MEMORANDUM

MICHAEL BAYLSON, District Judge

This civil rights case was commenced by plaintiff James George Douris ("Plaintiff or "Douris") against the following defendants: Mark S. Schweiker, [formerly] Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the County of Bucks ("Bucks County"); the Bucks County District Attorney's Office ("DA's Office"); Bucks County District Attorney Diane Gibbons; Bucks County Assistant District Attorney Michelle A. Henry; Bucks County Assistant District Attorney Anne Scheetz Damon; and Timothy Rauch, a Bucks County police officer ("Rauch"). Plaintiff's original complaint contained six counts alleging violations and retaliation under the First Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C § 12101 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 et seq. The Complaint also alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, conspiracy, and a constitutionally inadequate state appeals process.

The defendants all filed Motions to Dismiss. On October 23, 2002, this Court granted the majority of these Motions. Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp.2d 391 (E.D. Pa. 2002). However, for reasons detailed within that opinion, this Court decided not to dismiss certain claims against Bucks County, the DA's Office, and Rauch (collectively "Remaining Defendants"). Specifically, regarding defendants Bucks County and the DA's Office, the Court did not dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 "failure to train" claim. With respect to defendant Rauch, the remaining claims against him concerned an arrest allegedly without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and a state tort claim of malicious prosecution.

Presently before the Court are Remaining Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons which follow, Remaining Defendants' Motions will be granted.

I. Background

The Court thoroughly recounted the factual background in its earlier opinion. Douris, 229 F. Supp.2d at 395-96. The Court recites only those facts of especial relevance to the pending Motions.

A. The 1999 Criminal Prosecution

Plaintiff's first criminal prosecution stemmed from a fracas at the Human Resources Department for Bucks County on May 6, 1999. Commonwealth v. Douris, 766 A.2d 1276 (Pa.Super. 2001). This incident involved Douris and Bucks County employee Marie Costello ("Costello"). Id. at 1277. On May 6, 1999, Plaintiff visited the Human Resources Department and informed Costello that he wished to apply for work. Costello provided Plaintiff with an application, but informed him that county policy dictated that he complete the paperwork within the office. 766 A.2d at 1277.

Notwithstanding Costello's instructions, Douris took the application, placed it in his briefcase, and left the office. Id. at 1278. Costello followed Plaintiff to the elevator where, having first blocked his path, she reminded him of the county's policy. Id. Douris shoved Costello into the elevator frame, boarded the elevator, and left the office. Id. The Bucks County District Attorney's Office charged Plaintiff with harassment and disorderly conduct; Plaintiff was eventually convicted of harassment, which was upheld on appeal. Id. at 1280.

Of relevance to the instant case is Plaintiff's claim that the prosecution failed to disclose certain evidence and eyewitness identities. (Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., Docket No. 81, Ex. O, ¶ 17.) Peter Riley and Jack Elfman had been nearby, had witnessed the altercation outside the elevator, and had provided statements to the prosecution. These statements were not shared with Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff claims never to have received a statement prepared by another Bucks County Employee, Jane Lacy. Each of the three witnesses corroborated Costello's factual rendition: Costello had blocked the elevator and Douris pushed her aside. (Statements of Riley, Elfman, Lacy, Docket No. 81, Exs. F-H.)

B. The 2001 Criminal Prosecution

In 2001, Plaintiff was again criminally prosecuted in Bucks County, but under unrelated circumstances. This prosecution originated from a traffic incident, and involved Plaintiff, Paul Schuman ("Schuman"), Bryan Ghantt ("Ghantt"), and Angela Vanni ("Vanni"). On a rainy May 22, 2001 evening, Schuman skidded through the intersection of Route 532 and Stoopville Road and narrowly avoided contact with the car driven by Plaintiff. Plaintiff pursued Schuman down the road until Schuman eventually pulled over. (Police Crim. Compl. Aff. Probable Cause, Docket No. 81, Ex. I; Tr. Prelim. Hr'g Sept. 13, 2001, Docket No. 81, Ex. J.)

Although he never gave his name, Douris identified himself as a police officer, and he requested Schuman's license and insurance information. (Schuman Test., Docket No. 41, Ex. J, at 4, 6.) According to Plaintiff, Schuman produced supposedly phony paperwork in an attempt to conceal his identity. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Rauch's Supplemental Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Docket No. 101, ¶¶ 1-4.) In return, Schuman asked Douris to see his badge, but Douris protested, "I don't have to show it to you." (Schuman Test., Docket No. 81, Ex. J, at 4.) Ghantt, the passenger in Schuman's car, overheard the conversation between Schuman and Plaintiff, and testifies that Douris identified himself as a police officer. (Ghantt Test., Docket No. 41, Ex. J, at 15, 22, 24.) Plaintiff provided no personal information or identification to Schuman.

Another vehicle began to approach the two parked cars, and Plaintiff waved it over to the side of the road. This car was driven by Vanni, who coincidentally had been behind Plaintiff at the intersection where the two cars nearly collided. (Vanni Test., Docket No. 41, Ex. J, at 26-27.) Douris insisted that Vanni stop momentarily for she had been a witness to the accident. (Id. at 27.) In Vanni's car were her two young children. (Id. at 28.) According to Vanni's testimony, Plaintiff was nasty, aggressive, abusive, and "mean, mean, mean." (Id.). Plaintiff pounded repeatedly on Vanni's car window and loudly barked orders at her. Out of concern for herself and her children, Vanni telephoned 911 to report the situation.

He was just hollering at everything and everyone. He was hollering at the gentlemen driving the car. . . . I don't recall exactly what he was saying. He was just hollering at them. He was abusive. He was hollering at them and he was hollering at me I witnessed this accident. I had to stay put. I'm on the phone with the [911] dispatcher who hears him hollering at me and how he's being [sic] and they would not let me get off the phone. They heard it all themselves. . . . They would not let me get off the phone because they heard how I was being hollered at herself and him pounding on the window and she said to stay on the phone until the police get there.

(Id. at 34.)

Officers Rauch and Haines reported to the site and conducted preliminary interviews with Vanni and Plaintiff; Schuman and Ghantt had driven away prior to the officers' arrival. (Rauch Test., Docket No. 81, Ex. J, at 37.) At the scene, Plaintiff handed to Rauch some paper on which he had made cursory notes. (Rauch Test., Docket No. 75, Ex. A, at 22-23.) These notes contained only disorganized scribble, (Id. at 23-25), which Douris attributes to his several physical disabilities. Plaintiff admits that his handwriting is not clearly legible. (PI. Files Supplement of R., Docket No. 109, at 2) ("Plaintiff would agree the paper could be difficult to read for some") (emphasis removed). Rauch could not discern anything from the notes and subsequently threw them away. Douris claims that he recorded Schuman's identification and other information on this sheet. Even without the benefit of Plaintiff s notes, the police managed to locate and interview Schuman and Ghantt.

Based on the investigation and interviews with witnesses, Officer Rauch arrested Douris and the Bucks County District Attorney's Office charged Douris with terroristic threats; impersonating a public servant; disorderly conduct; harassment and stalking by communication; and duty to give information and render aid. (Police Crim. Compl. Aff. Probable Cause, Docket No. 81, Ex. I.) Every charge, with the exception of impersonating a public servant, was dismissed. Douris voluntarily entered an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program for that remaining charge.

II. Jurisdiction and Legal Standard

This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the moving party's initial burden can be met simply by "pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. After the moving party has met its initial burden, "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by making a factual showing "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. Analysis

1. Defendants Bucks County and DA's Office

A. Plaintiffs § 1983 Claims Against Remaining Defendants a. Parties' Contentions

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Bucks County and the DA's Office (collectively "Defendants") argue that Plaintiff's "failure to train" claim fails because he has not (1) established "deliberate indifference" in support of such a "policy, practice, or custom"; (2) shown that the "failure to train" was the "moving force" behind the alleged constitutional deprivation; or (3) shown a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), because the evidence in dispute was not "exculpatory" and its nondisclosure did not "undermine confidence in the outcome" of Plaintiff s criminal trial. Defendants strongly assert that it is the invariant policy of Bucks County and its DA's Office to disclose all discoverable evidence, whether exculpatory or not, to all criminal defendants. Defendants contend that their prosecutors are well-versed in their obligations under Brady, and that their prosecutors adhere to Brady without deviation. Defendants refer the Court to the assorted training seminars, on-site tutorials, and oversight procedures sponsored and encouraged by them.

Plaintiff responds that Defendants have twice deprived him of his constitutional rights through their "policy, practice, or custom" of failing to train their prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to county defendants, as required by Brady. With regard to his 1999 criminal prosecution, Plaintiff claims that the DA's Office failed to inform him of the existence of three witnesses to the elevator incident and their eyewitness statements. With regard to the 2001 criminal prosecution, Douris contends that Defendants failed to disclose timely the 911 telephone call transcript and portions thereof, and that Defendants failed to disclose evidence collected by Officers Rauch and Haines.

b. Failure to Train

For a municipality such as Bucks County to be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality caused a deprivation of a constitutional right through an official policy, practice, or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Municipal custom can be demonstrated either by reference to express, codified policy or by evidence that a particular practice, although not authorized by law, is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes law. E.g., Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). For liability to attach under a failure to train theory, Defendants' failure to train its employees "must reflect a deliberate or conscious choice by policymaking officials, such that one could call it the . . . policy or custom."Grazier v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2003). Further, Plaintiff must demonstrate causation, as "a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the moving force behind the constitutional violation." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (quotations and alteration omitted). Lastly, where a plaintiff contends that the "failure to train" was in the context of a prosecutor's duty under Brady, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the withheld evidence was material either to guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

In support of their Motion, Defendants have submitted evidence before the Court that clearly demonstrates their commitment to the education of its professional employees on their obligations and duties under Brady. Defendants aggressively promulgate and promote appropriate prosecutorial practices. (Terry Dep., Docket No. 81, Ex. A, at 114-15.) The DA's Office sends its attorneys to a Basic Prosecutor's Course that teaches its attendees adherence to Brady. (2000 Basic Prosecutor's Course Materials, Docket No. 81, Ex. B.) Its attorneys are required to attend regular CLE seminars, which occasionally include Brady-specific instruction. (Terry Dep., Docket No. 81, Ex. A, at 115-16.) The DA's Office itself sponsors and hosts periodic legal training courses, and it distributes notable judicial opinions to its attorneys for their review. (Id. at 134-36.) The DA's Office assigns Coordinators to provide on-the-job training to its attorneys that covers, among other topics, prosecutorial duties underBrady. (Id. at 15-21.) Further, when prosecutors have been assigned to more substantial criminal trials, Coordinators meet daily with those attorneys to monitor their professional behavior and to ensure compliance with their assorted prosecutorial duties, including those under Brady. (Id. at 15-21.) Policy demands the disclosure of all discoverable evidence — exculpatory or otherwise — to all defendants. (Id. at 34.)

Plaintiff has referred to no express, codified policy that forbids Bucks County prosecutors from disclosing exculpatory or inculpatory evidence to their criminal defendants. Nor has Douris hypothesized which alternative training measures Defendants could have promulgated in order to guarantee those rights allegedly compromised in the instant case. Plaintiff has not identified any particular unauthorized practice, the popularity and permanence of which would constitute de facto law. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants or their policymakers deliberately and consciously chose not to share such evidence with their criminal defendants. Douris cannot satisfy the causation element, as he has not identified which of these practices led to the alleged deprivation and violation of his constitutional rights and protections. Lastly, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the evidence supposedly withheld from him during his criminal trials was material either to guilt or punishment.

I. Whether Douris Is Entitled to a Trial to Prove Defendants' "Deliberate Indifference" to Their Constitutional Obligations Under Brady

To support his claims, Douris must show that Defendants' failure to train their prosecutors amounts to "deliberate indifference" to the rights of those citizens with whom the attorneys come into contact. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have failed to train their employees on Brady because of alleged withholdings during the two criminal trials referenced above.

Q: Describe all facts in support of your allegation that the County of Bucks failed to train its employees with respect to providing or withholding exculpatory evidence, police reports, eyewitness identifications, or Brady evidence, as set forth in the Complaint?

A: . . . It is well established United States and Pennsylvania State law that inculpatory and exculpatory evidence is to be turned over to the accused by the police and prosecutor. This includes the names of eyewitnesses and their addresses. The Defendants did not do so and this type of conduct is inconsistent to well established law. Which thus infers to mean there is either no supervision or training being provided, or the actions or intentional and the result of a policy, practice or custom. Twice doing the same act, which is prohibited by law, also infers a pattern and practice of the Office of the Bucks County District Attorney Office. The inference is, at the very least, that the DA's Office is NOT training its personnel to turn over BRADY evidence.

(Defs.' First Interrogs. Pl.'s Resp., Docket No. 81, Exs. N O, ¶ 15) (first emphasis added). From these two occasions alone and without reference to other criminal trials where prosecutors failed to disclose discoverable evidence, Plaintiff deduces that it is Defendants' policy, practice, or custom not to train their employees to follow Brady.

Defendants earlier filed an unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, which this Court denied since, in order to proceed, Plaintiff needed only to allege that he was deprived of a federally protected right through an act committed by a state actor. Douris, 229 F. Supp.2d at 400. However, now that the case has progressed to the summary judgment phase, Plaintiff no longer can rely on simple allegations, but must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Regarding his claim that Defendants failed to train their attorneys their affirmative duties under Brady, Plaintiff has not referred this Court to any similar instances of prosecutorial misconduct. This Court cannot on the present record infer the systematic disregard of Brady that Douris so vigorously claims. Plaintiff relies exclusively on these two separate instances out of the thousands of cases prosecuted each year by the Bucks County District Attorney's Office. (Terry Dep., Docket No. 81, Ex. A, at 24.)

Since Douris has failed to produce any evidence that similar withholding occurred in earlier cases, the record is "critically deficient" of any support on which a reasonable jury could base a finding that Defendants failed to train their prosecutors. Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997). Even assuming arguendo that Defendants violated their Brady requirements in these two cited cases involving Douris, the Court concludes that this 0.0002 percent failure rate — 2 out of the estimated 10,000 cases prosecuted annually — is insufficient to demonstrate Defendants' "deliberate indifference" toward the trial rights of those criminal defendants prosecuted by the DA's Office. See, e.g.,Grillone v. City of Philadelphia, No. 02-6916, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4677, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2003) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff's "failure to train" claim where plaintiff could not identify widespread or repeated instances of similar violence").

"The issue in a case like this one . . . is whether [Defendants'] training program is adequate." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Douris has introduced no evidence that would convince this Court to conclude that, regarding the adequacy of Defendants' training programs, a genuine dispute remains for trial. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No. 97-3666, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12641, at *5-6, *18-20 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1998) (finding comparable prosecutorial training programs and orientation seminars sufficiently adequate to defeat a "failure to train" claim). Plaintiff's failure so to inform the Court fatally affects his claim as, under these circumstances, Douris "must present evidence that the need for more or different training was so obvious and so likely to lead to the violation of constitutional rights that the policymaker's failure to respond amounts to deliberate indifference." Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). Given the numerous educational seminars, proactive mentoring programs, and on-site education undertaken by Defendants, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could not find, based on Plaintiff's unsupported references to two isolated occurrences, that Defendants have failed to train their prosecutors on their duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.

ii. Whether Douris Is Entitled to a Trial to Prove Defendants' "Policy, Practice, or Custom" Not to Disclose Brady Evidence Was the "Moving Force" Behind His Alleged Injury

Douris has the burden to show a genuine issue of fact for trial as to each element of his case. Plaintiff must demonstrate that the failure to train represents the "moving force" behind his alleged sufferings. As the Third Circuit has held, "[e]stablishing municipal liability on a failure to train claim under § 1983 is difficult." Reitz, 125 F.3d at 145. In order "to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time negligent administration of the program . . . is the `moving force'" that caused his injury, Douris could, for example, rely on "a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees." Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 408, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). In order to avoid adverse judgment at this stage in the proceedings, Douris "must identify a failure to provide specific training that has a causal nexus with [his] injuries. . . . " Reitz, 125 F.3d at 145.

Plaintiff has shown no connection between Defendants' training and orientation programs and the alleged nondisclosure of evidence in his two summary criminal cases. Douris has not identified any particular educational practice and traced its effects to the constitutional damage he supposedly suffered. A plaintiff cannot survive a Motion for Summary Judgment unless that plaintiff demonstrates enough evidence as to show a genuine issue of fact that the municipality, "through its deliberate conduct,. . . was the `moving force' behind the injury alleged." Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (emphasis removed). Causation also can be shown by a "municipality's failure to act, once it was on notice that its procedures were constitutionally deficient." Linden v. Spagnola, No. 99-2342, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14573, at *27 (D.N.J. Jun. 27, 2002) (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990)).

Liberal review of Plaintiff s pleadings leads to the conclusion that Douris might not simply be accusing Defendants of having generally failed to disclose evidence as required under Brady. Douris seems to assert, more specifically, that the policy, practice, or custom is not to disclose exculpatory evidence to him. To support his contentions, Plaintiff refers to his several lawsuits that, according to him, have so vexed and embarrassed Bucks County that the county prosecutors concocted this retaliatory scheme to "`get' Douris." Most relevant among Plaintiff's contentions regarding motivation, "moving force," and causation is the following accusation:

As Douris has filed claims with Pa. Human Relation [sic] Commission and U.S. Justice Dept. about the Bucks County District Attorney's Office not being accessible in their activities as D.A. Auctions. And filing complaints in federal court about the County of Bucks, so has made the Defendants very mad with anger in other words hatred toward Douris.

(Pl. Supplement of R., Docket No. 109, at 2.) "The Defendants became very mad and they had a motive to `get' Douris. . . ." (Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n Defs. Bucks County and DA's Office Mot. Summ. J., Docket No. 89, ¶ 14.)

"[P]roof that a municipality's legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably." Brown, 520 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added). "Where a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law . . . resolving these issues of . . . causation is straightforward." Id. at 404. Douris frequently and persistently claims that Defendants intentionally and vindictively targeted him for deprivation of his constitutional privileges and rights, perhaps even despite organizational adherence otherwise to Brady for all other criminal defendants. Should this Court determine that this alleged failure to disclose Brady evidenceto Douris violated federal law, then there would be a genuine issue for trial whether this municipal action was the "moving force" behind Plaintiff's injury. Id. at 405.

Defendants highlight that Plaintiff never identified those County's policymakers who would presumably be responsible here. Nor has Plaintiff ever shown that those unnamed decision-makers were aware either of his prosecution or of any failure to disclose Brady evidence. (Defs. Bucks County and DA's Office's Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Docket No. 80, at 17 n. 5.) While these representations are accurate, this Court need not address those particular deficiencies of Plaintiff s legal argument. As detailed within the next section of this memorandum, this Court concludes, as a matter of law, that there was no Brady violation under the facts presented in the instant case, even when those facts are viewed most favorably toward Plaintiff. Since the harm Douris allegedly suffered could not have run afoul of any federally protected right, even the intentional or deliberate cause of that harm could not create a genuine issue for trial.

iii. Whether Douris Is Entitled to a Trial to Prove the Existence of a Brady Violation Regarding the Evidence Withheld During His Two Criminal Prosecutions

Even under a most favorable interpretation of the facts presented, Douris cannot identify a genuine issue of fact for trial that the evidence withheld conclusively would have generated different verdicts or that Defendants' suppression thereof demonstrably undermines confidence in the disposition of his trials. With respect to his 1999 criminal prosecution for harassment, Douris criticizes Defendants' failure to apprise him of the existence of eyewitnesses and their statements regarding the elevator incident. (Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., Docket No. 81, Ex. O, ¶ 17.) Those three eyewitnesses were Peter Riley, Jack Elfman, and Jane Lacy. Defendants have disclosed those statements pursuant to discovery, and the Court cannot imagine how those statements, had they been earlier shared with Plaintiff and introduced by Douris during trial, could have produced a different verdict.

Peter Riley stated, "He pushed her aside. She was blocking the elevator. He was wrong, DIDN'T have to push her." (Riley Statement, Docket No. 81, Ex. F.) Jack Elfman stated, "She came out and told him he can't take the papers out of the [building]. She was blocking the elevator. He pushed her aside." (Elfman Statement, Docket No. 81, Ex. G.) Jane Lacy stated, in pertinent part, "The elevator door opened up and [Douris] moved forward to step in. [Ms. Costello] walked in front of him trying to bar his entrance into the elevator. [Douris] moved passed her and pushed her out of the way into the molding . . . around the elevator door." (Lacy Statement, Docket No. 81, Ex. H.)

Each of these eyewitnesses corroborated Ms. Costello's factual depiction: She blocked the elevator, and Douris responded by pushing her aside. These eyewitness accounts only would have strengthened confidence in Plaintiff's guilty verdict, and there is no reason to believe that the cumulative effect of these additional incriminating statements would have convinced a jury to acquit Douris of harassment. See Buehl, 166 F.3d at 181 ("[T]he suppressed evidence is `considered collectively, not item-by-item.'") (quoting Kyles. 514 U.S. at 436). Therefore, underBrady, Plaintiff enjoys no federal right to the mandatory disclosure of these inculpatory statements. Accordingly, Douris is not entitled to a trial to prove that these withheld statements critically subverted his constitutional rights.

Regarding Plaintiff's 2001 criminal prosecution for those charges arising from the traffic incident, Defendants inform the Court that Douris and his then-attorney received the "withheld" evidence prior to the scheduled trial date. (Def. DA's Office's Disc. Resp., Docket No. 81, Ex. K; Def. DA's Office's Supplemental Disc. Resp., Docket No. 81, Ex. L.) Douris could have requested a continuance to review the newly disclosed evidence had he believed its belated delivery prejudiced his defense. Plaintiff did not do so. Instead, having received this evidence, Douris accepted admission into the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition ("A.R.D.") program. (A.R.D. Form, Docket No. 81, Ex. M.) In his responses opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff does not dispute that his attorney and he possessed this information prior to accepting admission into the A.R.D. program. Since Plaintiff received the requested evidence before accepting admission into A.R.D., the Court cannot conclude that Douris has created a material issue of genuine fact regarding whether this belated disclosure prejudiced his defense underBrady. "[A]bsent a finding that plaintiff has suffered a `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws'. . . there is no basis for liability." Douris v. Dougherty, No. 01-5757, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1576, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2003) (citation omitted).

2. Defendant Rauch

a. Parties' Contentions

In his Motion for Summary Judgment and supplemental briefs, Defendant Rauch argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from litigation because a reasonable police officer would have considered Rauch's conduct objectively lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information then known and possessed by the officer. Further, Rauch contends that the arrest warrant he eventually secured was objectively reasonable, as he reasonably believed his application was supported by probable cause (i.e., by the statements of eyewitnesses Schuman, Ghantt, and Vanni).

Plaintiff responds that Officer Rauch is not entitled to qualified immunity because Rauch acted unlawfully by discarding the personal notes that Plaintiff had made following the traffic incident. According to Douris, Rauch's actions were improperly motivated by the organizational conspiracy to "`get' Douris" and by Rauch's own discriminatory animus against the disabled; Douris also contends that the "excessive" charges should have been mitigated by and forgiven due to his various handicaps. Also, due to some factual disparities within the eyewitness accounts provided by Schuman, Ghantt, and Vanni, Plaintiff contends that a genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether Officer Rauch had probable cause to arrest Douris.

b. Qualified Immunity

Rauch asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity against all of Plaintiff s charges. The Court's analysis in this situation follows the two-step framework established in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). As a threshold matter, a reviewing court must consider whether the facts alleged — when viewed favorably toward the apparently harmed party — demonstrate that the officer violated a constitutional right. 533 U.S. at 201. If a constitutional violation could have occurred under the facts alleged, the court then must resolve whether that constitutional right supposedly violated is "clearly established." Id. In order to qualify as a "clearly established" right, the constitutional right must be articulated with enough particularity and specificity such that "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. Whether the constitutional right is "clearly established" and whether the officer acted unreasonably given the factual situation are questions of law properly decided by the court. See, e.g.,Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2000).

Douris contends that Rauch violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when Rauch applied for Plaintiff's arrest warrant, even though Rauch allegedly knew that no probable cause existed to support the charges. To resolve Plaintiff's § 1983 claim and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must determine whether a reasonable police officer could have believed that Rauch's conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information then-possessed by Officer Rauch. Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 826 (3d Cir. 1997). In denying Defendant Rauch's Morion to Dismiss, this Court drew all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor and concluded that Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint were sufficient to support his claims. 229 F. Supp.2d at 401, 402. However, in its disposition of Rauch's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court now must look beyond Plaintiff's mere assertions that Officer Rauch lacked probable cause to arrest. This Court must determine whether Douris has set forth specific facts that both support those original allegations and — as Plaintiff is the non-moving party — indicate a genuine issue for trial remains.

In determining whether to grant summary judgment regarding Defendant Rauch's entitlement to qualified immunity, this Court must decide if the question "Would a reasonable police officer's consider Officer Rauch's actions lawful?" remains in genuine dispute. Under these circumstances, a police officer loses his qualified immunity where the arrest warrant application is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." Mallev v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). The Court decides that, as a matter of law, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, would not support a reasonable jury finding that Officer Rauch's actions were objectively unreasonable. A reasonable officer would have considered the three positive eyewitness identifications, and would have concluded that his subsequent application for an arrest warrant was supported by probable cause. The eyewitnesses variously confirmed that Douris ranted and raved on the scene, that he pounded on Vanni's car windows, that he falsely identified himself as a police officer, and that he refused to provide any identification. (Aff. of Probable Cause, Docket No. 41, Ex. B.) On the basis of these witnesses, Rauch applied for the arrest warrant. ( Id.) It should be noted that these three same witnesses later testified under oath and there was no material deviation from their initial recounts, even under cross-examination by Plaintiff's then-attorney. ("Ranting and Raving": Schuman Test., Docket No. 41, Ex. J, at 10-11; Ghantt Test., Docket No. 41, Ex. J, at 16, 23-24; Vanni Test., Docket No. 41, Ex. J, at 27-29, 34-35. "Police Officer": Schuman Test., Docket No. 41, Ex. J, at 4, 6; Ghantt Test., Docket No. 41, Ex. J, at 15, 22, 24.) The facts and circumstances known to Officer Rauch at the time were sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the charged offenses had been committed by Plaintiff.

In his Motion to Dismiss, Officer Rauch had attached these testimonies as evidence. However, this Court decided not to consider these testimonies at that time because to have done so would have converted the Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment, which is a transformation within the discretion of a trial court, but still a procedural issue for which the plaintiff had neither prepared nor submitted suitable memoranda. Douris, 229 F. Supp.2d at 401 n. 3. This Court instead limited its review to the pleadings and those "document[s] integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint. . . . " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)). Having not relied upon those testimonies, the Court found that Plaintiffs allegations were sufficient to withstand a Motion to Dismiss. Now that discovery has been completed, it is entirely appropriate for this Court to consider these witness testimonies, in addition to the other evidence produced during discovery, toward disposition of Officer Rauch's pending Motion.

Having now considered the evidence thus far produced, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a genuine issue for trial exists regarding the clear violation of an established statutory or constitutional right. As the non-moving party, Plaintiff "may not successfully oppose a summary judgment motion by simply replacing `conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.'" Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (quoting Luian v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 95 (1990)). Plaintiff has identified the occasional factual disparity within the record, and he brings these inconsistencies to the Court's attention in the hope that one such contradiction will establish the genuine issue of fact he must demonstrate in order to survive a summary judgment motion. None of Plaintiff s references indicates that Rauch materially misrepresented the witnesses' statements when completing his affidavit; moreover, none of Plaintiff's references demonstrates that Rauch lacked probable cause to arrest. For instance, Douris emphasizes that one account has Plaintiff offensively identifying himself as a police officer to the eyewitnesses whereas another account has Plaintiff so identifying himself only after first being asked whether he is a police officer. (Pl.'s Resp. Def. Rauch's Supplemental Filing, Docket No. 73, ¶¶ 5-6.) This inconsistency regarding the impetus for Plaintiff's self-identification is irrelevant. What matters in determining whether Rauch had probable cause to arrest Douris for impersonating a police officer is whether Douris ever identified himself as one; it does not matter what prompted Plaintiff so to speak. See, e.g., Samuels v. Parcells, No. 85-5906, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19013, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 1986) (finding probable cause in support of an arrest warrant for impersonating a public official where eyewitness identified suspect and where testimonial discrepancies were irrelevant and inconsequential).

Similarly, Plaintiff refers to factual disparities regarding the extent of the traffic incident itself. (Pl.'s Resp. Def. Rauch's Supplemental Filing, Docket No. 73, ¶¶ 7-9.) Officer Rauch's accident report indicates that Schuman struck Plaintiff's car whereas Schuman later testified that no contact ever had been made. Douris would prefer to adopt Schuman's version now because absent an actual accident, Plaintiff would have had no attendant duty to provide information and give aid. Therefore, under those facts, Rauch should have known that Douris could not have been charged with those offenses. However, given that Officer Rauch's accident report had been influenced by Plaintiffs on-site representations and by Rauch's view of some corroborative scratches on Plaintiff's car, Douris cannot now ignore his original representations and pretend that Rauch had no reasonable justification for concluding that Plaintiff and Schuman had collided. Officer Rauch "did an accident report based upon the fact that Mr. Douris was adamant that an accident occurred." (Rauch Test., Docket No. 75, Ex. A, at 30) (emphasis added). As Plaintiff's own filings admit, "Douris believed the pick-up struck his vehicle. . . . " (Pl.'s Notice of Application for Hr'g/or Decision on Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed Sept. 25, 2001, Docket No. 41, Ex. A, ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff contends that Rauch should lose his qualified immunity because he knowingly discarded handwritten notes Plaintiff had entrusted to him. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Rauch's Reply Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Docket No. 86.) The Court disagrees. It is undisputed that Rauch could not read the notes and that Rauch subsequently threw them away, thinking they were of no assistance. (Rauch Test., Docket No. 75, Ex. A, at 22-26.) As Plaintiff argues,

[t]he next question for the Court is if the paper with scribble was not scribble, would Defendant Rauch would [sic] have been able to read the written information on the papers? Yes, Defendant Rauch would have been able to read the information and Defendant Rauch would have kept the paper as evidential value.

(Pl.'s Resp. Def. Rauch's Supplemental Filing, Docket No. 73, ¶ 2);see also Rauch Test., Docket No. 75, Ex. A, at 26 ("I threw [the paper] out. . . . It had no evidential value.") Yet, Douris maintains that Rauch was motivated by a conspiratorial desire to deprive him of exculpatory evidence, notwithstanding Rauch's uncontested inability to read Plaintiff's handwriting. If Rauch could not have learned the contents of the documents he discarded, he could not have consciously concealed their evidentiary value, if any. Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the destruction of the notes because the witnesses were soon thereafter found by the police and because Plaintiff had an opportunity to impeach the Commonwealth's witnesses when his then-attorney cross-examined them during the September 13, 2001 hearing. Throwing away an illegible document that contained no useful information does not create an issue of material fact for trial, nor does it constitute any Constitutional violation.

As the Fourth Amendment guarantees, Douris may not be arrested by Rauch or by any officer except upon probable cause. However, even when resolving factual disputes in favor of Plaintiff, the Court concludes there was no violation of this constitutional right, any other constitutional right, or any statutory right. A reasonable officer would understand that filing several criminal charges against a suspect positively identified and described by three witnesses would not have violated that individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrests unsupported by probable cause.

c. Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from arresting citizens except upon probable cause. Probable cause exists wherever "the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483. "Even if there is an abundance of circumstantial evidence showing that probable cause to arrest existed, minimal credible evidence by plaintiff that there is a lack of probable cause is sufficient for the case to withstand summary judgment and proceed to the jury." Brooks v. Carrion, No. 96-1172, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14652, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1996).

As Defendant Rauch reminds the Court, there was a hearing before a neutral magistrate, who found that probable cause existed to hold over Douris for trial. (Def. Rauch's Mem. Supp. Summ. J., at 8-9.) While this intermediate review does not automatically bar suit, it raises a presumption that probable cause was present. Brooks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14652, at *11. Plaintiff argues that Rauch should have concluded no probable cause existed because Douris himself had telephoned the police and because Plaintiff had been cooperative at the scene of the automobile accident. Regardless of who summoned the police or who initially cooperated, Rauch only filed his affidavit after interviewing the principals involved in the traffic incident. Douris ignores the cumulative effect of those statements Rauch gathered during his investigation.

Plaintiff forcefully argues that Rauch — fully aware of the countywide conspiracy to harass and penalize Plaintiff — targeted him for arrest and prosecution despite inadequate probable cause in order to curry favor with his superiors. (Pl.'s Pet. for the Ct. to Hold Defs. in Default Enter J. to Pl., Docket No. 82.) Whether or not Plaintiff's contentions are truthful is not pertinent to the disposition of Rauch's Motion, as precedent clearly states that the Court must confine itself to objective review of the circumstances. As the Supreme Court held in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137, 98 So. Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), the first step in analyzing supposed violations of the Fourth Amendment is "an objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him." A law enforcement officer's "subjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." Id. at 136. Whatever Officer Rauch might have subjectively thought is of no consequence to the disposition of his Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's repeated accusations that Rauch knowingly conspired alongside the other defendants in order to "`get' Douris" will not create a genuine issue of material fact, especially given that this Court concludes that Rauch's behavior was objectively lawful.

In his numerous motions and filings with the Court, Plaintiff repeatedly insinuates that Rauch targeted him for prosecution because of his disability. That is, in addition to satisfying the prosecutorial conspiracy against Douris, arresting Plaintiff also afforded Rauch the opportunity to indulge his supposed animus toward the disabled. Regardless of whether Douris has presented enough evidence that could convince a rational jury that Rauch was so subjectively motivated — which, incidentally, the Court finds he has not done — Plaintiff's version of Rauch's motives is unnecessary given that the Court must confine itself to objective review of the factual circumstances. Again, given the positive identifications given by Schuman, Ghantt, and Vanni, the Court concludes that whether Officer Rauch had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on charges of impersonating a police officer, making terrorist threats, harassment, and duty to give information and render aid no longer remains in genuine dispute among the parties.

B. Malicious Prosecution

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Rauch subjected him to malicious prosecution, and that he is entitled to appropriate relief. To state a claim for malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant instituted the proceedings against the plaintiff, (2) without probable cause, (3) with malice, and (4) the proceedings terminated in the plaintiff's favor. Watson v. Abington Twp., No. 01-5501, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300, at *26 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2002) (citing McKibben v. Schmotzer, 700 A.2d 484, 492 (Pa.Super. 1997)). As the Court concludes that Officer Rauch had probable cause to arrest Douris, see section III.A.2, supra, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim cannot continue for want of this essential element.

Defendant Rauch reminds this Court that, due to his voluntary entrance into an A.R.D. program, Douris also cannot demonstrate that the proceedings terminated in his favor. (Def. Rauch's Supplemental Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Docket No. 92.) "[W]hether an A.R.D. disposition is a termination favorable to plaintiff for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim has been addressed by [Pennsylvania's] federal and state courts. Both have concluded that such a disposition is not sufficiently favorable to satisfy the common law requirements for malicious prosecution." Nardini v. Hackett, No. 00-CV-5038, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15896, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2001). Plaintiff has introduced no credible evidence to rebut Rauch's interpretation of the law.

Because Douris cannot demonstrate a genuine issue of fact regarding half of the elements required, Plaintiff is not entitled to a trial in order to prove Defendant Rauch subjected him to malicious prosecution.

IV. Conclusions

With regard to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Bucks County and DA's Office, this Court concludes that Plaintiff Douris has not established a material issue of fact for trial regarding either Defendants' "deliberate indifference" toward any departmental failure to disclose Brady evidence or whether Defendants actually violated Brady under the facts, even when construed most favorably toward Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion.

With regard to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Rauch, this Court concludes that a reasonable police officer would have considered Rauch's conduct objectively lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information then possessed by Defendant. Nor has Plaintiff established a material issue of fact for trial that could discredit Rauch's proffered justification for Plaintiff's 2001 arrest. Also, absent two elements of the prima facie case for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff is not entitled to a trial to prove that claim against Rauch. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion.

An appropriate order follows.

ORDER

Further, upon consideration of Defendant Timothy Rauch's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 41), his Supplemental Briefs in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 65, 75, 92), and Plaintiff's responses to those Supplemental Briefs (Docket Nos. 73, 86, 101), it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

All other outstanding Motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

Judgment is granted against Plaintiff James George Douris and in favor of Defendants County of Bucks, Bucks County District Attorney's Office, and Officer Timothy Rauch.