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Superior Court v. County of Sacramento

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Mar 5, 2008
No. C053142 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008)

Opinion


THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Defendants and Appellants. C053142 California Court of Appeal, Third District, Sacramento March 5, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super. Ct. No. 06CS00116

SCOTLAND, P.J.

For many years, persons called for jury duty at the Sacramento County Superior Court were provided with free parking, paid for by the County of Sacramento, either next to the courthouse in a parking lot owned by the County and dedicated to use by jurors or at other locations when that lot is full. In 2003, the County ceased paying for overflow juror parking at locations other than the dedicated lot. Concluding that the discontinuation of such parking violated the Trial Court Facilities Act of 2002 (Gov. Code, § 70301 et seq.), the Superior Court obtained an order directing the County to reinstate overflow juror parking at the level that existed on October 1, 2001. The County appeals.

For reasons that follow, we reject the County’s contention that such juror parking is not a “necessary and suitable facilit[y]” for which the County is responsible to provide pursuant to the Trial Court Facilities Act of 2002 (Gov. Code, § 70311, subd. (b)); however, we conclude the County is required to provide free overflow juror parking only at the level that was “necessary and suitable [based on] judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996” (ibid.). Thus, we shall reverse the order to the extent it compels the County to provide free overflow juror parking as existed on October 1, 2001, and shall remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Before the Legislature enacted the Trial Court Facilities Act of 2002 (the Facilities Act) (Gov. Code, § 70301 et seq.; further section references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified), persons called for jury duty at the Sacramento County Superior Court had options for parking during their jury service. They could park free of cost in a 351-space parking lot owned by the County and dedicated for juror parking or use free overflow parking at seven other locations--a County-owned parking structure; five parking structures owned and/or rented by the City of Sacramento; and a privately-owned parking lot. The County did not reserve spaces in those overflow lots; it simply reimbursed jurors who used them on a space available basis when the dedicated juror parking lot was full.

In July 2003, the County stopped paying for juror overflow parking. The Superior Court warned the County that its failure to pay for overflow parking violated the Facilities Act, but the warnings went unheeded. Thus, in a “final Notice of Specific Deficiency,” the Superior Court asked the County whether it would “provide free juror parking facilities equal to the discontinued overflow juror parking, or resume equivalent free juror parking in the same facility, pursuant to Government Code section 70344[, subdivision ](c).”

The Facilities Act, which we will discuss later in more detail, governs the transfer of responsibility for trial court facilities from the counties to the Judicial Council. (§ 70321; Stats. 2002, ch. 1082, § 1(b).) According to the Superior Court, because the County had not yet transferred responsibility for its court facilities to the Judicial Council, the County was required to provide necessary and suitable facilities in the interim, including free overflow juror parking similar to what the County had provided historically.

When the County responded that it could not assist the court in meeting the demand for juror parking, the Superior Court ordered the County to provide free overflow juror parking at the same level that existed in October 2001, and to pay for the cost out of the County’s general fund. The Superior Court specified “three separate bases . . . under the [Facilities] Act” for its order: the County must provide free overflow juror parking because it is “necessary and suitable” (§ 70311, subd. (b)(1)); diminishing the level of court facilities before transfers are completed contravenes the Legislature’s intent to maintain the level of court facilities before and during transfer (§ 70330); and the overflow parking structures are “shared use buildings” under the Act and when the County takes away the court’s ability to provide jurors with free overflow parking in a shared use building, the County must provide replacement parking in a manner “at least equal to” what it previously provided (§ 70344, subd. (c)).

The County refused to comply with the order; thus, the Superior Court filed a complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate directing the County to provide overflow juror parking at the same level that existed on October 1, 2001, and to pay for the cost out of the County’s general fund.

The trial court granted the requested relief, directing the County to reinstate its discontinued cost-free juror parking policy and provide such parking, at the level it did on October 1, 2001, in either the dedicated parking lot or in overflow parking structures or “other parking structures of comparable convenience” to jurors who cannot park in the dedicated parking structure. The County appeals.

DISCUSSION

I

Historically, a county has been obligated to provide “suitable rooms for holding the . . . courts, for the chambers of the judges of said courts and for the court attendants, together with sufficient attendants, furniture, furnishings, heat, light, equipment, stationery, supplies and other personal property, for said rooms and chambers and for the transaction of the business of the courts” in that county. (Former § 68073, Stats. 1953, ch. 911, § 1, p. 2266; Mallett v. Superior Court (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1853, 1857, 1864, 1867.) A county was also obligated to fund court operations that were not provided for in the state budget. (Former § 68073; Stats. 1994, ch. 308, § 10, p. 2042.) And jurors have been entitled to a daily attendance fee during jury service as well as reimbursement for mileage traveled in attending court (Code Civ. Proc., § 215); but there was no express statutory provision for the payment of jurors’ parking fees.

In 1996, the blue ribbon commission on jury system improvement recommended that courts provide sufficient parking for jurors or reimburse jurors for parking, and that Code of Civil Procedure section 215 be amended to cover jurors’ parking costs. However, the Legislature has not amended the statute.

In the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997, the Legislature found it was “increasingly clear that the counties of California are no longer able to provide unlimited funding increases to the judiciary and, in some counties, financial difficulties and strain threaten the quality and timeliness of justice.” (Stats. 1997, ch. 850, § 2(f).) Consequently, the Legislature acted to provide that “county contributions to trial court operations shall be permanently capped at the same dollar amount as that county provided to court operations in the 1994-95 fiscal year with adjustments to the cap, as specified” in the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997 (Stats. 1997, ch. 850, § 3(b)).

To accomplish this, the Legislature amended former section 68073 to limit a county’s responsibility for court facilities. “Commencing as of July 1, 1996, and each year thereafter, [a county] shall be responsible for providing necessary and suitable facilities [only] for judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996” (former § 68073, subd. (b), italics added); and, commencing July 1, 1997, “no county . . . shall be responsible to provide funding for ‘court operations’ as defined in [s]ection 77003 [meaning salaries, benefits, and public agency contributions for judges, subordinate and other court staff; marshals, constables, and sheriffs as the court deems necessary for court operations; court-appointed counsel in juvenile dependency proceedings and for representation of minors in family law proceedings; collective bargaining with respect to court employees; and certain indirect costs for county general services attributable to court operations]” (former §§ 68073, subd. (a), 77003, subd. (a).) (Stats. 1997, ch. 850, §§ 27, 43.)

Accordingly, a county would remain responsible for providing “suitable and necessary facilities” for “judicial officers and court support staff for judicial positions created prior to January 1, 1996,” and for “judgeships” authorized in 1996 if the county agrees that new facilities for those judgeships “are either not required or that the county is willing to provide funding for [those new] court facilities”; however, unless the court and the county agree otherwise, the state “shall assume responsibility for suitable and necessary facilities for judicial officers and support staff for any judgeships authorized . . . from January 1, 1998, [and thereafter].” (Former § 77654, subd. (i); Stats. 1997, ch. 850, § 48.) In other words, the Legislature shifted to the state the responsibility for facilities for newly created judgeships.

For the purpose of proceeding “as rapidly as possible toward the goal of full state funding of trial court operations” (Stats. 1997, ch. 850, § 2(g)), the Legislature also created “The Task Force on Court Facilities,” “charged with identifying the needs related to trial and appellate court facilities, and options and recommendations for funding court facility maintenance, improvements, and expansion, including the specific responsibilities of each entity of government.” (§§ 77650, 77653, subd. (h).) After studying the matter, the task force recommended that full responsibility for funding trial court facilities and operations should be shifted to the state based on the rationale “[t]he state, being solely responsible for creating new judgeships, drives the need for new court facilities.” The task force also outlined a proposed method of transferring responsibility for these facilities.

In 2002, the Legislature responded by enacting the Facilities Act “to transfer the responsibility for trial court facilities funding and operation” from the counties “to the state in a manner generally consistent with the recommendations of the task force.” (Stats. 2002, ch. 1082, § 1(b).) The Facilities Act directs the Judicial Council to enter into agreements with each county concerning the transfer of responsibility for court facilities, and requires that the transfer occur no later than June 30, 2007 (§ 70321), if the county transfers responsibility. (See, e.g., § 70326.)

The County notified the Administrative Office of the Courts that the County would not seek to transfer the courthouse in downtown Sacramento because it has been given an unacceptable seismic rating, and the cost of retrofitting the building would exceed $10 million. An “unacceptable seismic safety rating” makes it a deficient building within the meaning of the Facilities Act (§ 70326, subd. (b)(2)), which states in pertinent part: “Neither title to a deficient building nor responsibility for the court facilities in that building shall transfer to the state or the Judicial Council under this chapter, . . . unless provision is made in the agreement for correction of the deficient items.” (§ 70326, subd. (c).)

As part of the Facilities Act, the Legislature amended and renumbered former section 68073 as section 70311, to provide that a county remains “responsible for providing necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996. . . .” (§ 70311, subd. (b); Stats. 2002, ch. 1082 (Sen. Bill No. 1732), § 3.)

Before enactment of the Facilities Act, former section 68073 had been amended to specifically define “facilities” for judicial and court support positions as: “(1) rooms for holding superior court, (2) the chambers of the judges of the court, (3) rooms for the attendants of the court, and (4) sufficient heat, ventilation, air-conditioning, light, and fixtures for those rooms and chambers.” (Former § 68073, subd. (e); Stats. 2002, ch. 784, § 201.) However, this definition of “facilities” was deleted by the Legislature when it renumbered former section 68073 as section 70311, and added a new definition of “court facilities” (§ 70301, subd. (d)) as part of the Facilities Act. (Stats. 2002, ch. 1082, §§ 3, 4(d).)

“Court facilities” now “consist of all of the following: [¶] (1) Rooms for holding superior court. [¶] (2) The chambers of the judges of the court. [¶] (3) Rooms for the attendants of the court, including but not limited to, rooms for accepting and processing documents filed with the court. [¶] (4) Heat, ventilation, air-conditioning, light, and fixtures for those rooms and chambers. [¶] (5) Common and connecting space to permit proper and convenient use of the rooms. [¶] (6) Rooms for secure holding of a prisoner attending court sessions, together with secure means of transferring the prisoner to the courtroom. [¶] (7) Any other area within a building required or used for court functions. [¶] (8) Grounds appurtenant to the building containing the rooms. [¶] (9) Parking spaces historically made available to one or more users of court facilities.” (§ 70301, subd. (d); italics added.)

If a county fails to meet its obligations under section 70311, “the court shall give notice of a specific deficiency” and if the county fails to rectify the situation, “the court may direct the appropriate officers of the county . . . to provide the necessary and suitable facilities. The expenses incurred, certified by the judges to be correct, are a charge against the county . . . treasury and shall be paid out of the general fund.” (§ 70311, subd. (c).)

A county’s responsibility to provide necessary and suitable facilities continues until it transfers responsibility for a court facility to the Judicial Council. Thereafter, it is “relieved of any responsibility for deferred or ongoing maintenance for the facility transferred, except for the county facilities payment required by Section 70353. . . .” (§ 70312.)

The county facilities payment is the amount “paid by a county in partial exchange for relief from the responsibility for providing court facilities.” (§ 70301, subd. (c).) It is calculated based on the amount that the “county historically expended for operation and maintenance of court facilities” (§ 70351), pursuant to a method set forth in the Facilities Act (§§ 70353-70363), including the cost of “[m]aintenance of parking spaces or garages dedicated to the court or for jurors” (§ 70356, subd. (e)), but not including the cost of “[m]aintenance of parking for the general public whose responsibility is not transferred and that may also be used by the courts or jurors [i.e., nondedicated juror parking].” (§ 70360, subd. (c).)

The Facilities Act dictates that the transfer agreement “shall provide for parking spaces for the court of comparable convenience, number, and type, as was made available for court use as of October 1, 2001. For purposes of this section, parking spaces for the court includes, but is not limited to, spaces for judges, court employees, other court staff, witnesses, and jurors.” (§ 70330.)

Thus, the Facilities Act directs the Judicial Council and each county to enter into agreements to transfer court facilities to the Judicial Council (§ 70321); and the agreements must provide for parking spaces of comparable convenience, number, and type made available for the use of the court and jurors as of October 1, 2001. (§ 70330.) Until it transfers the facilities, a county must provide “necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996. . . .” (§§ 70311, subd. (b), 70312.) Although a county has no responsibility to fund court operations after July 1, 1997 (§ 70311, subd. (a)), juror parking is not part of “court operations.” (§ 77003, subd. (a)(8); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.810(d).)

With this statutory framework in mind, we turn to the County’s challenges to the order directing it to provide free overflow parking for jurors.

II

The County contends that its statutory responsibility to provide “necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996” (§ 70311, subd. (b)) does not include parking for jurors because, in the County’s words, “[j]ury parking is clearly not necessary to support judicial and court support positions.” The County acknowledges that, as used in the statutory scheme, “[c]ourt facilities” include “[p]arking spaces historically made available to one or more users of court facilities.” (§ 70301, subd. (d)(9).) However, the County argues that the reference to “facilities,” as opposed to “court facilities,” in section 70311, subdivision (b), expresses a legislative intent to omit parking spaces from the “necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and court support positions” that the county must provide. We are not persuaded.

Sections 70301 and 70311 are both part of the Facilities Act and deal with the same subject matter. As statutes “in pari materia,” meaning “‘[o]f the same matter; on the same subject’” (Altaville Drug Store, Inc. v. Employment Development Department (1988) 44 Cal.3d 231, 236, fn. 4), they must be interpreted “‘one in light of the other.’” (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 124, fn. 4.) In other words, “we must construe them together as one statute. [Citation.] In this regard, all parts of a statute should be read together and construed in a manner that gives effect to each, yet does not lead to disharmony with the others. [Citations.]” (City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462, 468; People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 327.) And when so construing the words, we must, of course, “‘keep[] in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear . . . .’ [Citations.]” [Walker v. Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 124.)

These principles of statutory construction lead to the inevitable conclusion that the Legislature intended the word “facilities” in section 70311, subdivision (b) to include all the things specified in the definition of “[c]ourt facilities” set forth in section 70301, subdivision (d).

The Facilities Act was a continuation of the Legislature’s intent (1) to maintain “county contributions to trial court operations” at the level a county “provided to court operations in the 1994-95 fiscal year with adjustments to the cap, as specified” in the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997 (Stats. 1997, ch. 850, § 3(b)), and (2) to proceed “as rapidly as possible toward the goal of full state funding of trial court operations” (Stats. 1997, ch. 850, § 2(g)). Therefore, the nature and obvious purpose of the Facilities Act was to maintain the status quo until the state assumes full responsibility for trial court operations.

Viewing the Facilities Act as a whole discloses that all of its provisions concern court facilities. It encompasses the transfer of court facilities to the Judicial Council (§ 70321); the obligation of a county to continue to provide court facilities prior to their transfer to the Judicial Council (§ 70311, subd. (b)); and the responsibility of a county to help fund the maintenance of those facilities after their transfer (§§ 70351, 70353).

When the Legislature enacted the Facilities Act, it amended and renumbered former section 68073 as section 70311, deleted the definition of “facilities” contained in former section 68073, and replaced it with a more comprehensive definition of “court facilities” in section 70301, subdivision (d). This more comprehensive definition incorporates the components of the definition of “facilities” found in former section 68073 and adds the types of facilities that counties were providing for court operations based on judicial and court support positions that existed prior to July 1, 1996. (§ 70301, subd. (d).) Hence, removing the then-existing definition of “facilities” from former section 68073 (now § 70311) and moving it to, and expanding it in, section 70301 does not reflect an intent to relieve a county of its obligation to provide facilities that it was already funding. Indeed, such a result would be contrary to the purpose of the Facilities Act and the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997. If, as the County claims, the Legislature intended a different definition of facilities to apply to a county’s statutory obligation under section 70311 than applies under the rest of the Facilities Act, it would have retained in section 70311 the definition from former section 68073.

In sum, omission of the word “court” from the phrase “necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and court support positions” does not reflect a legislative intent to treat that phrase differently from the rest of the facilities covered by the statutory scheme. Rather, the Legislature’s reference to “facilities” in section 70311 refers to “court facilities” as defined in section 70301, including the grounds appurtenant to the building containing the courtrooms (§ 70301, subd. (d)(8))--e.g., the appurtenant juror parking lot--and parking spaces historically made available to the users of court facilities (§ 70301, subd. (d)(9))--which indisputably includes jurors.

The County concedes that it has historically provided jurors with cost-free parking spaces in a dedicated juror parking lot and that from at least 1993 until enactment of the Facilities Act, it provided jurors with cost-free use of other parking locations when the dedicated juror parking lot is full. Because the dedicated juror parking lot and the overflow parking existed on July 1, 1996, and were “[p]arking spaces historically made available” to jurors as users of court facilities, they are “necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996,” for which the county remains financially responsible within the meaning of section 70311, subdivision (b).

The County does not dispute its obligation to maintain the existing dedicated juror parking lot, but notes that it will not have to pay for overflow juror parking after the downtown courthouse is transferred to the Judicial Council. (§§ 70301, subd. (c), 70351, 70353) [the “county facilities payment” (CFP) it will have to make “in partial exchange for relief from the responsibility for providing court facilities” will not include the cost of “[m]aintenance of parking for the general public whose responsibility is not transferred and that may also be used by the courts or jurors,” i.e., nondedicated juror parking (§ 70360, subd. (c))].) It follows, the County argues, that its current responsibility to provide court facilities pursuant to section 70311, subdivision (b) does not encompass non-dedicated overflow parking for jurors because they “are not subject to the transfer agreement.” We disagree.

The fact that overflow parking costs in general public parking lots will not be part of the County’s CFP after the transfer of the downtown courthouse to the Judicial Council (because the County will not be transferring the general public parking lots to the Judicial Council under the Facilities Act) does not mean that the County has no responsibility to provide such a suitable and necessary facility to jurors prior to the transfer. As we have explained, sections 70301 and 70311 make the County financially responsible for all juror parking, including overflow parking, that it was providing prior to July 1, 1996.

Although we conclude the definition of court facilities in section 70301 applies to the facilities the County must provide pursuant to section 70311, this is not the end of the matter.

III

The trial court directed the County to provide free juror parking, at the same level the County provided on October 1, 2001, in either the dedicated juror parking lot or in overflow parking structures or other structures of comparable convenience to jurors who cannot park in the dedicated parking lot.

The County correctly contends that if it has a pretransfer obligation to provide juror overflow parking, that responsibility is limited to necessary and suitable parking for the number of jurors required by judicial and court positions created prior to July 1, 1996, rather than required by such positions that existed on October 1, 2001. As we have explained in part II, ante, the Facilities Act and the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997 are intended to maintain the status quo, as of June 30, 1996, with respect to a county’s obligation to provide necessary and suitable trial court facilities, including parking historically made available to jurors.

In arguing that October 1, 2001, should be the operative date, the Superior Court relies on section 70330, which provides that when the County and the Judicial Council agree to transfer responsibility for the downtown court facilities from the County to the Judicial Council, (§ 70321 et seq.), the transfer agreement “shall provide for parking spaces for the court of comparable convenience, number, and type, as was made available for court use as of October 1, 2001,” including “spaces for . . . jurors.” (§ 70330.) But section 70330 applies only to the transfer of court facilities, while the County’s pretransfer obligation is governed by sections 70301 and 70311, which cap the County’s responsibility to provide court facilities at the level required on June 30, 1996. To the extent that more parking spaces for jurors have been required between June 30, 1996, and October 1, 2001, as a result of judgeships created after July 1, 1996, the responsibility to pay for those additional parking spaces was shifted to the state. (§§ 70311, 77654, sub. (g).)

Thus, lacking in merit is the Superior Court’s position that the requirement the transfer agreement include the juror parking capacity existing on October 1, 2001 (§ 70330) constitutes a legislative determination that “such parking [is] necessary and suitable” within the meaning of section 70311, thereby requiring the County to preserve, at its expense, said level of parking pending the transfer. Because we reject this aspect of the Superior Court’s position, we need not address the County’s argument that “the Superior Court does not have standing to challenge actions taken allegedly in violation of the [Facilities] Act’s transfer requirements.”

The record lacks any evidence as to the amount of overflow juror parking that was necessary and suitable based on judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996. Therefore, we must remand the matter to the trial court to decide that question.

IV

In another attack on the funding order, the County claims it is “deficient because the Superior Court did not consider the County’s fiscal condition as required by [s]ection 70311,” subdivision (b), which states in pertinent part: “(b) . . . In determining whether facilities are necessary and suitable, the reasonable needs of the court and the fiscal condition of the county . . . shall be taken into consideration.”

The record does not support this claim. With respect to the fiscal condition of the County, the record shows the Superior Court reviewed the budget and financial responsibilities of the County and determined that the elimination of free overflow parking saved the County approximately $509,520 in fiscal year 2005-2006, which was only 0.025 percent of its budget for the general fund. As to the reasonable needs of the court, the record shows that after the County ceased paying for overflow parking in 2003, jurors complained about the lack of available free parking and the resulting difficulty in timely reporting for jury duty. The Superior Court also observed that a task force report concerning the jury system concluded that free juror parking is essential to minimize declining juror participation. The trial court took judicial notice of this information.

The court did not abuse its discretion (Mallett v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1873) in determining that (1) the County’s financial condition in fiscal year 2005-2006 showed it could afford to reinstitute the cost-free overflow parking program, which was a tiny portion of its budget, and (2) juror parking was a reasonable need for the effective and efficient administration of justice and operation of the court. That the court did not consider the County’s financial condition in 2003, when the County eliminated the cost-free parking program, was immaterial because the court did not order the County to retroactively pay for overflow parking costs incurred during the period of time that the program was discontinued.

V

The remaining basis for the Superior Court’s funding order is the portion of the Facilities Act that governs the administration of shared use buildings, which are buildings “used for both court and noncourt purposes.” (§ 70301, subd. (l), see also §§ 70341-70344.) The Superior Court relied on section 70344, subdivision (c), which states in pertinent part: “[I]f the court . . . is required to vacate a shared use building owned by the county, in whole or in part, the county shall provide the court . . . with suitable and necessary facilities at least equal to those previously occupied by the court. . . .”

We agree with the County that the Superior Court’s reliance on the shared use provisions of the Facilities Act does not support its determination that the County must pay for juror overflow parking at the level it provided before it ceased reimbursing jurors for their overflow parking costs. The County does not own six of the seven parking structures used for overflow juror parking. Therefore, section 70344 is inapplicable as to those structures because the Superior Court was not “required to vacate a shared use building owned by the county.” (§ 70344, subd. (c).) In fact, the Superior Court was not required to vacate any of the seven structures within the meaning of the statute, which, when viewed in context, concerns situations where the court is deprived of the right to use a portion of a shared use building by an action akin to eviction. The County simply ceased reimbursing parking fees for jurors who used overflow parking structures on a space available basis. No one prevented the Superior Court from using the structures for court-related purposes.

Section 70344 states: “(a) The entity holding title to a shared use building, except a third-party lessor, shall not transfer any right to a third party of the part of the building used by the other entity or place further bonded indebtedness on it, except as already required by operation of the legal documentation related to bonded indebtedness or as agreed to by the Judicial Council and the county, if the result of the action would be a further delay in transfer of title to the building to the other party pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 70325. [¶] (b) If either the court or the county occupies 80 percent or more of a shared use building, the Judicial Council, on behalf of the court, or the county may require the other entity to vacate the building. The entity vacating the building shall be given reasonable notice and shall be compensated by the other entity for its equity in the facility and for relocation costs at the fair market rate. [¶] (c) Except as provided in subdivision (b), if the court or the Judicial Council is required to vacate a shared use building owned by the county, in whole or in part, the county shall provide the court or the Judicial Council with suitable and necessary facilities at least equal to those previously occupied by the court. The failure of the county to provide those facilities shall make the county responsible to the court under Section 70311 for the facilities not provided.”

VI

For the reasons stated in parts II and III, ante, the County is required to maintain the parking lot dedicated to juror parking and to provide, free of cost, overflow juror parking that was necessary and suitable based on judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed to the extent that it compels the County to provide free, overflow juror parking at the level that existed on October 1, 2001. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with part III of this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(3).)

We concur: SIMS, J. MORRISON, J.


Summaries of

Superior Court v. County of Sacramento

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Mar 5, 2008
No. C053142 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008)
Case details for

Superior Court v. County of Sacramento

Case Details

Full title:THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento

Date published: Mar 5, 2008

Citations

No. C053142 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008)

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