Opinion
ID #0107009268
July 10, 2002
Adam D. Gelof, Esquire
Mr. Carl M. Walker, Deputy Attorney General
Ruth J. M. Smythe, Esquire
Dear Mr. Walker and Counsel:
This is my decision on defendant Carl M. Walker's motion for postconviction relief. Walker was charged by Indictment on August 13, 2001 with one count of Delivery of Cocaine. Walker pled guilty to this charge on October 15, 2001. The State filed a motion to have Walker declared an habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a). I granted that motion and sentenced Walker to 10 years at Level V with credit for 90 days previously served.
Walker filed a motion for postconviction relief on April 15, 2001. Walker took no direct appeal to the Supreme Court. This is Walker's first motion for postconviction relief and it was filed in a timely manner. Therefore, there are no procedural bars to Walker's motion for postconviction relief. Walker sets forth two grounds for relief, both of which relate to the habitual offender statute. One, Walker alleges that he did not sign the standard habitual offender paperwork. Two, Walker alleges that he was never given an opportunity for rehabilitation after each of his prior convictions.
The transcript of the plea colloquy was completed on May 21, 2002.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Habitual Offender Paperwork
Walker's allegations in this regard are unclear. It appears to me that Walker is alleging that the habitual offender statute should not be applicable to him for sentencing purposes because he did not, in his view, sign the standard habitual offender paperwork. It further appears that Walker is alleging that because this was not done, he did not understand the consequences, for sentencing purposes, of being declared an habitual offender. Walker's allegations are simply unfounded. There was no standard habitual offender paperwork for Walker to sign. All of the necessary paperwork to have Walker declared an habitual offender was properly filed and discussed in his presence. The State filed a motion on October 15, 2001 to declare Walker an habitual offender. This was discussed during Walker's plea colloquy. Walker's attorney, Ruth M. Smythe, stated, "We have reviewed the motion the State has submitted. It concurs with the charge." When I asked Ms. Smythe if she had any objection to the State's motion, she said, "No, your Honor, we do not." Walker, of course, was present and made no objection. The fact that Walker was being sentenced as an habitual offender was also reflected on the Plea Agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, both of which Walker signed. On each, it was clear that Walker was facing a sentence of 10 years to life. I have no doubt that Walker knew that by pleading guilty he would be sentenced as an habitual offender.
Opportunity For Rehabilitation
Walker alleges that he was never given an opportunity for rehabilitation after each of his prior convictions. In support of this argument, he cites two cases, Hall v. State and Buckingham v. State. The Delaware Supreme Court, in both of these cases, held that the legislature intended to reserve the habitual offender penalties for those individuals who were not rehabilitated after the specified number of encounters with the criminal justice system and a corresponding number of chances to reform.
473 A.2d 352, 356 (Del. 1984).
482 A.2d 327, 330 (Del. 1984).
Walker alleges that each of his convictions occurred while he was using drugs and that he was not given an opportunity to participate in a drug treatment program after each of his prior convictions. Walker has misunderstood the Hall and Buckingham decisions. They only require, in the context of the habitual offender statute, that there be some time for rehabilitation between the sentencing for one offense and the commission of another offense. They do not require that the State actually place the offender in a particular program. Based on Walker's record of convictions, he did have the opportunity for rehabilitation. However, Walker did not take advantage of it.
For the reasons set forth herein, Walker's motion for postconviction relief must be denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.