Opinion
H12CP11013967A.
11-30-2012
In re ABRIANNA P.[1]
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KELLER, J.
On June 1, 2012, the petitioner, Joette Katz, the commissioner of the department of children and families (the department), filed a petition pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 to terminate the parental rights of the respondents, Sherlie P. and Osvaldo V., the mother and father of Abrianna P., born on June 6, 2011. Both parents were properly served notice of the petition for termination of parental rights. On June 28, 2012, they appeared to defend the petition, entered pro forma denials, and were appointed counsel after being determined indigent. The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of the child. Neither parent has claimed any Native American tribal affiliation. This court has jurisdiction.
On October 9, 2012, the mother and her attorney appeared and presented to the court a properly executed form consenting to the termination of her parental rights in Abrianna. This court canvassed mother on her consent and found by clear and convincing evidence that it had been knowingly and voluntarily entered by mother with a full understanding of the legal consequences of her action. Her consent was accepted. See General Statutes § 17a-112(i). Subsequently, the petitioner orally moved to amend the petition to withdraw the non-consensual ground alleged against mother and allege the ground of consent. The oral motion to amend the petition was granted by the court on October 9, 2012.
Trial was held on November 13, 2012. At her request, mother and her attorney were excused from attending the trial. Osvaldo V. appeared, represented by counsel, to contest the petition. In reaching the decisions reflected in the orders that issue in this memorandum, the court has fully considered the criteria set forth in relevant statutes and applicable case law, as well as the credible evidence, including the exhibits and the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the arguments of the parties. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and terminates the parental rights of the mother and the father in Abrianna P.
I
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Termination of Parental Rights
The petition, as amended, alleges consent on the part of the mother, and two statutory grounds for termination of the parental rights of the father.
The first is the ground of abandonment. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) provides for termination if " the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern and responsibility as to the welfare of the child."
The second non-consensual ground is the failure to rehabilitate, which provides, in pertinent part, for termination if " (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court ... to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ... and [the parent] has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child." General Statutes § 17a-112(B)(i); In re Zowie N., 135 Conn.App. 470, 503, 41 A.3d 1056, cert. denied 305 Conn. 916, 46 A.3d 170 (2012).
Termination of parental rights proceeds in two stages: adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment. See In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010); In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769, 858 A.2d 887 (2004); In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1991); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b), 35a-7. However, where the ground alleged involves failure to rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B), " [i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527, 939 A.2d 16 (2008); In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000). " What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." Id., at 231; In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000). " Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than ‘ any’ rehabilitation ... Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation." (Citations omitted.) In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. at 500. " [E]ven if a parent has made successful strides in [his] ability to manage [his] life and may have achieved a level of stability within [his] limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, [he] could assume a responsible position in the life of [his] children." (Citation omitted.) In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450 (2005). The issue is not whether the parent has improved his ability to manage his own life, but whether he has gained an ability to care for the specific needs of the child at issue. See In re Summer S., 124 Conn.App. 540, 545, 5 A.3d 972 (2010); In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.App. 619, 627, 5 A.3d 575 (2010); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 104 (2001).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, including consent by a parent, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756, 936 A.2d 638 (2007). " In the dispositional phase ... the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k) ]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joseph L., supra, 105 Conn.App. at 529. Procedurally, it is permissible to hear evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases in a single, nonbifurcated proceeding. See In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 15 A.3d 194 (2011); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 257, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); Practice Book § 35a-7(b).
II
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2011, the department invoked a 96-hour hold, and on June 9, 2011, filed an ex parte motion for temporary custody of the newborn Abrianna, as well as a neglect petition on her behalf. The neglect petition, by implication, alleged, under the doctrine of predictive neglect, that it was more likely than not that if she were placed in the care and custody of either parent, she would be denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and would be permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being. See In re Joseph W., 305 Conn. 633, 648-49, 46 A.3d 59 (2012). At the preliminary hearing on the temporary custody order on June 15, 2011, mother and then putative father, Osvaldo V., agreed that the temporary custody order to the department should be sustained. Osvaldo V. requested paternity testing, which also was ordered on that date. Preliminary specific steps, issued for the department and both parents on June 9, 2011, were reaffirmed at the preliminary hearing.
The neglect petition also initially named an unidentified John Doe as a putative father. That unknown person was subsequently removed as a party on February 2, 2012, when paternity testing established that Abrianna's biological father is Osvaldo V.
On March 13, 2012, both parents executed a written acknowledgment of paternity after paternity test results confirmed Osvaldo was Abrianna's biological father. By agreement, with both mother and father pleading nolo contendere, Abrianna was adjudicated neglected on the ground of being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her well-being and she was committed to the care and custody of the department. Father was present in court at the time of the adjudication and commitment and his nolo contedere plea was canvassed and accepted by the court. Final specific steps issued on that date were substantially similar to the preliminary steps issued on June 9, 2011.
On April 5, 2012, the court (Cofield, J.), approved the department's proposed permanency plan of termination of parental rights for Abrianna. Neither parent objected to the plan. Subsequently, on June 1, 2012, the department filed its petition for termination of parental rights.
III
FACTUAL FINDINGS
At trial on November 13, 2012, the petitioner introduced 13 exhibits and the testimony of five witnesses: Dr. Bruce Freedman, a psychologist appointed by the court to evaluate the parents, as well as the child's interaction with them and the foster mother; Officer Richard Kisluk of the New Britain police department; Andrew Chmielecki of the Office of Adult Probation; Paige Bogda of Children First Partners and Nantambu Satchidananda, the department social worker assigned to this case. Father introduced two exhibits and called no witnesses. The child's attorney called no witnesses and introduced no exhibits. The court granted the department's motion for judicial notice dated November 2, 2012, and indicated it would take judicial notice of all items requested therein. In addition, the court indicated it would take judicial notice of the filing dates and allegations of all pleadings, specific steps, court memoranda and court orders in the files. No party objected to the court taking such of the above referenced items. See In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 402, 852 A.2d 643 (2004); In re Mark C., 28 Conn.App. 247, 254, 610 A.2d 181, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 922, 614 A.2d 823 (1992).
The credible and relevant evidence introduced at trial, and a review of the judicially noticed court items, supports the finding of the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
A. Respondent Mother
Mother, Sherlie P., is 28 years old. She was raised primarily by her mother and rarely saw her biological father. Her stepfather lived with her until she was eight years old. During that time, she witnessed severe verbal and physical abuse. Mother had problems in school and did not earn a high school diploma. She only has minimal employment history. She has never been married. At age 16, she was diagnosed with depression as a result of family problems, and also suffered from self-mutilation and suicidal ideation. Mother has a sad and distressing history of relationships with the various men who have sired her five children. The father of her first child ended their volatile relationship, in which mother was the aggressor. The father of mother's second child left her after finding out she was pregnant. When this child was born prematurely, hospital staff noticed bruises on mother's body and reported it to the department. Mother's two oldest children were removed and placed in a foster home. After their removal, mother remained in another violent relationship. Eventually, her two oldest children were placed in the guardianship of their maternal grandmother. Mother gave birth to two more children who were removed from her care as a result of her transient lifestyle and unaddressed mental health issues. Eventually, her rights to those two children were terminated. In June 2011, the department received a referral from the Connecticut Children's Medical Center at Hartford Hospital, where mother gave birth to Abrianna after only a 31-week period of gestation. The premature baby weighed 3 1/2 pounds and had a positive toxicology screen for cocaine. Mother reported a five-year relationship with Osvaldo V., whom she named as the putative father, and confirmed domestic violence between the two of them, citing father as the perpetrator.
Mother has a criminal history and is a convicted felon. In July 2010, she was arrested for assault in the second degree and disorderly conduct. She was placed on probation, but subsequently violated it and was incarcerated. In May 2012, after spending eight months at York correctional facility, she was released to in inpatient dual diagnosis program. Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights in Abrianna on October 9, 2012.
B. Respondent Father, Osvaldo V.
Father, Osvaldo V., is 32 years old. He was born in Puerto Rico to a single mother. He never knew his father. He and his mother left Puerto Rico when he was an infant and moved to the mainland United States. His mother left his five older siblings behind. Father grew up like an only child and lived with his mother for about 20 years before she returned to Puerto Rico. Father and his mother moved around frequently, so he had to attend a number of different schools. He dropped out of high school after completing the 11th grade. Father reports that after leaving school, he just hung around in the streets with friends. Father has never served in the military. His minimal employment history includes working at the post office and a few years at a fast food restaurant. He also has performed " handyman" services, for which he has received " under the table" compensation.
In 2000, father married a woman named Iris V. Father and Iris had three children together between 1999 and 2001. According to department records, father was substantiated for physical neglect of these three children in December 2009 due to substance abuse with adverse effects on the children. The family had a total of eight referrals and two substantiations.
Father provided Dr. Bruce Freedman with information concerning his relationship with Iris during the court-ordered evaluation. He met Iris when he was 15 years old and still in high school. Iris was two years older and no longer attending school. He and Iris moved into an apartment together after they began having children. Their first son was born just before father's 19th birthday. After Iris became pregnant with their second son, the couple married in 2000. A third son was born in 2002. Father stated that Iris has a bad temper and which would lead to an argument every week. He liked to party a lot with his friends, which would make Iris angry and jealous because he was spending his time with other people and not the family. During one argument, he became so angry that he scared Iris, and was arrested for threatening in 2002. This is the first time he went to jail. Since then, he has been in and out of jail. Iris stayed with him until 2008. By then, father had decided he wanted nothing more to do with her since he felt she contributed to his criminal involvement.
Father admits to smoking a lot of marijuana, but not using other drugs. He has sold drugs including crack cocaine and heroin, and this has led to several of his arrests. When father met mother, Sherlie P., he did not plan to have any more children. He met her on the street and says he did not know at first that she was addicted to drugs. He said she began to follow him around. Father believes, looking back, that mother was interested in his money and his drugs. Father claims he first learned of mother's use of illegal drugs after she became pregnant. While mother was pregnant with Abrianna, father spent time between the houses of Jessica G. and mother, who, at the time, had a subsidized rental unit. After she became pregnant, mother started using crack cocaine. Father denies mother's claim that he supplied her with drugs, although he acknowledges she stole cocaine from him a few times. After a while, because father refused to provide mother with drugs, she started prostituting to get money to purchase drugs. Father only went to her house about once every week during her pregnancy. He indicated she kept looking worse every time he saw her. He began parking his car outside of her house and observed her prostituting herself. He warned her that the department would take the baby away from her, but she told him that she did not believe him. By the end of 2011, father was no longer involved with mother and was living with Jessica G., who had her own children.
Father is a convicted felon with a long criminal history that dates back to 1998, when he was 18 years old. He has a number of convictions: six for possession of illegal drugs, four for failure to appear, six violations of probation, three for assault in the third degree, one for threatening, one for interfering with a peace officer, two for driving while under suspension and one for evading responsibility. Between 2000 and 2010, not a single year went by without father being arrested. On March 6, 2010, father was arrested for sale of illegal drugs and ultimately convicted of possession of narcotics and a violation of probation. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment, execution suspended after nine months, and placed on probation for two years.
On December 23, 2011, and again, on January 26, 2012, father was arrested for two counts of assault in the third degree as a result of two domestic violence incidents involving his then girlfriend, Jessica G. He was incarcerated after the second arrest. Officer Richard Kisluk of the New Britain police department testified that on December 23, 2011 police received two reports from Jessica concerning several incidents of domestic violence between her and father. Jessica said she had been threatened and assaulted by father. Kisluk personally observed redness on the inside of her upper lip and multiple bruises on her person, including her chest, shoulder, thigh and ankle. Kisluk's incident report is in evidence. Father's explanation to the officer was that he and Jessica fell off the bed and he denied inflicting any injury on her. He also indicated to Freedman that Jessica fabricated the charges to seek revenge on him because he had a new girlfriend, Rosa, and Jessica had asked him for money but he refused to give her any. On the day of Jessica's report, she indicated she came home and found father in bed with another woman which led to his slapping her, causing the injury to her upper lip. Jessica reported that father had been very physical and controlling during their relationship. She was having trouble breaking up with him, and he kept coming back to her apartment. Jessica told Kisluck that she no longer wanted to associate with father because he was dealing drugs. A neighbor interviewed by Kisluck reported heavy pedestrian traffic to and from Jessica's apartment. Jessica said that at one point, father had choked her to the point where she almost passed out. While involved with father, during the later summer of 2011, the department removed Jessica's children from her care.
Father was convicted of the two counts of assault in the third degree. He was sentenced on April 25, 2012 and incarcerated at Cybulski correctional facility. He was released on September 28, 2012, less than two months prior to trial, and is now serving a two-year probation. The criminal court also issued a standing criminal restraining order against him to protect Jessica G. Father's special probation conditions include attending counseling and not driving a motor vehicle without a valid license, registration and insurance.
The case involving Jessica G. is the latest of a series of incidents involving domestic violence between father and his women, including his ex-wife, Iris, who obtained two protective orders against him in 2009, one of which extended to their three children, and mother, Sherlie P., who obtained protective orders against father in 2009 and 2011.
Mother reported disturbing and violent incidents with father. On one occasion, while mother was expecting Abrianna, she began hemorrhaging and father locked her out of her own apartment. Another incident occurred in public, on a street in Hartford, where he physically beat her. Mother indicated she had used illegal drugs throughout her pregnancy with Abrianna, and that father provided her with those drugs. On September 5, 2009, mother and father were living together in East Hartford when police were called to mother's apartment and met by a man who stated he had been robbed in that apartment and forced to walk home without his shoes or wallet. The victim identified father as one of the three people who had robbed him. He indicated father had punched him with a closed fist. Ultimately, father was convicted of assault in the third degree and sentenced to a 30-day jail term. A Hartford police report in evidence, dated March 6, 2010, notes that while father was standing on the street drinking a beer, police discovered him to be in possession of crack cocaine and charged him with possession of narcotics with intent to sell. This led to a conviction for possession of narcotics and he was sentenced to two years, suspended after six months, and two years probation.
After Abrianna's removal, father consistently stated to Satchidananda, the department worker, that he could not and did not want to reunify with Abrianna. Given that attitude, he was resistant to services. Despite his criminal history and being subject to several protective orders, he denied he had ever been the perpetrator of domestic violence. Five months later, he was arrested due to the domestic violence with Jennifer G.
Father questioned paternity at the time of the preliminary temporary custody hearing, Pursuant to a court order issued on June 15, 2011, Satchidananda scheduled a test for July 7, 2011, but father missed the appointment, despite receiving a certified letter from the department notifying him of the date and time. Another test was scheduled for August 22, 2011, but father also missed that appointment. He finally did attend a third test scheduled in September 2011 and was informed of the results by the end of that month. Despite the uncertainty as to Abrianna's paternity, the department began offering father visits from the beginning of the case in June 2011. On June 22, 2011, Satchidananda called father and left a voice message for him to contact the department regarding visits with his newborn daughter. Satchidananda called again on June 27 and mailed father a certified letter. The first contact Satchidananda received from father was on July 12, 2011 regarding missing the first scheduled paternity test, but father did not visit the child until September 8, 2011. On that date, he held her and took many pictures. Abrianna was quiet, but she did smile at father, who appeared appropriate and nurturing. Paige Bogda, assigned by the provider, Children First Partners, to supervise the visits, suggested to father that he check to see if the baby's diaper needed changing. Father said, " No, I don't change diapers, especially girls." Bogda informed him that this was part of caring for his daughter, and offered to show him how. Father left this one-hour visit 15 minutes early, stating he had to get changed for work. He left the visit without giving Abrianna a kiss goodbye, and did not help walk her out to the car. On September 15, 2011, the baby was transported for a visit which father had confirmed with Children First Partners the day before, but he did not show up or call to indicate why he could not attend. No further visits occurred in October 2011, as father was required to call first and he did not. As a result, Children First Partners terminated its service. Father told Satchidananda that he did not visit because the provider didn't contact him.
In November 2011, Satchidananda told father he would be supervising father's visits. Visits were to occur once a week, but only two visits took place in November. Satchidananda was having a hard time contacting father, who had given him numerous telephone numbers. Satchidananda would go down a list and call them all, without result. Father did not attend another visit until January 13, 2012. All in all, father has only attended about 25% of his scheduled visits. In January, Satchidananda learned father had been incarcerated and attempted to resume once a month visits between father and the baby in prison. He made numerous calls to the department of corrections, but was unable to schedule a visit until March 30, 2012. While incarcerated, father had visits every month except for a visit in June 2012. The reason for the June visit not taking place is not in evidence. Satchidananda observed little bonding between Abrianna and her father, and noted that during visits, father would talk to him rather than make an effort to relate to the child. Father remained very uncomfortable with changing a diaper.
Satchidananda testified that in July or August of 2012, father changed his mind about reunification efforts and presented himself as a resource for Abrianna. Since his release, he has resumed visiting and attended three visits in October. A fourth visit was canceled by Satchidananda, who offered father a make-up visit, which father declined. On October 16, 2012, Abrianna appeared tired and cried when handed to father. He told the department worker it was best if the worker tried to comfort her and would not hold her even after she fell asleep. On November 2, 2012, just a few days before trial, father failed to attend a visit and did not call ahead to cancel it, an ominous return to the irresponsibility he exhibited before he was incarcerated. Abrianna was transported to the department from daycare for no reason. Sachidananda attempted to contact father without success. At no time during any of his visits, has father brought Abrianna any clothing, food, cards, books or toys. He recently turned down a legitimate job at a Red Robin restaurant due to insufficient hours. Although working under the table as a handyman, he has not provided any support for Abrianna. As witnessed by Satchidananda, as Abrianna has gotten older, she is not very comfortable with him and does not want to be held or hugged by him. If she cries, father makes very little attempt to soothe her. It is clear to Satchidananda that he still requires a lot of prompting and instruction on engaging with and caring for a child. For most of her visits with him, the child is anxious.
Prior to his incarceration, father, as noted above, missed two appointments for paternity testing and did not attend an administrative case review in August 2011. It was not until November 2011 that father began to comply with the department's request that he accept the court-ordered services. However, he continued to miss visits. His compliance came with the condition that when his mother relocated from Puerto Rico to Hartford, Abrianna would be placed with her. However, his mother eventually determined she was not willing to alter her life to care for her granddaughter.
The following preliminary and final specific steps were issued by the court on June 9, 2011 and March 13, 2012 to facilitate the reunification of Abrianna with her father:
Keep all appointments set by or with the Department. Cooperate with department home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child court appointed attorney.
Father was not fully compliant with this specific step. He did not allow the Department to visit his residence until recently, when he allowed Satchidananda to visit Iris' residence, where he is now staying. He did not attend administrative case reviews held on August 9, 2011 and February 23, 2012. He missed two scheduled paternity tests.
Visit the child as often as DCF permits and demonstrate appropriate parent child interaction during visits.
Father was not compliant with this step. He attended only four visits prior to his incarceration on January 26, 2012. During these visits, he refused to deliver essential, basic care to Abrianna such as changing her diaper. After his incarceration, when the child had to be brought to him in prison, he did visit the child once a month with the exception of June 2012. However, his ability to interact with, soothe or provide basic care to the child was still not at an acceptable level. Although he made an effort to attend visits last month, on November 2, 2012, just prior to trial, he missed a scheduled visit and did not call ahead to cancel it. He does not demonstrate appropriate parent-child interaction during visits. He continues to be unable to comfort the child or provide basic child care. In one instance, he refused to hold the child, at Satchidananda's suggestion, even when she was asleep.
Participate in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals. The goal of services for father were to create a home environment free from abuse and neglect, maintain sobriety and stable mental health.
Father was initially resistant to services, as he indicated he was not pursuing reunification. Finally on November 29, 2011 he signed release of information forms in order to be referred for a substance abuse evaluation and drug screens at the Alcohol and Drug Recovery Center (ADRC) and parenting services at the Village Rambuh program. On December 20, 2011 father signed the release of information form in order to be referred to the NOVA domestic violence program. Subsequently, perhaps because he seemed to express an opinion that attending to the baby's basic needs was women's work, the department determined that My People Clinical Services' Father to Father parenting program would be more appropriate than the Village. However, father was arrested and incarcerated before any referrals could be completed. ADRC scheduled a substance abuse evaluation and screening for February 22, 2012, which he could not attend. While incarcerated at Cybulski, father attended twelve group sessions designed for inmates who have committed a domestic violence offense. Successful completion of this program is a requirement for inmates who wish to enter into community-based transitional supervision programs for such offenders, so father had an additional incentive to participate: freedom. He attended all 12 sessions, showed proper attitude and behavior and participated in group discussions. However, the facilitator commented that " He was vague in verbally acknowledging responsibility for his behavior." Recently, on October 18, 2012, father was assigned to another domestic violence program that is required by his probation. This is a 26-week group counseling session at the Wheeler Clinic, called " Explore." His probation officer testified unconvincingly that " as far as he knows, " father had been attending in the weeks preceding the trial. The department recently referred him back to the Father to Father parenting program and the NOVA domestic violence program, but those programs had not commenced as of the date of trial.
Submit to a substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment.
On June 22, 2011 father refused to participate in a substance abuse evaluation or screen. At the end of November 2011, he consented to do so, but the intake could not be scheduled due to his incarceration in January 2012. There is no evidence that father has participated in any substance abuse evaluation or testing as of the date of trial. Another referral to ADRC has only recently been made. Despite numerous convictions involving the possession of illegal drugs, his admission that he has sold drugs, and several previous probation violations, there is no indication his probation officer is monitoring him in any manner to insure he is refraining from substance abuse.
Obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by the Department to avoid future domestic violence incidents.
It does not appear that father and mother still have a relationship, so this particular step may no longer be applicable as it pertains to mother and father. However father has returned to his ex-wife, a woman he describes as having a temper who sought protective orders against him on at least two separate occasions and ultimately divorced him. There is no safety plan or family counseling in place to avoid a situation fraught with risk for repeat domestic violence. He again is dependent on a woman with whom he is not been able to get along in the past and is attempting to parent three boys, ages 10 through 13, who have not experienced the attentiveness and proper role modeling they have a right to expect from a father. The resumption of this relationship prior to father's completing a domestic violence program, addressing his past history of substance abuse, acquiring knowledge of parenting skills and securing legitimate employment is concerning.
Attend and complete an appropriate domestic violence program.
While incarcerated at Cybulski, father attended twelve group sessions designed for inmates who have committed a domestic violence offense. Successful completion of this program is a requirement for inmates who wish to enter into community-based transitional supervision programs for such offenders, so father had an additional incentive to participate: freedom. He attended all 12 sessions, showed proper attitude and behavior and participated in group discussions. However, the facilitator commented that " He was vague in verbally acknowledging responsibility for his behavior." Recently, on October 18, 2012, father was assigned to another domestic violence program that is required by his probation. This is a 26-week group counseling session at the Wheeler Clinic, called " Explore." The department recently referred him back to the NOVA program, but it had not commenced as of the date of trial.
Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.
Father is not compliant with this specific step. He has no verified legal income, and if he is working under the table as he has in the past, failure to pay taxes can constitute a violation of the law that may cause his probation to be violated. Father's ex-wife, Iris, lives with her three boys in a Section 8 rental unit. There is no evidence that father's moving into this federally subsidized unit has been approved by the appropriate authorities. The court is surprised that his probation officer would allow a person convicted of domestic violence to move back in with a woman who also has been a victim of father's aggression. Suffice it to say, his current residence does not appear secure.
Have no involvement further involvement with the criminal justice system.
Father is not compliant with this specific step. On December 23, 2011 and again on January 26, 2012 he was arrested and incarcerated for charges relating to domestic violence perpetrated on his girlfriend, Jessica G. He was convicted and sentenced on two counts of assault in the third degree. He spent almost nine months in jail, and has just begun a two-year period of probation.
C. Child, Abrianna P.
When Abrianna was born, she was delivered two months early after being exposed to cocaine in utero. Father supplied mother with illegal drugs during her pregnancy and was aware she was prostituting herself to buy more. Abrianna spent five weeks in the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit and had to be fed through a nasogastric tube every three hours. There is no credible evidence that father ever visited her at the hospital. Mother says he did not, and Satchidananda said father's first contact with the child, who was in the department's care from June 9, 2012, was in September 2012. Mother identified a family friend, the maternal grandmother's best friend, as a placement resource. She was cleared to visit Abrianna in the hospital so she could receive specific training on the infant's care. The foster mother slept at the hospital and participated in child specific training to learn to properly care for Abrianna. She also took off most of the summer of 2011 from her employment to devote to the baby's care and form a bond with her. Abrianna was finally discharged on July 11, 2011 and placed with her foster mother. Since then, as a result of her being born premature, Abrianna has required the services of the Visiting Nurse Association (VNA), two evaluations to rule out hip and brain abnormalities, and special synergist shots. Father was supportive of this placement, but only as a temporary one. He suggested the paternal grandmother as a placement resource, but she was residing in Puerto Rico and mother opposed this placement, as Abrianna already had been placed with and was bonding with her foster mother. Abrianna is medically up to date and has received all of her necessary immunizations. She had to be tested to rule out brain and hip abnormalities. By December 2011, at a neonatal follow-up program at Hartford Hospital, no concerns were reported regarding Abrianna's progress. However, as a result of her prematurity, her development will need to be further assessed. At this point, she is receiving excellent care, and despite her poor start in this world, there are no noted developmental delays that require the intervention of the Birth to Three program.
Abrianna is a confident, healthy and social baby who can make good eye contact with her caregivers. She is very bonded to her foster care mother, a working single woman with no other persons to care for at this time. Abrianna attends day care while her foster mother works as a school bus driver. Her foster mother, who is willing to adopt her, takes excellent care of her and the department has no concerns. Abrianna is now a toddler, a demanding and vulnerable phase of childhood that requires diligent, patient, attentive and structured care. She cannot care for herself or indicate to anyone what is wrong, and is totally dependent on others for her care. She requires a competent, capable and sober caregiver. The only home, she has ever known is with her foster mother, where she has thrived. She has no bond with her father or mother due to lack of consistent contact. During the visits, Abrianna does not transition easily to her father and is at times inconsolable until returned to her foster mother. She has never met father's ex-wife, Iris, a woman with her own child protection history, whom father is putting forth as a potential caregiver for her.
D. The Psychological and Interactional Evaluation of Dr. Bruce Freedman
On August 30, 2012, the court ordered a psychological evaluation of mother and father, including an observation of the interactions between Abrianna and her parents. Dr. Bruce Freedman, an experienced forensic psychologist who has conducted over 1500 evaluations for the courts as an expert in clinical psychology, conducted his evaluation over two days, on September 18 and 27, 2012, less than two months before trial. When he interviewed father, he was still incarcerated. Each of the parents was interviewed for three hours, and each completed psychological testing. Father's tests included the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Test-2-RF and the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory. Freedman also reviewed documents provided to him by the court: the court memorandum of decision concerning one of mother's older children, the summary of facts and social study in support of the termination of parental rights petition concerning Abrianna, and several affidavits secured by the department at the time of Abrianna's removal in June 2011. No collateral contacts were authorized.
Father refuted much of the history mother gave about the volatile nature of their relationship. He denied providing her with drugs and locking her out of her apartment. He also denied ever assaulting Jessica G. He also falsely told Freeman he had visited Abrianna every week after her birth until he was incarcerated. He did indicate that his problems with women were the result of his seeing more than one at the same time, and not revealing it to them, rather than any need on his part to dominate or control them. He acknowledged his infidelity antagonized them.
Although he had four girlfriends waiting for him to be released, all of whom had written to him and asked to visit him in jail, he did not allow them to visit. He said when he got out, he would figure out which girlfriend to see again. He told Freedman that when he was released from jail he would be living with a male friend who owns a building with apartments, and had an extra bedroom where father was welcome to stay for free. He said he would be released the following Friday, and his friend was expecting him. He might have to perform some maintenance tasks in lieu of paying rent. Father was now subject to a permanent protective order regarding Jessica G. He said he had a lot of friends who offered him help and could keep him out of trouble.
Father recognized that he had three sons who had been growing up without him. He had not had any contact with them while he was in prison. He said Iris had called him last year while he still was out of prison, asking what he wanted to do about their marriage. He told her he wanted a divorce. She agreed and made the arrangements to get it done. Before he was incarcerated, Iris had offered him a chance to see his boys, either by calling her or her mother. He had only done this a few times. He said all three boys got into a lot of trouble in school because they were hyperactive. They took medication to calm them down. He stated Iris has trouble handling the three boys and they do not respect her. He said it has been that way for years. He advised Freedman that he intended to meet with the department social worker after he was released to find out what kind of programs he was supposed to complete. He figured he would have to attend some parenting classes and some kind of drug program and was determined to complete these. He said he had attended a domestic violence group in prison and was hoping that he did not have to attend any more of such sessions. He told Freedman although he preferred to have a wife or girlfriend change his daughter's diaper, he now would learn to do it himself for his daughter's sake.
Mother told Freedman father was a drug dealer by trade, and she met him in her neighborhood. At the time, he had been married for six years and was still living with Iris. However, he did not tell her about his wife right away. When mother met father in 2008, she was pregnant with one of her older children, Abigail, who was born in 2009. Father was caught with drugs and was sent to prison, but mother continued her relationship with him for three years. When father got out of jail, he started staying at her house, rather than with Iris and his sons. He discovered that mother was using crack cocaine and although he liked to tell people that he only smoked marijuana, he also started smoking crack with her. She got pregnant with Abrianna, and ended up in a hospital a few times during the pregnancy. She was barely eating. When father got high, mother said he would get paranoid and used to hit her. If he started accusing her falsely of things, she would try to leave. They had a number of physical fights. They were having sex one time, rather roughly, and she went into labor. When she realized she was in labor, father would not let her use either of his two phones to call for help. Instead, she had to go outside and call her brother, who called for an ambulance. She disputed father's report that he had visited the baby in the hospital. She said he had never bought anything for the baby.
After the birth of Abrianna, there was little left to the relationship between mother and father. Mother lost her apartment and spent three months on the run, moving from place to place, still using crack and prostituting. She was eventually arrested and spent eight months in prison. Father advised Freedman that he planned to help mother, whom he believed to be on the run from authorities, to save her life. He would trick her into meeting him and get her into the car and drive her to the police. Freedman felt this was a rather poorly conceived plan, since father had no valid license to drive and contact with mother might cause an altercation that could lead to his re-arrest and further incarceration for violating probation.
During the testing conducted by Freedman, father showed an extreme effort to portray himself in an excessively positive, problem-free manner. This is consistent with some of the inaccurate history, noted above, that he relayed to Freedman during the interview. He showed signs of difficulty with thinking clearly and making sound judgments. He expressed many complaints of physical distress, reported a low level of positive emotion, a substantial level of antisocial behavior, and viewed the world with significant feelings of being persecuted by others. He views himself as emotionally distant and disconnected from people around him. Consistent with his perceived level of persecution, father blamed many of his problems on his various girlfriends and their family members. Freedman stated father showed no insight, or any sense of responsibility or concern about his casual, overlapping relationships with women, or his lack of support for them or his children. Father told Freedman that regardless of an individual attending classes, in this case for domestic violence, it would still be up to the person to decide to change. Freedman noted that father, while pursuing his own pleasure and impulses, had become an absentee father for three boys and now an infant. The substance abuse assessment Freeman administered to father only recorded father's denials, so he was inaccurately portrayed as having no alcohol or substance abuse problems in his entire life, which did not jibe with his known history.
For the parent and child observations, the foster mother arrived with Abrianna. Abrianna smiled and waved at Freedman in a friendly manner. The foster mother agreed to bring the baby into the interview room where father was waiting. Abrianna looked nervously at her father, made no move to lean toward him or hold her arms out, and leaned toward Freedman, a perfect stranger, rather than toward her father, to be held. As soon as the foster mother handed Abrianna to father, she started to cry, and although he tried to hold and snuggle her and see if she wanted a toy or a bottle, he was unable to soothe her. She became so upset father suggested that Freedman bring the foster mother back into the room. When foster mother entered the room, Abrianna had gotten so worked up that she had spit up her bottle all over father's prison uniform. He looked upset and a little disgusted, and showed little familiarity or comfort with parenting his young daughter. The foster mother then took Abrianna and gently changed her diaper and offered her a bottle of juice, which Abrianna drank while having her diaper changed. She showed a very high level of comfort with the foster mother. Abrianna continued to keep her distance from her father, avoided looking at him, and pulled away from a couple of tentative approaches he made early in the visit. At the same time, she was very friendly with Freedman and seemed to be a very outgoing child. Freedman noted that according to the records, father had had approximately 10 to 12 visits with the child, roughly one per month. As a result, Freedman did not understand why she had such a very negative reaction to father, one he testified was " as bad as it could get." Throughout the hour that Freedman observed, father was unable to hold or provide even the most basic care to his daughter. She took little comfort from him, clearly less than she had with Freedman as a new person who approached her gently. This was consistent with father's report that Abrianna had been crying during her previous visit with him, so that he could not hold her for a sustained visit.
Freedman observed the baby interact with her foster mother. Freedman noted the foster mother handled the baby expertly. The child was very comfortable and enjoyed snuggling with her, and the foster mother read the baby's signals very well. The foster mother demonstrated to Freedman that she understood Abrianna's level of development, such that the child was secure and comfortable performing at her highest level of developmental tasks. Freedman concluded that this observed relationship was clearly the primary one for Abrianna. Any outsider would easily mistake the relationship for that of a parent and child, based on the closeness and comfort. Foster mother was affectionate, attentive and supervised Abrianna well. She was friendly, but protective as far as the parents' contact with the child was concerned. Freedman noted that the foster mother had demonstrated a strong commitment to a child, having spent time at the hospital and stayed up with her at night as necessary, helping her to withdraw from exposure to illicit drugs and become physically comfortable.
In making his recommendations, Freedman noted that with respect to father's older children, he had a long criminal history in addition to his habit of seeing a number of women, both of which made him frequently unavailable to participate in his sons' lives. In his testing and interview, father showed much defensiveness, denial of his problems and shifting of blame to others. For example, while he denied drug use with or without his girlfriends, something mother disputed, more than one of the girlfriends he stayed with had lost custody of her children while involved with him. Freedman noted that father demonstrated a selfish, irresponsible approach throughout his reported history, particularly with parenting. He often spent time with several women at once, and complained if any of the women made even basic demands on him. In the case of his marriage, his wife grew tired of his repeated incarcerations and absence from the home even when he was out of jail. He recognized that all his sons had substantial behavior problems, but had never worked to support or help them in any constructive way. Although father was pledging to do everything right once he was released, for Abrianna's sake, Freedman noted his poor parenting record, long criminal history and observed, poor interaction with his daughter suggests a very poor prognosis for a future parental role he might play in Abrianna's life. The child's avoidance of him and her severe distress when forced to deal with him, even for a short time, was striking, observed Freedman. This, an indication of his lack of skill, motivation or commitment to his children, left his planned rehabilitation appearing to be a promise unlikely to be fulfilled or successful.
Freedman believes father has deep-rooted problems in that he has established a lifestyle in which taking advantage of women until he tires of them is routine. His problems would not lend themselves readily to counseling, since he does not identify problems or faults he wants to change. He could only tell Freedman he would cooperate with the department and the court, without having demonstrated a similar commitment to any of his other children or Abrianna in the past. His general plan, once he got out of prison, was to visit with all his girlfriends and children and then decide whom he wanted to spend time with. Freedman indicated that if father became involved with one or more of his other women, it would be unlikely that he could focus enough time and effort in order to successfully parent Abrianna. Father, Freedman concluded, could not demonstrate adequate parenting skills, and did not seem to show any understanding of children, as he clearly believes their care is the responsibility of the mother. His behavior had demonstrated that he did not accept or appreciate the importance of having a father present in the child's life. In the case of his sons, he did not acknowledge that his absence could be a strong contributor to their behavioral problems. Instead, he blamed this on their lack of respect for their mother.
Freedman concluded his report by stating, " Further reunification efforts between either of the parents and Abrianna would not be considered to be in the child's best interest ... For father, all indications were that he would continue his chosen lifestyle and behavior patterns after his release from prison." Freedman said father had not made himself available for services when these were offered, and his incarceration further hindered his progress. He did not visit his daughter regularly or consistently, and sometimes blamed his poor attendance on others. Even when he did visit, he refused to change the child's wet or soiled diaper, so that someone else had to be present to supplement his basic care. Father at the time of the evaluation was incarcerated, and stating for the first time that he would cooperate with any and all services required by the department or the court. However, father did not identify any problems he needed help with, and he had no proven record attending such services outside of prison or making similar efforts on behalf of his other children.
At the time of the evaluation, Freedman observed Abrianna had a close, solid attachment to her foster mother, which provided the basics for healthy psychological and physical development. By contrast, she had little or no relationship with either of her parents. Freedman concludes that at 15 months of age, Abrianna's primary attachment to her foster mother was very important to her, and breaking this could have significant, adverse consequences.
Freedman testified that he could not devise a plan for reunification between father and Abrianna. He would not know where to start. He predicted that father will, most likely, fall back into some of his longstanding patterns, trying to live off women and eventually tiring of them. If he has trouble finding work, he will go back to his tried and true way of making money, selling drugs, which will displease any woman he takes up with unless she is a drug user. Freedman indicated that the likelihood of father establishing a secure, stable home for a very young child is very low. If he stays with Iris, his three boys with behavioral problems will be craving his attention and not looking favorably on his giving attention to another child unrelated to them. Problems with his difficult boys would likely create problems between him and Iris. Freedman fears father will drop Abrianna off with Iris and move on. Freedman noted that anti-social personality disorders like father's are very difficult to address in counseling, as the disorder includes disregard for the rights and feelings of others and a tendency to blame others for one's behaviors rather than taking responsibility for one's mistakes. The person counseled must be very strongly motivated to change, a predisposition father lacks.
IV
ADJUDICATION
Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes § 17a-112(j) is an independent ground for termination. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). The petitioner is required to prove at least one ground alleged as to each parent in its petition by clear and convincing evidence. In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 46, 907 A.2d 126 (2006).
A. Reasonable Efforts Finding— General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1).
In order to terminate parental rights, the department must show, by clear and convincing evidence, as a prerequisite, that it " has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Jorden R ., 293 Conn. 539, 552, 979 A.2d 469 (2009); In re Brendan C., 89 Conn.App. 511, 524, 874 A.2d 826, cert. denied 275 Conn. 910, 882 A.2d 669 (2005); In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 640, 809 A.2d 119, cert. denied 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). " Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 347, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998). In this case, the department alleges that reasonable efforts had been made to reunify Abrianna with her father. Alternatively, the department also has pled that the father is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. See In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47-8, 887 A.2d 415 (2006); In re Jorden R., supra, 293 Conn. at 554.
These findings are not required as to any parent who consents to the termination of parental rights. See General Statutes § 17a-112(i).
From the time of the initiation of the neglect petition on June 9, 2011, the department made reasonable efforts to locate Osvaldo V. His address was discerned by the department, and he was duly served notice of the temporary custody order and the neglect and termination petitions in accordance with the law. The department arranged for genetic testing at father's request, which established paternity. The father's specific steps required that he keep the department, his attorney and the attorney for his children notified of his whereabouts. There was a brief period of time in January where the department worker was unaware father had been incarcerated, but this was after the issuance of the specific steps putting the burden on father to keep his whereabouts known to the department. Nevertheless, the department worker, Satchidananda, made diligent efforts to make contact with father at the correctional facility. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that prior to the adjudicatory date, the department made reasonable efforts to locate father.
Prior to the adjudicatory date, June 1, 2012, the department made reasonable and appropriate efforts, to the extent possible, given Osvaldo V.'s lack of compliance with his specific steps and unwillingness to engage in services, to promote reunification of Abrianna with Osvaldo V. The department arranged for genetic testing to establish paternity at father's request. It took three appointments to get him to attend. The court ordered two substantially similar sets of specific steps for Osvaldo V. and the department, a preliminary set on June 9, 2011 and a final set on March 13, 2012. Father was expected to cooperate with the department, keep his whereabouts known to the department, his attorney and the children's attorney, engage in domestic violence and parenting programs, participate in a substance abuse and mental health evaluation and follow any recommendations for treatment, submit to random drug tests, sign releases to monitor his progress in programs, secure adequate housing and legal income, not engage in substance abuse and not have further involvement with the criminal justice system. He also was expected to visit the child as often as the department permitted. Father initially refused all services. When he finally signed releases for referrals at the end of 2011, he still was not intent on caring for Abrianna, and his subsequent incarceration prevented his attendance at any of the programs contemplated by the steps and recommended by the department.
In addition to the services offered to father, the department provided Abrianna with services, including a special study foster home, instruction for the foster mother prior to the baby's hospital discharge, VNA in-home services, developmental evaluations and medical treatment. The department transported Abrianna to visits with her father, even to the correctional institution. Father, as of June 1, 2012, had failed to participate in proposed services to reunify with his Abrianna for almost an entire year. In fact, he had shown so little interest in her it took multiple appointments to perform genetic testing he requested to ascertain if he was her biological father. Subsequently, after having been found to be the father, he barely visited Abrianna. By the end of January 2012, he had assaulted his new girlfriend and was arrested and incarcerated. " Although incarceration alone is not a sufficient basis to terminate parental rights, incarceration, nonetheless, may prove an obstacle to reunification due to the parent's unavailability ..." In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 661, 6 A.3d 86 (2010). That is the case here. During the first six months of his incarceration, father kept telling Satchidananda he was not interested in reunification. During the entire period prior to the adjudicatory date, he did not or was unable to address his lack of parenting skills, substance abuse or mental health issues or lack of secure housing and employment skills, although relevant programs are often available at the department of corrections. During visits with Abrianna, he continued to show an aversion to basic child care and a general lack of understanding of child behavior.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify Osvaldo V. with Abrianna to the extent possible, given father's lack of communication or interest, his lack of compliance with specific steps and continued criminal behavior. His incarceration further hindered his already lackluster performance. While father took part in a domestic violence program in prison, he began that subsequent to the adjudicatory date, on June 20, 2012, motivated by the possibility of release to a halfway house. There is no evidence father engaged in any other programs in prison prior to the adjudicatory date, such as parenting, substance abuse, mental health, education or skills training. The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that, as of the adjudicatory date, father was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services.
B. Abandonment— § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)
This first ground for termination of parental rights alleged as to Osvaldo V. is established when a child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. In determining this ground, the court determines whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that abandonment existed as of the adjudicatory date. Unlike where the ground alleged is failure to rehabilitate, the court, in determining whether or not abandonment has occurred is limited to events preceding the date of the filing of the petition or the last amendment thereto. See In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. at 230; Practice Book § 35a-7(a).
Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of " interest, concern or responsibility." In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986). " The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 732, 994 A.2d 233 (2010); In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998); In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993). Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility includes " attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). " Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare." In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008). While incarceration alone is insufficient to prove abandonment, while a parent is in prison, he should " take advantage of programs that would have permitted him to maintain contact with the child." In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. at 733.
It is indisputable that father, as of the adjudicatory date, had fallen far short of the above minimal standards for attentive parenting and had exhibited little interest, concern or responsibility. There is no evidence he ever contributed anything toward the child's support.
Father was provided with preliminary specific steps, by order of the court, almost 12 months before the termination petition was filed. Prior to the adjudicatory date, it took three appointments to get him to complete a paternity test he requested. There is no evidence he contacted the foster mother or the department regularly to inquire as to the welfare of Abrianna. He refused to fully participate in or complete substance abuse, mental health, domestic violence or parenting programs referred by the department until the end of 2011, services he would have had to attend consistently before return of the child could ever be contemplated. In addition, even at the end of 2011, he told the department worker that he was only going to do services until his mother could begin caring for Abrianna; he had no intention of caring for her himself at that time. Within a few weeks, he was twice arrested for assaulting his girlfriend. The services father was asked to participate in, had he done so in a more timely fashion, might have helped to prevent his incarceration for two assaults that occurred at the end of 2011. Getting oneself arrested when your child is languishing in foster care is a strong indication of a lack of responsibility and concern.
Between June 2011 and January 2012, father only visited Abrianna four times, although he was offered weekly visits. His first visit was not until September. When he failed to visit, he also did not call ahead, as required, to indicate he would not be attending so, at times, Abrianna would be transported to the visiting location for nothing. After missing a visit, he failed to call the department or the service provider, Children First Partners, to explain his absence or establish when he would next visit. He claimed the provider should have called him. There is no evidence he ever brought or sent his daughter any cards, gifts, snacks or letters, despite asking the worker what the child might need. After he was incarcerated, he took no initiative in informing the worker of his whereabouts or contacting the worker to request visits in prison. As before, the worker had to make an effort to get in touch with him. See In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 518-19, 959 A.2d 1063 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911, 964 A.2d 545 (2009) (respondent mother failed to approach employees of the department to initiate visits with the child ... or to inquire about the child's welfare).
Statutory abandonment on the part of the father has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. As of the adjudicatory date, June 1, 2012, he had not manifested any continuing, reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to Abrianna's welfare. See In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. at 112, 121-23, 614 A.2d 832 (1991); In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 37-38, 534 A.2d 897 (1987). In the case of In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 314-15, 771 A.2d 160 (2001), the ground of abandonment, as then set forth in § 45a-717(f), was discussed by the court. " Section 45a-717(f) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern ..." Father's expressed interest and concern for Abrianna, and his assumption of responsibility for her, were certainly nothing more than sporadic up to the time of the adjudicatory date.
C. Failure to Rehabilitate— General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
This is the second ground for termination alleged against father in the petition. If the parent of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding fails to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, he could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, this ground for termination exists.
The evidence is undisputed that Abrianna was adjudicated neglected on March 13, 2012 and committed to the custody of the petitioner. Father attended court on that date and the court ordered final specific steps for father.
" Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of the parent to a constructive and useful role as a parent ... [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jazmine B., 121 Conn.App. 376, 383-84, 996 A.2d 286, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 924, 998 A.2d 168 (2010); In re Jeisean M., supra, 270 Conn. at 398; In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706; 741 A.2d 873 (1999). Whether the age and needs of the child do not support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). Also, in determining whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient and allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation further, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. See In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. at 485; In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230; In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).
" An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires ... a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities." In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999); In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 499. See also In re Christopher B., 117 Conn.App. 773, 786-87, 980 A.2d 961 (2009) (trial court properly relied on respondent's history with the department prior to the filing of the most recent neglect petition).
The evidence in this case is clear and convincing that Osvaldo V., as of the date of the filing of the termination petition on June 1, 2012, the adjudicatory date, had not achieved a reasonable degree of rehabilitation. Further, there is no evidence of conduct on his part subsequent to the date of the filing of the petition which would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Abrianna, he could assume a responsible position as her parent.
A parent's compliance with specific steps set during the pendency of the neglect case is a relevant and important consideration in reaching a rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. at 167-68; In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 179, 743 A.2d 165 (1999). The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parenting, and has corrected any of the factors that led to the initial neglect adjudication. See In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. at 126. " To terminate parental rights for the failure to achieve rehabilitation, both prongs of the test incorporated in [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) ] must be met: one, that the parent has failed to achieve rehabilitation; and two, that there is no reason to believe that the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child." In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 843, 724 A.2d 546 (1999).
The specific steps essentially map out a guide to the efforts and requirements both the department and the parent must meet in order to achieve family reunification.
The specific steps set for Osvaldo V. were first issued by the court on June 9, 2011, and reaffirmed during the preliminary 10-day temporary custody hearing on June 15, 2011, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129(c). Substantially similar final steps were issued on March 13, 2012. There is no doubt that Osvaldo V. had a very clear picture of what he was expected to do if he seriously desired to raise this child, and the consequences of non-compliance with his specific steps.
In Part III of this decision, the requirements set for father in his specific steps, and the level of his compliance, have been fully discussed. It should be kept in mind that until Abrianna was thirteen months old and already securely attached to her foster mother, father expressed no interest at all in assuming her care and custody. After the neglect petition was filed on June 9, 2011, he took three months to ascertain whether he was, in fact, her biological father, an issue he raised at the preliminary hearing on the order of temporary custody. Before his incarceration at the end of January 2012, he was difficult to contact and visited Abrianna only four times. During visits, he recoiled at the performance of basic child care tasks; only recently has he declared a willingness to consider changing the child's diaper. When he was not visiting, he did not even call the department worker to inquire as to the child's well-being. He refused to participate in evaluations or services until the end of 2011, and even then, told the worker he wished to have his mother care for Abrianna. His arrest and incarceration for two assaults on his girlfriend prohibited participation in services when he finally did request service referrals. Despite his participation in 12 sessions of group counseling while in prison to address his violence toward women, his group facilitator noted he still fails to accept responsibility for his actions.
The evidence is clear and convincing that as of the adjudicatory date, June 1, 2012, father had not achieved a status where he was more able to capably parent than at the time of the initiation of the neglect petition on June 9, 2011. Furthermore, there is no evidence to conclude that rehabilitation into the role of a constructive parent for Abrianna could be achieved by father within a reasonable period of time.
In September 2012, just before his release from prison, Freedman, the court evaluator, felt he was observing a man just giving lip service to appear appropriate. His denial of his chronic illegal activity and his blaming the women in his life for his troubles indicate he has made little progress mentally or emotionally. Whether he can overcome his cruel, violent and selfish nature, based on Freedman's psychological assessment, is questionable. He does not even acknowledge the effectiveness of counseling. He had hoped to avoid further domestic violence counseling when released; he attends the Wheeler Clinic program, which just began, because his probation officer says he has to attend.
Father still requires a great deal more intervention in order to become an effective parent. Freedman could not opine that rehabilitation is even possible for him, given his personality disorder, without an exhibition of far greater motivation than he has displayed to date. His plan includes his past practice of relying on others to care for Abrianna. More " passing off" of responsibility to another by Osvaldo V. is not in Abrianna's best interest. She requires someone singularly devoted to her and committed to her needs. This is not a situation where Osvaldo V. has undergone a dramatic transformation and displays a credible, newfound commitment to rehabilitation. See In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. at 644. This is a disappointing case of a man who waited far too long to address his own deficiencies— deficiencies he has yet to acknowledge. He paid very little attention to his three sons over the past two years until he needed a place to stay. He has yet to securely establish a grown up, independent, law-abiding lifestyle of his own, and is still woefully unprepared to do what is necessary to reunify with Abrianna and shows little insight or understanding into her physical or emotional needs.
Since his release, he visited Abrianna three times in October, but missed his November 2, 2012 visit and did not call to cancel it in time to prevent the baby's being transported to the department office from her daycare center, a return to the pattern he exhibited prior to his incarceration. The worker was unable to contact him at the time of the visit. His missed visits over the past year-and-a-half and his lack of parenting skills have prevented the forging of any bond with Abrianna.
Although he requested referrals for programs from the department when he was released, he has yet to begin any of the programs the department is offering, pursuant to the specific steps. As of the date of trial, although he had another option with a male friend, he chose to resume his pattern of depending on women and is residing with his ex-wife, a woman with a temper and a child protection history, and his three behaviorally-challenged children. Although he knows how fearful Abrianna is around him, he tried to bring his ex-wife to one of his recent visits to introduce her to Abrianna, which the department did not permit. The resumption of the relationship with Iris is risky. It appears he may be biting off more than he can chew. He has not secured legal employment and his current housing raises an issue about Abrianna's safety.
Further delay in this case in an attempt to renew efforts to rehabilitate father into the role of a suitable parent would be injurious to Abrianna. She is thriving in the care of a foster mother who is devoted to her and capable of addressing her needs. After over 16 months in foster care, the child should see a resolution to the permanency issue to assure she meets her full potential. It is clear it would take a great deal of time with little possibility of success, given father's lack of empathy and past performance, to persuade him to cooperate, engage in supervised visits and services and permit thorough monitoring of his progress. Even if his own mental health issues, which have lead to his brutal abuse of women, other criminal behaviors and chaotic lifestyle, were adequately addressed, an additional prolonged period of time would be necessary to aid him in improving his parenting skills and his relationship with his child, who has had so little contact with him she becomes overwrought in his presence.
Prolonging Abrianna's status in the limbo of foster care to assist a father who has a distressing history, for over a decade, of criminal involvement, noncooperation with the department, violation of court orders, both juvenile and criminal, and disinterest in his other children, would be futile and potentially harmful to the child, who is now firmly secure in a loving, attentive home with a foster mother who wishes to adopt her.
Failure to rehabilitate, pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), the second ground alleged for termination of father's parental rights, has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
V
DISPOSITION
A. Section 17a-112(k) Criteria
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that all the statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of parental rights of Osvaldo V. have been proven.
Except in a case where termination is based on a parent's consent, before making a decision whether or not to terminate parental rights, " the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k) ]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Devon W ., 124 Conn.App. 631, 648, 6 A.3d 100 (2010); In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 72, cert. denied 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 403 (2005); In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26-26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004). These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:
(1) " The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent."
As noted in greater detail in Parts III and IV. A of this decision, the Department offered timely and appropriate services to the father to facilitate his reunion with Abrianna.
(2) " Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended."
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. This finding and the basis therefore are thoroughly explored in Parts III and IV of this decision.
(3) " The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations."
The specific steps ordered by the court, and the department's and father's level of compliance with them, has been extensively discussed in Part III of this decision. The court has found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father failed to fulfill the expectations required by the steps and because he was unable or unwilling to do so.
(4) " The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties."
Abrianna has displayed, during visits, an aversion to the presence or approach of her father. She exhibits no bond with him, despite over 10 visits. Freedman, the court evaluator, noted that the interaction he observed between the child and father was as bad as an interaction could be. Abrianna has been with her foster mother approximately 16 months, since her discharge from the hospital at the age of one month. She now speaks a few words and calls her foster mother, " Mamma." As Freedman noted, the child's primary attachment is to her foster mother, which is not surprising given the devoted and careful attention she has provided to Abrianna.
(5) " The age of the child."
Abrianna, born on June 6, 2011, is almost eighteen months old.
(6) " The effort the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communications with the guardian or other custodian of the child."
The full extent of father's lack of effort and contributions to the child, and his unjustified failure to maintain regular contact with the department, the foster home and the child are thoroughly reviewed in Parts III and IV of this decision.
Father has made little effort to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of Abrianna to return to him in the foreseeable future. He frankly had no interest in parenting her until just a few months ago, as evidenced by his continued chaotic and violent lifestyle, which resulted in his incarceration. Since his recent release, he has returned to an environment where he is dependent on his ex-wife, who sought protective orders against him on two occasions, inserting himself into the lives of three troubled sons he has never consistently supported financially or emotionally. The legality of his tenancy and work situation is also questionable. The current situation is fraught with risk for continued instability and possible repeat of the risky and aggressive behaviors he has engaged in for the last 13 years.
(7) " The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable acts or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."
There is no evidence that the department or any other person interfered with the respondent father's ability to maintain a relationship with the child by unreasonable acts or conduct.
There is no evidence that economic circumstances have constituted a significant factor in father's failure to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Services, and supervised visitation, including transportation, were available. Father had legal representation throughout the pendency of these cases at no expense to him. The child's medical and other needs were addressed and payment was arranged by the department. Unfortunately, the father's availability and receptiveness to assistance and services offered to him was inadequate; in fact, non-existent until very recently.
B. Best Interest of the Child
The court must now address the issue of whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. This is the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. " If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In this phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child ." (Citation omitted) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 258, 881 A.2d 450 (2005); In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003), see also In re Devon W., supra, 124 Conn.App. at 648. The trial court " must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents'] parental rights is not in the best interest of the child." In re Vanna A., supra, 83 Conn.App. at 17, 26-27.
" Time is of the essence in child custody cases ... This furthers the express public policy of this state to provide all of its children a safe, stable, nurturing environment." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431, 439-40, 446 A.2d 808 (1982). The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U .S.C. § 670 et seq. as amended, and General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1) mandate that after 12 months in foster care, a child must have a plan for a permanent home. See In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Supp. 468, 479, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd. 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 (1998), cert. denied 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999). Our supreme court has noted consistently the important of permanency in children's lives. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 181 Conn. at 646, n. 4. (removing child from foster home or further delaying permanency would be inconsistent with child's best interest .) " Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 285, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). Foster care should be a strictly limited episode in the life of a child. With a statutorily mandated twelve-month limit prior to the institution of a permanency plan, a transition from foster care of nearly eighteen months duration to the achievement of a permanent home for Abrianna falls outside the acceptable timelines.
" Child placement concepts, and the need for prompt resolution of child placement decisions have been recognized in federal law under [ASFA]. This legislation, presently implemented in Connecticut, calls for the commencement of proceedings for termination of parental rights for any child who has been in the care of the state for fifteen out of the past twenty-two months, an implicit recognition that the children need a secure placement and may have developed a secure attachment while in foster care ... The legislation also recognizes that one year in a child's life is a long time. Within twelve months of foster home placements, state courts must hold permanency hearings to consider the future status of each child ... This requirement is a further recognition by the Congress that one year is generally a sufficient time to evaluate whether parents have restored or rehabilitated themselves to the point where they can resume a responsible position in the life of the child." In re Michael P., Jr., Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Willimantic, Docket No. W10-CP10-015925-A (November 19, 2012, Foley, J.) (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) See also § 46b-129(k)(1) and Practice Book § 35a-14.
In this case, the permanency plan calling for termination of parental rights and adoption was filed on March 8, 2012, nine months after Abrianna's removal as required. At the time the department filed its plan, Osvaldo was incarcerated and his criminal charges had yet to be resolved regarding two assaults on his girlfriend, Jessica G. On April 5, 2012, without objection, the permanency plan was approved by the court within one year of removal as required by law.
Mother currently resides in a half way house. She has acknowledged her inability to rehabilitate in a timely manner and selflessly consented to the termination of her parental rights.
Father's efforts, such as they are, have come too little, too late. He has a significantly long way to go to even establish an ability to care for himself. He remains dependent on a woman, and has no high school diploma, steady employment or secure living environment. He has not addressed his substance abuse issues or sought treatment for his personality disorder. He just began an intensive 26-week program to address his routine propensity for domestic violence, which Freedman sees as having no potential for risk reduction because his anti-social personality disorder prevents him from acknowledging his own contribution to his problems. Father continues to blame other people for his difficulties, especially the multitude of women he has had in his life. He has yet to address his lack of parenting skills; only recently did he even show an interest in doing so. Child care, as far as he is concerned, is woman's work. He had no experience being raised by a father. Despite being the father of three sons from a marriage that endured almost a decade, he recoils from changing a diaper and became disgusted when his infant girl vomited on him. His ex-wife has had to virtually raise his three sons alone while he sold and used drugs, lived with and abused other women and moved in and out of jail. His thinly concealed, real plan for Abrianna, as with his other children, appears to be foisting responsibility for Abrianna on some woman, either his mother, who wants no part of it, and now, Iris, a woman with a child protection history father admits has a bad temper and to whom her own children afford little respect. Father made so little effort to connect with Abrianna until he was incarcerated that the child has predominantly negative feelings for him, and he lacks the patience, insight and susceptibility to programs and treatment that he would need to overcome the immensity of her aversion to him and his lack of parenting skills. What little progress he has just begun to make has not occurred within a time frame that is desirable for Abrianna, given her age and needs. A child cannot be " placed on a shelf" for a few years while a biological parent is attempting to get his life back together. " At some point, as here, getting your life back on track comes too late to meet the child's immediate needs." In re Michael P., Jr., supra, at 15.
Any further delay of permanency to allow for parental rehabilitation in the case of Abrianna will only prolong the child's nearly eighteen-month long lack of permanency and certainty. As she ages, were the likely futile process of continuing to attempt reunification continue, she will begin to understand the potential for removal from the only home she has ever known, and, understandably, suffer the emotional consequences of fearing such a loss. Any further consideration of disrupting her firmly established relationship with her foster mother, when measured against the possible psychological harm of an unsuccessful disruption, must be resolved in favor of the loving and secure relationship Abrianna now has with her foster mother. Abrianna may yet exhibit some developmental issues as a result of her drug-exposure in utero and premature birth. She requires a patient, sober, reliable and informed caretaker in order to fully achieve her potential. There is no satisfactory evidence that her father could ever meet the level of parenting and attentiveness that needs require.
The child's attorney advocates termination of parental rights and adoption as being in Abrianna's best interest. In deciding the issue of best interest in this case, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispostional evidence in its entirety, and has concluded there is no other credible or realistic plan achievable within a reasonable time to secure and protect Abrianna's best interest other than a termination of her parents' rights.
Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered the exhibits, testimony, judicially noticed items and arguments of counsel, the court concludes that the evidence is clear and convincing that the best interest of Abrianna is served by the termination of her mother's and fathers' parental rights so she may be free for adoption.
CONCLUSION
Termination of Parental Rights
The petition for termination of parental rights is granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of Sherlie P. and Osvaldo V. in Abrianna P.
Pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(m), it is ordered that the commissioner of the department of children and families be appointed statutory parent for the child so that she may be placed for adoption. In securing adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the current foster parent.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(o), the statutory parent will file a written report on the case plan for the children with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before December 31, 2013 at 9:00 A.M. As previously ordered, a motion to review permanency plans, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b-129(k), is to be filed in the Hartford juvenile district court on or before January 3, 2013, and a hearing to review any such plans will be held on February 14, 2013 at 10:00 A.M.
Additional reports and/or motions to review permanency plan for the child will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as the child's adoption is finalized.
The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when an adoption is finalized.
Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that may exercise jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of this child is ordered to notify in writing the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoption is finalized.
The state legislature recently enacted P.A. 12-82. Effective October 1, 2012, the juvenile courts may hear adoption petitions connected to cases in which such courts have entered judgments terminating parental rights on petitions filed by the department.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.