Opinion
(AC 18075)
Argued November 9, 1998
PROCEDURAL HISTORYPetition by the commissioner of children and families to terminate the respondents' parental rights with respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London, Juvenile Matters at Uncasville, and transferred to the Child Protection Session at Middletown, where the matter was and tried to the court, Brenneman, J.; judgment terminating the respondents' parental rights, from which the respondent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
OPINION
The respondent mother (respondent) appeals from the trial court's judgment terminating her parental rights. The respondent claims that the trial court improperly (1) terminated her parental rights on the statutory ground of failure to achieve personal rehabilitation, (2) terminated her parental rights where such termination denied her rights to equal protection of the law guaranteed under the constitution of Connecticut and (3) found clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. We find no merit to any of these claims and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
To prevail on a nonconsensual termination of parental rights, the commissioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that one of several grounds for termination exists. General Statutes § 17a-112 (c)(3). In this case, the commissioner alleged the ground of failure to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112 (c)(3)(B). "A determination by the trial court . . . that the evidence is clear and convincing that the parent has not rehabilitated himself or herself will be disturbed only if a finding is not supported by the evidence and [is], in light of the evidence in the whole record, clearly erroneous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 166, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). If the trial court determines that the commissioner has proven, by the appropriate standard, a failure to achieve rehabilitation, it must then determine if termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. General Statutes § 17a-112 (c) (2); see also In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 356-57, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). The trial court's findings as to both issues will be reversed on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous. See In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn. App. 353, 362, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).
Our examination of the records, briefs and our consideration of the arguments of the parties, persuades us that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. In a concise, thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision, the trial court found the essential facts required to sustain its determination to terminate the appellant's parental rights were proven by the proper standards and supported by the evidence. The trial court analyzed and applied the law consistent with our statutes and case precedents. See In re Samantha B., 45 Conn. Sup. 468, 722 A.2d 300 (1997).
Because the trial court's memorandum of decision addresses the arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the applicable law on these issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. See In re Michael R., 49 Conn. App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279 (1998); In re Karrlo K., 40 Conn. App. 73, 75, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
The judgment is affirmed.Officially released December 29, 1998
Danielle I. Mattessich, with whom, on the brief, was Raymond J. Rigat, for the appellant (respondent mother). Stephen G. Vitelli, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).