MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

ROGERS, JUDGE.

Defendant Chris Anastos, P.E., d/b/a Anastos Engineering Associates ("AEA") has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties have stipulated to the following facts.

Tor, Smullen, Coleeny Anastos ("TSCA") performed structural engineering services for the project at issue in this lawsuit through August of 1999. TSCA was hired by the New York architectural firm, Fox Fowle. TSCA was a former partnership in which Chris Anastos ("Anastos"), was a partner. TSCA was dissolved in approximately August of 1999. Collins Enterprises LLC is a Connecticut limited liability company registered to do business in the State of New York. TSCA billed Collins in Connecticut for design services rendered. Collins paid TSCA from Connecticut for design services rendered. TSCA's offices were located in New York and Connecticut. TSCA was a Connecticut partnership. While with TSCA, Anastos traveled to TSCA's New Haven, Connecticut office for partners' meetings once every two to three weeks. TSCA files did not pass back and forth between its New York and Connecticut offices.

Fox Fowle was replaced and its design was rejected by Collins in the middle of 1999. Schuman, Lichtenstein, Claman Efron ("SLCE") became the architect of record. SLCE is a New York firm.

Chris Anastos d/b/a Anastos Engineering Associates ("AEA") is a sole proprietorship and has been since August of 1999. AEA's offices are located solely in New York, New York. Mr. Anastos is a registered professional engineer in New York and Connecticut. AEA mailed a proposal for structural engineering services to Collins in Connecticut dated March 30, 2000. In response, Collins mailed a letter with an attached rider to AEA in New York regarding AEA's March 30, 2000 proposal. AEA sent mail including letters and invoices, and telefacsimiles from New York to Collins in Connecticut throughout the course of the project. Collins and/or Hudson Park Investors LLC paid AEA from Connecticut for design services rendered. While in New York AEA telephoned Collins in Connecticut throughout the course of the project. AEA met once with Collins at Collins' Connecticut office to discuss the problem with the structural design in building shear walls. Hudson Park at Yonkers is the project at issue in this case. It is located in Yonkers, New York. Collins attended meetings regarding the project in New York. Hudson Park Investors LLC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company registered to do business in New York.

Chris Anastos and AEA own no real property in Connecticut. Chris Anastos and AEA do not lease property in Connecticut. The complaint is dated December 11, 2003.

In addition, the court makes the following findings of fact based on the evidence presented during a one-day hearing.

Arthur Collins is the president of Collins Enterprises, LLC. Fox Fowle was the original architect on the project. Fox Fowle retained TSCA to be the structural engineer. The Fox Fowle design prepared by TSCA called for a steel structure. When Fox Fowle left the project, SLCE took over as the architect of record. When SLCE took over for Fox Fowle in 1999, Fox Fowle's structural steel design was abandoned.

Once Fox Fowle was removed from the project, Collins attended meetings with Mr. Anastos at the New York offices of SLCE. During these meetings, Mr. Collins discussed the retention of AEA, Anastos' sole proprietorship, to provide structural engineering services for Hudson Park. As a result of these meetings, it was agreed that AEA would be the structural engineer for the project.

Mr. Collins asked AEA for a proposal which Anastos provided in a letter dated March 30, 2000. This letter was a proposal for professional services for the structural engineering work to be done at Hudson Park in Yonkers. It was sent to 53 Forest Avenue, Old Greenwich, Connecticut. Paragraph 3.1 of the proposal states: "The fee for above services from this date forward shall be a lump sum of $130,000. Fees paid to date for schematic design services are not included in this fee." AEA's proposal was never countersigned by Collins. Instead, Anastos subsequently received a proposed rider to his own proposal from Collins. Collins' proposed rider was never countersigned by Anastos. There is no single document that Anastos and Collins both signed.

AEA provided drawings to SLCE which were in turn forwarded to Collins Enterprises in Connecticut. Collins also received drawings in Connecticut directly from Mr. Anastos regarding the Hudson Park project.

There are a series of transmittal letters from AEA to Collins Enterprises in Connecticut beginning on July 7, 2000 and lasting through January 28, 2002. Mr. Anastos admitted that the structural design drawings and specifications that were sent to Collins in Connecticut probably included the structural shear walls at issue in this case.

Daniel Zink was an independent contractor used periodically by AEA to do computer aided drafting work. Zink, who resides in Connecticut, did computer-aided drafting for a small part of the project at issue.

Anastos attended one meeting in Connecticut after Fox Fowle and TSCA were no longer involved. This meeting took place after an issue arose regarding the shear wall. The meeting in Connecticut took place in late June or early July of 2002.

Anastos d/b/a AEA does not have an office in Connecticut.

Collins did send from Connecticut fees for services rendered by ABA to AEA's office in New York.

DISCUSSION

When a defendant files a motion to dismiss challenging the court's jurisdiction, a two-part inquiry is required. The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant. If the statutory requirements are met, its second obligation is then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would violate constitutional principles of due process. Knipple v. Viking Communications. Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 674 A.2d 426, 428-29 (1996). "The United States constitution allows state courts to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only when minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state. The nature of these contacts must be such that requiring the defendant to defend in the forum state does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." M.O.A. Inc. v. Tomblin, 2003 WL 22905194, 5 (Conn.Super. 2003).

Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the state's long-arm statute authorizes exercise of personal jurisdiction. Nastro v. D'Onofrio, 268 F.Sup.2d 446 (D.Conn., 2003).

CONNECTICUT'S LONG-ARM STATUTE DOES AUTHORIZE THE ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT

Connecticut's long-arm statute, C.G.S.A. § 52-59b, provides five different bases for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident individual. Jurisdiction is allowed over a nonresident individual who:

1) Transacts any business within the state;

2) Commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act;

3) Commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to a person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce;

4) Owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state; or

5) Uses a computer, as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53-451, or a computer network, as defined in subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of said subsection, located within the state.

A. TSCA's Contacts with Connecticut do not Establish Jurisdiction Over AEA

Chris Anastos, the sole proprietor of AEA, was a former partner of TSCA. When plaintiff terminated Fox Fowle, TSCA's role on the project also ended. TSCA dissolved at about the same time that plaintiff fired Fox Fowle in 1999. After the termination of Fox Fowle and the dissolution of TSCA, plaintiff hired AEA as structural engineer and SLCE served as the project architect. After SLCE/AEA was hired, plaintiff decided to go forward with an entirely different design. While the Fox Fowle/TSCA design had called for a steel structure, the SLCE/AEA design called for a block and plank structure. Plaintiff's claim arises from AEA's alleged negligence in designing the shear wall for the block and plank structure. Plaintiff's claim is not related to the services performed by TSCA in preparation of the design for a steel structure.

There is no dispute that as a former partner of TSCA, Chris Anastos is liable for TSCA's negligence. However, the claims in this case do not arise from any contract entered into by, or tortious conduct of, TSCA. The claims in this case arise solely from AEA's alleged negligence. Indeed, TSCA is not a party to this action and plaintiff's complaint makes no mention of TSCA. Accordingly, the sole issue before the court is whether it has jurisdiction over Chris Anastos d/b/a AEA, which is a sole proprietorship.

B. The Court has Jurisdiction Over the Defendant.

"A ruling on a motion to dismiss is neither a ruling on the merits of the action . . . nor a test of whether the complaint states a cause of action . . . Motions to dismiss are granted solely on jurisdictional grounds." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Villager Pond. Inc. v. Darien, 54 Conn.App. 178, 182, 734 A.2d 1031 (1999).

The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant. With regard to the fist part of the jurisdictional inquiry, the plaintiff argues that personal jurisdiction over the defendant is authorized by Connecticut's long-arm statute under §§ 52-59b(a)(1) and (a)(2). General Statutes § 52-59b(a) provides in part: "As to causes of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual . . . who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business within the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the state . . ." Our Supreme Court noted in Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, 184 Conn. 471, 474, 440 A.2d 179 (1981) that "the General Statutes do not define what the phrase `transacts any business' means in the context of 52-59b . . . however . . . we construe the term `transacts any business' to embrace a single [* 480] purposeful business transaction." (Citations omitted.) Id. at 474. "Furthermore, the phrase `transacts [* * * 7] any business' in 52-59b has a broader meaning that the [phrase] `[transacts] business . . .'" Id. at 476 n. 4. It should be determined upon a balance of "consideration of public policy, common sense, and the chronology and geography of the relevant factors." Id. at 477.

In reviewing the somewhat limited Appellate authority regarding General Statutes § 52-59b, it is clear that the question of whether jurisdiction exists because the defendant meets the "transacts any business within the state" standard is a fact driven analysis. AEA sent a proposal from its New York office to plaintiff's Connecticut office. Plaintiff responded from its Connecticut office with a proposed rider containing terms that supplemented AEA's proposal. Accordingly, at least part of the negotiations took place in Connecticut. Other than these actions, no contract was signed by both parties. AEA also sent mail and telefacsimiles from New York to Collins in Connecticut throughout the course of the project including letters and invoices and, while in New York, AEA communicated with Collins in Connecticut. Plaintiff also paid AEA from Connecticut for AEA's services. Finally, AEA met once with Collins in Connecticut to discuss a problem with the shear walls which are at issue in this case. The court finds that all of this conduct constitutes transacting business within the State of Connecticut. See Computer Assistance, Inc. v. Morris, 564 F.Sup. 1054 (D.Conn. 1983); MS/C Communications, Inc. v. Hamilton, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 266263 (August 8, 1990, Spear, J.) ( 2 Conn. L. Rptr. 247, 249). Pro Performance Corporation, Inc. v. Goldman, 47 Conn.Sup. 476 (Sup.Ct. 2002).

The defendant relies upon Custom Navigation Systems, Inc. v. Pincus, 935 F.Sup. 117, 119 (D.Conn. 1995), for the proposition that `the transmission of communications between an out-of-state defendant and a [party] within the jurisdiction does not, by itself, constitute the transaction of business within the forum state." The nonresident defendant in Custom Navigation telephoned and wrote to the plaintiff in Connecticut on a few occasions in connection with the plaintiff's sale of equipment, which the plaintiff was to deliver and install in New York. Unlike the situation in Custom the defendant in this case communicated multiple times via telephone, mail and fax, with the plaintiff in Connecticut regarding the Hudson Project. He also visited Connecticut and met with Collins regarding the project. It is this combination of communications and a meeting regarding the project that persuades the court that defendant did transact business in Connecticut.

In order to find jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, only one of the provisions of § 52-59b needs to be satisfied. See Pitruzello v. Muro, 70 Conn.App. 309, 311, 798 A.2d 469 (2002) ("[a] foreign corporation may be haled into court in Connecticut only if a plaintiff alleges jurisdictional facts that, if proven, would satisfy one of the provisions of the long-arm statute . . ."). Because the court has found plaintiff has satisfied the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-596(a)(1) it need not address whether jurisdiction is also authorized under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-59b(a)(2).

The second part of the two-part inquiry invokes the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which permits state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that has "certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).

Either "specific" jurisdiction or "general" jurisdiction can satisfy the constitutional requirement of sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum. A state court will have specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever the defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation [has] result[ed] from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.

Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 234 Conn. 281, 287-88, 661 A.2d 595 (1995), citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine. Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473 (1984) and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. CT Page 6052 471 U.S. 462, 472-73, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985).

By contrast, because general jurisdiction does not require that the cause of action "arise out of" a defendant's activities, such jurisdiction may be exercised even when there is no causal connection between the defendant's forum-directed activities and the plaintiff's lawsuit, as long as the defendant has had "continuous and systematic general business contacts" with the state.

Thomason at 289-29, 661 A.2d 595, citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall. 466 U.S. 408, 415-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (1984).

"The twin touchstones of due process analysis under the minimum contacts doctrine are foreseeability and fairness. `[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'" United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 41, 495 A.2d 1034 (1985), quoting World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980). "[T]he quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to ensure" is to be weighed. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. 154. "The specific facts of each case necessarily determine the outcome of a minimum contacts analysis." United States Trust Co., 197 Conn. at 42, 495 A.2d 1034, quoting Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690 (1978).

A review of the facts demonstrate that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Connecticut by virtue of the same conduct that amounted to transacting business under the long-arm statute. Anastos met with Collins in Connecticut, and had repeated communications with Collins in Connecticut by such means as telephone calls, letters, invoices, and telefaxes. Additionally, Anastos was registered as a professional engineer in the State of Connecticut.

The sum total of all these contacts establishes that the defendant should have foreseen that its conduct could one day subject it to suit in Connecticut. The Court finds that its exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not violate the minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is denied.

CHASE T. ROGERS SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE