Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. CM026301 & CM027569
NICHOLSON, J.
Defendant Joseph Robert Sharpe contends the trial court erred when it ordered him as part of his sentence to pay victim restitution to the El Medio Fire Protection District for its extinguishing an arson fire at defendant’s home. The Attorney General agrees with defendant’s claim. So do we.
Defendant was charged in these consolidated cases with arson, insurance fraud, and various witness intimidation crimes. The informations alleged defendant hired an individual to burn down his house and drive his car into a lake, and then he submitted false claims to his insurance company for the losses. In addition, while awaiting trial, defendant attempted to dissuade several witnesses from testifying against him.
Ultimately, defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of defrauding an insurer (Pen. Code, § 548, subd. (a)), and two counts of intimidating a witness. (Pen. Code, § 137, subd. (b).)
The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of 11 years. It also ordered defendant to pay the El Medio Fire Protection District $1,824.74 as victim restitution to reimburse the District’s costs of suppressing the fire at defendant’s home.
Defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause, and now challenges the victim restitution order.
Penal Code section 1202.4 requires a defendant to make restitution to a victim who suffers economic loss due to the defendant’s conduct. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) For purposes of this statute, a “victim” includes a governmental agency “when that entity is a direct victim of a crime.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (k)(2).)
A governmental agency is a direct victim of a crime only when the offense was committed against the agency or the agency was the immediate object of the crime. (People v. Martinez (2005) 36 Cal.4th 384, 393.) An agency does not become a direct victim simply by incurring expenses in performing its regular duties. (See People v. Ozkan (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1077 [“public agencies are not directly ‘victimized’ for purposes of restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4 merely because they spend money to investigate crimes or apprehend criminals”].)
Thus, under the definition of “direct victim,” a fire department is not a direct victim of an arson committed on a lot not owned by the department where its economic loss consists of costs incurred to suppress the fire. (People v. Martinez, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 394, fn. 2, disapproving In re Brian N. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 591, 594-595.)
The El Medio Fire Protection District was not a direct victim of defendant’s crimes. His acts of insurance fraud and witness intimidation were not committed against the District, and the District was not the immediate object of his acts. The trial court exceeded its authority when it ordered defendant to pay victim restitution to the District in this case.
The District is not left without a potential remedy. It may seek to recover its fire suppression costs in a civil action against defendant pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 13009, subdivision (a).
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order of victim restitution to the El Medio Fire Protection District is stricken. The clerk of the trial court is ordered to prepare an amended abstract of judgment deleting victim restitution to the El Medio Fire Protection District and to send the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.