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People v. Stockman

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division
Nov 25, 2008
No. A120518 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent v. GREGORY CHATTEN STOCKMAN, Defendant and Appellant. A120518 California Court of Appeal, First District, First Division November 25, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR20626

Marchiano, P.J.

Defendant Gregory Chatten Stockman was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) and committed to a state mental hospital. He appeals from an order denying him a trial on his application for restoration of sanity. Defendant contends that he was entitled to such a trial because he has been on outpatient status in the past. We disagree because defendant is not now and has not been for some time on outpatient status as required by Penal Code section 1026.2 for a restoration of sanity trial. Accordingly, we affirm.

Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

I. FACTS

This case has recently been before us in a prior appeal. (People v. Stockman (July 18, 2008, A117559) [nonpub. opn.].) We restate or paraphrase the pertinent facts from our prior opinion.

In May 1993, defendant was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 187/664; 245, subd. (a)(1).) He was found NGI and committed to a state mental hospital.

In February 2001, defendant was placed on outpatient status, to be supervised by the Conditional Release Program (CONREP).

On May 31, 2006, CONREP—not for the first time—requested revocation of defendant’s outpatient status. CONREP invoked section 1608, which allows the outpatient treatment supervisor to seek revocation if he “is of the opinion that the [outpatient] requires extended inpatient treatment or refuses to accept further outpatient treatment and supervision . . . .”

On October 20, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on the revocation request. Defendant’s outpatient supervisor, Ernest Hernandez, was the sole witness. We summarize his testimony as follows.

Defendant had been on outpatient status for about seven years, but his status had been revoked several times due to noncompliance with terms and conditions of outpatient release. Defendant was bi-polar and required medication, but was resistant to individual and group therapy. Defendant had a grandiose self-image and was passive aggressive. He was difficult to interview about his mental illness. He would refuse to engage in discussions regarding his annual reviews, claiming attorney-client privilege.

After other evidence of defendant’s inability to comply with the terms of outpatient release, including financial disclosure requirements, the trial court revoked defendant’s outpatient status and returned him to Napa State Hospital. The court revoked outpatient status because defendant was “unwilling to comply with the terms and conditions” of outpatient release. The court noted that defendant wanted to “pick and choose which terms and conditions he wants. He is completely unwilling to truly disclose his finances.” The court analogized the revocation to the revocation of probation for failing to follow probation terms. The trial court had “grave concerns” about defendant.

In the prior appeal, we upheld the October 20, 2006 order revoking outpatient status and also upheld a stipulation that defendant could not file a petition for restoration of sanity until September 24, 2007.

On October 10, 2007, defendant applied for a trial on restoration of sanity. It is undisputed that he had not been returned to outpatient status and was still in the custody of Napa State Hospital. Defendant argued he was entitled to a restoration of sanity trial, despite the fact that he had never been returned to outpatient status. The trial court disagreed with defendant’s reading of the governing statute, section 1026.2, and ruled that the statute required a year of successful outpatient performance just before consideration of the issue of restoration of sanity. Accordingly, the trial court denied the application.

II. DISCUSSION

Section 1026.2 provides a comprehensive scheme for the processing of applications for restoration of sanity. Subdivision (e) of the statute creates a two-step process upon the filing of an application, which we here highlight with bold numerals:

(1) “The court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the person applying for restoration of sanity would be a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, if under supervision and treatment in the community. If the court at the hearing determines that applicant will not be a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, while under supervision and treatment in the community, the court shall order the applicant placed with an appropriate forensic conditional release program for one year. All or a substantial portion of the program shall include outpatient supervision and treatment. The court shall retain jurisdiction.”

(2) “The court at the end of the one year, shall have a trial to determine if sanity has been restored, which means the applicant is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder. The court shall not determine whether the applicant has been restored to sanity until the applicant has completed the one year in the appropriate forensic conditional release program, unless the community program director sooner makes a recommendation for restoration of sanity and unconditional release . . . .”

The statutory process is clear. First, an applicant for restoration of sanity spends a year successfully in an outpatient program, and then is considered for a determination of restoration and the concomitant unconditional release. “Subdivision (e) of section 1026.2 sets up a two-step process for processing an application for release: first, a determination of whether the applicant should be placed in a local program, and later, after a year in such a program, a determination of whether the applicant’s sanity has been restored. [Citation.].” (Barnes v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 969, 973 (Barnes), italics added; see People v. Superior Court (Woods) (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 614, 617.)

Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the statute clearly contemplates that the one-year outpatient period immediately precede the restoration of sanity hearing. “There are sound public policy reasons supporting the local placement period for an applicant who contends that his sanity has been restored. The local program provides mental health professionals with a good opportunity to analyze whether the applicant’s sanity has, in fact, been restored. For those who will be released after the second proceeding, the program provides a bridge between life in a state institution and unsupervised life in the community.” (Barnes, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 976, italics added.)

The statute does not contemplate a “bridge to nowhere.” Simply put, defendant’s past time as an outpatient is not pertinent to his present application from the custody of the state hospital.

The trial court properly denied defendant’s application.

Defendant suggests there are constitutional considerations here. He argues he is not dangerous and thus is entitled to show his sanity has been restored. But as we observed in defendant’s prior appeal, defendant relies on various cases which recognize that the Constitution requires a showing of dangerousness for civil commitment of the mentally ill. (See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 357-358; Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504 U.S. 71, 75-77.) But in the case of an NGI committee, the finding of dangerousness is implicit in the NGI determination, and is only dispelled by a finding under section 1026.2 that “sanity has been restored, which means the [committee] is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder.” (§ 1026.2, subd. (e); see In re Locks (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 890, 897.)

III. DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s application for a hearing on restoration of sanity is affirmed.

We concur: Margulies, J., Flinn, J.

Judge of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


Summaries of

People v. Stockman

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division
Nov 25, 2008
No. A120518 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Stockman

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent v. GREGORY CHATTEN STOCKMAN…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division

Date published: Nov 25, 2008

Citations

No. A120518 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008)

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