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Seven Canyons Recap LLC v. Villa Renaissance LLC

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE
Apr 16, 2019
No. 1 CA-CV 18-0382 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2019)

Opinion

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0382

04-16-2019

SEVEN CANYONS RECAP LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. VILLA RENAISSANCE LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

COUNSEL Tiffany & Bosco PA, Phoenix By Kevin P. Nelson, Christopher R. Kaup, Michael A. Wrapp Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant/Counter-Defendant Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix By Robert A. Shull, Michael R. Scheurich Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Counter-Claimant Villa Renaissance LLC Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix By Donald L. Gaffney, Benjamin W. Reeves, Emily Gildar Wagner Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Counter-Claimant The Villas at Seven Canyons Owners Quarles & Brady LLP, Phoenix By William Scott Jenkins, Jr., Hannah R. Torres Counsel for Defendant/Appellee John Mitchell


NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2016-015827
The Honorable Roger E. Brodman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL Tiffany & Bosco PA, Phoenix
By Kevin P. Nelson, Christopher R. Kaup, Michael A. Wrapp
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant/Counter-Defendant Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix
By Robert A. Shull, Michael R. Scheurich
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Counter-Claimant Villa Renaissance LLC Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix
By Donald L. Gaffney, Benjamin W. Reeves, Emily Gildar Wagner
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Counter-Claimant The Villas at Seven Canyons
Owners Quarles & Brady LLP, Phoenix
By William Scott Jenkins, Jr., Hannah R. Torres
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee John Mitchell

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined. HOWE, Judge:

¶1 Seven Canyons Recap, LLC ("Recap") appeals the superior court's order requiring a receiver (the "Receiver") to pay accrued and accruing homeowners' association assessments before making payments on Recap's loan. Recap also appeals the superior court's denial of its attorneys' fees and costs. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The Villas at Seven Canyons ("Seven Canyons") is a luxury residential and timeshare-style golf community, and The Villas at Seven Canyons Owners' Association, Inc. (the "VOA") manages the community. Parcel A within Seven Canyons consists of 25 condominium villas. Each villa is divided into ten fractional units. The Declaration of Condominium and Fractional Ownership Plan of The Villas at Seven Canyons (the "CC&Rs") governs the VOA's rights, duties, and responsibilities in managing Seven Canyons. The CC&Rs state that "owners" of wholly-owned and fractionally-owned units must pay assessments to the VOA. The term "owner" excludes "anyone holding an interest in a Unit or Fractional Interest merely as security for the performance of an obligation." From the assessments, the VOA pays for common expenses and insurance for the villa units.

¶3 In May 2010, Recap entered into a loan purchase contract with Reliance Bank and Reliance Loan Center. Through the contract, Recap purchased a loan from Resort Finance, LLC to Sedona Development Partners, LLC ("SDP") originally made for the construction of a portion of Seven Canyons. As a result, Recap acquired a lien on 70 of the fractional interests of Parcel A secured by a deed of trust ("DOT"). About two weeks later, SDP filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, Recap's loan was secured by a first-position lien on the villas under the DOT.

¶4 In February 2013, SDP filed its bankruptcy plan (the "Plan"), which created a reorganized debtor known as Villa Renaissance, LLC ("VR"). The Plan called for VR to sell the fractional interests. As each interest was sold, proceeds from the sale of the villas were to be distributed as follows:

1. First, to pay commission, closing costs and accrued association dues on the unit being sold.

2. Twenty five percent (25%) of the remaining proceeds shall be paid to Reorganized Debtor.

3. Seventy [f]ive percent (75%) of the remaining proceeds shall be paid to Recap. . . .

4. The balance of the proceeds thereafter shall be distributed to the Reorganized Debtor.
(Emphasis added.) The Plan did not specifically designate which entity must distribute the sales proceeds nor did it limit that responsibility to VR. In April 2013, the bankruptcy court confirmed the Plan. Recap signed the confirmation order, agreeing to the Plan's distribution of sales proceeds. Through the Plan, VR acquired 70 fractional interests in Parcel A subject to Recap's lien.

¶5 After acquiring the 70 fractional interests, VR disputed the amount of assessments it owed the VOA. As a result, VR did not pay the VOA any assessments after January 2014. Then in December 2014, VR defaulted on its debt to Recap. Recap formally informed VR of its default in May 2015, but did not foreclose on the property because, among other reasons, it did not want to pay the VOA the assessments. Although Recap did not pay any VOA assessments, it benefited from the VOA's insurance on the property. For instance, a fire in August 2016 destroyed some of Recap's collateral, but it was rebuilt under the VOA's insurance policy. The burned collateral was appraised at about $1.5 million.

¶6 In June 2016, the VOA and VR agreed to arbitrate the assessment dispute, to which Recap was not a party. Under the arbitration agreement, VR put into escrow an executed quitclaim deed of its wholly-owned villas and an assignment of declarant rights, which included the right to receive 25% of sales proceeds under the Plan. If the arbitrator entered an award in the VOA's favor and VR did not timely pay the award, the title company would record the quitclaim deed of the villas in the VOA's or its designee's favor. The arbitration agreement did not, however, explicitly provide that the transfer of the villas and declarant rights would satisfy the arbitration award based on past-due assessments.

¶7 On October 10, 2016, Recap filed a complaint asking the superior court to appoint a receiver over its collateral. The next day, the arbitrator awarded the VOA $624,635 for unpaid, post-bankruptcy assessments, plus interest at the rate of 15% per annum and a one-time late fee of 10%. On October 12, the superior court appointed the Receiver and tasked him with, among other things, collecting and reviewing VR's financial records, maintaining and preserving the receivership estate, and marketing and selling the villas. The receivership order also prohibited anyone from "interfer[ing] in any manner with the Receiver and his operations of the Receivership Property[.]" When the VOA learned that VR was not going to pay the arbitration award, it offered to quitclaim the villas to Recap. Recap refused to take title to the villas, and the title company recorded the quitclaim deed of the villas and assignment of declarant rights in the VOA's favor on October 18. When VR quitclaimed the wholly-owned villas to the VOA, it did not believe that the villas had any equity in excess of Recap's first-position lien under the DOT. The title transfer did not affect Recap's secured interest on the collateral as limited by the Plan and the Receiver's appointment. The VOA deeded the villas to its wholly-owned subsidiary, VOA Property Holding, LLC.

¶8 In January 2017, Recap amended its complaint asking for the appointment of a receiver and named the VOA as a defendant. The VOA answered the complaint and asserted its own counterclaims, requesting (1) a declaratory judgment that the VOA was entitled to 25% of the sales proceeds under the Plan due to the transfer of title and declarant rights from VR to the VOA, (2) equitable recovery for the amount that Recap had been unjustly enriched by the VOA's preservation of Recap's collateral (i.e. past-due assessments that accrued before and after the Receiver's appointment), and (3) a determination of the Receiver's liability for assessments incurred during the receivership.

¶9 In May 2017, Recap moved for summary judgment on the VOA's counterclaims and the VOA cross-moved for summary judgment. The court determined that the Receiver owed the VOA assessments that accrued during the receivership, but also found that the VOA had no claim for unjust enrichment. The court declined to grant summary judgment on whether the VOA was entitled to 25% of the sales proceeds. Although Recap asked the court to enter an Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) judgment, the court refused to do so.

¶10 Before trial, the VOA noted that its counterclaims included two related issues: (1) its right to an additional $5,000 per sale of the villas and (2) its entitlement to the first $350,000 received on the third tranche of Recap's loan. In a joint pretrial statement, the VOA urged the court to find unjust enrichment—based on Recap's benefiting from the VOA's maintenance and preservation of the collateral at the expense of other villa owners—if it declined to grant the VOA 25% of the sales proceeds.

¶11 In January 2018, the superior court held a trial for the remaining issues. The VOA argued that the transfer of title of the villas and the right to 25% of sales proceeds was in lieu of the past-due $624,635, even though the arbitration agreement did not explicitly so state. A VOA Board member testified that the VOA requested VR to include title to the villas and the right to sales proceeds and that the VOA would not agree to arbitrate without including the right to sales proceeds. The VOA argued in closing that it was entitled to 25% of sales proceeds according to the arbitration agreement and that its claim to the arbitration award would be satisfied only if the court found that the right to sales proceeds had been transferred to the VOA. The court noted that although the VOA had not argued that the Receiver was required to pay accrued assessments under the Plan, the joint pretrial statement provided that accrued association fees needed to be paid before payments could be made on Recap's loan. The court asked the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that included whether the Receiver should be required to pay the VOA accrued assessments under the Plan.

¶12 The VOA's proposed findings and conclusions of law provided that the VOA was entitled to 25% of sales proceeds, or the Plan required the sales proceeds first to satisfy accrued association dues, including pre-receivership dues. It also provided that Recap had subordinated its lien to the payment of accrued association assessments to the VOA under the Plan. The VOA further noted that its claim to 25% of the sales proceeds was intended to recover its pre-receivership dues. Recap objected, countering that the Plan required only VR to pay accrued assessments to the VOA from the sales proceeds, not Recap. Recap also argued that the Plan "merely contemplated the payment of the current quarterly assessments related to each [v]illa sold prior to the distribution of the 25%." Recap further argued that the Plan "did not bind [Recap] to take on unforeseen obligations related to VR's failure to pay its assessment obligations to the VOA for the three years after the Effective Date of the Plan."

¶13 After hearing the evidence, the court found that (1) the VOA had no claim against Recap or the Receiver for a $5000 payment for each villa sold, (2) the first $350,000 received from the sale of the villas based on the third tranche of Recap's loan shall be paid to the VOA, and (3) the VOA was not entitled to 25% of the sales proceeds. It also reaffirmed its conclusion from summary judgment that the receivership owed the VOA assessments from the time the Receiver was appointed. Further, the court determined that the VOA was entitled to $624,635 from the receivership estate, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of the arbitration award, which had remained unpaid. It based its decision first on the Plan's language regarding the distribution of sales proceeds. The court noted that the payment of accrued assessments before making payments on Recap's loan was "baked into the Bankruptcy Plan." Although the court believed that the $624,635 payment was appropriate under the Plan, it also found the payment justified because Recap had been "unjustly enriched to [the] VOA's impoverishment by [benefitting] from the maintenance and preservation of its collateral at the expense of the other villa owners." The court noted that the assessments paid for insurance on the villas, which then benefitted Recap after some of its collateral had been destroyed by a fire.

¶14 The VOA and Recap filed a joint report asking the court to clarify the practical effects of its rulings. The court clarified that (1) the $624,635 was due immediately, provided that the Receiver had sufficient reserves; (2) it did not find that Recap had foreclosed on its collateral; (3) Recap had the right to foreclose; and (4) it rejected only the VOA's claim to 25% of the sales proceeds and did not address the validity of the assignment of the villas to the VOA. Specifically, the court stated that "Recap never challenged the assignment in the arguments made during trial. If it tries to now, Recap has waived the argument."

¶15 Thereafter, the court declined "to award either party its attorneys' fees because both parties were successful in part and unsuccessful in part." It noted that the VOA would recover more than $1 million, but the amount was far less than the amount it claimed. Next, the court determined that the VOA was the successful party and entitled to $14,745.67 in costs. The court entered its final judgment on the counterclaims, which incorporated its summary-judgment ruling, trial ruling, and the attorneys' fees and costs ruling. Recap timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

1. The Plan Requires Payment of Accrued Assessments

¶16 Recap argues that the superior court erred by finding that the Receiver was required to pay the VOA for accrued and accruing assessments. This Court reviews legal conclusions de novo but defers to the superior court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Rash v. Town of Mammoth, 233 Ariz. 577, 583 ¶ 17 (App. 2013).

¶17 "A Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan is essentially a contract between the debtor and his creditors[] and must be interpreted according to the rules governing the interpretation of contracts." Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers' Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that a reorganization plan resembles a consent decree and should be construed as a contract). When parties bind themselves by a valid contract with clear and unambiguous terms, "a court must give effect to the contract as written." Grubb & Ellis Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 86 ¶ 12 (App. 2006).

¶18 Here, the Plan unambiguously stated that accrued association dues must be paid before payments could be made on Recap's loan. Recap agreed to the Plan's distribution of sales proceeds because it signed the confirmation order, thereby creating a contract concerning the distribution of sales proceeds. Thus, the superior court correctly found that the payment of accrued assessments was "baked into" the Plan. Accordingly, the court did not err by ordering the Receiver to pay the VOA accruing association fees as well as $624,635, plus interest, for pre-receivership dues.

Because this Court affirms the superior court's finding that the Plan requires the Receiver to pay accruing association assessments as well as $624,635, plus interest, to the VOA before payments can be made on Recap's loan, we need not address the court's additional reasoning under an unjust enrichment theory nor Recap's arguments related to the court's findings under the unjust enrichment theory. Additionally, because the court correctly applied the order of payments based on the Plan, we reject Recap's contention that the court used its equitable powers to "circumvent" the law.

¶19 Recap argues that the court's ruling effectively "rewrote the Plan" by making Recap rather than VR responsible for the accrued and accruing assessments. We disagree. The court did not order Recap to pay the assessments; it ordered the Receiver to pay the assessments. The court did not rule Recap personally liable for the assessments or require it to pay them from its funds.

¶20 Next, Recap argues that the parties and the bankruptcy court could not have contemplated the payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars in assessments that accrued after the effective date of the Plan because VR's performance was assumed under the Plan. We reject this argument because Recap does not cite language in the Plan or legal authority to support its argument that future accruing assessments were not accounted for in the Plan or bankruptcy plans in general. Furthermore, the accrual of hundreds of thousands of dollars occurred over a substantial period, and Recap had available the remedy of requesting the Plan be modified if it genuinely believed that the Plan was leading to "absurd results" as it argues. But it did not do so.

¶21 Recap also contends that the court's rulings modified the Plan; therefore, the court or the VOA needed to formally modify the Plan under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or the Plan itself. The Plan's plain language, however, is aligned with the superior court's interpretation. As such, the court did not alter the Plan and did not need to modify the Plan formally. Thus, this argument is not persuasive.

¶22 Further, Recap argues that the VOA was not entitled to recover from Recap as a third-party beneficiary of the Plan because VR failed to make its assessment payments. The VOA did not argue below that it was a third-party beneficiary and does not contend so now. The VOA is listed as a direct creditor under the confirmation order. Additionally, the VOA is not recovering anything from Recap. The court ordered the Receiver to pay assessments first, as the Plan required, then to make payments from the remaining sales proceeds to Recap. Therefore, this argument fails.

¶23 Recap also contends that the Plan called for only VR to pay assessments to the VOA from the sales proceeds. The Plan's plain language does not specify who must pay the assessments, however. The Plan simply states, "Proceeds from the sale of the [villas] shall be distributed as follows . . . First, to pay . . . accrued association dues on the unit being sold." Additionally, "[w]hen appointed, the receiver stands in the shoes of the entity it represents[,]" Gravel Res. of Ariz. v. Hills, 217 Ariz. 33, 38 ¶ 16 (App. 2007), or more plainly, the "receiver . . . stands in the shoes of the owner[,]" O'Flaherty v. Belgum, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1044, 1093 (2004). Here, the court explicitly appointed the Receiver to, among other things, control VR's financial records, maintain and preserve the receivership estate, and market and sell the villas. As such, the Receiver stepped into VR's shoes—specifically the role of marketing and selling the villas—and he was required to distribute the sales proceeds under the Plan. See Gravel Res. of Ariz., 217 Ariz. at 38 ¶ 16 ("[T]he receiver stands in the shoes of the entity it represents.").

¶24 Recap attempts to distinguish Gravel from this case because the receiver in Gravel was referred to as a "general receiver" but the receiver in this case was referred to as a "special receiver." Gravel does not discuss the difference between a general or special receiver, however, and it does not state that a general receiver steps into the shoes of an entity but a special receiver does not. In fact, Gravel does not even mention a special receiver. Recap cites no other legal authority supporting its assertion that a special receiver is different from a general receiver, and the Receiver's duties in this case are the same however he is denominated. Thus, this argument is not persuasive.

¶25 Next, Recap argues that the Receiver did not need to pay assessments because he did not "control" the receivership property. Recap did not make this argument until its motion for a new trial in July 2018, and the court found the argument untimely and declined to consider it. As such, Recap waived this argument. See Flanders v. Maricopa Cty., 203 Ariz. 368, 378 ¶ 65 (App. 2002).

Although titled as a "Motion Requesting Entry of Order Staying Judgment to Resolve Stalemate and Clarify Record," the superior court determined that the motion was actually an untimely motion for new trial filed over two months tardy.

¶26 Recap counters that this Court should nevertheless consider its argument because it "inadvertently forfeited" rather than "intentionally waived" its "control" argument. It relies on Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., which holds that a court may address a forfeited issue "when the public interest requires that the issues be heard or when a manifest injustice would result from the failure to consider the new issues." 877 F.3d 136, 146-47 (3rd Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Anthony Dell'Aquilla, Enters. & Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 335 (3rd Cir. 1998)).

¶27 Recap claims that it did not know that the Receiver's paying of accrued assessments was an issue before the superior court until the court ruled and that its lack of notice constitutes exceptional circumstances. But the record shows otherwise. From the outset, the VOA argued that it wanted the Receiver to pay for assessments during the receivership. The VOA also argued that it should receive equitable restitution for the unpaid assessments before the Receiver's appointment. While the VOA did not initially argue that it should receive payments under the Plan, the court raised that issue to both parties during trial after receiving evidence regarding the Plan. The court then explicitly instructed both parties to discuss in post-trial filings whether the Plan required the Receiver to pay accrued assessments to the VOA. Both parties complied and also responded to the opposing parties' filings. Thus, Recap had notice and opportunity to raise this issue before the court in its filings, or at the very least in a timely motion for reconsideration. Recap did neither. Therefore, exceptional circumstances are not present and we will not consider this issue.

2. Transfer of Title Does Not Satisfy the Arbitration Award

¶28 Recap argues that the arbitration agreement between the VOA and VR was an accord and that the transfer of the wholly-owned villas and declarant rights to the VOA satisfied the $624,635 arbitration award for pre-receivership dues. This Court defers to the superior court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but it reviews legal conclusions de novo. Rash, 233 Ariz. at 583 ¶ 17. "An 'accord and satisfaction discharges a contractual obligation or cause of action when the parties agree to exchange something of value in resolution of a claim or demand and then perform on that agreement, the accord being the agreement, and the satisfaction its execution or performance.'" Abbott v. Banner Health Network, 239 Ariz. 409, 413 ¶ 11 (2016) (quoting Best Choice Fund, LLC v. Low & Childers, P.C., 228 Ariz. 502, 510 ¶ 24 (App. 2011)). "The four elements of an accord and satisfaction are (1) proper subject matter, (2) competent parties, (3) assent or meeting of the minds of the parties, and (4) consideration." Id.

The VOA argues that Recap waived its accord and satisfaction argument by failing to "properly" raise it in the superior court. The issue was not waived, however, because Recap presented the argument during trial, albeit briefly.

¶29 The record shows that after arbitration, the VOA and VR attempted to execute an accord. Although the arbitration agreement did not specifically state that transfer of title of the villas and the right to 25% of sales proceeds was in lieu of the past-due $624,635, the VOA's testimony and arguments show that the parties agreed to an accord. A VOA Board member testified that the VOA would not agree to arbitration until the right to sales proceeds was included with the transfer of title. The VOA argued that it was entitled to 25% of sales proceeds per the arbitration agreement and that the arbitration award would only be satisfied if the court found that the right to the sales proceeds had been transferred to the VOA.

¶30 The VOA again argued in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that it was entitled to 25% of sales proceeds or payments under the Plan to satisfy the arbitration award regarding pre-receivership dues. The VOA specifically pointed out that the 25% of sales proceeds would be used to recover its pre-receivership dues. The court ultimately found that the VOA was entitled to receive payments on its pre-receivership dues under the Plan but that it did not receive the right to 25% of sales proceeds. Thus, the accord was not satisfied because the VOA never received their primary consideration—25% of sales proceeds. Because the court also found that the pre-receivership dues had not been paid, the VOA is entitled to receive pre-receivership dues in the amount of the arbitration award, plus interest.

¶31 Recap claims that the record does not support the VOA's assertion that the right to 25% of sales proceeds was necessary to satisfy the arbitration award and that the transfer of title alone sufficiently satisfied the award. In particular, Recap cites a footnote in the VOA's reply brief for summary judgment arguing that the VOA "has consistently stated its position that if the transfer of the six whole [v]illa units to the [VOA] pursuant to the [a]rbitration [a]ward is conceded as valid, then the delinquent amounts up to October 2016 will be waived." Viewed in isolation, this statement appears to support Recap's argument that the sales proceeds were unnecessary to satisfy the arbitration award. The record as a whole, however, shows that (1) the VOA would agree to arbitration only if VR included the right to sales proceeds, (2) the arbitration agreement included the right to sales proceeds, (3) VR attempted to transfer title and the right to sales proceeds to the VOA, (4) the VOA argued at trial that the arbitration award would be satisfied only if it received the sales proceeds, (5) the VOA noted in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that the sales proceeds were intended to recover its pre-receivership dues, and (6) evidence was presented showing that the villas had no equity in excess of Recap's lien. Thus, the record supports the VOA's claim that the sales proceeds were necessary to satisfy the arbitration award, and Recap's argument fails.

3. Attorneys' Fees and Costs

¶32 Recap argues that the superior court erred by declining to award it attorneys' fees and costs. The award of attorneys' fees under A.R.S. § 12-241.01 is discretionary. A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) ("[T]he court may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees."); Ader v. Estate of Felger, 240 Ariz. 32, 45 ¶ 48 (App. 2016). An attorneys' fees order under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Peterson v. City of Surprise, 244 Ariz. 247, 253 ¶ 25 (App. 2018). We also review the superior court's determination of who is the prevailing party for an abuse of discretion. See Cook v. Grebe, 245 Ariz. 367, 369 ¶ 6 (App. 2018). "[T]he fact that a party does not recover the full measure of relief it requests does not mean that it is not the successful party." Sanborn v. Brooker & Wake Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 178 Ariz. 425, 430 (App. 1994).

¶33 Here, the record supports the court's finding that both parties were "successful in part and unsuccessful in part." Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award either party its attorneys' fees. Although the court noted that Recap was successful in defending some of the VOA's claims, it also noted that the VOA received a net judgment in excess of $1 million. As such, the court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the VOA was the successful party and entitled to its taxable costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.

¶34 Recap argues that because the amount awarded in the judgment was far less than the amount that was denied, it should have been viewed as the successful party. This argument is not persuasive. The judgment awarded the VOA over $1 million, which was a substantial amount. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by declaring the VOA as the successful party.

CONCLUSION

¶35 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. As the prevailing party on appeal, the VOA is entitled to its taxable costs upon its compliance with ARCAP 21.


Summaries of

Seven Canyons Recap LLC v. Villa Renaissance LLC

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE
Apr 16, 2019
No. 1 CA-CV 18-0382 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2019)
Case details for

Seven Canyons Recap LLC v. Villa Renaissance LLC

Case Details

Full title:SEVEN CANYONS RECAP LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. VILLA RENAISSANCE LLC, et…

Court:ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

Date published: Apr 16, 2019

Citations

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0382 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2019)