Opinion
ID. No. 0604016016.
Submitted: March 15, 2007.
Decided: May 17, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Motion To Suppress.
GRANTED In Part.
DENIED In Part.
Kenneth M. Haltom, Esq., and Jason C. Cohee, Esq., Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware. Attorneys for State.
John P. Deckers, Esq., Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the defendant's motion to suppress statements made by him to investigating police officers, the State's opposition, and the record of the case, it appears that:
1. The defendant is charged with Murder in the First Degree, two counts of Attempted Murder in the First Degree, multiple counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Assault in the Second Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, two counts of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. He has filed a motion to suppress statements made during a police interrogation which occurred shortly following his arrest.
2. While investigating a shooting that resulted in the death of the victim in this case, City of Dover Police Officers were given the defendant's name as a suspect by witnesses. They arrested the defendant and transported him to the Dover police station. He was placed in an interview room. Shortly after the defendant was placed in the interview room, and before he was asked any questions, the defendant's parents arrived at the police station and were led to the interview room to be present during any questioning. The defendant was given his Miranda rights. The officer giving the defendant his Miranda rights then asked the defendant if he understood his rights. The defendant's mother, who was seated slightly behind and to the defendant's right, answered "yes." The defendant simultaneously nodded in the affirmative. The officer then asked the defendant if he wished to talk to him and answer questions, to which the defendant responded "yes." The questioning then began and as it went on, sometimes the two officers present asked the defendant questions and sometimes his parents asked him questions. Initially the officers described what they were investigating as a "serious matter" or "a shooting." Approximately halfway through the interview, or after about forty minutes, the officers informed the defendant and his parents that they were charging the defendant with murder. At that point, the defendant's parents began yelling in agitation. The defendant's father physically threatened the defendant and later in the interview his mother did the same. At various times during the remainder of the interview, the parents yelled at him and the mother stood over him loudly demanding that he tell the police something. At one point the mother gestured her hands at him in a choking motion. The mother also pounded her fist on the table at which the defendant was sitting. During this period, the police, as well as the parents, continued to ask the defendant questions. Sometimes when he gave an answer, the parents would say it wasn't true and demand that he give another answer. This is but a brief description of what occurred after the defendant and his parent's were informed that he was being charged with murder. The defendant was seventeen years of age at the time of his arrest.
Audio and video of the interrogation, including the giving of the Miranda warnings, was recorded on a DVD. I have carefully watched the DVD and I find as fact that the defendant did nod affirmatively.
3. "As a general rule, the burden of proof is on the defendant who seeks to suppress evidence. However, once the defendant has established a basis for his motion,. . .the burden shifts to the government." The Government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the actions of its agents are consonant with constitutional protections.
United States v. Davis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3591, citing United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at *11.
4. The defendant first contends that the Miranda warnings and waiver were inadequate. "The State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent and voluntary." "The Court's determination of whether the waiver is valid depends `upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forego his rights to remain silent and to have assistance of counsel.'" Among the factors to be considered in this analysis are the "juvenile's age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given to him."
State v. Siple, 1996 Del. Super. LEXIS 335 citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986); DeJesus v. State, Del. Supr., 655 A.2d 1180, 1192 (1995).
Id. at *43 citing DeJesus, 655 A.2d at 1192 quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
Fare, 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
5. In this case the officer clearly read the defendant his Miranda warnings. When the officer finished he asked the defendant if he understood those rights. The defendant nodded his head indicating an affirmative answer. After carefully reviewing the DVD of the interview, I am persuaded that the defendant's affirmative nod was his own spontaneous response and was not influenced by or the product of his mother's verbal "yes." Then the Detective asked the defendant, "Having these rights in mind, would you like to talk to me and answer some questions?" To this question the defendant answered with a clear "yes." The defendant then proceeded to answer the officers' questions. In addition, the defendant has been arrested on a prior occasion, read his rights and declined to speak, indicating an understanding of his rights. Looking at the totality of the circumstances it is clear that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.
6. The defendant next contends that the interrogation violated the ruling in Rhode Island v. Innis. In that case, the court held that ". . . Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." There the defendant was read his Miranda warnings and then requested to speak to an attorney. During his ride with the police back to the station, the police began to talk about the gun and that it may be found by a child because there was a school nearby. The comments made by the police prompted the defendant to tell them where the gun was hidden. The court held that "(a) practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation."
446 U.S. 291 (1980).
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
7. That case is not analogous to this case. In this case the officer does talk to the defendant before giving him the Miranda warnings. During these initial comments, the officer explains to the defendant that he has obtained statements from various witnesses and that this is the time for the defendant to give his version of what occurred. He informs the defendant that it is important for the defendant to tell his side of the story. At that point, however, the defendant did not make any statements, except to tell the officer his name and address. The defendant was then given his Miranda warnings and only then, after he waived his right to remain silent and expressed his willingness to answer questions, did he begin answering questions about the incident. Under these circumstances, I find that the interview did not violate the ruling in Innis.
8. Finally, the defendant argues that his statement to the police was not voluntary. "The question of voluntariness of a defendant's statement is determined by a totality of the circumstances analysis." "Also like the inquiry surrounding Miranda waivers, the State must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence."
Siple, 1996 Del. Super. LEXIS 355 at *51 citing DeJesus, 655 A.2d at 1196.
Id. citing DeJesus, 655 A.2d at 1196.
9. The defendant was 17 years old at the time of his arrest and interrogation. He has a tenth grade education, although, he has ADHD which causes him learn more slowly than normal. The defendant argues that because he had taken drugs on the day of the interrogation, his statements could not have been voluntary. "The mere fact that one has taken drugs does not render consent involuntary." In United States v. Hollis, the court stated, "there is no per se rule mandating that statements made under the influence of narcotics are involuntary." The use of drugs is just one factor the court must consider while looking at the totality of the circumstances to decide if a statement is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice." "The question is one of mental awareness so that the act of consent was the consensual act of one who knew what he or she was doing and had a reasonable appreciation of the nature and significance of his or her actions." The defendant testified that he smoked marijuana laced with PCP on the day he was questioned. However, after watching the interrogation video there is insufficient evidence that would suggest that his statements were not consensual or that the defendant did not appreciate the nature and significance of his actions. The defendant appeared to understand the officers' questions and he was able to respond to them. I conclude that the defendant's statements from the beginning of the interview until the point where he and his parents are informed that he is being charged with murder are clearly voluntary.
United States v. Prince, 157 F. Supp. 2d 316 (D. Del. 2001).
387 F. Supp. 213, 220 (D. Del. 1975).
Prince, 387 F. Supp. at 326.
Id.
10. However, I conclude that the State has failed to meet its burden of proving that the defendant's statements were voluntary from the point where he and his parents were informed that he was being arrested for murder through the end of the interview. I cannot conclude that the parent's coercive conduct during that section of the interview did not overbear the defendant's will. The State contends that under the totality of the circumstances, this portion of the statement was voluntary. It also argues that the parents' conduct is not state action. However, based upon my review of the DVD, I cannot conclude that the defendant's statements during this portion of the interview were voluntary. I also conclude that since the parents' conduct occurred in the context of a police interview that it cannot be separated from the police interrogation. The police made no effort to control the parents and continued themselves to ask questions in between the parents questions. I therefore reject the State's contentions.
11. Therefore, the portion of the statement from the beginning until up to the point where the defendant and his parents are informed that he is being arrested for murder not suppressed. However, the portion of the statement from that point to the end is suppressed.
12. Therefore, the defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part .
IT IS SO ORDERED.