Opinion
C054097
7-30-2008
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Not to be Published
This is the second appeal in an action arising from a dispute between the County of Sacramento and the Superior Court of Sacramento County regarding whether the County must reimburse persons on jury duty for the cost of parking when they must park in publicly or privately owned lots because the Superior Court lot dedicated to juror parking is full.
The County first appealed after the Superior Court ordered it to pay for such juror parking (the funding order) and the trial court directed the County to comply with the funding order. We held the County is obligated to pay for juror overflow parking, but not at the level directed in the funding order. Therefore, we remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the appropriate level of the Countys obligation. (Superior Court of Sacramento County v. County of Sacramento (Mar. 5, 2008, C053142) [nonpub. opn.] (hereafter County of Sacramento I ).)
While the first appeal was pending, the trial court entered a "Judgment Granting Enforcement Order," which enforces the funding order.
In this second appeal, the County contends the trial court lacked authority to issue the enforcement order while the first appeal was pending from the judgment directing compliance with the funding order. We requested and received supplemental briefing concerning the effect that our decision in County of Sacramento I has on this second appeal.
As we will explain, the Countys contentions concerning the trial courts authority to issue the enforcement order are now moot in large part because of our decision in County of Sacramento I. To the extent that the enforcement order directs the County to pay for juror overflow parking that County of Sacramento I subsequently determined is the Countys obligation, it is irrelevant whether the court had the authority to issue the enforcement order pending appeal. To the extent that the order directs the County to pay for juror overflow parking that is not the Countys obligation because it exceeds the level of juror overflow parking that existed in July 1996, the order is invalid and must be reversed.
BACKGROUND
In the first appeal, we addressed the validity of the Superior Courts funding order directing the County to reimburse persons serving on jury duty for the cost of overflow parking. (County of Sacramento I, supra, C053142.) The Superior Courts order was based on its interpretation of the Trial Court Facilities Act (Facilities Act or the Act) (Gov. Code, § 70301 et seq.), which is designed to transfer from the counties to the state the responsibility for trial court facilities funding and operation. (Stats. 2002, ch. 1082, § 1(b).) The Act directs the Judicial Council to enter into agreements with counties concerning the transfer of responsibility for court facilities, and requires a transfer to occur no later than June 30, 2007 (Gov. Code, § 70321), if the county transfers responsibility. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 70326.) Three sections of the Act were pivotal to the Superior Courts funding order.
Government Code section 70311, subdivision (b) states in pertinent part that, unless and until a county transfers responsibility for trial court facilities to the Judicial Council, "commencing as of July 1, 1996, and each year thereafter," the county "shall be responsible for providing necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996. . . ." If a county fails to meet its obligations under section 70311, "the court may direct the appropriate officers of the county . . . to provide the necessary and suitable facilities. The expenses incurred, certified by the judges to be correct, are a charge against the county . . . treasury and shall be paid out of the general fund." (Gov. Code, § 70311, subd. (c).)
"Court facilities" include various rooms and fixtures, such as courtrooms, judges chambers, and rooms for court personnel, and also include "[p]arking spaces historically made available to one or more users of court facilities." (Gov. Code, § 70301, subd. (d)(9).)
In its funding order, the Superior Court determined that the County, which has not transferred responsibility for the courthouse in downtown Sacramento, is obligated to pay for juror overflow parking. This was so because the County has an obligation to provide "necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and court support positions" (Gov. Code, § 70311, subd. (b)), including parking spaces historically made available to users of court facilities (Gov. Code, § 70301, subd. (d)(9), which encompassed the juror overflow spaces for which the County had historically paid until 2003. The Superior Court observed that the County was "required to include the same manner of juror parking spaces it provided as of October 1, 2001 . . . ." It based this conclusion on Government Code section 70330, which states that the transfer agreement "shall provide for parking spaces for the court of comparable convenience, number, and type, as was made available for court use as of October 1, 2001. For purposes of this section, parking spaces for the court includes, but is not limited to, spaces for judges, court employees, other court staff, witnesses, and jurors." (Gov. Code, § 70330.)
The Superior Court ordered the County to provide free overflow parking to jurors. When the County failed to comply with the order, the Superior Court filed a complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Superior Court and directed the County to comply with the funding order and reinstate the cost-free juror overflow parking policy the County discontinued in July 2003.
We concluded the County is obligated to pay for juror overflow parking pursuant to the Facilities Act; but we disagreed with the Superior Courts determination of the extent of this obligation. (County of Sacramento I, supra, C053142.) Pursuant to section 70311, subdivision (b), the County has to provide "necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996." (Italics added.) Thus, the Countys obligation is limited to maintaining the parking lot dedicated to juror parking and to providing—free of cost—juror overflow parking that was necessary and suitable based on judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996. Accordingly, we (1) reversed the judgment to the extent it compelled the County to provide free overflow parking for jurors at a level greater than what existed in July 1996, and (2) remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. (County of Sacramento I, supra, C053142.)
While the first appeal was pending, the Superior Court filed a motion to enforce the funding order and to lift the automatic stay pending appeal (Code. Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a) ["the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order"].) The Superior Court claimed it was entitled to the requested relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1110b, which states: "If an appeal be taken from an order or judgment granting a writ of mandate the court granting the writ . . . may direct that the appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution if it is satisfied upon the showing made by the petitioner that he will suffer irreparable damage in his business or profession if the execution is stayed." It also relied on Code of Civil Procedure section 1097, which states that where there is a persistent refusal to obey a peremptory writ of mandate, the court "may make any orders necessary and proper for the complete enforcement of the writ.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1097 provides: "When a peremptory mandate has been issued and directed to any inferior tribunal, corporation, Board, or person, if it appear to the Court that any member of such tribunal, corporation, or Board, or such person upon whom the writ has been personally served, has, without just excuse, refused or neglected to obey the same, the Court may, upon motion, impose a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars. In case of persistence in a refusal of obedience, the Court may order the party to be imprisoned until the writ is obeyed, and may make any orders necessary and proper for the complete enforcement of the writ."
The County opposed the motion, arguing the Superior Court had not established grounds to vacate the automatic stay.
The trial court issued the enforcement order, which is the subject of this second appeal. The court ordered that the appeal not operate as a stay of the funding order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1110b. It determined that the judgment and writ of mandate were prohibitory orders because they directed the County to stop charging jurors for overflow parking, and the County had not complied. Relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 1097, the court directed the County to (1) cease charging jurors for parking in overflow lots and permit jurors to enter and exit overflow parking lots on a cost-free basis once the dedicated juror parking lot is full; (2) reimburse overflow parking costs incurred by jurors who paid for overflow parking since June 28, 2006, which is the date of the funding order; and (3) file a compliance report.
DISCUSSION
The County challenges the enforcement order on procedural and jurisdictional grounds, claiming the trial court abused its discretion or lacked the authority to enforce the funding order while it was being appealed.
According to the County, the enforcement order is "internally inconsistent" because the trial court relied on both sections 1110b and 1097 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the County argues cannot both be applicable. (Further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.) It contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting relief from the automatic stay under section 1110b because that statute "does not apply to writs issued against governmental entities," and the Superior Court did not show it would be subject to irreparable damage if the funding order was stayed during the Countys appeal. The County also contends the trial court lacked authority to issue the enforcement order pursuant to section 1097.
We directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing as to the effect that our decision in County of Sacramento I has on the contentions raised by the County in this appeal. We specifically asked if the decision rendered any portion of this appeal moot, or transformed the Countys contentions regarding the trial courts authority into a request for an advisory opinion. We also asked how the County was damaged by the enforcement order in light of our decision in County of Sacramento I, and what remedy it sought.
Our request for supplemental briefing asked: "(1) What effect does the decision in Superior Court of Sacramento County v. County of Sacramento (case No. C053142, filed on March 5, 2008) have on the appeal in Superior Court of Sacramento County v. County of Sacramento (case No. C054097)? For example: (a) [D]oes the decision in C053142 render all or a portion of the appeal in C054097 moot? (b) Does the decision in C053142 transform the appellants contentions in C054097 into a request for an impermissible advisory opinion regarding the trial courts discretion and authority? [¶] (2) Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court exceeded its authority in entering the Judgment Granting Enforcement Order, which is the subject of the appeal in C054097, has the appellant County suffered any damage from this judgment in light of our decision in case No. C053142? If so, what remedy does appellant seek?"
In its supplemental brief, the County argues its appellate contentions are not moot because, absent clarification by us that the enforcement order is void as a result of County of Sacramento I, "the County cannot with any degree of certainty determine that the Enforcement Order is no longer valid or enforceable." In its view, (1) the entire funding order is invalid because the existing record provides no evidence concerning the level of juror overflow parking in July 1996, and (2) because the funding order is invalid, so is the enforcement order. Therefore, the County asks us to clarify that the enforcement order is void as a result of our decision in County of Sacramento I. It also argues that this appeal is not moot because the enforcement order affirmatively required the County to incur substantial expenditures for parking in excess of the amount required under Government Code section 70311.
The County fails to explain why, given the effect that our decision in County of Sacramento I has on the enforcement order, it is necessary for us to decide whether the enforcement order must be reversed based upon the courts alleged lack of authority to lift the automatic stay.
An action originally based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions raised have become moot by subsequent acts or events. (Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 10.) Here, the validity of the enforcement order —requiring the County to comply with the funding order and to pay for juror overflow parking—is directly affected by our decision concerning the funding orders validity. In County of Sacramento I, we reversed the judgment upholding the funding order to the extent that it required the County to pay for overflow parking in an amount greater than required by Government Code section 70311, i.e., juror overflow parking that was necessary and suitable based on judicial and court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996. However, contrary to the Countys assertion that County of Sacramento I invalidated the funding order in its entirety, we implicitly affirmed the judgment upholding the funding order to the extent it determined that the County has a legal obligation to pay for juror overflow parking. The County claimed it did not have to pay for any such costs, but we explained that it has a statutory obligation to do so. We did not disturb the trial courts conclusion that the County has to pay for overflow parking; we simply remanded the matter for further proceedings on the level of the Countys obligation. (County of Sacramento I, supra, C053142.)
"`[A]n unqualified reversal remands the cause for a new trial (citation), and places the parties in the trial court in the same position as if the cause had never been tried, with the exception that the opinion of the court on appeal must be followed so far as applicable. [Citation.] This principle is equally applicable to a partial reversal of a judgment. [Citation.]" (Hall v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 377, 381.) Indeed, "[t]he law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court `states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal . . . ." (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892-893.)
In other words, the trial court cannot enforce the funding order beyond the extent allowed by our decision in County of Sacramento I. Thus, it matters not whether the trial court exceeded its authority under section 1110b or section 1097 in entering the enforcement order. To the extent the enforcement order requires more than permitted by County of Sacramento I, it is invalid. To the extent it orders the County to pay for overflow parking fees that we have determined are the Countys obligation, the County has not been aggrieved, and any question of whether the court exceeded its authority is moot. (Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 295-297 [the existence of an aggrieved party is a jurisdictional requirement to an appeal]; Santa Clara County Dist. Attorney Investigators Assn. v. County of Santa Clara (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 255, 266 [where a judgment directing issuance of a writ of mandamus has been affirmed, appellants claim that the trial court exceeded its authority in lifting an automatic stay of the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1110b is moot]; Fuller v. San Bernardino Valley Mun. Wat. Dist. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 66, 68 [same].)
The County contends its appellate claims are not moot because similar issues concerning the trial courts authority to lift the automatic stay may arise again after further proceedings required by County of Sacramento I. This is so, the County argues, because if the trial court orders the County to provide parking at a disputed level and the County appeals, the trial court might enter another enforcement order pending appeal. Therefore, according to the County, we should address the Countys claims concerning the trial courts authority in the interest of judicial economy.
It is speculative that the trial court will incorrectly compute the Countys obligation, that the County will appeal, and that the trial court will issue another enforcement order pending appeal. Accordingly, we decline the Countys invitation to address its claims because a court should avoid advisory opinions involving hypothetical facts. (Benitez v. North Coast Womens Care Medical Group, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 978, 991.)
The County argues a matter should not be considered moot if substantial attorney fees can be awarded. It points out that the trial court awarded the Superior Court its reasonable attorney fees incurred in obtaining the enforcement order. But "it is settled that an appeal will not be retained solely to decide the question of liability for costs." (Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 134.) Although the case upon which the County relies questions the wisdom of mechanically denying review where the costs and fees awarded are substantial (Cinnamon Square Shopping Center v. Meadowlark Enterprises (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1837, 1843, fn. 2), the County fails to point to any evidence in the record showing such fees were awarded in the present case. The Countys only reference to the record discloses that reasonable fees and costs were awarded, which is insufficient to preclude application of the general rule.
In County of Sacramento I, the County did not challenge the judgment with respect to the trial courts award of attorney fees to the Superior Court. In the present appeal, the County does not challenge the trial courts authority for the award of attorney fees in the enforcement proceeding.
The County asks us to remedy the wrong created by the invalid enforcement order by requiring the Superior Court to reimburse the County for the funds it paid for juror overflow parking costs in an amount greater than required by our decision in County of Sacramento I. This is an accounting matter that must be addressed by the trial court in the first instance.
DISPOSITION
The enforcement order is reversed to the extent it obligates the County to pay for juror parking costs that exceed the Countys obligation as set forth in County of Sacramento I. In other respects, the appeal is dismissed as moot. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
We concur:
SIMS, J.
MORRISON, J.