Opinion
I.D. Nos. 0408002660, 0408009977, 0409003817.
Submitted: June 30, 2005.
Decided: August 16, 2005.
Dennis Kelleher, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Dover, Delaware. Attorney for the State.
George R. Goodlett, Pro se.
Upon Defendant's filing of various Motions, the Court's findings are as follows:
FACTS
On October 4, 2004, George R. Goodlett, Jr. (" Defendant") was charged with a number of counts in three separate cases. Specifically, Defendant was charged with two counts of Burglary Third Degree; one count of Conspiracy Second Degree; one count of Theft under $1,000; three counts of Criminal Mischief under $1,000; one count of Kidnapping First Degree; one count of Assault Second Degree; one count of Robbery First Degree; one count of Terroristic Threatening; and one count of Non-Compliance with Conditions of Bond. On January 12, 2005, Defendant pled guilty to Assault Third Degree, Non-compliance with Bail, Burglary Third Degree and Criminal Mischief. The remaining charges against Defendant were dismissed by the State.
On March 16, 2005, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea. Defendant has also filed a Motion to Disqualify Counsel, a Motion to Appoint Counsel and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Sentencing was set for June 30, 2005 but Defendant elected to proceed with his various motions on that date, deferring sentencing until a later time.
On August 5, 2005, Defendant filed a Motion to Amend his Motion to Withdraw. The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion to Amend. The weight of Defendant's arguments in his Motion to Amend appear to center around Defendant's objections to his potential sentencing as a habitual offender. As discussed later in this opinion, the State has withdrawn its petition for habitual offender status on July 25, 2005. Defendant's arguments as to his possible habitual offender status are, therefore, moot. The Court notes that the rest of the arguments in Defendant's Motion to Amend simply supplement the arguments Defendant made at the hearing on June 30, 2005. The Court has taken these supplemental arguments into consideration, and has incorporated them into the discussion of Defendant's original Motion to Withdraw.
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTIONS
Defendant, in his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, requests that the remedies he sought in a previous Writ of Mandamus and his Motion for Assistance of Counsel be granted.
In his Motion to Withdraw Plea, Defendant raises a number of claims that can be summarized as follows:
(1) At the time he signed the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form (" Guilty Plea Form"), he was informed only of the possible sentence directly given by the Superior Court, not possible punishment by another court (here, the Family Court).
(2) There was a procedural defect in his Plea Agreement, because, at the Plea Colloquy, Defendant's Public Defender and the State agreed to an additional condition to be added at the time of sentencing.
(3) Defendant is actually innocent of the charges against him.
(4) Defendant alleges that the Public Defender assigned to his case inadequately defended him.
(5) Defendant also argued, at the oral arguments on June 30th, that he was not informed that he would be eligible for Habitual Offender status if he pleaded guilty to these charges. He alleges that the maximum sentence recommended was five years and thirty days.
Based on these arguments, Defendant requests: "(1) withdraw of the plea agreement; (2) the Courts [ sic] order the prosecution and Public Defender's office to release `All' Rule 16 discovery information to the defendant; (3) upon ordering a [ sic] evidentiary hearing so Defendant can present his legal claim to innocence; (4) . . . dismissal of charges against him and [/] or bail review.
Defendant has also filed two related motions. One asks the Court to Disqualify Defendant's current counsel. The other asks the Court to appoint counsel. Defendant makes a number of claims alleging that his counsel did not adequately pursue his claims that he was innocent, and that his counsel did not file the proper motions prior to trial. Defendant complains, specifically, that his counsel did not file a suppression motion. Defendant insists that any further representation by the Public Defender's Office would raise a conflict because: 1) if the Public Defender represented him, he would not be able to represent himself; 2) the Public Defender's Office received copies of the motions Defendant has filed; 3) Defendant's current counsel from the Public Defender's Office rejected the evidence he presented that allegedly proves his innocence; and 4) his counsel did not inform him or have the courts inform him of the maximum direct consequence considered when taking the plea.
DISCUSSION
I. Preliminary Injunction
The Delaware Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Defendant's request for a preliminary injunction. Rather, the Court of Chancery, as designated by 10 Del. C. §§ 341, 343, is the proper authority to hear and grant preliminary injunctions. Further, Defendant's Motion for a Writ of Mandamus has been decided in the interim, making that portion of Defendant's motion moot. In addition, this opinion will deal with the defendant's Motion to Appoint Counsel. Defendant's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is, therefore, DISMISSED.
II. Motion to Disqualify Public Defender as Counsel
The basis for Defendant's motion to disqualify the Public Defender's Office is that continued representation by the Public Defender prevents the Defendant, somehow, from presenting evidence of innocence and conducting a motion to suppress evidence of the State. These arguments would have consequence only in the course of a defense on the merits of the case. Any consideration of such items, therefore, is contingent upon Defendant's going to trial. Since Defendant, at the time of his Plea, expressly and repeatedly stated his election not to go to trial, choosing instead (quite understandably) to plead guilty to reduced charges, this Motion has no bearing on any proceeding, unless Defendant is permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, entered on January 12, 2005.
III. Appointment of Counsel
Because Defendant already has a public defender appointed for him, this motion appears, at first blush, to be superfluous. However, viewing this as an intent on Defendant's part to request different counsel, the Court will examine Defendant's motion in the light and context of Moore v. State. In Moore, the Delaware Supreme Court dealt with the appellant's complaint that he had not been afforded counsel of his choice at the trial. The appellant had declined the services of the Public Defender, electing to represent himself. The Supreme Court held that:
268 A.2d 875 (Del. 1970).
The Public Defender's Office has been created by the General Assembly to preserve to indigent defendants their constitutional rights to assistance of counsel in criminal cases. An indigent defendant may not decline the services of the Public Defender, and expect the appointment by the Court of other counsel, unless the Public Defender represents some other conflicting interest in the case.
Id. at 876.
Defendant has not presented any evidence to suggest any conflicting interest in Ms. Amalfitano's (Defendant's counsel through the Public Defender's office) representation of Defendant. His motion for different counsel is, therefore, DENIED.
IV. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
A. Standard of Review
The decision whether or not to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) permits this Court to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing "upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason." Unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the defendant is "bound by the representations he made during his guilty Plea Colloquy." The defendant bears the burden of establishing that he either entered the Plea Agreement involuntarily or entered the agreement because he misapprehended or misunderstood his legal rights. In determining whether the defendant has provided a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea, this Court should make the following inquiries:
Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 504 (Del. 1969).
Harley v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 116, at *3 (citing Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997)).
State v. Insley, 141 A.2d 619, 622 (Del. 1958).
i. was there a procedural defect in taking the plea;
ii. did the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consent to the Plea Agreement;
iii. does the defendant have a basis to assert legal innocence;
iv. did the defendant have adequate legal counsel throughout the proceedings; and
v. does granting the motion prejudice the State or unduly inconvenience the Court?
See State v. Adkins, 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 195, at *2 (citing State v. Friend, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 229, at *4).
B. Defendant's Specific Complaints
The Court has reviewed the Plea Colloquy involving the Defendant and Judge Stokes on January 12, 2005. The colloquy is complete and careful, covering the nature and consequences of the plea, providing for all Rule 11 requirements. Defendant was informed of, and he specifically noted his understanding of, the nature of each of the various charges to which he was pleading, together with the maximum penalty, as well as the Court's ability to exceed any "recommended" penalties. Defendant noted orally, and in writing, his knowledge and understanding of his various trial rights, with the assistance of counsel, who stood beside him. Defendant further acknowledged his awareness of the plea's effect, which precluded any further trial. Also pursuant to Rule 11, Defendant made clear to Judge Stokes that his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, which Defendant emphasized on his signed Guilty Plea Form.
The Court now turns to Defendant's specific arguments as to why he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
(1) Defendant asserts that he was not advised of certain "punishment," which the execution of the plea would evoke. Specifically, Defendant complains that he was not informed that pleading guilty in Superior Court could lead the Family Court to deny him custody of his child.
This is a contention not addressed to the statutory consequences of Defendant's plea, which, of course, would be the potential criminal ramifications. As noted, all of that was specifically covered in the Plea Agreement, the Guilty Plea Form and the Plea Colloquy. In spite of that, Defendant contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly given; not because of any potential incarceration for the criminal convictions, but because a different Court all together — the Family Court — might acknowledge these new convictions (quite separate and apart from Defendant's many prior convictions), and make conclusions about Defendant's suitability for child custody. Indeed, presumably, the Family Court, in any custody situation, would take notice of any conviction of each party, and would utilize that information as that court sees fit. That has nothing to do with this Court.
(2) Defendant argues that there was a procedural defect in his Plea Agreement, because, at the Plea Colloquy, Defendant's Public Defender stated to the court that there was an additional agreement made which was not on the Plea Agreement form. The transcript of the plea hearing, shows that this "agreement" involved a no-contact order between Defendant and the victim of the crime, with whom Defendant has a daughter. Defendant's counsel, at the Plea Colloquy, requested that the condition be modified to provide for "no contact except for valid Family Court order." The Court, at the Plea Colloquy, deferred this decision to the time of sentencing, remarking that, "let's be sure when the sentencing comes that's a joint request at that time as well." The Prosecutor agreed to this condition.
Transcript of Plea Colloquy, at 5.
Id.
As the Court noted at the Plea Colloquy, this request for a condition by Defendant's counsel was a matter merely to be considered at the time of sentencing. It does not constitute a procedural defect in the Plea Agreement as signed and agreed to by Defendant on the date of the Plea Colloquy.
(3) Defendant also alleges that he is innocent of the charges against him. At oral arguments for this motion, Defendant indicated that he had independently retained a private investigator who, Defendant claims, had discovered evidence to prove Defendant's innocence.
Defendant did not offer specifics of this evidence, however, and such evidence is not in the record before the Court.
After admitting to an offense at the time of the plea, the defendant may not now assert innocence in the absence of some other support. "Conclusory allegations of innocence are not sufficient to require withdrawal of a guilty plea, especially when the defendant has admitted his guilt in the plea colloquy." Accordingly, as Defendant has not offered any evidence of his innocence, the Court rejects this ground as a reason to withdraw Defendant's knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
State v. McNeill, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 132, at *9-10 (citing Russell v. State 1999 Del. LEXIS 179, at *7).
Russell, 1999 Del. LEXIS 179, at *7 (citing United States v. Morrison, 967 F.2d 264, 268 (8th Cir. 1992)).
(4) Defendant further maintains that the performance by the Public Defender assigned to his case was inadequate. Defendant asserts, specifically, that the Public Defender's Office did not sufficiently research the Defendant's claims that he was innocent. Defendant also maintains that he provided evidence to the Public Defender's office which would have proved his innocence.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. "In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must show that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on proceeding to trial." Further, in making a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must rebut a "strong presumption" that his counsel's assistance was within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Del. 2003) (citing Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997)).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Defendant argues that he was not given all available discovery information by the Public Defender's Office. He further asserts that his counsel did not thoroughly review all the evidence available to demonstrate Defendant's innocence. Defendant has not, however, offered any evidence to substantiate these claims, much less enough evidence to rebut the "strong presumption" that counsel's assistance was effective. Nor has Defendant presented any evidence that any alleged error on the part of counsel altered the outcome of his case. Additionally, again, the record reflects that Defendant admitted to committing these specific crimes at the plea hearing.
Accordingly, the Court, considering this matter for the adequacy of counsel, as described in State v. Friend, finds that counsel's representation of Defendant was entirely appropriate and adequate throughout these plea proceedings. There is nothing in the record, nor has Defendant presented any evidence, that his counsel committed any error that affected the outcome of his case. Further, Defendant's voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any claims of alleged errors or defects preceding the entry of the plea.
State v. Friend, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 229, *7-8.
Miller, 840 A.2d at 1232.
(5) Defendant further contends that he did not make his plea voluntarily, because he did not specifically agree to Habitual Offender status during the Plea Colloquy. Defendant argues that the maximum sentence the judge said Defendant could be given for these crimes was five years and 30 days.
On July 25, 2005, the Attorney General notified the Court that the State was withdrawing its petition to declare Defendant an Habitual Offender. This withdrawal by the State makes Defendant's complaints that he was not fully informed of the possible enhanced status sentence he could receive moot.
Therefore, upon review of the record, and the information and argument presented, the Court finds that no procedural defect existed in taking the plea; that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the Plea Agreement; that Defendant's present assertion of legal innocence is unpersuasive, even to the level of raising a viable issue, and the Court is unaware of any such basis; that Defendant did have legal counsel who properly investigated for, represented and advised Defendant (keeping in mind that Defendant was charged with two counts of Burglary in the Third Degree, Conspiracy Second, Theft, and three counts of misdemeanor Criminal Mischief), meanwhile, recognizing a very strong probable cause affidavit regarding Defendant.
The last criterion is the presence or absence of prejudice to the State. The State, having accepted the plea, and not having maintained contact with witnesses, would be prejudiced by having to "fire up" the case again. Given the inability of Defendant to demonstrate the presence of the foregoing factors, the degree of inconvenience to the State regarding the withdrawal of a plea is low. That degree is satisfied in this case.
Consequently, Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is DISMISSED. Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea and Motion to Amend his Motion to Withdraw are DENIED. Hence, Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Counsel is also DENIED, as is his Motion to Appoint Counsel.
SO ORDERED.