Opinion
NO. 4-13-0113
09-24-2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GLEN J. WHEAT, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Champaign County
No. 11CF2100
Honorable Heidi N. Ladd, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE POPE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Appleton and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) We vacate fines imposed by the circuit clerk and remand to the trial court to reimpose the mandatory fines.
(2) The trial court erroneously awarded defendant presentence credit for the day he was sentenced.
(3) The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's petition to vacate fines.
¶ 2 In July 2012, defendant, Glen J. Wheat, pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2010)) pursuant to an open plea agreement. The trial court accepted the open guilty plea and later sentenced defendant to 6 years' imprisonment, followed by 1 year of mandatory supervised release (MSR), and awarded defendant 206 days' credit for time served. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and reconsider his sentence, arguing he is entitled to a vacation of
certain assessments imposed pursuant to his conviction. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On December 21, 2011, the State charged defendant by information with unlawful possession with intent to deliver cannabis (count I) (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2010)). The charge alleged on December 1, 2011, defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed with intent to deliver more than 30 grams but not more than 500 grams of cannabis. Because of defendant's criminal history, extended-term sentencing applied to this offense.
¶ 5 On February 6, 2012, defendant was arrested in Cook County for an unrelated matter and he remained in jail throughout these proceedings. On April 20, 2012, defendant was served with an arrest warrant in the instant case and transferred to the Champaign County jail.
¶ 6 On July 23, 2012, the State charged defendant by information with unlawful possession of cannabis (count II) (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2010)). On that same day, defendant entered into an open plea agreement to unlawful possession of cannabis (count II), and in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the unlawful-possession-with-intent-to-deliver-cannabis charge (count I). The State and defendant stipulated the value of cannabis seized was $800 and agreed to a street-value fine in that amount. Neither the State nor defense counsel informed the trial court of all the fines, nor the corresponding dollar amounts, statutory law required.
¶ 7 At the July 2012 hearing on the guilty plea, the trial court advised defendant of the nature of the charge and the range of possible penalties, including the applicability of extended-term sentencing. The court advised defendant he had the right to plead not guilty and persist in that plea. The court advised defendant by pleading guilty, he would give up his right to
trial. The court further explained by pleading guilty, defendant would relinquish his rights to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to cross-examine those witnesses.
¶ 8 Defendant told the trial court he understood the nature of the charge against him and the range of possible penalties for the offense of unlawful possession of cannabis. Defendant also informed the court he understood the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty. Defendant stated his choice to plead guilty was made of his own free will and no person forced, threatened, or pressured him to enter such a plea.
¶ 9 The trial court explained to defendant it would make the ultimate determination regarding his sentence and an $800 street-value fine would be imposed. Defendant stated he understood everything the court explained and the agreement as described accurately stated what defendant expected to result from his guilty plea. The State provided a factual basis and the court accepted defendant's open guilty plea. The court scheduled a sentencing hearing for August 29, 2012, and ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI).
¶ 10 At the sentencing hearing, the parties were allowed to suggest corrections to the PSI. However, neither the State nor defendant offered any corrections to the report. Moreover, no evidence was presented by either party in aggravation or mitigation. The State recommended six years' imprisonment. Defense counsel recommended a sentence of two years' imprisonment. After permitting defendant to make a statement in allocution, the trial court sentenced defendant to an extended term of 6 years' imprisonment, followed by 1 year of MSR, and awarded defendant 206 days' credit against his sentence. The court then ordered defendant to pay the following assessments:
"THE COURT: *** He must pay all financial obligations to the circuit clerk. Any bond posted to apply, pursuant to any
bond assignment on file. This would include that he pay all fines, fees and costs authorized by statute, a violent crime victim assistance act [(VCVA)] fee. He's to receive a $1,030.00 credit towards any fines for time served. He must pay a $1,000.00 mandatory assessment, a $100.00 crime laboratory analysis fee. And he must submit specimens for genetic testing in accordance with the statute, unless he's already done so. ***
MR. CLIFTON [(assistant State's Attorney)]: Your Honor, I think you may have misspoken. I think the $1,000.00 mandatory assessment, given this is a Class IV, I think it should be $500.00.
THE COURT: You're correct. I did misspeak. Thank you. It is a $500.00 mandatory assessment for the Class IV conviction."
(The trial court did not impose the $800 street-value fine announced at the time of the plea.)
¶ 11 The written sentencing order, filed on August 29, 2012, and signed by Judge Ladd, required defendant to serve 6 years' imprisonment with credit for 206 days previously served. Under subparagraph "A," count II is listed with the name and date of the offense, citation to the statute, the offense's class, and the term of imprisonment and MSR imposed. Under subparagraph "C," the sentencing order required defendant to "pay costs of prosecution herein" but did not refer to any specific fines or fees.
¶ 12 A docket entry dated August 29, 2012, states:
"Defendant is ordered to pay $100.00 crime lab analysis fee, a [VCVA] fee, and a $500 mandatory assessment. Defendant is to receive $1,030 towards his fines based on the 206 days served.
The Defendant is to submit specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to the Illinois Department of State Police or Department of Corrections [(DOC)] within 45 days[.]"
Additionally, the docket entry lists the following monetary assessments: "Fine + Cost 611.55[,] CRIME LAB 100.00[,] STATE OFFENDER [DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC ACID (DNA)] .00[,] PRELIMINARY HEARING 10.00[.]"
¶ 13 The circuit clerk's fines and fees information shows defendant was assessed the following assessments: (1) a $5 document-storage assessment, (2) a $10 automation assessment, (3) a $100 circuit-clerk assessment, (4) a $25 court-security assessment, (5) a $50 court-finance assessment, (6) a $40 State's Attorney assessment, (7) a $2 State's Attorney Automation assessment, (8) a $10 arrestee's-medical assessment, (9) a $5 spinal-cord-research assessment, (10) a $100 crime-lab assessment, (11) a $100 trauma-fund assessment, (12) a $130 traffic/criminal-surcharge assessment, (13) a $30 juvenile-expungement-fund assessment, separated into three $10 assessments as discussed below, (14) a $10 preliminary-hearing assessment, (15) a $52.55 Sheriff's fee, (16) a $52 VCVA assessment, and (17) a $10 State Police operations assistance assessment. The clerk's information reflects $0 in mandatory assessments was ordered, $0 fines, $0 state-offender DNA, and $0 drug-court program.
¶ 14 In September 2012, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and reconsider his sentence. In October 2012, defendant filed a pro se petition to revoke his fines pursuant to section 5-9-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-9-2 (West 2010)), alleging he was financially unable to pay the fines imposed. More specifically, defendant argued as follows:
"He has been unable to secure good paying work when he was out of custody and will likely have trouble finding it upon his release in 2015 because he has multiple felony convictions. Per the Court's records (attached), Defendant owes no fines due to the credit for time served at the time of the sentencing. However, if such fines still exist, Defendant is seeking a revocation of them."
¶ 15 In January 2013, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion. In February 2013, the trial court denied defendant's motion. The court found the guilty plea had been knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, and defendant's disappointment with the sentence imposed was no basis for withdrawing his plea. The trial court also denied defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, finding it considered all factors, including defendant's seven prior drug convictions, the fact he was on parole at the time of his arrest, "as well as other factors in his life, including his drug addiction[ and] jeopardizing his own physical health." The court also noted an error in the PSI and ordered a correction to the written sentencing judgment to show 132 days' credit for time served, instead of the 206 days originally ordered. (The trial court did not reduce defendant's $5 per diem presentence credit to $660.)
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 A. Fines
¶ 19 Defendant argues this court should vacate the fines improperly imposed by the circuit clerk. The State concedes the circuit clerk improperly imposed fines, but contends the fines should be reimposed. The State asserts the VCVA and traffic/criminal-surcharge fines need to be recalculated. The State also asks this court to impose the mandatory $800 street-value
fine. Finally, the State requests we reduce defendant's per diem sentencing credit to $660 to reflect the 132 days' sentencing credit.
¶ 20 At issue in this appeal are the following fines: (1) a $10 arrestee's-medical assessment, (2) a $50 court-finance assessment, (3) a drug-court assessment, (4) a $30 juvenile-expungement-fund assessment, (5) a $500 mandatory assessment, (6) a $5 spinal-cord-research-fund assessment, (7) a $10 State Police operations assistance assessment, (8) an $800 street-value assessment, (9) a $100 trauma-center-fund assessment, (10) a $130 traffic/criminal-surcharge assessment, and (11) a $52 VCVA assessment.
¶ 21 In Illinois, it is well settled the trial court, as opposed to the circuit clerk, must impose fines as a component of a defendant's sentence. "This court has consistently held the circuit clerk does not have the power to impose fines." People v. Montag, 2014 IL App (4th) 120993, ¶ 37, 5 N.E.3d 246. Although circuit clerks have statutory authority to impose a fee, they lack authority to impose a fine, because the imposition of a fine is exclusively a judicial act. People v. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56, 10 N.E.3d 959. "[W]hen presented with mandatory fines assessed by the clerk, we may vacate the fines and reimpose them ourselves." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 18, 991 N.E.2d 914.
¶ 22 A reviewing court must determine whether the assessment was imposed by the trial court or circuit clerk. "In ascertaining the terms of the sentence, a reviewing court may examine the record as a whole [citation], since the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written sentencing order entered on the same date can be viewed as one transaction." People v. Thurston, 255 Ill. App. 3d 512, 514-15, 626 N.E.2d 426, 427 (1994); see also People v. Moore, 301 Ill. App. 3d 728, 735, 704 N.E.2d 80, 85 (1998) (in the case of a conflict between the oral
pronouncement of the sentence and the written sentencing order, the oral pronouncement controls).
¶ 23 We must also determine whether the assessment is a fine or a fee. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 598, 861 N.E.2d 967, 984 (2006). A "fee" is defined as a charge that "seeks to recoup expenses" the State has incurred or " 'compensat[es]' the State for some expenditure incurred in prosecuting the defendant." Id. at 582, 861 N.E.2d at 975. A "fine," however, is "punitive in nature" and is "a pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 581, 861 N.E.2d at 975. "To determine whether an assessment is a fine or a fee and whether the assessment may be imposed on each count within a defendant's case, we look to the language of the statutes providing for their imposition." People v. Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 92.
¶ 24 Because the issues presented are ones of statutory construction, our review is de novo. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 959 N.E.2d 621.
¶ 25 1. The Arrestee's-Medical Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 26 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $10 arrestee's-medical assessment (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2010)) in defendant's case. In Larue, this court held the arrestee's-medical fee, despite its label as a "fee," is actually a fine and could not be imposed by the circuit clerk. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 57, 10 N.E.3d 959; Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 112. In support of this conclusion, we noted a defendant can be required to pay the fine even though defendant did not receive medical treatment or costs. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 57, 10 N.E.3d 959; People v. Jackson, 2011 IL 110615, ¶¶ 24, 27, 955 N.E.2d 1164. Because the arrestee's-medical assessment is a fine, the clerk could not properly impose it. We
vacate the assessment and direct the trial court to impose the $10 arrestee's-medical fine on remand.
¶ 27 2. The Court-Finance Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 28 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $50 court-finance fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c) (West 2010)) in defendant's case. In People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (4th) 121118, ¶ 54, we held the court-finance fee is actually a fine. See also People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 120691, ¶ 21, 1 N.E.3d 648; People v. Ackerman, 2014 IL App (3d) 120585, ¶ 30, 10 N.E.3d 470 (court-finance assessment is a fine). Therefore, the clerk improperly imposed the court-finance fine and we vacate the assessment. On remand, the trial court must impose the $50 court-finance assessment.
¶ 29 3. The Drug-Court Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 30 The circuit clerk's printout contains an entry for a drug-court assessment (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2010)), but no dollar amount is listed next to the entry. The record is not clear as to any amount imposed by the clerk and it is unclear whether the per diem sentencing credit was applied to offset the assessment.
¶ 31 In Warren, we held "the $5 drug-court assessment imposed by the circuit clerk was a fine, despite its label as a 'fee,' because the assessment is intended to be used 'for the operation and administration of the drug court.' " Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 131 (quoting 55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2010)). Because defendant never participated in drug court, this assessment did not reimburse the state for the costs of prosecuting defendant. People v. Rexroad, 2013 IL App (4th) 110981, ¶ 53, 992 N.E.2d 3. Thus, to the extent a $5 drug-court assessment was imposed by the clerk, we vacate the assessment. On remand, the trial court must
reimpose the $5 drug-court assessment, if appropriate. People v. Folks, 406 Ill. App. 3d 300, 306, 943 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (2010).
¶ 32 4. The Juvenile-Expungement-Fund Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 33 Defendant argues the circuit clerk improperly imposed a $10 State Police Services Fund assessment. Actually, the clerk imposed a $30 juvenile-expungement-fund fine—listed as three separate $10 charges for the Circuit Clerk Operations and Administrative Fund, State's Attorney's Office Fund ($10 added to State's Attorney's fee of $30), and State Police Services Fund. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17 (West 2010) (added by Pub Act. 96-707, § 15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010)).
¶ 34 In Warren, we held "[t]he plain language of section 5-9-1.17 clearly shows the legislature intended this assessment to be a fine." Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 127. Because the $30 juvenile-expungement-fund assessment (including the three separate $10 assessments contained therein) is a fine, the circuit clerk cannot properly impose it. We vacate the $30 juvenile-expungement-fund fine and direct the trial court to impose it on remand.
¶ 35 5. The Mandatory Assessment
¶ 36 The record shows the trial court, at defendant's sentencing hearing, ordered defendant to pay a $500 mandatory assessment pursuant to section 10.3 of the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/10.3 (West 2010)). Although the circuit clerk's printout contains an entry for the mandatory assessment, no dollar amount is provided next to the entry. The record provides no explanation for the disparity between what the court expressly ordered and the amount stated on the clerk's printout. Moreover, it is unclear whether the clerk assessed the $500 mandatory assessment as ordered by the court or applied part of the per diem sentencing credit to offset the assessment.
¶ 37 On remand, the trial court should ensure the sentencing judgment contains the $500 mandatory assessment (720 ILCS 550/10.3 (West 2010)) ordered by the trial court during defendant's sentencing hearing, as well as the amounts creditable against it.
¶ 38 6. The Spinal-Cord-Research Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 39 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $5 spinal-cord-research assessment (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2010)) against defendant. In Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 599, 861 N.E.2d at 985, our supreme court held the spinal-cord-research fee, despite its statutory label as a fee, is a fine. We vacate the spinal-cord-research fine imposed by the circuit clerk in this case. On remand, the trial court shall impose the fine as mandated by the statute.
¶ 40 7. The State Police Operations Assistance Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 41 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $10 State Police operations assessment (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5) (West 2010)). In People v. Millsap, 2012 IL App (4th) 110668, ¶ 31, 979 N.E.2d 1030, this court held the State Police operations assistance fee is a fine for the purpose of calculating a defendant's VCVA fine. See also Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 140 (holding the State Police operations assistance assessment to be a fine). Because this assessment is a fine, the circuit clerk could not properly impose this assessment against defendant. We vacate its imposition and direct the trial court to reimpose it.
¶ 42 8. The Street-Value Assessment
¶ 43 The State asks this court to impose an $800 street-value fine (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) (West 2010)) pursuant to the parties' open plea agreement.
¶ 44 In Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 152 (citing 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) (West 2010)), we held the street-value assessment to be a mandatory fine and noted "[t]he
legislature has mandated the imposition of the street-value fine of an amount not less than the full street value of the drugs seized." (Emphasis in original.) As our supreme court stated, the statute requires an evidentiary basis for a street-value fine. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 46, 912 N.E.2d 1220, 1228 (2009). Such an "evidentiary basis may be provided by testimony at sentencing, a stipulation to the current value, or reliable evidence presented at a previous stage of the proceedings." Id. Here, defendant stipulated to a current value of $800 for the 100.3 grams of cannabis seized and agreed to an $800 street-value fine as part of his open guilty plea. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court must impose a street-value fine of $800 to reflect the stipulated value of all the cannabis seized in this case. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) (West 2010); Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 153.
¶ 45 9. The Trauma-Fund Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 46 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $100 trauma-fund assessment (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(b) (West 2010)) in defendant's case. "[O]ur supreme court held the trauma-fund the legislature labeled it as such." Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 119 (citing Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 593, 861 N.E.2d at 981-82). We vacate the trauma-fund fine imposed by the circuit clerk and direct the trial court to reimpose it.
¶ 47 10. The Traffic/Criminal-Surcharge Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 48 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $130 traffic/criminal-surcharge fine (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010)) in defendant's case. Defendant argues, and the State concedes, the clerk improperly imposed the traffic/criminal-surcharge fine. However, the State disputes the amount to be imposed on remand.
¶ 49 In Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 122, we held the assessment to be a fine because the legislature clearly intended it to be punitive in nature. We further noted, "the statute does not indicate the assessment is to be used to reimburse the county or the State for the expenses related to the prosecution of a defendant." Id. Because the circuit clerk imposed the criminal surcharges after defendant was sentenced by the trial court, we vacate the fine.
¶ 50 On remand, the trial court must impose a traffic/criminal-surcharge fine. This may require the trial court to calculate the total fines imposed in defendant's case and assess an additional $10 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fines imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010); see Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 21, 991 N.E.2d 914 (" 'Lump Sum Surcharge' " imposed pursuant to section 5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code is to be calculated before the VCVA assessment; the surcharge is added to the total fines and the VCVA assessment is calculated based on the new total).
¶ 51 11. The VCVA Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 52 The record shows a $52 VCVA assessment (725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010)) was imposed in defendant's case. The VCVA assessment is a mandatory fine only the court has authority to impose. Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721, ¶ 135. Here, although the trial court ordered defendant to pay the VCVA assessment, it failed to determine the appropriate amount of the fine. Absent a court order imposing a specific fine, it is well established the clerk of a court, as a nonjudicial officer, has no power to levy fines. Id. ¶ 82. Nothing in the record suggests the trial court reviewed, approved, or intended to incorporate the clerk's calculations or intended to order a $52 VCVA fine. Accordingly, we vacate the VCVA fine imposed by the clerk.
¶ 53 Moreover, since additional fines are imposed in this case, the defendant's VCVA must be amended. We direct imposition of a VCVA fine of $4 for each $40 of fines assessed.
725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008). This task may require the court to calculate the total fines, including the traffic/criminal surcharge, and impose an additional penalty of $4 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fines imposed. 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2008); see Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 21, 991 N.E.2d 914 (" 'Lump Sum Surcharge' " imposed pursuant to section 5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code is to be calculated before the VCVA assessment; the surcharge is added to the total fines and the VCVA assessment is calculated based on the new total).
¶ 54 B. Sentencing Credit
¶ 55 The State argues defendant's $5 per diem sentencing credit should be reduced to $660 to reflect the 132 days' presentence credit. We note, however, the trial court incorrectly awarded defendant an additional day of credit.
¶ 56 Here, the trial court observed the PSI incorrectly stated February 6, 2012, as the date of defendant's arrest. The trial court found defendant was in custody for this offense beginning April 20, 2012, the date he was served with an arrest warrant. However, the trial court erroneously credited defendant for August 29, 2012, the day he was sentenced. See People v. Williams, 239 Ill. 2d 503, 510, 942 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (2011) ("the date a defendant is sentenced and committed to the [DOC] is to be counted as a day of sentence and not as a day of presentence credit"). Accordingly, defendant is entitled to 131 (not 132) days' presentence credit.
¶ 57 We order the trial court to enter a modified sentencing judgment reducing defendant's sentencing credit to 131 days and direct $655 per diem credit toward any creditable fines imposed in this case. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967); People v. Rivera, 378 Ill. App. 3d 896, 900-01, 882 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (2008).
¶ 58 C. Petition To Revoke Fines
¶ 59 Defendant argues the trial court erred when it failed to adequately address his request to revoke his fines. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-2 (West 2010) The State argues the trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, which included his request to revoke fines. The parties dispute whether section 5-9-2 applies to mandatory fines.
¶ 60 Section 5-9-2 of the Unified Code provides as follows:
"§ 5-9-2. Revocation of a Fine. Except as to fines established for violations of Chapter 15 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the court, upon good cause shown, may revoke the fine or the unpaid portion or may modify the method of payment." 730 ILCS 5/5-9-2 (West 2010).
¶ 61 Section 5-9-2 is intended to provide a defendant relief in the future if hardship circumstances arise, warranting revocation of fines to ease defendant's financial burden. People v. Mingo, 403 Ill. App. 3d 968, 972, 936 N.E.2d 1156, 1159 (2010). Since the court "may revoke the fine" (emphasis added) (730 ILCS 5/5-9-2 (West 2010)), we review the revocation of fines as a matter of judicial discretion and absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's decision may not be altered on review. People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883 (1977).
¶ 62 Defendant argues the trial court failed to adequately address his request to revoke his fines. We disagree. It is incumbent upon defendant to request further explanation from the court as to its reason for denying a particular subsection of his motion. (Defendant's request to revoke fines was included within his written motion to reconsider sentence. Indeed, "a trial judge need not specifically state that the defendant was determined to have financial resources and ability to pay; that finding is implicit in the imposition of a fine where the judge is aware of the facts which support such a determination." People v. Ruff, 115 Ill. App. 3d 691, 695, 450
N.E.2d 1369, 1373 (1983). Here, the trial court was well aware of defendant's financial circumstances and ability to pay. The PSI shows defendant earned $903 per month in disability income and $97 per month in food stamps. Prior to incarceration, defendant worked at Heartland Human Care Employment Agency and Salvation Army, where he earned $10 per hour and $7.25 per hour, respectively. Defendant also testified he earned $9.18 per month in prison and, although he had a difficult time finding employment following his last prison sentence, he "went to the car wash and [he] made do." Based on defendant's ability to find employment and generate income through social security disability and food stamps, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition to revoke fines. Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we need not address whether section 5-9-2 applies to the fines imposed in this case.
63 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 64 We affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court's judgment and remand for the trial court, and not the circuit clerk, to impose the mandatory fines vacated herein and any other fines mandated by statute. We further direct the clerk of this court to furnish the Champaign County circuit clerk with a copy of this disposition, ensuring she understands the errors as to fines and fees, discussed herein, so the errors are not repeated. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2012).
¶ 65 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.