Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR20626
Marchiano, P.J.
Defendant Gregory Chatten Stockman was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) and committed to a state mental hospital. He appeals from an order revoking his outpatient status and from a separate order denying him a trial on his petition for restoration of sanity. He contends that revocation of outpatient status requires a showing of dangerousness, and that the revocation order is not supported by substantial evidence. He also contends he had a right to a trial on the issue of restoration of sanity despite a stipulation foreclosing such a trial at the time requested. We reject defendant’s contentions and affirm.
I. FACTS
In May 1993, defendant was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 187/664; 245, subd. (a)(1).) He was found NGI and committed to a state mental hospital.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In February 2001, defendant was placed on outpatient status, to be supervised by the Conditional Release Program (CONREP).
In September 2003, CONREP requested revocation of defendant’s outpatient status. One reason for the request, as later noted by the trial court, was that defendant was preoccupied with legal issues and “was filing legal document after legal document.”
On September 24, 2003, the parties reached a negotiated settlement and memorialized it in a stipulation. Among other things, the stipulation provided that the People and CONREP would withdraw the request to revoke outpatient status; defendant would remain in CONREP for a period of 48 months from September 24, 2003; and during that four-year period defendant “shall refrain from filing any petitions requesting release from CONREP, or restoration of sanity . . . .”
On May 31, 2006, CONREP again requested revocation of defendant’s outpatient status. CONREP invoked section 1608, which allows the outpatient treatment supervisor to seek revocation if he “is of the opinion that the [outpatient] requires extended inpatient treatment or refuses to accept further outpatient treatment and supervision . . . .”
On October 20, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on the revocation request. Defendant’s outpatient supervisor, Ernest Hernandez, was the sole witness. We summarize his testimony as follows.
Defendant had been on outpatient status for about seven years, but his status had been revoked several times due to noncompliance with terms and conditions of outpatient release. Defendant was bi-polar and required medication, but was resistant to individual and group therapy. Defendant had a grandiose self-image and was passive aggressive. He was difficult to interview about his mental illness. He would refuse to engage in discussions regarding his annual reviews, claiming attorney-client privilege.
Defendant was employed as a salesman in a department store. He was supposed to limit his work week to 20 hours, because CONREP was concerned about his stress level. Defendant had difficulty limiting his work week as requested, despite numerous confrontations over the issue with Hernandez.
Another condition of defendant’s outpatient status was that he notify Hernandez of any financial contract or obligation of $500 or more. But in early 2006, CONREP learned that defendant had taken out a home loan. Defendant refused to provide documentation regarding the loan. Defendant was not in complete compliance with the requirement that he be open about his finances and contracts. Hernandez was concerned that defendant would accumulate so much money that he would jeopardize his Social Security eligibility.
Defendant had a “very grandiose view of his role” in treatment programs and wanted to be in charge of his treatment plan. He was “very guarded” and “suspicious” and had a tendency “to take the most malevolent view of [CONREP’s] treatment goals and objectives.”
CONREP agreed that defendant could remain on outpatient status if he met several additional conditions regarding his finances, without which Hernandez feared that defendant would lose his house.
CONREP proposed other conditions, including that Jan Jack, apparently a friend of defendant, no longer have his power of attorney. CONREP described Jack as uncooperative and not acting in defendant’s best interests.
On cross-examination, Hernandez testified that he did not believe defendant was a danger to himself.
The trial court found that defendant “continued to deflect true participation in group meetings and even in individual meetings,” and did not acknowledge his mental illness. The court noted reports that during group therapy defendant was “disorganized in his thinking . . . gets upset . . . is fragmented. His thoughts are tangential and at times [he] becomes incoherent in his sessions. All of those things are of great concern to the court.”
The court further noted that the incessant filing of legal documents was one reason for the September 24, 2003 stipulation, which barred defendant from filing sanity restoration petitions for four years. The court noted its “concern”: “[I]t was his preoccupation with those kind of issues [i.e., legal issues] in 2003 that was the core basis for [CONREP] wanting to revoke his outpatient status at that time. And that’s what I’m seeing again, that he is preoccupied. Instead of being occupied with addressing the core of his mental illness, he’s occupied with the legal process.”
The court revoked defendant’s outpatient status because defendant was “unwilling to comply with the terms and conditions” of outpatient release. The court noted that defendant wanted to “pick and choose which terms and conditions he wants. He is completely unwilling to truly disclose his finances.” The court analogized the revocation to the revocation of probation for failing to follow probation terms. The trial court had “grave concerns” about defendant.
Presumably, any future outpatient status would be subject to the additional conditions proposed by CONREP. Defendant did not wish to adhere to those conditions, so he pursued a petition for restoration of sanity he had filed in the late summer or early Fall of 2005.
On October 30 and 31, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on the issue of whether defendant had a right to a hearing, i.e., a jury trial, on his petition for restoration of sanity. The parties discussed several issues, but the pertinent one for purposes of our present review is the effect of the September 24, 2003 stipulation. In that regard, the trial court ruled that defendant entered into the stipulation on advice of counsel, benefitted from the stipulation, but “by virtue of that agreement [defendant] does not have a right [to] a restoration of sanity hearing until September [24th,] 2007.”
On March 26, 2007, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s denial of a hearing on his restoration petition. He pointed to the reporter’s transcript of the hearing on September 24, 2003, at which his counsel set forth the terms of the stipulation. Counsel recited:
“Three, that [defendant] will agree not to file any petitions or writs or anything in regards to requesting restoration of sanity for a period of 48 months from today’s date. That means four years from today’s date. However, if CONREP chooses to file some kind of a revocation proceeding against him, he does obviously have the right to start working and contesting that so this is only as to the issue of coming off CONREP.” (Italics added.)
Defendant pointed to the italicized language and argued that “in contract terms” the language qualified the agreement to forbear from filing. Defendant claimed his forbearance was conditioned on CONREP not moving to revoke outpatient status—and should it do so the ban on seeking restoration of sanity was lifted.
The People argued that the italicized language only meant that defendant could oppose any petition for revocation of outpatient status, and had nothing to do with defendant’s agreement not to seek restoration of sanity for four years. The court agreed and denied reconsideration.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant challenges the revocation of his outpatient status and the denial of a hearing on his 2005 petition for restoration of sanity.
1. Revocation of Outpatient Status.
Outpatient status may be revoked at the request of the outpatient treatment supervisor under the terms of section 1608, i.e., if the outpatient needs inpatient treatment or refuses outpatient treatment and supervision. Outpatient status may also be revoked at the request of the prosecutor under section 1609, based on the prosecutor’s opinion that the outpatient is a danger to the health and safety of others.
Section 1608 does not require a showing of dangerousness. It focuses on the treatment of the outpatient, while section 1609 is concerned with the safety of the community. (See People v. DeGuzman (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 414, 419-420 (DeGuzman); In re McPherson (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 332, 339-340.)
Although section 1608 does not require a showing of dangerousness by its plain terms, defendant argues that such a showing is constitutionally mandated. He relies on various cases which recognize that the Constitution requires a showing of dangerousness for civil commitment of the mentally ill. (See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 357-358; Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504 U.S. 71, 75-77.) But in the case of an NGI committee, the finding of dangerousness is implicit in the NGI determination, and is dispelled by a finding under section 1026.2 that “sanity has been restored, which means the [committee] is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder.” (§ 1026.2, subd. (e); see In re Locks (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 890, 897.)
Given the overarching determination of dangerousness in an NGI case, we know of no constitutional requirement of a separate dangerousness determination under section 1608. The statute merely gives the outpatient treatment supervisor flexibility in administering the outpatient’s performance in what is essentially a probationary context. (See DeGuzman, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 419-420.) Revocation deprives the outpatient of only “a conditional liberty to which he is entitled only if he observes special restrictions.” (Ibid.)
Defendant also contends the revocation order is not supported by substantial evidence. The facts set forth above demonstrate that substantial evidence supports revocation of outpatient status on the grounds set forth in section 1608.
We do not address Argument III in the appellant’s opening brief because it is conditioned on our finding that the revocation was erroneous.
2. Denial of a Hearing on the Restoration Petition.
This issue is simply resolved. By clear and express terms, defendant agreed to forbear from filing any petition for restoration of sanity until September 24, 2007. The statements of counsel at the hearing on September 24, 2003, do not qualify that agreement, but only recognize defendant’s right to oppose revocation of outpatient status. Thus, defendant had no right to a hearing on his 2005 petition for restoration of sanity.
Defendant cites a transcript of a 2005 review hearing at which the judge seemed to indicate he had a right to file a restoration of sanity petition. The judge, who did not preside at the September 24, 2003, hearing, apparently was not entirely familiar with defendant’s case. Defendant’s claim of judicial estoppel is without merit.
III. DISPOSITION
The orders revoking outpatient status and denying a hearing on the 2005 petition for restoration of sanity are affirmed.
We concur: Swager, J., Margulies, J.