Opinion
SC: 162125-6 COA: 348471 348472
04-30-2021
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher Wayne STOKES, Defendant-Appellant.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 20, 2020 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Welch, J., joins the statement of McCormack, C.J.
McCormack, C.J. (concurring).
I concur in the order denying leave to appeal. It is not clear to me that the defendant is correct to argue that this case implicates the prohibition on using acquitted conduct to increase a defendant's sentence from our decision in People v. Beck , 504 Mich. 605, 939 N.W.2d 213 (2019). Nowhere in its summary of the defendant's presentence investigation reports (PSIRs) did the trial court refer to acquitted conduct. After reviewing the defendant's juvenile and criminal history, the court stated, "I do not see anything—I've not seen anything in this new report, from what I've heard today that would cause me to change my sentences." Thus, the court made clear that nothing in the new PSIRs persuaded it to deviate from its original sentences, suggesting that it did not rely on the acquitted conduct. I agree with the Court of Appeals that finding a Beck violation here would rest on speculation, not evidence in the record.
Another reason to doubt Beck ’s applicability is that the trial court didn't increase the defendant's sentences at all; in fact, despite the references in the PSIRs to the acquitted conduct, the court declined to increase the sentences and instead imposed the same sentences it had originally. Thus, the trial court did not punish the defendant more severely by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed the acquitted offenses and sentencing him accordingly.
In Beck , despite the jury's acquittal on a murder charge, the court expressly stated on the record that it had concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the murder. The court used that finding as a basis to depart upward from the applicable guidelines range for being a felon in possession of a firearm, the convicted offense (22 to 76 months), and impose a 240- to 400-month sentence.
And the defendant did not preserve these arguments in the trial court, so our review is limited to plain error. Since Beck does not plainly apply, the defendant cannot prevail. For all these reasons, I do not believe this case presents a good vehicle for considering the parameters of the Beck rule. But I would clarify the Beck rule in an appropriate case. I am not convinced that the Court of Appeals’ observations about the limits of the Beck rule are correct: The panel cited People v. Roberts (On Remand) , 331 Mich. App. 680, 691, 954 N.W.2d 221 (2020), rev'd People v. Roberts , 506 Mich. ––––, 949 N.W.2d 455 (2020), for the proposition that sentencing courts do not violate Beck by "considering the entire res gestae of an acquitted offense...." People v. Stokes , ––– Mich. App. ––––, ––––, ––– N.W.2d –––– (2020); slip op. at 4, 2020 WL 4908480. And it held that "a sentencing court may review a PSIR containing information on acquitted conduct without violating Beck so long as the court does not rely on the acquitted conduct when sentencing the defendant." Id.
In Roberts , the jury acquitted the defendant of assault with intent to murder, meaning the jury had not determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had "passed a gun to another individual, who it is undisputed then fired the gun into a crowd on a city street." Roberts , 506 Mich. at ––––, 949 N.W.2d at 455. We reversed the Court of Appeals judgment, holding that the trial court improperly relied on acquitted conduct when it "assigned 25 points to Offense Variable 9, MCL 777.39(1)(b), for endangering the crowd, and when it departed upward from the recommended guidelines range in order to deter gun violence on the city's streets ...." Id.
I am not confident that either statement is correct or consistent with our caselaw. The line between a trial court "considering" aspects of an acquitted offense and relying on acquitted conduct is a fine one, and may be an entirely artificial or nonexistent one. And the panel's holding that a PSIR may contain acquitted conduct as long as the sentencing court doesn't rely on it is in tension with our holding that "[a] judge is entitled to rely on the information in the presentence report, which is presumed to be accurate unless the defendant effectively challenges the accuracy of the factual information." People v. Grant , 455 Mich. 221, 233-234, 565 N.W.2d 389 (1997).
Cases such as this one and Roberts make plain that the Court of Appeals is struggling with the boundaries of our holding in Beck . I look forward to clarifying the law in this area when the right case comes along. This isn't it. For these reasons, I concur with the Court's order denying leave to appeal.