Opinion
2021 CA 0710
03-30-2022
COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE ZONING, LLC, DONALD ALETTE, ANNE B. BROOKS, MARY F. BLYTHE, RONNIE AND RACHEL SPENCER AND DWIGHT DOSKEY v. THE PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY AND ST. TAMMANY PARISH PRESIDENT
C. Randall Loewen Henry M. Weber Mandeville, Louisiana Dwight Doskey Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Intervenors/Appellants Sidney Borne, Kristen Joyce, and Donalyn Hassenboehler Warren Montgomery District Attorney Angel L. Byrum Alex L.M. Ducros Mandeville, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees St. Tammany Parish Government and St. Tammany Parish President John R. Walker Thomas Huval Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Intervenor/Appellee All State Financial Company
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana No. 2020-10074 The Honorable Reginald T. Badeaux, III, Judge Presiding
C. Randall Loewen Henry M. Weber Mandeville, Louisiana Dwight Doskey Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Intervenors/Appellants Sidney Borne, Kristen Joyce, and Donalyn Hassenboehler
Warren Montgomery District Attorney Angel L. Byrum Alex L.M. Ducros Mandeville, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees St. Tammany Parish Government and St. Tammany Parish President
John R. Walker Thomas Huval Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Intervenor/Appellee All State Financial Company
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., PENZATO, AND HESTER, JJ.
PENZATO, J.
Intervenors, Sidney Borne, Kristen Joyce, and Donalyn Hassenboehler, appeal the district court's judgment granting the peremptory exceptions of prescription, peremption, and alternative no cause of action in favor of the St. Tammany Parish Government and the St. Tammany Parish President and dismissing intervenors' claims with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm the portion of the district court's judgment sustaining the peremptory exception of peremption filed by the St. Tammany Parish Government and the St. Tammany Parish President and dismissing the claims of intervenors, Sidney Borne, Kristen Joyce, and Donalyn Hassenboehler. We vacate the portion of the January 26, 2021 judgment sustaining the peremptory exceptions of prescription and alternative no cause of action filed by the St. Tammany Parish Government and the St. Tammany Parish President. We grant the motion to strike filed by the St. Tammany Parish Government and the St. Tammany Parish President.
The petition for intervention was originally filed on behalf of Kristen Jones, and she is referred to as such in the judgment. However, since the petition for intervention was filed, this party has been referred to as Kristen Joyce. There is no explanation in the record or in brief as to whether this was a name change or an original mistake. Based upon her attorneys' repeated use of Kristen Joyce, this court will refer to her as such in this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 6, 2020, the Coalition for Responsible Zoning, LLC and several individual property owners filed a petition for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against the St. Tammany Parish Government and the St. Tammany Parish President. The plaintiffs alleged that the Parish Government, acting through the St. Tammany Parish Council and Parish President, abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in violation of applicable laws, codes, and the Comprehensive Zoning Plan by adopting Ordinance Calendar No. 6284, which rezoned a 69.46-acre tract of land in St. Tammany Parish. According to the petition, Ordinance Calendar No. 6284 was adopted on December 5, 2019 and became effective on December 20, 2019. The plaintiffs sought judicial review of the Parish Council's zoning decision and prayed for judgment declaring that Ordinance Calendar No. 6284 was improperly adopted and is void, declaring that the land rezoned under the ordinance be reinstated to its original zoning classification, ordering the defendants to cease and desist any attempt to enforce or implement Ordinance Calendar No. 6284, and permanently enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance.
None of the plaintiffs are involved in this appeal.
The St. Tammany Parish Government was incorrectly named in the petition as "The Parish of St. Tammany." At the time the petition was filed and during the events that are the subject of the petition, the Parish President was Pat Brister. Effective January 13, 2020, the office was held by Mike Cooper.
All State Financial Company, the owner of the property at issue, intervened in the suit to assert its rights and joined with the defendants. Numerous other parties sought to intervene as plaintiffs, including Sidney Borne, Kristen Joyce, and Donalyn Hassenboehler (collectively, "Borne Intervenors"). The Borne Intervenors' petition for intervention ("Borne intervention") was filed on April 13, 2020.
Andrew Dart was also named in the Borne Intervenors' petition for intervention, but he did not appeal the subject judgment of the district court and is not a party to this appeal.
On September 25, 2020, the defendants filed peremptory exceptions of prescription, peremption, and alternative no cause of action, alleging that the Borne intervention was untimely. The defendants maintained that a request for judicial review of a zoning decision must be made within thirty days after the effective date of the challenged ordinance. St. Tammany Parish Ordinance 120-90 provides for review of zoning decisions made by the St. Tammany Parish Council and specifically sets forth the time within which any person must seek judicial review. Ordinance 120-90(b) states:
Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the parish council relative to a request for amendment, supplement, or change to the regulations, restrictions, zoning district, land use
category, or boundaries may file a petition to the 22nd Judicial District Court in and for the parish for the issuance of a writ of certiorari or for other appropriate legal proceedings. The petition shall be filed within 30 days after the decision of the council becomes final, which shall commence on the day following the effective date of the council's resolution or when the adoption of an ordinance is required, the day following the effective date of the ordinance. The actions of the parish council shall be subject to review on the grounds of abuse of discretion, unreasonable exercise of police powers, an excessive use of powers granted to the council, or the denial of the right of due process. However, the right to petition for judicial review shall not be limited to the foregoing grounds. (Emphasis added.)
The defendants asserted that the Borne intervention was untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after the effective date of Ordinance Calendar No. 6284. The Borne Intervenors did not file an opposition to the exceptions.
The district court sustained the defendants' exceptions on January 12, 2021 at the conclusion of the trial on the exceptions. A judgment in conformity with this ruling was signed on January 26, 2021. We note that, while the written judgment sustained the defendants' exceptions of prescription, peremption, and alternative no cause of action, it appears the district court found that the Borne Intervenors' right to seek judicial review was perempted. In its oral reasons, the district court cited its prior ruling, made in connection with identical exceptions filed in response to other plaintiff interventions, that judicial review of the St. Tammany Parish Council's zoning decision is an exercise of the court's appellate jurisdiction per La. Const Art. V, § 16(B) and the right to seek judicial review of the decision must be asserted within the thirty-day deadline set forth in Ordinance 120-90(b).
The transcript reflects that the district court orally sustained the exceptions of prescription and peremption, then clarified "more importantly, peremption." The court pretermitted ruling on the alternative exception of no cause of action. Since the district court found merit in the exception of peremption and dismissed the Borne intervention for this reason, the remaining exceptions were rendered moot and erroneously sustained in the judgment. Thus, we vacate the portion of the January 26, 2021 judgment that sustains the exceptions of prescription and alternative no cause of action.
On September 16, 2020, the district court granted the defendants' prior exception of peremption filed in response to petitions for intervention filed by other plaintiff intervenors. Those intervenors are not parties to this appeal, and the judgment granting the prior exceptions is not before us. It appears no appeal was taken from the September 16, 2020 judgment.
The Borne Intervenors filed the instant appeal, seeking to reverse the January 26, 2021 judgment.
DISCUSSION
Although the Borne Intervenors raise numerous assignments of error, the single, pertinent issue is whether the intervention was timely.
In their assignments of error, the Borne Intervenors assert that the district court erred by converting this appeal, sua sponte, from suspensive to devolutive and by refusing to set a bond, as requested. However, the issue was not briefed and is deemed abandoned. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). We further note that, in light of our conclusion, any error in the district court's action was harmless.
St. Tammany Parish Ordinance 120-90(b) creates a right to seek judicial review of the Parish Council's zoning decision and sets forth the time period within which the right must be exercised. Therefore, we find the thirty-day period is peremptive. Hartzog v. Ezell, 2012-1461 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/10/12), 102 So.3d 884, 886 (When a statute creates a right of action and stipulates the time period within which that right is to be executed, the time period is one of peremption). Peremption is a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right. Unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon the expiration of the peremptive period. La. C.C. art. 3458.
Ordinarily, the exceptor bears the burden of proof at the trial of the peremptory exception. However, if the plaintiffs claim is perempted on its face, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the action is not perempted. Evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception of peremption. La. C.C.P. art. 931; Bank v. Rayford, 2017-1244 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/29/18), 247 So.3d 733, 736. Here, the defendants relied on exhibits to support the exceptions but did not introduce those exhibits into evidence at the trial of the exceptions. Unless properly offered and introduced into evidence, documents attached to memoranda do not constitute evidence and cannot be considered as such on appeal. In the absence of evidence, the exception of peremption must be decided on the facts alleged in the petition with all allegations accepted as true. Further, where no evidence is introduced, the manifest error standard of review does not apply, and the appellate court's role is to determine whether the district court's ruling was legally correct. Id. at 736.
The Borne intervention was filed on April 13, 2020. The petition for intervention states that the Borne Intervenors sought to challenge the enactment of Ordinance Calendar No. 6284 and previously sought to join this suit, as additional plaintiffs, on/about February 20, 2020. The petition further explains that, as an alternative to their previously filed motion for leave to be added as plaintiffs, which the defendants opposed, the Borne Intervenors sought to intervene pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1041. Thus, it is evident from the face of the pleading that the Borne Intervenors have attempted to seek judicial review of the zoning decision concerning Ordinance Calendar No. 6284 since February 2020, and the petition for judicial review (i.e., intervention) asserted in April 2020 was necessarily filed beyond the thirty-day deadline set forth in Ordinance 120-90(b). Notably, too, the Borne Intervenors do not dispute this or assert that their request for judicial review was timely under Ordinance 120-90(b).
We note that the plaintiffs state that the effective date of Ordinance Calendar No. 6284 was December 20, 2019, while the defendants maintain it was January 1, 2020. April 13, 2020 is more than thirty-days from either proposed effective date.
In brief, the Borne Intervenors reference Governor John Bel Edwards' COVID Orders, specifically "33 JBE 2020 and its progeny," which they assert further extended the deadlines provided in La. C.C.P. art. 1041. 33 JBE 2020, which imposed a stay-at-home order, became effective on March 23, 2020, well beyond the deadline to seek judicial review of Ordinance Calendar No. 6284. The same is true concerning the first COVID-related public health emergency declaration, made on March 11, 2020. See Emergency Proclamation No. 25 JBE 2020. Therefore, to the extent the Borne Intervenors assert that the state's COVID orders extended their filing deadline, this argument is without merit.
Instead, the Borne Intervenors argue that pursuant to Ordinance 120-90(b) only the original suit seeking judicial review must be brought within thirty days of the effective date of the zoning ordinance. They assert that their intervention is governed by La. C.C.P. art. 1041, not Ordinance 120-90(b). Article 1041 pertinently provides that an incidental demand is not barred by prescription or peremption if it was not barred at the time the main demand was filed and is filed within ninety days of date of service of main demand. Thus, the Borne Intervenors maintain that a party seeking to intervene in a suit for judicial review is not bound by Ordinance 120-90(b)'s thirty-day deadline. The practical effect of their argument is that the first aggrieved person(s) to file a petition for judicial review must abide by a different, much more stringent filing deadline than those aggrieved person(s) who subsequently seek the same relief by intervening into a pending suit.
An intervention is an incidental demand. La. C.C.P. art. 1031.
We disagree with this interpretation and find the clear and unambiguous language of Ordinance 120-90(b) makes no distinction between original petitions for judicial review and interventions. See Derbonne v. State Police Commission, 2019-1455 (La.App. 1st Cir. 10/14/20), 314 So.3d 861, 872, writ denied, 2020-01323 (La. 2/17/21), 310 So.3d 1152 (When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written.) Contrary to the Borne Intervenors' assertion, Ordinance 120-90(b) establishes one time period within which "[a]ny person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved" by a zoning decision may seek judicial review.
Additionally, in Vallery v. Louisiana State Department of Environmental Quality, 2011-1315 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/2/12), 97 So.3d 1026, 1027, writ denied, 2012-2061 (La. 11/16/12), 102 So.3d 41, this court held that interventions allowed by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure are not permitted in proceedings for judicial review, where the district court is exercising appellate jurisdiction pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 16(B). Instead, interventions pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure pertain to ordinary proceedings. Id. at 1028.
In Vallery, this court addressed the procedural question raised in the present appeal: "whether a party may file a petition to intervene in an action on judicial review after the time delay allowed for filing a petition for judicial review has elapsed." Id. at 1027. There, the plaintiff timely sought judicial review of a permit decision made by the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). The prospective intervenors sought to intervene after the time delay allowed for filing a petition for judicial review had elapsed. See La. R.S. 30:2050.21(A), which sets forth the procedure for an aggrieved person to seek review of an action by the DEQ and pertinently provides, "A petition for review must be filed in the district court within thirty days after notice of the action or ruling being appealed has been given." After concluding the matter was not an ordinary proceeding and, thus, no right to intervene existed, this court considered whether the prospective intervenors, as aggrieved persons, timely filed a petition for review within the delay set forth in La. R.S. 30:2050.21(A). Like Ordinance 190-20(b), the statute at issue in Vallery made no distinction between aggrieved persons who are first to seek judicial review and those who seek to intervene; instead, all must follow the same statutory procedure. Id. at 1028-29. Because the prospective intervenors in Vallery did not file their petition for intervention within the statutory thirty-day period, this court affirmed the judgment sustaining the exceptions of no cause of action and peremption. Id. at 1029. See In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So.2d 367, 370 (La. 1991), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court held that judicial review of quasi-judicial administrative agency determinations is an exercise of the district court's appellate jurisdiction pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, §16.
The language of Ordinance 120-90(a) also demonstrates that the St. Tammany Parish Council hears the first appeal of the zoning commission's decision, then the district court considers any appeal of the Parish Council's decision. Specifically, Ordinance 120-90(a) states that "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by a decision of the zoning commission may appeal to the parish council" within ten days following the commission's hearing. Following this ten-day period, the appeal may be heard by the parish council, who shall have the exclusive right to overturn any zoning commission decision by a majority vote of the membership of the parish council. Ordinance 120-90(a). Thereafter, as noted above, Ordinance 120-90(b) provides for judicial review by the district court.
We further find no merit in the Borne Intervenors' assertion that Vallery is inapplicable because it concerned the district court's review of a decision made by a "quasi-judicial body" rather than, as here, a "zoning decision made by the legislative branch." The pertinent discussion and holding of Vallery - that the prospective intervenors had no right to intervene at the judicial review stage pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure and that the intervenors' petition was untimely because it was filed beyond the statutory timeframe - apply equally here.
Louisiana jurisprudence likewise does not support the Borne Intervenors' argument that the district court has original jurisdiction here because the decision at issue was not made by an administrative agency. In Northwest St. Tammany Civic Association v. St. Tammany Parish, 2011-0461 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/9/11), 2011 WL 5410169, at *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2011-2710 (La. 3/2/12), the plaintiffs filed a "Petition for Writ of Mandamus" challenging a decision to issue a conditional use permit by the St. Tammany Parish Council - the same entity whose conduct is challenged here. This court noted that, although the petition purported to be a mandamus action, it was "an action for judicial review" and "clearly an appeal" of the Parish Council's decision. Id. at *4 n.5. This court further concluded that the plaintiffs' petition, filed more than thirty days following the challenged permitting decision, was untimely under Ordinance 120-90.
At the time, Ordinance 120-90 was identified as Ordinance 18-051.05, but its substance was identical to the current version now at issue. Northwest St. Tammany Civil Association, 2011 WL 5410169 at *4. Although this court described the filing deadline in this ordinance as a prescriptive period, we find, for reasons previously discussed, that the time period is peremptive.
See Matter of St. Tammany Parish Board of Adjustments, 95-2005 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/14/96), 676 So.2d 119, 120 (recognizing a zoning board of adjustment is a quasi-judicial body); Elysian Fields, Inc. v. St. Martin, 1991-0333, 600 So.2d 69, 72, (La.App. 4th Cir. 1/30/92) (making no distinction between "boards and quasi-judicial tribunals"); Our Lady of Lake Roman Catholic Church, Mandeville v. City of Mandeville, Planning & Zoning Commission, 2013-0837 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/3/14), 147 So.3d 186, 189 (before the court on judicial review of a "decision by an administrative agency," referring to the decision of a zoning board). See also Willis v. City of New Orleans, 2014-0098 (La.App. 4th Cir. 6/18/14), 143 So.3d 1232, 1236 n.3, wherein the court considered La. R.S. 33:4727, which like Ordinance 120-90(b), pertinently provides, "any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved" by any decision by the board of adjustment may present to the district court of the parish or city in which the property affected is located a verified petition setting forth that the decision is illegal, in whole or in part. The Willis court noted, "A plain reading of La. R.S. 33:4727's review provision suggests that a district court would be exercising its appellate jurisdiction...If this is the case, intervention in a proceeding seeking a district court's review of a Board's decision would be improper under any circumstance." (Citations omitted.)
The issue before the court in Willis was whether an intervening party may raise issues not previously raised by the parties to the principle action. The court did not address whether an intervention was proper as the parties did not frame the issue for the court's review. Willis, 143 So.3d at 1236 n.3.
Finally, to support their assertion that the district court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction, the Borne Intervenors rely on jurisprudence, which states that a challenge to a zoning decision in Louisiana is not an appeal from the decision of a lower tribunal but, instead, is a "de novo proceeding." See Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Commission of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So.2d 482, 492 (La. 1990); Toups v. Cityof Shreveport, 2010-1559 (La. 3/15/11), 60 So.3d 1215, 1217; Truitt v. West Feliciana Parish Government, 2019-0808 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/21/20), 299 So.3d 100, 103. The Borne Intervenors argue that, as a de novo proceeding, the district court reviews the zoning decision under its original jurisdiction per La. Const. Art. V, § 16(A). We disagree.
While these cases do not define "de novo proceeding," Louisiana jurisprudence clearly provides that, in a proceeding for judicial review of a zoning decision, the issue before the district court is "whether the result of the legislation is arbitrary and capricious, and therefore a taking of property without due process of law." Toups, 60 So.3d at 1218, citing Palermo. 561 So.2d at 492. Judicial review of zoning decisions serves as a check on the legislative power granted to parish officials to ensure there is no abuse of the power. Courts will not and cannot substitute their judgment for that of the legislative authority. Palermo, 561 So.2d at 492. A court may not constitute itself as a zoning commission or zoning board nor is it the province of the courts to second guess a zoning decision that appears to have been based on appropriate and well-founded concerns for the public. Toups, 60 So.3d at 1218. Zoning falls under the jurisdiction of the legislature, and as such, courts will not interfere with their prerogative unless the action is palpably erroneous and without any substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare. Truitt, 299 So.3d at 103.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:4780.40 also provides that zoning ordinances enacted by a governing authority and the acts of its zoning commission shall be subject to judicial review on the grounds of abuse of discretion, unreasonable exercise of police powers, excessive use of the power herein granted, or the denial of the right of due process. We note that the Borne Intervenors refer to La. R.S. 33:4721 numerous times in their brief to this court. For clarity, La. R.S. 33:4721-4734 is contained in Title 33, Chapter 14, Part I, Subpart A, entitled "Municipal Zoning Regulations." The statutes applicable in this case are La. R.S. 33:4780.40-33:4780.52 contained in Title 33, Chapter 14, Part I, Subpart H, entitled "Zoning Regulations for Parishes."
It is evident from this language that the district court has no authority to substitute its own judgment for that of the zoning entity and does not conduct a trial de novo when reviewing zoning decisions such as the one at issue here. Pardue v. Stephens, 558 So.2d 1149, 1160 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1989) (recognizing that, in a trial de novo of an administrative proceeding, the appellate court can make its own factual determinations, exercise its own discretion and substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency.) See also Williams v. Parish of St. Bernard, 2015-1105 (La.App. 4th Cir. 12/2/16), 206 So.3d 259, 267, writ denied, 2016-2280 (La. 2/3/17), 215 So.3d 696 (A trial de novo of an administrative proceeding is a new trial on the entire case, on both questions of fact and issues of law, conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance.)
Unlike here, the statute at issue in Pardue specifically provided for a trial de novo. Id. at 1158-59.
We have found no zoning challenge wherein a trial de novo was required, and the Borne Intervenors have cited none. Instead, consistent with the jurisprudence cited above, we conclude that the district court here was exercising appellate jurisdiction pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 16(B), not its original jurisdiction under La. Const. Art. V, § 16(A). Judicial review of the Parish Council's zoning decision and enactment of Ordinance Calendar No. 6284 is not an "adjudication in the first instance." See Vallery, 97 So.3d at 1028 ("The grant of original jurisdiction refers to judicial adjudications in the first instance with the adjudicative tribunal being the forum in which the initial adjudication is made. It does not refer to judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies.") Since the district court was exercising appellate jurisdiction, the Borne Intervenors had no right to seek judicial review of the zoning decision, via intervention or otherwise, after the thirty-day filing deadline set forth in Ordinance 190-20(b). The district court properly concluded that the Borne Intervention, filed after this period expired, was untimely.
The Borne Intervenors cite Westside Lumber & Supply Co, Inc. v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 So.2d 1384-85 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978), a zoning case wherein evidence was introduced before the district court to determine whether the zoning decision was arbitrary or capricious. We disagree with the Borne Intervenors' assertion that the introduction of evidence alone "shows that a suit for judicial review of a zoning ordinance is not an' appeal' based on the record established in the lower tribunal." Further, as the defendants point out, the statute at issue in Westside Lumber expressly provides for the hearing of additional evidence.
Motion to Strike
On appeal, the Borne Intervenors assert that their petition for intervention relates back to the timely filed petition of the original plaintiffs pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1153. The defendants filed a motion to strike with this court, asserting the relation-back argument was raised for the first time on appeal and should be stricken. As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider issues that were not raised in the pleadings, were not addressed by the district court, or are raised for the first time on appeal. LaCerte v. State, 2019-1401 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1/4/21), 317 So.3d 763, 770, writ denied, 2021-00193 (La. 3/23/21), 313 So.3d 272. This general rule is codified in Rule 1-3 of the Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, which provides: "The Courts of Appeal will review only issues which were submitted to the district court and which are contained in specifications or assignments of error, unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise." See Hurst v. Department of Police, 2014-0119 (La.App. 4th Cir. 7/23/14), 146 So.3d 857, 860-61 (refusing to address an argument not raised in the district court or before the city civil service commission).
Although the Borne Intervenors did not file a written opposition to the exceptions, they argued during the trial of the exceptions that a challenge to a zoning decision is a "de novo proceeding, "citing Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 399 So.2d 1179, 1182 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 401 So.2d 1192 (La. 1981). However, relation-back was not argued.
Furthermore, we do not find this is a situation in which "the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise." We have already determined that the district court was exercising its appellate jurisdiction and that La. C.C.P. art. 1041 pertains to ordinary proceedings, not the judicial review stage of administrative proceedings. For the same reasons, we also find La. C.C.P. art. 1153 is inapplicable. See Vallery, 97 So.3d at 1028. We grant the motion to strike.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the portion of the January 26, 2021 judgment sustaining the peremptory exception of peremption filed by the St. Tammany Parish Government and the St. Tammany Parish President and dismissing the claims of intervenors, Sidney Borne, Kristen Joyce, and Donalyn Hassenboehler. We vacate the portion of the January 26, 2021 judgment sustaining the peremptory exceptions of prescription and alternative no cause of action filed by the St. Tammany Parish Government and the St. Tammany Parish President. We further grant the motion to strike filed by the St. Tammany Parish Government and the St. Tammany Parish President. All costs of this appeal are assessed against intervenors, Sidney Borne, Kristen Joyce, and Donalyn Hassenboehler.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; MOTION TO STRIKE GRANTED.