealth had "a bad motive." Id. at 24. For this reason, he argues that, under the facts of this case, he should not have been tried as an adult.
The Defender Association of Philadelphia filed an amicus brief in support of neither party. It argues we should vacate appellant's conviction and discharge him since the Sentencing Code does not provide a process by which aged-out offenders can prove they are no longer in need of "treatment, supervision[,] or rehabilitation." Brief for Amicus Def. Ass'n. of Phila. at 6, quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(b). It adds, "[i]n lieu of this action," we should "at the very least ... declare that the Eighth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 mandate that in imposing a sentence on aged-out children, a judge must account for the youthful age of a defendant." Id.
In response, the Commonwealth argues the Juvenile Act's definition of a "child" clearly precluded appellant from being tried in a juvenile court and thus the trial court did not err in retaining jurisdiction over the case. The Commonwealth observes the Act defines "child," in relevant part, as an individual who "is under the age of 18 years" or "is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years[.]" Commonwealth's Brief at 7, quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. The Commonwealth emphasizes the trial court's explanation that the Juvenile Act "pointedly does not define a child as a person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense, unless the person remains under the age of 21 at the time of adjudication." Id. at 8, quoting Trial Ct. Op., 6/6/2020 at 7.
Concerning the Superior Court's case law in this arena, the Commonwealth notes that in Anderson , the Superior Court explicitly held an individual who commits a crime as a juvenile but is over twenty-one years at the time of trial may be tried and sentenced as an adult. In reaching this conclusion, the Anderson court reasoned that although Anderson no longer fell under the Juvenile Act by the time of trial, "[t]he inapplication of the Act ... does not mean that he inhabits a jurisdictional limbo between the Family Court Division and the Trial Division." Anderson , 630 A.2d at 49. As for the rule established in Monaco , the Commonwealth rebuts appellant's allegation that it had an improper motive for delaying prosecution in this case. The Commonwealth stresses appellant's failure to support his allegation of improper motive with any fact of record. In fact, according to the Commonwealth, the record demonstrates it promptly began an investigation upon learning of C.L.’s 2016 disclosure of appellant's abuse to PSP and that, following a thorough investigation, the Commonwealth timely filed charges against appellant in November of 2018.
Finally, the Commonwealth emphasizes the Juvenile Act's stated goal is to provide "care, protection, safety and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within" its jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1.1) (emphasis added). It argues that because the Act is tailored to a child's special needs, its purpose cannot be extended to adults. The Commonwealth notes this Court's recognition that, while the criminal justice system is penal in nature, the purpose of the juvenile system is primarily rehabilitative. See Commonwealth's Brief at 11, citing Commonwealth v. Iafrate , 527 Pa. 497, 594 A.2d 293 (1991). It therefore believes trying and sentencing adults like appellant in a juvenile court "would be inconsistent with both the purpose of the Juvenile Act and the juvenile justice system." Id.
The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association and the Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania filed amicus briefs that largely repeat the Commonwealth's arguments.
ii. Analysis
The question of whether appellant, at age forty-two, fell within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is a question of statutory interpretation we review de novo . See, e.g. , Interest of L.J.B. , 650 Pa. 266, 199 A.3d 868, 873 (2018). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly" so as to give the statute its intended effect. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). To discern the General Assembly's intent, we first consider the language of the statute itself. "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Id. § 1921(b). We may "ascertain the plain meaning of a statute by ascribing to the particular words and phrases the meaning which they have acquired through their common and approved usage, and in context." Commonwealth v. Gamby , ––– Pa. ––––, 283 A.3d 298, 306 (2022). When the language "clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent," we are duty-bound to apply it and "not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain its meaning." In re Adoption of L.B.M. , 639 Pa. 428, 161 A.3d 172, 179 (2017), quoting Mohamed v. PennDOT, 615 Pa. 6, 40 A.3d 1186, 1193 (2012). In other words, we may only "resort to the rules of statutory construction ... when there is an ambiguity in the provision." Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh , 608 Pa. 386, 11 A.3d 960, 965 (2011).
Like the courts below, we hold the Juvenile Act clearly and unambiguously refutes appellant's position he should have been tried in a juvenile court. The General Assembly, through the Juvenile Act, conveyed limited jurisdiction to juvenile courts, the scope of which applies "exclusively to ... [p]roceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent." 42 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Act explicitly defines a "child" as an individual who "is under the age of 18 years" or "is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years." Id. § 6302. Thus, the Act plainly extends juvenile jurisdiction to offenders who committed an offense while under the age of eighteen only if they are prosecuted before turning twenty-one. Because we detect no ambiguity in this definition, we must abide by the letter of the statute. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
We observe the Juvenile Court Law of 1933 granted juvenile courts jurisdiction over all crimes, except murder, committed by children under the age of sixteen. See Juvenile Court Law, 11 P.S. § 262, 1933 Pa. Laws 1433 (June 2, 1933) (repealed 1972). A 1939 amendment extended that jurisdiction to children under the age of eighteen. See id. , amended by 11 P.S. § 243. The General Assembly later passed the Juvenile Act as part of the Judiciary Act of 1976, which further expanded the age of applicable offenders to twenty-one, so long as the crimes at issue were committed when the offender was under the age of eighteen. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302.
Although our jurisdictional analysis begins and ends with an examination of the plain language of the Juvenile Act, we nevertheless observe that a statutory construction analysis would lead us to the same conclusion. Were we to adopt appellant's position that the adult criminal court lacked jurisdiction over him because he committed his crimes before the age of eighteen, it would mean that no court would have jurisdiction to try and sentence him. See In re Jones , 432 Pa. 44, 246 A.2d 356, 363 n.5 (1968) ("The Juvenile Court ... loses jurisdiction over persons when they attain majority."). As a practical result, then, all juvenile offenders who escape prosecution until after they turn twenty-one could not be held accountable in any state court in this Commonwealth. This would effectively relieve juvenile offenders of all consequences of their criminal acts if not prosecuted before the age of twenty-one. We do not believe the General Assembly intended such a sweeping and drastic result. Accord 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922 (reflecting presumption that the General Assembly in enacting statutes like the Juvenile Act does "not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable")
In her concurrence, Chief Justice Todd asserts "it is neither necessary nor appropriate to engage in further analysis of the rules of statutory construction" because "the relevant statutory language is plain and unambiguous[.]" Concurring Opinion at 382 (Todd, C.J.). We agree it would be inappropriate to "disregard" the clear and unambiguous language of the statute "under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Respectfully, though, that is not our purpose here. Rather, in addressing the full breadth of appellant's arguments, we merely recognize that, in this particular case, all signs point to the same answer. By doing so, we do not in any way disturb the long-settled principle that the plain language controls when a statute is unambiguous. See, e.g. , Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 653 Pa. 596, 211 A.3d 810, 822 (2019).
Along similar lines, we note the General Assembly amended the Juvenile Act in 1995 to clarify that its purpose is to "provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the development of competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive members of the community." 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(2). At the same time, it retained other language which already expounded on the importance of the need to ensure the child's welfare and "the interests of public safety" by "using the least restrictive intervention that is consistent with the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the rehabilitation, supervision and treatment needs of the child[.]" Id. at § 6301(b)(3)(i). The statute also specifically allows for "imposing confinement" in limited circumstances. Id. at § 6301(b)(3)(ii). Moreover, the overarching goal of the Juvenile Act "is the care and protection of the child" — including child victims of sexual assault. Commonwealth v. Hooks , 921 A.2d 1199, 1207 (Pa. Super. 2007). In light of the stated purposes of the Juvenile Act to protect the community and hold the offender accountable, it would be unreasonable to conclude the General Assembly intended for the Act to subvert an offender's accountability in the name of rehabilitation. Rather, it is clear to us that the legislature intended to equally balance the desire for rehabilitation with the need for community protection and offender accountability, and did not intend for the Act to be weaponized to preclude accountability in the manner appellant proposes.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6301, amended by Pub. L. 1127, No. 33 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 2 (Nov. 17, 1995).
All that remains is appellant's argument that the Commonwealth's alleged bad-faith delay in charging him warrants an exception to the statute which would allow him to be treated under the juvenile system. We reject the argument under the facts of this case. The sole basis for appellant's claim that the Commonwealth was on notice of his crimes in 1996 is C.L.’s testimony that she reported her abuse to a single PSP Trooper and then to CYS, which turned her away. Yet, appellant simultaneously maintains that "it seems highly probable that CL misrepresented ... that she went to a trooper and CYS and disclosed all of these things that were happening to her but nobody ever did anything[.]" Appellant's Brief at 20-21. In short, appellant asks us to infer the Commonwealth intentionally "wait[ed] for over two decades before charging and trying him" even though he does not actually believe C.L. ever made a report to police in the first place. Id. at 24. On this record, we decline to make such an assumption. Cf. Monaco , 869 A.2d at 1030 (requiring showing of "some improper motivation for the delay" attributable to the Commonwealth).
The Monaco court did not elaborate on the legal basis underlying the "bad faith" exception it discerned within the Juvenile Act. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth does not presently take issue with that decision and appellant does not discuss it in his brief. Consequently, we express no opinion about its viability; we merely conclude appellant failed to show the Commonwealth acted in bad faith here, so the plain language of the statute controls.
Appellant was in his forties when he was charged with assaulting C.L. He therefore did not qualify as a "child" under the Juvenile Act, and consequently, did not fall under the purview of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Although appellant invokes the spirit of the Juvenile Act's purpose to support his argument that we should extend the definition to aged-out offenders who would have once qualified as a "child," "[w]e are constrained ... to apply statutory language enacted by the legislature rather than speculate as to whether the legislative spirit or intent differs from what has been plainly expressed in the relevant statutes." Commonwealth v. Bursick , 526 Pa. 6, 584 A.2d 291, 293 (1990). As appellant was not charged until he was in his forties, he did not fall under the scope of the Juvenile Act and was properly tried and sentenced in adult criminal court.
B. Constitutional Issues
i. Arguments
As a backup to his statutory jurisdictional argument, appellant also raises multiple constitutional challenges. First, appellant avers the trial court inflicted a greater punishment through his adult sentence than the law in effect at the time he committed the crimes would have permitted on a juvenile, thereby violating the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law[.]"); PA. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("No ex post facto law ... shall be passed."). He points to United States Supreme Court precedent defining an ex post facto law as "one which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed." Fletcher v. Peck , 10 U.S. 87, 138, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810). See also Bouie v. City of Columbia , 378 U.S. 347, 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (an "unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law"). Appellant contends his adult prosecution was an unforeseeable enlargement of the criminal statute, authorizing a "greater punishment than [he] would have otherwise received if a juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent when he was a minor child of 14." Appellant's Brief at 25. He further maintains the adult prosecution made it impossible for him to foresee or predict the maximum penalty he could have received when committing the crime.
Appellant repeatedly asserts the Commonwealth was made aware of the allegations against him when he was fourteen years old. See Appellant's Brief at 13, 23-25, 27, 29. Assuming appellant equates the Commonwealth's supposed knowledge with the victim's alleged report to a PSP Trooper in 1996, we observe he would have been nineteen years old at that time, not fourteen. See supra note 1.
Next, appellant provides a single paragraph of argument with respect to his equal protection claim. It states in its entirety:
Also, compelling relief is the fact [a]ppellant who was 14 years-old should be treated just like others, those who committed such a crime as a juvenile. Thus, it is also respectfully submitted that denying [appellant] the right to a new sentencing hearing denies both equal protection and due process. In Curtis v. Kline , [542 Pa. 249, 666 A.2d 265, 267 (1995)], the Court noted that ‘[t]he essence of the constitutional principle of equal protection of the law[ ] is that like persons in like circumstances will be treated similarly.’ (citations omitted).
Id. at 27-28.
Regarding due process, appellant does not address it in a separate section of his brief as he does with his other constitutional claims. Instead, appellant only references it tangentially in the context of his other claims. In addition to the passing mention above (which appeared in the "Equal Protection" section of appellant's brief), he also cites it while discussing his ex post facto claim. See id. at 27 ("concluding that this application is barred by the ex post facto clauses would also be consistent with recognized notions of fairness and due process"); id. ("the imposition of the later-enacted penalty [ ] violated due process").
Finally, appellant claims the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by imposing "an unduly harsh sentence that did not account for [his] youth and a child's capacity for rehabilitation[.]" Id. at 29. Specifically, appellant complains the court overemphasized the nature of his offenses and "neglected to give adequate consideration to [his] age, lack of maturity[,]" upbringing, and impressionable and still developing brain. Id. He reiterates the United States Supreme Court's admonitions in cases like Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Roper , supra , that, since juveniles have a diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, they are less deserving of the most severe sentence. Appellant asserts it "seems logical" that he should not be required to serve an adult prison sentence for a crime he committed as a child. Id. at 30.
The Commonwealth responds by noting appellant failed to timely raise or meaningfully develop these issues such that the Superior Court properly deemed them waived. It insists appellant's delay in raising his equal protection, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment claims until his Rule 1925(b) statement triggered Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 302, which provides that "[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Because this rule applies even to constitutional issues, see, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Purnell, ––– Pa. ––––, 259 A.3d 974, 982 n.4 (2021), the Commonwealth argues appellant's delay resulted in waiver of his claims. See Commonwealth's Brief at 12. The Commonwealth further asserts appellant's failure to state, or even fairly suggest, his ex post facto claim in his statement of questions involved renders that claim also waived. See id. at 14-15, citing Pa.R.A.P. § 2116(a) ("No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby."). Lastly, the Commonwealth contends appellant's vague constitutional claims lack meaningful discussion or developed analysis of relevant legal authority, and it argues appellant's due process claim should be considered "waived for failure to be sufficiently developed for appellate review." Id. at 14.
Even if we were to determine appellant did not (or could not) waive these constitutional claims, the Commonwealth asserts they are nevertheless meritless. First, it says appellant's equal protection claim fails because he was treated the same as similarly situated defendants. It directs our attention to cases like Anderson and Monaco , which authorized the sentencing of adults in adult court for crimes they committed as juveniles, to demonstrate appellant was treated similarly to "like persons in like circumstances." Id. at 16, citing Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty. , 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981).
The Commonwealth does not address the merits of appellant's ex post facto claim.
Next, the Commonwealth argues appellant "was afforded all procedural due process protections" including being notified of the elements of the underlying charges against him, which remained unchanged at his trial and sentencing, and receiving the opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal within the established statute of limitations. Id. at 17-18. Although the Commonwealth recognizes the General Assembly extended the statute of limitations after appellant committed the crimes at issue here, see supra note 4, it asserts the extension applied to all offenders and cautions this Court against "rul[ing] on the wisdom of legislative enactments." Id. at 18, quoting Mercurio v. Allegheny Cnty. Redev. Auth. , 839 A.2d 1196, 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). As the Commonwealth sees it, when viewed as a whole, appellant was treated with the requisite " ‘basic fairness’ ... at the heart of due process." Id. at 17.
Finally, the Commonwealth argues appellant's punishment was neither cruel nor unusual and his sentence is consistent with the state and federal constitutions. According to the Commonwealth, the Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences which are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime. Id. at 20, quoting Commonwealth v. Lankford , 164 A.3d 1250, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2017). Because the Commonwealth believes there is nothing in the record suggesting appellant's sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime — especially considering the nature of the charges and the sentencing court's broad discretion — the Commonwealth submits his sentence was not cruel or unusual.
ii. Analysis
Before we can address the merits of appellant's constitutional claims, we must first determine whether they are preserved. "Generally speaking, issues not properly raised and preserved before the trial court ‘are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’ ... A challenge that implicates the legality of an appellant's sentence, however, is an exception to this issue preservation requirement." Commonwealth v. Thorne , ––– Pa. ––––, 276 A.3d 1192, 1196 (2022), quoting Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). An appellate court may address, and even raise sua sponte , challenges to the legality of an appellant's sentence even if the issue was not preserved in the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Hill , 662 Pa. 127, 238 A.3d 399, 407 (2020). However, not "all constitutional cases implicating sentencing raise legality of sentence concerns." Commonwealth v. Lawrence , 99 A.3d 116, 122 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Watley , 81 A.3d 108, 118 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc ).
Moreover, regardless of whether a particular claim implicates the legality of a sentence, it is well settled that an appellant bears the burden of sufficiently developing his arguments to facilitate appellate review. See Wirth v. Commonwealth , 626 Pa. 124, 95 A.3d 822, 837 (2014). "[O]ur rules of appellate procedure are explicit that the argument contained within a brief must contain ‘such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.’ " Id. , quoting Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). "Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived. It is not the obligation of an appellate court to formulate [an] appellant's arguments for him." Banfield v. Cortés , 631 Pa. 229, 110 A.3d 155, 168 n.11 (2015) (alteration in original), quoting Wirth , 95 A.3d at 837 ; see Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 29 (2011) (a litigant's "failure to develop the claim in any meaningful fashion ... so as to allow for appellate review [is] a sufficient basis in itself to reject the argument") (citation omitted). Indeed, we are "neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter. The Court is left to guess at the actual complaint that is intended by the party." Commonwealth v. Williams , 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 532 (2001) (Castille, J., concurring).
Whether a claim has been "meaningfully" or "adequately" developed depends "on the circumstances, and the practice of judging quintessentially requires the application of considered judgment." Commonwealth v. Bishop , 655 Pa. 270, 217 A.3d 833, 844 (2019). As we cautioned in Bishop , "lawyers who omit reasons, or provide only scant ones, in their efforts to secure relief for their clients should know very well that they are proceeding at the risk of waiver." Id. (citation omitted). Even a "constitutional claim is not self-proving, and we will not attempt to divine an argument on [a litigant]’s behalf." Commonwealth v. Spotz , 610 Pa. 17, 18 A.3d 244, 282 (2011).
The flexible "considered judgment" standard exists "precisely because many principles simply are not reducible to per se edicts, and attorneys in our system of justice are trained accordingly in furtherance of effective advocacy." Bishop, 217 A.3d at 844.
With these principles in mind, we now turn to appellant's constitutional claims. Initially, we emphasize appellant has not forwarded an argument that any of his claims implicate the legality of his sentence such that they are nonwaivable. In fact, the sole reference he makes to sentencing legality is within the "Scope and Standard of Review" section of his brief, wherein he merely asserts "[i]ssues relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of law." Appellant's Brief at 4. But appellant presents no developed argument (in fact, he presents no argument at all) that his discrete ex post facto , equal protection, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment claims are nonwaivable.
Although "an appellate court may sua sponte raise and address issues concerning illegal sentences," Hill , 238 A.3d at 410 n.11 (emphasis added), we may also decline to do so where appropriate. Indeed, "[t]his Court has never held that a mere allegation that one's sentence is illegal is alone sufficient to avoid waiver." Commonwealth v. Prinkey, ––– Pa. ––––, 277 A.3d 554, 576 (2022) (Mundy, J., dissenting). In Commonwealth v. Belak , for example, we found "[i]t would be improper for us to consider" appellant's Apprendi claim even though it implicated the legality of his sentence because he "did not raise th[e] issue in his petition for allowance of appeal or in his initial brief to this Court, but rather, raised it for the first time in his reply brief." 573 Pa. 414, 825 A.2d 1252, 1256 n.10 (2003). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Fahy , we refused to entertain a legality of sentence challenge when submitted in an untimely PCRA petition. 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999) (rejecting appellant's assertion that "a petitioner's claims will always be considered on the merits when the claims challenge the legality of the sentence" even if untimely). As we explained, "[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of the exceptions thereto." Id. These cases demonstrate that, even with respect to legality of sentencing claims, appellate courts retain discretion to "enforce[ ] procedural rules [and] jurisdictional limits and requir[e] such claims be properly presented at the time they are raised in order to obtain review thereof." Commonwealth v. Jones, 932 A.2d 179, 183 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).
We conclude such restraint is warranted here. As noted, appellant does not argue his claims fit into the "[f]our broad categories of challenges [that] have emerged in our caselaw" as implicating the illegal sentencing doctrine, nor does he advocate for the expansion or recognition of a new category. Prinkey , 277 A.3d at 562. As well, the issue we accepted for review, as framed by appellant himself, makes no mention of an illegal sentence. Particularly since the illegal sentencing doctrine "has, at times, proved challenging for this Court[,]" id. at 560, we find it prudent to wait until we are presented with more developed advocacy before determining whether the types of constitutional claims raised herein are nonwaivable. Accordingly, for purposes of this case, we will assume arguendo that the constitutional claims raised by appellant do not implicate the legality of his sentence, and thus are subject to ordinary issue preservation rules. We now proceed to determine whether appellant has preserved his constitutional claims. Concerning appellant's ex post facto claim, we agree with the Superior Court that this issue is waived, first and foremost, due to appellant's failure to include it in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) ("Issues not included in the [1925(b)] Statement ... are waived."); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) ("Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."); Commonwealth v. Lord , 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (1998) ("Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived."). Appellant's ex post facto claim is additionally waived for being underdeveloped. Although he includes several citations to support general propositions describing the nature of ex post facto violations, appellant does not adequately explain how the trial court allegedly violated those proscriptions here. For example, appellant states an "unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law," but he does not identify a criminal statute which was allegedly enlarged or applied retroactively in his case. Appellant's Brief at 26-27, quoting Bouie , 378 U.S. at 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697. In short, the two paragraphs of boilerplate case law provided by appellant are insufficient to enable adequate appellate review. We thus deem this claim waived. See Commonwealth v. Perez , 625 Pa. 601, 93 A.3d 829, 841 (2014) (appellant's use of "boilerplate language" failed to "provide any developed argument" and "result[ed] in waiver").
Justice Wecht faults us for engaging in a "technical matter of categorization" when, in his view, appellant's constitutional claims "undoubtedly" all "sound in a challenge to the legality of [his] sentence." Concurring Opinion at 387 (Wecht, J.); see id. at 387 (contending the issues "squarely fall within the third category of legality challenges: claims asserting a constitutional barrier to the exercise of sentencing authority conferred in a facially constitutional statute"). In fact, the concurrence argues "this Court has long held [these claims] to be nonwaivable[.]" Id. at 388; see also id. at 390 ("this Court has branded these claims as non-waivable"). But this is inaccurate. We have never confronted whether any of the four discrete claims raised herein implicates the legality of sentencing, as confirmed by the concurrence's failure to identify a single case directly in support of its position. Cf id. at 387-88 (citing Hill , a double jeopardy case, and Prinkey , a vindictive prosecution case). And since appellant has not asked us to consider that preliminary question here (in contrast to Hill and Prinkey ), we believe the most appropriate course is to save it for another day.
Our learned colleague disagrees. He takes the view that litigants "might be better off to let this Court raise the issue sua sponte [.]" Id. at 389; see also id. at 388 (suggesting "we can introduce the issue entirely on our own initiative"). Indeed, the concurrence admits that what it really seeks is the Court's adoption of a new rule altogether: one that condones the practice of appellate judges raising novel legality of sentencing theories, without prompting from or advocacy by the parties, and then resolving them in the first instance. We decline to endorse such a rule. Although there is nothing improper about an appellate court addressing sua sponte a known legality of sentence problem if it appears in a case, a court that goes out of its way to offer new theories for expanding the class of illegal sentencing claims has veered into the "conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter." Williams , 782 A.2d at 532 (Castille, J., concurring). See generally Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 483 (Pa. Super. 2005) ("[T]he term ‘illegal sentence’ is a term of art that our Courts apply narrowly, to a relatively small class of cases.").
Relatedly, we firmly reject the concurrence's assertion that this Court no longer "remains uniformly devoted to maintaining its role as solely a neutral arbiter" following our decision in Commonwealth v. Hamlett , 660 Pa. 379, 234 A.3d 486 (2020). Concurring Opinion at 391 (Wecht, J.). That case concerned harmless error and its intersection with the right-for-any-reason doctrine. See Hamlett, 234 A.3d at 492 ("The harmless-error doctrine functions as the underlying substantive principle of law, and the right-for-any-reason precept merely provides the explanation for when and why an appellate court may exercise its discretionary prerogative to proceed of its own accord to preserve a valid verdict in appropriate circumstances."). No reasonable comparison can be drawn between the widely accepted right-for-any-reason doctrine and the expansive judicial power-grab that the concurrence advocates for here.
As for appellant's equal protection claim, he insists his rights were violated because he was not treated "just like others ... who committed such a crime as a juvenile." Appellant's Brief at 27. He cites to one case, Curtis v. Kline , 542 Pa. 249, 666 A.2d 265, 267 (1995), for the general proposition that "[t]he essence of the constitutional principle of equal protection of the laws is that like persons in like circumstances will be treated similarly." Id. at 28, quoting Curtis , 666 A.2d at 267. But he does not contend with existing cases in which persons in like circumstances (i.e. , adult defendants charged for offenses they committed as juveniles) were treated similarly to him (by being sentenced in adult criminal court). See, e.g. , Monaco , 869 A.2d 1026 ; Anderson , 630 A.2d 47. Instead, appellant submits only "generalized assertions[,] ... not arguments, much less reasoned and developed arguments supported with citations to relevant legal authority." Spotz , 18 A.3d at 326 ; see also id. at 262 n.9 (finding equal protection claim unreviewable and waived for lack of development). This type of mere issue spotting without sufficient analysis or legal support precludes appellate review. See In re Beach's Estate , 324 Pa. 142, 188 A. 108, 108 (1936) (per curiam ) (an "appellant must not only specifically assign as error any rulings complained of, but, further, must point out wherein the error lies and reasons therefor, or they will be deemed to have been waived"). We find this claim undeveloped and, consequently, waived.
Appellant's due process claim suffers the same fate. In support of this claim he merely offers one sentence within his "Equal Protection" argument section to argue he was denied due process because he was not treated "just like others ... who committed such a crime as a juvenile." Appellant's Brief at 27-28. As is evidenced by the section heading, this complaint sounds in equal protection, not due process. Appellant also includes in his discussion of the alleged ex post facto violation an assertion that "the imposition of the later-enacted penalty [ ] violated due process." Id. at 27. And he argues a finding in his favor on his ex post facto claim would "be consistent with recognized notions of fairness and due process." Id. Neither of these assertions is discussed further. As a result, we conclude appellant's two-"sentence, undeveloped assertions of [a Fourteenth] Amendment violation[ ] fail[s] to provide any reviewable argument." Spotz , 18 A.3d at 304. Indeed, as appellant does not "cite even a single [ ] case to support his bald assertion of [a] constitutional violation[ or] ... offer the slightest explanation or elucidation of his claim," we find his due process claim completely undeveloped and unreviewable. Id. at 282.
Finally, we turn to appellant's cruel and unusual punishment claim. The Superior Court determined this claim was waived due to appellant's failure to adequately develop it "with argument, applicable authority, and pertinent analysis." Armolt , 2021 WL 240523, at *4. We agree. The only citations appellant includes in his argument section for his cruel and unusual punishment claim come from Miller , supra , which he uses to broadly illustrate the Supreme Court's reasoning for treating juveniles more leniently. But appellant incorporates no cases to support his argument that his sentence was grossly disproportionate. Nor does he advance any legal arguments beyond mere complaints about how the sentencing judge exercised his discretion. Thus, to the extent this claim properly raises a cruel and unusual punishment claim rather than a garden-variety discretionary sentencing claim, we conclude is it waived for lack of development.
To reiterate, we do not resolve whether appellant's constitutional claims implicate the legality of his sentence such that they are nonwaivable. Our reason for exercising this restraint is straightforward: because appellant has not asked us to consider that unresolved issue, it would be improper for us to decide, sua sponte , whether to expand what has traditionally been a narrow class of sentencing legality claims. Our ruling in no way "create[s] a jurisprudential trap for litigants" to fall into. Concurring Opinion at 389 n.55. Had appellant articulated some theory in his brief for why his discrete claims implicate the legality of his sentence, we may have elected to consider it in our discretion. He also could have presented the question for our review directly, as occurred in Hill and Prinkey , the cases relied upon by the concurrence. Or, he could have simply preserved his claims through traditional means. But he did none of these things. As such, we have no choice but to deem his constitutional claims waived.
III. Conclusion
As we conclude the adult criminal court had jurisdiction over appellant pursuant to the plain language of the Juvenile Act, and since appellant's related constitutional claims are all waived, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. In doing so, we recognize there is a significant statutory gap when it comes to dealing with aged-out offenders such as appellant and, although our decision today provides some clarification, other questions remain outstanding, including the constitutional challenges we are unable to reach in this case. Accordingly, we respectfully observe it may be prudent for the General Assembly to consider the matter.
Justices Mundy and Brobson join the opinion, Chief Justice Todd joins Parts I and III of the opinion, and Justices Donohue and Wecht join Parts I and II(A).
Chief Justice Todd files a concurring opinion.
Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion in which Justice Donohue joins.
The Late Chief Justice Baer did not participate in the decision of this matter.
CONCURRING OPINION
CHIEF JUSTICE TODD
While I agree with the majority's determination that the protections of the Juvenile Act extend only to individuals who commit certain criminal offenses prior to reaching 18 years of age and are prosecuted before turning age 21, I do so based solely upon the plain and unambiguous language of the Juvenile Act. As such, I would end my analysis there and would refrain from venturing into an application of other statutory construction tools as does the majority. See Majority Opinion at 372-74. Indeed, our Court has repeatedly stressed that the paramount factor in discerning the meaning of a statute is the plain and unambiguous language thereof. See , e.g. , Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh , 653 Pa. 596, 211 A.3d 810, 822 (2019) ("In seeking the General Assembly's intent, our inquiry begins and ends with the plain language of the statute if that statute is unambiguous."); Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh , 608 Pa. 386, 11 A.3d 960, 965 (2011) ("[I]t is well established that resort to the rules of statutory construction is to be made only when there is an ambiguity in the provision.").
Notably, our constitution provides that the courts of common pleas have "unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law." Pa. Const. art. V, § 5. The General Assembly further demarcated the jurisdiction of our trial courts in Section 931(a) of the Judicial Code, which provides that:
Except where exclusive original jurisdiction of an action or proceeding is by statute or by general rule adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of matters) vested in another court of this Commonwealth, the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings, including all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common pleas.
42 Pa.C.S. § 931(a). Stated differently, "the courts of common pleas have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions, except where otherwise provided by law." Domus, Inc. v. Signature Bldg. Sys. of Pa., LLC , ––– Pa. ––––, 252 A.3d 628, 636 (2021) (citations omitted). Thus, in this matter, our Court is essentially tasked with determining the extent to which the Juvenile Act limits a trial court's general jurisdiction, in light of the express statutory language of the relevant provisions.
Pertinently, to that end, Section 6303(a) of the Juvenile Act delineates that the provisions thereof apply "exclusively" in the following circumstances:
(1) Proceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent.
(2) Transfers under section 6322 (relating to transfer from criminal proceedings).
(3) Proceedings arising under Subchapter E (relating to dispositions affecting other jurisdictions).
(4) Proceedings under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, as set forth in
section 731 of the act of June 13, 1967 (P.L. 31, No. 21), known as the Public Welfare Code.
(5) Proceedings in which a child is charged with a summary offense arising out of the same episode or transaction involving a delinquent act for which a petition alleging delinquency is filed under this chapter. The summary offense shall be included in any petition regarding the accompanying delinquent act. Upon finding a child to have committed a summary offense, the court may utilize any disposition available to the minor judiciary where a child is found to have committed a summary offense, including a finding of guilt on the summary offense.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a) (internal footnote omitted). Additionally, Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act clarifies that a "child" is an individual who:
(1) is under the age of 18 years;
(2) is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years; or
(3) is under the age of 21 years and was adjudicated dependent before reaching the age of 18 years, who has requested the court to retain jurisdiction and who remains under the jurisdiction of the court as a dependent child ....
Id. § 6302.
Critically, Section 6303 lacks any ambiguity with respect to the scope of the Juvenile Act, limiting applicability thereof to scenarios involving "child" offenders, including, as relevant herein, instances in which "a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent." Id. § 6303(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, the definition of "child" contained in Section 6302 leaves no room for interpretation beyond the plain language drafted by our legislature. Indeed, Section 6302, in conjunction with Section 6303(a), indicates that an alleged offender is a child — who is, thus, entitled to the protections afforded in the Juvenile Act — if that individual committed the relevant criminal offense while under the age of 18 and is prosecuted for said offense prior to turning age 21. Consequently, given that the relevant statutory language is plain and unambiguous, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to engage in further analysis of the rules of statutory construction to bolster our determination that the trial court rightfully possesses jurisdiction over offenders, such as Appellant, who commit criminal offenses while under the age of 18, but are not prosecuted until after they have surpassed the age 21.
Relatedly, while, in my view, this case has highlighted a litany of potential constitutional concerns with the Juvenile Act's differentiations based on age, I am, unfortunately, constrained to agree with the majority's determination that Appellant waived his various constitutional challenges related to the Juvenile Act's treatment of aged-out child offenders such as himself. As the majority explained, Appellant failed to include his ex post facto claim in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal, and, in any event, neglected to develop his argument on the issue, and he likewise failed to sufficiently develop his underlying arguments with respect to his equal protection, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment claims. Consequently, our Court cannot address these constitutional challenges to the Juvenile Act at this time.
CONCURRING OPINION
JUSTICE WECHT
Beginning when he was ten years old, and continuing until he was seventeen, Herman Armolt repeatedly physically and sexually assaulted his minor stepsister, C.L. The Commonwealth did not prosecute Armolt for these crimes until almost thirty years later. When he was prosecuted, Armolt was no longer a "child" for purposes of the Juvenile Act. Therefore, he could not have been tried in a juvenile court. This does not mean that Armolt could not be tried in any court. To the contrary, as the Majority correctly holds, "adult criminal courts possess jurisdiction over the prosecution of an individual who is over the age of twenty-one for crimes committed as a juvenile." Armolt cannot escape prosecution for the serial abuse that he inflicted upon his stepsister merely because sufficient time has elapsed to place him beyond the reach of the Juvenile Act.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (defining "child" as a person who "is under the age of 18 years" or "is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years").
42 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a)(1) (limiting the juvenile court's jurisdiction "exclusively to ... [p]roceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent").
Maj. Op. at 365.
The Majority also correctly rejects Armolt's argument that the nearly three-decade delay in prosecuting him was the product of the Commonwealth's bad faith, as the record bears no evidence to support such an allegation. Resolving the claim on the facts of this case, the Majority declines to identify, or evaluate the propriety of, the legal foundation of the "improper motive" rule that Armolt invokes. Because consideration of that rule is unnecessary to the disposition of the instant case, I take no issue with the Majority's exercise of restraint. Nonetheless, the rule warrants some brief discussion here.
Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 374 n.13.
This "improper motive" rule stems from two Superior Court decisions, Commonwealth v. Anderson and Commonwealth v. Monaco . In Anderson , the sixteen year old defendant struck another juvenile in the head with a baseball bat and was charged with aggravated assault and related offenses. Due to Anderson's status as a minor, the charges were assigned to a juvenile court. However, Anderson failed to appear at his scheduled hearings, and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.
428 Pa.Super. 92, 630 A.2d 47 (1993).
869 A.2d 1026 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Anderson , 630 A.2d at 48.
Id.
When Anderson was nineteen years old, he was arrested again, this time for retail theft. Once again, he failed to appear in court to respond to the charges, and another bench warrant was issued. Then, when he was twenty-two years old, he was arrested yet again, on a third set of charges.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 49.
After Anderson's third arrest, the Commonwealth re-charged him as an adult for the charges from which he had absconded when he was a juvenile. The juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over Anderson because he was no longer a "child" under the Juvenile Act. The juvenile court lifted the bench warrant on those charges, and Anderson was set to be tried as an adult on all three cases. Anderson filed a motion to dismiss the formerly juvenile charges on the basis that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over juvenile offenders, a category that included him at the time of the baseball bat assault. The trial court agreed and dismissed the charges. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court reversed.
Id.
Id.
The panel explained that the Juvenile Act applies only when an offender is a "child" at the time of prosecution. Because Anderson was no longer a "child," the Juvenile Act did "not apply to him." That did not mean that he "inhabit[ed] a jurisdictional limbo" between the juvenile court and adult court. Instead, the court held, he "should be tried as an adult" for his crimes.
Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 ).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50.
The Superior Court emphasized that any potential inequity in Anderson being tried as an adult for his juvenile crimes resulted from his own actions. Anderson "would have been tried as a child if it were not for his deliberate avoidance of the justice system." "[B]y virtue of his flight," Anderson "denied himself the opportunity to be tried" as a juvenile. The court held that a juvenile cannot willfully abscond from the juvenile system until he is no longer a "child" under the Juvenile Act, and then exploit that absconding to demand that he be tried as a juvenile.
Id.
Id.
Anderson argued that the Commonwealth should have been precluded from prosecuting him as an adult for his juvenile charges because, when he was nineteen years old and still under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Act for those charges, the Commonwealth held him in custody on the retail theft charges. Anderson asserted that the Commonwealth should have pressed the juvenile charges at that point, but failed to do so, with the result that Anderson aged out of the juvenile system.
Id.
Id. at 50-51.
The Superior Court rejected this argument. The court observed that the record contained no evidence that, at the time that Anderson was arrested for retail theft, the Commonwealth knew that Anderson had unresolved juvenile charges, that Anderson informed the Commonwealth of such charges, or that Anderson requested to be tried for the juvenile charges. Because Anderson failed to "avail[ ] himself of the benefits of the Juvenile Act when they were his as of right," his argument that the Commonwealth should have been barred from prosecuting him as an adult was "groundless." In assessing the merits of Anderson's claim, the Superior Court did not discuss any constitutional provision, statute, or case law that might be invoked to support the "improper motive" or "bad faith" argument that it had rejected.
Id. at 51.
More than twenty years would pass before the Superior Court returned to Anderson and to the question of whether an "improper motive" exception exists. In Monaco , three females reported to the police in 2002 that the defendant had sexually abused them when they were minors during the mid-to-late 1990s. Monaco was a juvenile at the time of each of the sexual assaults. However, he was twenty-two years old when he was charged. Monaco eventually pleaded guilty in adult court to attempted rape and to corruption of the morals of a minor, having never challenged the adult court's jurisdiction over him for the crimes that he had committed as a minor.
Monaco , 869 A.2d at 1027-28.
Id. at 1028.
Monaco was sentenced to five to ten years in prison and to a consecutive term of probation. He did not file a direct appeal. However, in a subsequent PCRA petition, Monaco contested the adult court's jurisdiction. The PCRA court denied relief, and Monaco appealed.
Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 -46.
Monaco , 869 A.2d at 1028.
Relying extensively upon Anderson , the Superior Court rejected Monaco's argument that the Commonwealth had only two options: try him as a juvenile, or not at all. The court stressed that the "right to be treated as a juvenile offender is statutory rather than constitutional." And that statutory right applies only to a "child," i.e. , one who, at the time of trial, is under the age of twenty-one but committed the subject crimes before turning eighteen. Because the Juvenile Act is "tailored to a child's special needs, the purpose of the Act cannot be extended to adult offenders." The primary objective of the Juvenile Act is to provide "care, protection, safety and wholesome mental and physical development" to children, not to adults. As in Anderson , because Monaco was twenty-two at the time of his arrest, the Juvenile Act was inapplicable.
Id. at 1029 (citing Commonwealth v. Cotto , 562 Pa. 32, 753 A.2d 217 (2000) ).
Id. at 1030.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Monaco panel noted that the case differed from Anderson in one material way. Unlike Anderson, Monaco did not deliberately abscond, and he did nothing that could be construed as a forfeiture of the terms of the Juvenile Act. Monaco "was not responsible for the delay in his prosecution." But neither was the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth filed the charges approximately two months after the first victim reported the abuse. Nothing suggested that Commonwealth dragged its feet in prosecuting Monaco in an effort to avoid the Juvenile Act's jurisdiction. It was not the Commonwealth's fault that the victims had delayed reporting the crimes for several years.
Id.
Employing words that would form the basis for Armolt's "bad faith" argument in the instant case, the Monaco panel held that, absent "some improper motivation for the delay," Anderson applied, and Monaco properly could be tried as an adult for his juvenile crimes.
Id. (emphasis added).
As the Majority appears to suggest, the legal basis for the "improper motive" exception is unclear. In Anderson , the Superior Court premised its rejection of the defendant's attempt to point the finger at the Commonwealth on the dearth of supporting evidence in the record. The Anderson court cited no legal authority. In Monaco , the panel cited two non-binding, federal cases that upheld adult prosecutions of defendants who had committed their offenses as juveniles: United States v. Hoo , and United States v. Tsang . In Hoo and Tsang , there were legitimate bases for the delays in prosecution. And, in both cases, the federal courts refused to bar the prosecutions, even though neither defendant had caused the delay.
See Maj. Op. at 374 n.13.
Anderson , 630 A.2d at 51.
825 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1987).
632 F.Supp. 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
As in Anderson and Monaco , the courts in Hoo and Tsang appear to have assumed that, had the prosecution delayed the institution of criminal proceedings in order to subject the defendant to the more severe punishments available in the adult system, that prosecution could be barred. In other words, these courts (like Armolt here) presupposed the existence of an exception to the general rule that a person ineligible under the criteria of the juvenile statute for disposition of charges in juvenile court must face those charges in adult court.
But from where does this exception derive? No matter how equitable an exception may be, or how necessary it is to prevent miscarriages of justice, courts (and particularly lower courts) generally cannot conjure rules (or exceptions to rules) from whole cloth. A legal principle must be tethered to some tangible legal source. It must flow from a constitutional provision, a statute, or some other authority. Both the Superior Court and Armolt treat the "improper motive" exception as if its legal underpinnings are well-established. But they are not. Indeed, the courts that have tried to ascertain the legal foundation for the exception have found that foundation to be elusive. For instance, in Hoo (a case that does not bind this Court), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the argument that federal due process principles required the automatic dismissal of charges when the defendant did not cause the delay in prosecution that prevented him from being tried in juvenile court. However, the Court of Appeals did suggest that a delay that prevents a juvenile from obtaining the benefits of a juvenile system could amount to a "deprivation of [a defendant's] constitutional rights" upon a "showing of an improper prosecutorial motive." The Court of Appeals did not explain whether that particular outcome would be mandated by due process, or by some other legal source. Similarly, this Court has never addressed directly whether any provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution mandate the creation of such an exception.
Hoo , 825 F.2d at 670-71.
Id. at 671.
None of this is meant to suggest that the exception does not or should not exist. To the contrary, such a rule serves a vital interest. Just as a defendant cannot demand to be tried as juvenile when it was his course of action that aged him out of the non-punitive advantages of the Juvenile Act, the Commonwealth also should not be able to game the system and intentionally delay a case solely to attain the more severe sanctions available in the adult criminal system. The legal foundation for such a rule has never been excavated, let alone explored in depth, by this Court. It should be examined in an appropriate case. Because this is not that case, I join the Majority both in holding that Armolt could be tried as an adult and in declining to examine the "improper motive" exception in depth.
I respectfully disagree, however, with the Majority's decision to deem the balance of Armolt's claims to be waived for lack of meaningful development. Armolt first argues that, because he was sentenced to a more severe punishment than that to which he would have (or could have) been exposed had he been tried as an juvenile, his prison sentence violates the ex post facto provisions of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Next, Armolt contends that, because he committed his crimes as a juvenile, he should have been sentenced as a juvenile, and that the contrary disposition violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Armolt maintains as well that these purported constitutional violations simultaneously infringed upon his due process rights. Finally, Armolt argues that sentencing him to prison as an adult for crimes committed as a child was so unduly harsh that it violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. These claims sound in a challenge to the legality of Armolt's sentence. Thus, he cannot waive these claims, even if they are not developed in a substantive way.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Pa. Const. art. I, § 17.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
I do not dispute that Armolt's presentation of these claims to this Court is lackluster and insubstantial, at best. The Majority points out that Armolt does not even label his claims as legality-of-sentencing challenges, and that Armolt fails to frame his issues under one of the "[f]our broad categories of [legality] challenges [that] have emerged in our caselaw." But, setting aside any technical matter of categorization, Armolt alleges that his sentence is unconstitutional (under various theories). This is undoubtedly a species of legality-of-sentence claim. Construed fairly, Armolt's issues implicate the legality of his sentence, and he does not necessarily have to do or say anything further to obtain appellate review. He does not need to recite any magic words. So long as the claims, raised by him or even by this Court sua sponte , implicate the legality of an appellant's sentence, they simply cannot be waived. This is true even if the precise nature of the claims is difficult to decipher.
See Maj. Op. at 378.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Prinkey , ––– Pa. ––––, 277 A.3d 554, 562 (2022) ).
Like the double jeopardy challenge in Commonwealth v. Hill , and like the vindictive prosecution claim in Prinkey , Armolt's claims "squarely fall within the third category of legality challenges: claims asserting a constitutional barrier to the exercise of sentencing authority conferred in a facially constitutional statute." Construed fairly, Armolt's claims query whether the Ex Post Facto , Equal Protection, Due Process, or Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clauses proscribe his sentence, even though that sentence otherwise is authorized by a valid Pennsylvania law. It is unclear whether the Majority ultimately disagrees with this characterization. The Majority must believe to some degree that at least some of Armolt's claims implicate the legality of his sentence, as the Majority begins its analysis of this issue with a discussion of the basic legal principles that govern such claims. Even if there is some ambiguity as to the nature of Armolt's equal protection and due process claims (a point with which I do not agree), the ex post facto and cruel and unusual punishment claims undeniably advance legality of sentence arguments. That being the case, the problem is that the Majority holds that Armolt has waived what this Court has long held to be unwaivable claims.
662 Pa. 127, 238 A.3d 399, 409 (2020).
Prinkey , 277 A.3d at 564, 568.
Id. at 564.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a)(4) (authorizing a punishment of "total confinement" as a sentence upon conviction of a criminal offense).
See Maj. Op. at 376 (citations omitted).
That these clams are undeveloped does not meant they are ambiguous.
Notwithstanding my comparison of Armolt's claims to the constitutional issues addressed in Hill and Prinkey , the Majority insists that I offer no cases in support of my position that Armolt's claims implicate the legality of his sentence. See Maj. Op. at 378-79 n.18. Regardless, the Majority refuses to consider Armolt's claims as legality challenges because he "has not asked us to consider that question here." Id. But that does not matter. It is contradictory, at the very least, to claim that we can raise legality issues sua sponte and then to penalize an appellant for not raising that claim or presenting it in a way that meets this Court's unstated preferences. The fact of the matter is that, because the claims can be raised sua sponte , an appellant does not have to say anything about them, characterize them in any way, or even present meaningful argument in support of them.
The real problem appears to be that the Majority does not agree that Armolt's claims actually implicate the legality of Armolt's sentence. To the extent that the Majority is not convinced those claims do so, this does not preclude us from making the initial determination as part of our sua sponte review. Or, if this Court has any lingering confusion as to the character of the claims, we can always direct supplemental briefing for clarification.
Even if there is fair disagreement over the nature of some of the issues, there should be none as to claims that a sentence is Cruel and Unusual, or that a sentence violates the Ex Post Facto clauses of our Constitutions. The Majority apparently disagrees. The Majority does not explain how these claims do not at least implicate the legality of a sentence, nor does it cite to any cases holding to the contrary. Instead, the Majority deems the issues waived because Armolt failed to do what he is not required to do.
See Commonwealth v. Dickson , 591 Pa. 364, 918 A.2d 95, 99 (2007) ("a challenge to the legality of sentence cannot be waived").
Typically, "an appellant waives any claim that is not properly raised in the first instance before the trial court and preserved at every stage of his appeal." "A challenge that implicates the legality of an appellant's sentence, however, is an exception to this issue preservation requirement." It is axiomatic that "an appellate court can address an appellant's challenge to the legality of his sentence even if that issue was not preserved in the trial court; indeed, an appellate court may raise and address such an issue sua sponte ."
Commonwealth v. Barnes , 637 Pa. 493, 151 A.3d 121, 124 (2016).
Commonwealth v. Thorne , ––– Pa. ––––, 276 A.3d 1192, 1196 (2022) (quoting Hill , 238 A.3d at 407 ).
Hill , 238 A.3d at 407.
Because there are no preservation requirements for such challenges, and because we can introduce the issue entirely on our own initiative, an appellant potentially serving an illegal sentence is under no obligation to raise, let alone develop, such arguments. The law does not require Armolt to say a single word, yet the Majority finds waiver for not saying enough words. This waiver analysis creates a bizarre incongruity. Consider a civil litigant who appeals to this Court a judgment that, as it turns out, was issued by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Much like a legality-of-sentencing claim, subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue, and it can be raised by this Court sua sponte . Under the Majority's waiver analysis, if that civil litigant did not raise a subject matter jurisdiction challenge at all, this Court could (and would) raise the matter sua sponte and (likely) would vacate the judgment issued by the court that lacked jurisdiction. But, if that litigant raised a subject matter jurisdiction claim in his or her brief, but did not develop the argument to this Court's standardless and arbitrary satisfaction, we would deem the claim waived and would address the merits of other claims, even if we otherwise would have concluded that the lower court lacked jurisdiction. If this is the way we approach non-waivable legal issues, perhaps an appellant might be better off to let this Court raise the issue sua sponte than to run the risk of waiver under today's novel addition to the waiver rulebook.
In re J.M.Y. , 655 Pa. 452, 218 A.3d 404, 415 (2019) ("[T]he question of the subject matter jurisdiction of a court is nonwaivable, and, indeed, our Court is empowered to raise the issue sua sponte .") (citing Commonwealth v. Scarborough , 619 Pa. 353, 64 A.3d 602, 608 n.10 (2013) ).
In response to this point, the Majority asserts that I seek a "new rule altogether," one that permits a court to raise issues that implicate the legality of an appellant's sentence, "without prompting or advocacy by the parties." Maj. Op. at 378 n.18. This is precisely what I seek. But it is not a "new rule" at all. The ability of courts to raise and dispose of issues without being asked to do so, and without developed advocacy, is exactly what it means to raise an issue sua sponte .
Regardless, the Majority misses the point here. The Majority has created a jurisprudential trap for litigants. The law states clearly that challenges to the legality of a sentence cannot be waived. Yet, apparently, that is not true. If the appellant fails to satisfy our "considered judgment" as to the adequacy of the briefing—again, on an issue that we assure the appellant cannot be waived—then the appellant will have waived the issue. However, if this Court chooses to address the issue sua sponte , then there is no risk of waiver. It seems to me that, if we are going to set such a trap, and not even tell litigants clearly how to satisfy this Court's standard, litigants might be better off avoiding the trap altogether and simply letting this Court decide the issue on its own.
The Majority does not articulate a clear, workable standard for deciding when a non-waivable claim can be deemed to be waived for failure to present an argument that is sufficiently developed for this Court's review. The Majority says only that we will apply our "considered judgment." What does that mean? How can a party anticipate what does, or does not, satisfy our amorphous, undefinable "considered judgment?" "This is no rule. It is only muddle and confusion." If non-waivable claims can be found to be waived for this reason, the Court must provide at least some guidance as to precisely what level of advocacy is required to fall within this Court's "considered judgment." Today's Majority offers none.
Maj. Op. at 376-78 (citing Commonwealth v. Bishop , 655 Pa. 270, 217 A.3d 833, 844 (2019) ).
Bishop , 217 A.3d at 850 (Wecht, J., dissenting).
I have no quarrel with the general principle that, when a party fails to develop an argument with a substantive discussion of the issue and with supporting citations to authority, that issue is waived. The rule serves valid and important purposes. But it applies only to issues that are capable of being waived. Legality-of-sentence challenges are not among those issues. At the very least, this Court should acknowledge that, by imposing a baseline of advocacy, whatever and wherever that line may be, it has now decided that legality-of-sentencing claims no longer are non-waivable. There is no point in continuing to maintain the fiction that legality claims are non-waivable when that apparently is no longer true.
Maj. Op. at 376-77 (citing Banfield v. Cortés , 631 Pa. 229, 110 A.3d 155, 168 n.11 (2015) ).
The Majority is correct to say that this Court "may" raise legality-of-sentencing claims sua sponte but is not required to address such issues. There may be sound jurisprudential reasons that that we opt to exercise our discretion not to review a legality-of-sentence challenge. But the cases upon which the Majority relies for this point do not offer actual examples of this Court affirmatively declining to raise such claims sua sponte , nor do they remotely compel us to refuse review of Armolt's claims in this case. For instance, the Majority cites Commonwealth v. Fahy as an example of this Court "refus[ing] to entertain" a legality challenge. In that case, in an untimely PCRA petition, Fahy had sought review of the legality of his sentence. This Court "easily dismissed" the claim, but not as a willful exercise of this Court's discretion not to raise such claims sua sponte , as the Majority suggests. Rather, because the issue was raised in an untimely PCRA petition, this Court lacked jurisdiction to assess it. Far from a discretionary choice, this Court's decision was made in the absence of any lawful option to dismissal. That is not the same action as the one that the Majority undertakes today.
Id. at 377-78 (citing Hill , 238 A.3d at 410 n.11 ).
Id. at 378-79 (collecting cases).
Id.
558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223.
The Majority also cites Commonwealth v. Belak , which, while presenting a closer comparison, ultimately proves distinguishable. In that case, the defendant declined to present "meaningful argument" on the primary legality-of-sentencing issue before this Court. Instead, Belak chose to present an entirely new argument. Noting that Belak did not raise the issue in his petition for allowance of appeal or in his principal brief, but instead for the first time in his reply brief, this Court declined to review the issue even though "arguments of an unlawful sentence cannot be waived." This Court did not decline to review the issue because of the lack of "meaningful argument," but rather because Belak failed to raise the issue in a timely fashion. Here, unlike Belak, Armolt raised the constitutional challenges in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, in his brief to the Superior Court, in his petition for allowance of appeal, and in his brief to this Court. Thus, even though Belak corroborates the proposition that this Court retains the discretion to decline to review a legality challenge sua sponte , the case is patently distinguishable from the instant matter, and does not mandate a similar restraint on our discretion here.
573 Pa. 414, 825 A.2d 1252 (2003).
Id. at 1256 n.10.
Id.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 3/10/2020, at 1; see also Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/2020, at 3-4.
See Brief for Appellant (Superior Court), No. 459 MDA 2020, at 23-24.
See Petition for Allowance of Appeal, No. 315 MAL 2021, at 13-14.
See Brief for Appellant at 24-30.
The inapplicability of the Majority's cases notwithstanding, it remains true that this Court is not required by law to address any and all legality-of-sentence claims that are implicated in a case. However, until today, waiver for underdevelopment of a legal argument has never been invoked as a basis for declining to review legality claims. And with good reason: this Court has branded these claims as non-waivable. Because they can be raised sua sponte , no briefing is necessary at all, let alone high-quality briefing.
See Maj. Op. at 376 (citing Thorne , 276 A.3d at 1196 ).
In support of its novel ruling, today's Majority relies upon a handful of cases in which we have invoked the waiver doctrine because a litigant presented undeveloped legal arguments. These authorities include Wirth v. Commonwealth , a tax case, Banfield v. Cortés , a voting systems case, Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc. , a class-action automobile manufacturing case, and a concurring opinion from Commonwealth v. Williams , a capital appeal involving ineffective assistance of counsel assertions that did not pertain to the legality of the sentence. The problem with relying upon these cases is evident. None of them involved challenges to the legality of a sentence. These patently distinguishable authorities cannot justify extension of this form of waiver to traditionally non-waivable claims.
626 Pa. 124, 95 A.3d 822, 837 (2014).
110 A.3d at 168 n.11.
613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 29 (2011).
566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 532 (2001) (Castille, J., concurring).
One justification for finding waiver that the Majority repeatedly invokes is this Court's traditional reluctance to identify, and then advance, arguments on a litigant's behalf. This rationale is particularly unpersuasive here, for two reasons. First, the fact that we can raise these claims sua sponte expressly refutes the notion that we should not, or cannot, address them without developed advocacy. That is precisely what we do when we exercise our prerogative to raise, and dispose of, these select claims in this way. Second, in the wake of this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Hamlett , it cannot be said that this Court remains uniformly devoted to maintaining its role as solely a neutral arbiter. Although I strenuously dissented, Hamlett is now the law of Pennsylvania. It holds unequivocally that, when the Commonwealth fails (or declines) to meet its burden to prove harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt before an appellate court, this Court is more than willing to pick up the prosecutorial torch and carry it. For the Hamlett Majority, the primary justification to jettison (for the Commonwealth, at least) the burden of making a developed legal argument is the financial and emotional cost of holding a second trial. In attempting to minimize the fact that the Court was playing lawyer for the Commonwealth, the Hamlett Majority remarked that "[t]here are a litany of other interests impacted by the social costs of retrial, including those on the judicial system at large, jurors, victims, other witnesses, and the general public," and that there is therefore a "systemic interest in avoiding costly and unnecessary proceedings before the judiciary." It was on account of these "larger concerns" that the Hamlett Majority decreed that, when the Commonwealth entirely omits any discussion of harmless error, or does not advance a substantively developed argument on that point, this Court may nonetheless make the argument on the Commonwealth's behalf. If the costs of re-prosecution justify this Court ruling upon issues not fully developed, surely a person potentially serving an illegal sentence deserves the same treatment. What could be a "larger concern" in our constitutional system than the unlawful detention of a citizen by the government?
See Maj. Op. at 377 (quoting Banfield , 110 A.3d at 168 n.11 ("It is not the obligation of an appellate court to formulate [an] appellant's arguments for him."); Williams , 782 A.2d at 532 (Castille, J., concurring) (stating that this Court is "neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for the party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter. The Court is left to guess at the actual complaint that is intended by the party."); Commonwealth v. Spotz , 610 Pa. 17, 18 A.3d 244, 282 (2011) (explaining that "we will not attempt to divine an argument on [a litigant's] behalf.")).
660 Pa. 379, 234 A.3d 486 (2020).
Id. at 495-523 (Wecht J., dissenting).
Id. at 492.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Moreover, engaging in a harmless error analysis requires this Court to evaluate what role a legal error played in the factual record, and to assess how a jury would have ruled absent that error. This weighing of evidence is not a task that we are well-suited to perform. Apparently, we are willing to do so to conserve judicial resources, or to prevent witnesses from having to testify a second time. However, a challenge to the legality of a sentence is a pure question of law—a species of appellate claims that we are particularly well-equipped to assess. According to today's Majority, we will not review that strictly legal question without full briefing from the parties. Respectfully, we have gotten this backwards. We should decline to review fact and record-based questions like harmless error, and we should instead be willing to review purely legal questions like challenges to the legality of a sentence.
The Majority claims that there can be no "reasonable comparison" between this Court advocating for the Commonwealth in harmless error cases and advocating for an appellant in a legality-of-sentence case. Maj. Op. at 378, n.18. The alleged "unique intersection" between harmless error and the right-for-any-reason doctrine does not justify this Court's disparate treatment. Highlighting the substantive differences between these claims cannot obscure the fact that this Court has proven itself willing to advocate for some parties but not others. It is no longer convincing for this Court to state that we do not advocate for parties.
Prior to today, our articulation of the law was clear. A claim challenging the legality of a sentence could not be waived. If the appellant did not raise the claim, we could raise it sua sponte , and then rule on it. Following today's opinion, much of what was clear has changed. Now, a legality-of-sentence claim can be waived: (1) if the development of the issue does not satisfy our "considered judgment," despite the fact that the petitioner had no obligation to brief the issue at all; or (2) if there is any other procedurally deficient aspect of the presentation of the issue. The Majority also changes the way this Court can raise legality claims. Prior to today, this Court possessed the authority to raise the claims entirely sua sponte . Now, we can raise a legality claim only if it is a "known legality of sentence problem."
Id. at 378 n.18. The Majority cites no opinion from this Court for this new limitation. Instead, it relies upon a non-binding concurring opinion and a Superior Court case. Neither warrants this unprecedented limitation on our ability to raise claims sua sponte .
None of this was necessary. The Majority has added layer upon layer to our legality-of-sentence jurisprudence in order to avoid addressing Armolt's claims. I would not do so. Instead, I would straightforwardly apply this Court's well-established edict that a challenge to the legality of one's sentence cannot be waived. To apply the rules equally, predictably and as they are written is not to make some "expansive judicial power-grab." Instead, the "power-grab" that occurs here arises when the Majority creates new rules to justify its waiver determination.
Id.
Notwithstanding these profound disagreements, because any legality-of-sentence claims readily fail on the merits, I concur in the result reached by the Majority. In my view, no constitutional-based legality-of-sentence claim can succeed here because, as the Majority correctly holds, Armolt could claim no right (constitutional, statutory, or otherwise) to a juvenile disposition of his charges. Consequently, Armolt is entitled to no comparison between the way his case proceeded and how it would have proceeded in juvenile court. Because that comparison is at the heart of each of his legality claims, each must fail. That means that Armolt cannot reasonably claim that he suffered an increase in his sentence—a purported ex post facto violation—when he was never entitled to, and did not receive, an initial adjudication in juvenile court. Nor can Armolt establish that his sentence constituted an equal protection or due process violation; the law does not demand that he be tried as a juvenile in the first instance. He was sentenced exactly as anyone else convicted in adult court would have been sentenced. And, finally, for Eighth Amendment purposes, inasmuch as Armolt had no right to a juvenile disposition, there was nothing unduly harsh in his four-to-eight year sentence for a seven-year course of sexual abuse, particularly when the trial court fashioned the sentence, in part, to account for the fact that Armolt was a juvenile at the time that he perpetrated the abuse.
To the extent that the Majority feels that Armolt's claims are truly unreviewable without further development, rather than find them waived, it would be more consistent without our legality-of-sentence jurisprudence to recognize the issues as such, and then hold the case and direct the parties to brief the issues further. See Hamlett , 234 A.3d at 494 (noting that, "to enhance fairness," an appellate court can direct supplemental briefing when the parties’ efforts fail to assist that court meaningfully).
In sum, I join the Majority in holding that, once he was no longer a "child," Armolt could be tried in an adult court for his crimes. I do not join the Majority's decision to deem the remainder of Armolt's arguments waived. I would construe those claims as constitutional challenges to the legality of Armolt's sentence, and I would find that they lack legal merit. Ultimately, I agree that Armolt is not entitled to any form of relief. Thus, I concur in the Majority's disposition of this appeal.
Justice Donohue joins this concurring opinion.