Opinion
353817
06-10-2021
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUSSELL ROBERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 14-005563-01-FC
Before: Redford, P.J., and Borrello and Tukel, JJ.
Per Curiam.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted his resentencing to concurrent terms of 6 to 17 years' imprisonment for assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83; and 1½ to 5 years' imprisonment for carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227; as well as a consecutive term of two years' imprisonment for carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for correction of the judgment of sentence. Specifically, we affirm defendant's sentences of imprisonment in their entirety, vacate $68 of defendant's state costs and $400 in attorney fee assessments, and remand to the trial court solely for the purpose of correction of the judgment as relates to the financial aspects of his sentence indicated above.
People v Roberson, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 25, 2020 (Docket No. 353817).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case has a long and convoluted procedural history encompassing three previous appeals. This case arose in 2014 when defendant arrived at the scene of a fight between two teenage girls, pulled a gun from his waistband, and shot one girl's uncle, the victim. A jury convicted defendant of AWIM, felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, felony-firearm, and CCW. After his sentencing on those convictions, defendant appealed to this Court which affirmed his convictions but remanded to the trial court to consider our Supreme Court's decision in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich. 358; 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015).Defendant sought leave to appeal to our Supreme Court which in lieu of granting leave vacated the portion of this Court's opinion regarding the calculation of Offense Variable (OV) 7, and remanded to the trial court to determine whether it had correctly scored OV 7, and if so, to consider the previous sentences in light of Lockridge, and if not, to resentence defendant. People v Roberson, 500 Mich. 929, 929; 889 N.W.2d 486 (2017).
People v Roberson, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 2, 2016 (Docket No. 324668), vacated in part 500 Mich. 929 (2017).
On remand, the trial court determined that OV 7 should have been scored at zero points and ultimately held a final resentencing hearing on June 7, 2019. During that hearing, the trial court vacated defendant's felon-in-possession conviction and recalculated defendant's Prior Record Variable (PRV) and OV scores which changed defendant's recommended minimum sentence guidelines range to 27 to 45 months' imprisonment for the AWIM conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to 6 to 17 years' imprisonment for the AWIM conviction-an upward departure from the guidelines. After the delayed appointment of appellate counsel, defendant filed an application for delayed leave to appeal, which this Court granted.
People v Roberson, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 25, 2020 (Docket No. 353817).
II. JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE TO CCW CONVICTION
Defendant, in his Standard 4 brief, asserts that his CCW conviction must be reversed because the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We disagree.
Nevertheless, we consider defendant's challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction regarding the CCW conviction, because "[j]urisdictional defects may be raised at any time." People v Martinez, 211 Mich.App. 147, 149; 535 N.W.2d 236 (1995). Defendant also argues that he was unfairly surprised by the amendment of the felony information to add the CCW charge the day before trial. Defendant, however, should have raised that issue in his initial appeal as of right in 2014, and not as an appeal from resentencing after remand because such a challenge is beyond the permissible scope of this appeal. See People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich.App. 477, 481; 522 N.W.2d 880 (1994) (holding that "where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand"); see also People v Gauntlett, 152 Mich.App. 397, 400; 394 N.W.2d 437 (1986) ("[a]n appeal from a resentencing is limited to the resentencing proceeding"), citing People v Jones, 394 Mich. 434; 231 N.W.2d 649 (1975). Thus, we decline to consider that argument by defendant.
The failure to include the CCW charge in defendant's written return to circuit court and bindover did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over defendant. Defendant contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the CCW charge against him because he was not bound over by the district court on that charge. Defendant's argument lacks merit. In People v Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 458-459; 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998), our Supreme Court held that circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony criminal cases. Further, "[i]n personam jurisdiction is vested in the circuit court upon the filing of a return of the magistrate before whom the defendant waived preliminary examination or before whom the defendant had been examined." Id. at 458 (quotation marks and citation omitted). So long as sufficient facts were adduced at the preliminary examination to support a charge, the decision to bind over for trial on that charge and a subsequent amendment of the felony information are proper. People v Hunt, 442 Mich. 359, 362-364; 501 N.W.2d 151 (1993). Further, trial courts may permit the prosecution to amend the information at any time unless doing so would unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant. Goecke, 457 Mich. at 460 (quoting MCR 6.112(G)); see also People v Unger, 278 Mich.App. 210, 221; 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008).
First, respecting subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court had jurisdiction regarding felony criminal cases. Goecke, 457 Mich. at 458-459. Under MCL 750.227(3), someone who commits CCW "is guilty of a felony . . . ." Therefore, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.; Goecke, 457 Mich. at 458-459.
Second, regarding personal jurisdiction, defendant had to be bound over on facts that would support the charge of CCW. Id.; Hunt, 442 Mich. at 362-364. The prosecution filed a felony complaint before the preliminary examination, on May 19, 2014, but did not include the CCW charge for defendant. On May 23, 2014, the prosecution filed an amended felony information that did not list the CCW charge. When the preliminary examination began on June 25, 2014, however, the prosecution informed the trial court and gave notice to defendant that "I will be adding a count of [CCW]" for defendant. The victim testified that he stood directly in front of defendant and saw defendant remove a gun from his waist area. The victim stated that defendant carried and shot a "black semi automatic 9 millimeter." After the testimony, the prosecution argued that, for "[t]he CCW count, as you recall [the victim] said he saw [] [d]efendant remove the gun from his waistband area. That would be consistent with carrying concealed weapon of pistol on person." At the end of the hearing, the district court determined probable cause existed to believe that defendant committed the charged offenses, which specifically included the added CCW charge. Defendant, therefore, cannot establish surprise or prejudice.
The written return and bindover to circuit court, for reasons that are not clear from the record, did not contain a statutory citation for the CCW charge. Nevertheless, on September 30, 2014, the prosecution filed another amended felony information, which added the CCW charge against defendant which specifically cited the statutory CCW provision, MCL 750.227. Defendant, therefore, cannot establish surprise or prejudice. The trial commenced on October 1, 2014, at which defendant did not object to the amended felony information, and the jury ultimately convicted defendant of CCW.
Defendant now argues that the district court's failure to include a specific citation to the CCW statute in the return to circuit court divested the trial court of jurisdiction to try defendant and convict him of the CCW charge. As explained in Hunt, 442 Mich. at 362-364, however, the facts proved at the preliminary examination control whether a crime can be charged and tried before the trial court. In Goecke, 457 Mich. at 458-459, our Supreme Court verified that the bindover on those facts established personal jurisdiction. In this case, the prosecution informed defendant that he faced a CCW charge before the preliminary examination commenced. During the course of the preliminary examination, the prosecution elicited testimony from the victim that defendant had a gun concealed in his waistband before removing and firing it. The district court determined that the victim's testimony sufficed to bind defendant over for trial on a charge of CCW. The district court's failure to include the statutory citation to CCW in the return to circuit court did not change that outcome, considering the facts supporting the charge were introduced during the preliminary examination. Therefore, under Goecke, 457 Mich. at 458-459, and Hunt, 442 Mich. at 362-364, the trial court had jurisdiction to try and convict defendant of CCW.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL
Defendant, in his Standard 4 brief, argues that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The denial of effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law, which are reviewed, respectively, for clear error and de novo." People v Schrauben, 314 Mich.App. 181, 189; 886 N.W.2d 173 (2016), quoting People v Brown, 279 Mich.App. 116, 140; 755 N.W.2d 664 (2008). Questions of ineffective assistance of counsel for which no factual record has been created are reviewed for errors apparent on the record. People v Seals, 285 Mich.App. 1, 17; 776 N.W.2d 314 (2009).
B. ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by stipulating to the dismissal of defendant's appeal of his November 10, 2017 resentencing in Docket No. 346878. "[T]he test for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as that applicable to a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel." People v Uphaus, 278 Mich.App. 174, 186; 748 N.W.2d 899 (2008) (citation omitted). "Criminal defendants have a right to the effective assistance of counsel under the United States and Michigan Constitutions." Schrauben, 314 Mich.App. at 189-190, citing U.S. Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. "However, effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise." Schrauben, 314 Mich.App. at 190. The United States Supreme Court has held that "in order to receive a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" People v Vaughn, 491 Mich. 642, 669; 821 N.W.2d 288 (2012), quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694; 104 S.Ct. 2052; 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "When reviewing defense counsel's performance, the reviewing court must first objectively 'determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.'" People v Jackson (On Reconsideration), 313 Mich.App. 409, 431; 884 N.W.2d 297 (2015), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. "Next, the defendant must show that trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense-in other words, that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Jackson, 313 Mich.App. at 431, quoting Vaughn, 491 Mich. at 669. "The defendant 'bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice[;] the defendant [also] necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim.'" People v Cooper, 309 Mich.App. 74, 80; 867 N.W.2d 452 (2015), quoting People v Carbin, 463 Mich. 590, 600; 623 N.W.2d 884 (2001) (alteration in Cooper).
We first consider whether appellate counsel's decision to stipulate to the dismissal of the appeal in Docket No. 346878 was" 'outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.'" Jackson, 313 Mich.App. at 431, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. This issue focuses on defendant's appeal as of right in Docket No. 346878. The record indicates that Docket No. 346878 related to the November 27, 2018 reissuance of the November 10, 2017 judgment of sentence that the trial court originally entered after defendant's first resentencing hearing. The reissuance of that judgment of sentence resulted in defendant's ability to file an appeal as of right with this Court in Docket No. 346878. However, after defendant filed that appeal, defendant's appellate counsel also moved the trial court to correct defendant's invalid sentence. Ultimately, before this Court considered defendant's appeal, the trial court agreed with defendant and granted him a resentencing, which occurred on June 7, 2019. The judgment of sentence being appealed in Docket No. 346878, therefore, no longer existed as it related to defendant's convictions and sentences. Consequently, when defendant's appellate counsel stipulated to the dismissal of that appeal, which this Court granted, appellate counsel acted well within the bounds of professionally competent assistance, regardless of whether defendant personally agreed with the decision. Jackson, 313 Mich.App. at 431. For that reason, defendant's argument lacks merit.
IV. DEPARTURE SENTENCE
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him above the minimum guidelines range for his AWIM conviction. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We review for an abuse of discretion whether a sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense." People v Armisted, 295 Mich.App. 32, 51; 811 N.W.2d 47 (2011). A "trial court abuse[s] its discretion by violating the principle of proportionality . . ., which requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender." People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich. 453, 459-460; 902 N.W.2d 327 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
B. ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to state sufficient reasons to establish the proportionality of his sentence for AWIM. This Court recently restated the law regarding proportionality and reasonableness in People v Lampe, 327 Mich.App. 104, 125-127; 933 N.W.2d 314 (2019):
This Court reviews an out-of-guidelines sentence for reasonableness. [] Lockridge, 498 Mich. [at] 365 []. "[T]he standard of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness on appeal is abuse of discretion." []Steanhouse, 500 Mich. [at] 471[]; see also People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich.App. 490, 520; 909 N.W.2d 458 (2017)[]. A sentence is unreasonable-and therefore an abuse of discretion-if the trial court failed to adhere to the principle of proportionality in imposing its sentence on a defendant. Steanhouse, 500 Mich. at 477, citing People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630; 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990). That is, sentences imposed by a trial court must "be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender." Milbourn, 435 Mich. at 636. The trial court's fact-finding at sentencing is reviewed for clear error. See People v Garay, 320 Mich.App. 29, 43; 903 N.W.2d 883 (2017)(citation omitted) [, rev'd in part on other grounds__ Mich__; 949 N.W.2d 673 (2020)].
"[A] sentence is reasonable under Lockridge if it adheres to the principle of proportionality set forth in Milbourn." People v Walden, 319 Mich.App. 344, 351; 901 N.W.2d 142 (2017). Milbourn's "principle of proportionality . . . requires the sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender." Id. at 352 (quotation marks and citation omitted). An out-of-guidelines sentence "may be imposed when the trial court determines that 'the recommended range under the guidelines is disproportionate, in either direction, to the seriousness of the crime.'" People v Steanhouse (On Remand), 322 Mich.App. 233, 238; 911 N.W.2d 253 (2017)[, vacated on other grounds 504 Mich. 969 (2019)].
Factors that may be considered by a trial court under the proportionality standard include, but are not limited to:
(1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant's misconduct while in custody, the defendant's expressions of remorse, and the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. [Walden, 319 Mich.App. at 352-253 (citation omitted).]
The legislative guidelines remain a "useful tool" that must be taken into account when sentencing a defendant, and "a trial court must justify the [out-of-guidelines] sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review, which includes an explanation of why the sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence would have been." Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich.App. at 524-525 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
During the resentencing hearing at issue in this appeal, after a lengthy discussion with counsel and input by defendant regarding the correct number of points to assess for PRVs and OVs, the trial court recalculated defendant's sentencing guidelines minimum sentence at 27 to 45 months' imprisonment for defendant's AWIM conviction. The trial court acknowledged that the guidelines were important to consider when determining a proportionate sentence despite their being advisory. The trial court stated, "I'm going by them, too. I'm letting them advise me."
The trial court explained, "I heard this case. [Defendant] shot somebody and then walked up to him and shot him again and said, 'you should be dead.'" The trial court asked defendant for his input:
Defendant: Well, your Honor, I did have a co-defendant. So the way you explained-you know, I'm not trying to take away from-
Trial Court: Well, see, the more we talk about this case, the more I remember. This is where your girlfriend and somebody else's kids got into an argument.
Defendant: Right.
Trial Court: Your girlfriend allegedly made a phone call. She was charged with either aiding and abetting or conspiracy. I didn't think there was enough to convict her. So I gave her a directed verdict. But you came over and got into the argument and you ended up shooting this man. Not only did you shoot him once, but you shot him twice. You shot him while he was laying on the floor-I mean, on the ground. The only reason he didn't die is because there was luck on his side.
The trial court admonished defendant for going over to the location of the girls' argument and shooting the victim because defendant had no reason for going there. The trial court asked defendant how he justified his behavior. Defendant responded that he did not. Defense counsel advised the trial court that during his incarceration defendant had minor disciplinary tickets but none for any assaultive behavior. Defense counsel requested that the trial court sentence defendant within the revised guidelines range. The trial court declined to do so and imposed an upward departure sentence of 6 years' to 17 years' imprisonment.
The record reflects that in deciding to depart from the guidelines, the trial court considered the seriousness of the offense and the offender. See Lampe, 327 Mich.App. at 126, quoting Walden, 319 Mich.App. at 352-353. The trial court reflected upon the fact that defendant shot the victim twice. The record reflects that defendant first shot the victim incapacitating him, then approached the victim lying on the ground and shot him in the chest and callously stated that the victim should be dead. The trial court articulated reasons why a minimum sentence between 27 to 45 months' imprisonment would be inadequate considering the seriousness of the offense and the offender. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him above the advisory guidelines range because the sentence properly considered the seriousness of the offense and the offender.
The trial court noted that defendant had inserted himself into a fight between two young girls after defendant's girlfriend called him. The presentence investigation reports provided information regarding the incident including that the victim, an adult male, intervened in the dispute and broke up the girls. The trial court recalled from presiding over the trial that defendant took it upon himself to inject life-threatening violence toward an innocent victim. The record reflects that the trial court gave defendant an opportunity at the resentencing hearing to explain his conduct during which he could have expressed remorse, but rather than offer an explanation for his conduct or express any remorse, defendant deflected by essentially attempting to blame his codefendant.
In sum, when deciding to depart from the guidelines, the trial court gave adequate reasons for its upward departure sentence. Lampe, 327 Mich.App. at 125-127. The trial court imposed a reasonably proportionate sentence for defendant's commission of AWIM. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
V. COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant, in his Standard 4 brief, argues that the trial court improperly imposed $272 in state minimum costs and $400 in attorney fees. We agree.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[C]hallenges to the imposition of fees and costs . . . must be preserved when the trial court imposes the fee." People v Jackson, 483 Mich. 271, 292 n 18; 769 N.W.2d 630 (2009). "If not challenged at that point, the claim of error will be seen as unpreserved." Id. In this case, the trial court imposed the attorney fees and the state minimum costs for the second time during defendant's resentencing. Defendant did not object to those fees or challenge them in any manner. Consequently, those challenges are not preserved for our review. Id.
The trial court's ability to charge fees and costs during sentencing is provided by statute, People v Cunningham, 496 Mich. 145, 149; 852 N.W.2d 118 (2014), and appellate courts "review this question of statutory interpretation de novo," People v Wood, 506 Mich. 114, 121; 954 N.W.2d 494 (2020). Unpreserved challenges to fees, like these, are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Shenoskey, 320 Mich.App. 80, 82-83; 903 N.W.2d 212 (2017). "To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights." People v Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763; 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). In order to show that a defendant's substantial rights were affected, there must be "a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings." Id.
B. ANALYSIS
Defendant first challenges his assessment of state minimum costs for his three felony convictions. "The right of the court to impose costs in a criminal case is statutory . . .; [t]hus, courts may impose costs in criminal cases only where such costs are authorized by statute." Cunningham, 496 Mich. at 149 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under MCL 769.1k(1)(a), in pertinent part, "if the court determines after a hearing or trial that the defendant is guilty . . . [t]he court shall impose the minimum state costs as set forth in [MCL 769.1j] of this chapter." The minimum state costs provided by MCL 769.1j(1)(a) requires payment of "$68.00, if the defendant is convicted of a felony."
In 2014, the jury convicted defendant of four felonies-AWIM, felon-in-possession, felony-firearm, and CCW. Consequently, the trial court ordered him to pay a minimum state costs fee, calculated at $68 per felony, of $272. During defendant's June 2019 resentencing, however, the trial court vacated defendant's felon-in-possession conviction. The prosecution, in this appeal, does not challenge the trial court's decision to do so and has not filed a cross-appeal. Despite vacating defendant's felon-in-possession conviction, the trial court also ordered that all previously assessed costs be continued in the newly issued judgment of sentence. That order necessarily included the payment of $68 per felony, for four felonies, including the vacated felon-in-possession conviction. Because the June 2019 judgment of sentence after resentencing included only three felonies-AWIM, felony-firearm, and CCW-the statutory calculation of state minimum costs should have been $204. MCL 769.1k(1)(a); MCL 769.1j(1)(a). Specifically, the trial court had statutory authority to assess $68 per felony for three felonies totaling $204. Id.; MCL 769.1k(1)(a). Defendant, therefore, has established plain error that affected his right to proper assessment of statutory costs and the outcome, when properly calculated would be different. Therefore, he is entitled to relief. Carines, 460 Mich. at 763. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the trial court's June 2019 judgment of sentence related to state minimum costs, and remand with instructions to correct the judgment to assess only $204 as required by statute. Cunningham, 496 Mich. at 149.
Defendant also challenges the judgment of sentence's assessment of $400 for attorney fees. "[C]ourts may impose costs in criminal cases only where such costs are authorized by statute." Cunningham, 496 Mich. at 149. Under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv), in pertinent part, "if the court determines after a hearing or trial that the defendant is guilty . . . [t]he court may impose . . . [t]he expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant." In People v Lewis, 503 Mich. 162, 168; 926 N.W.2d 796 (2018), our Supreme Court held that a trial court is "required to determine the cost of providing legal assistance to defendant pursuant to MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv)," before including those fees in the judgment of sentence.
In this case, defendant does not simply object to the calculation of attorney fees; he claims that he never had an appointed attorney throughout trial and his original sentencing. In the original judgment of sentence, the trial court ordered defendant to pay $400 in attorney fees. When resentenced in June 2019, the newly issued judgment of sentence required all previously ordered costs and fees to remain in effect. The trial court, therefore, once again assessed defendant $400 for attorney fees, assuming he had not already paid the fee.
In arguing the impropriety of this assessment of attorney fees, defendant points to the register of actions printed shortly after his original sentencing which noted that his trial attorney had been retained. The record reveals that defendant's counsel filed an appearance as retained counsel for defendant on June 25, 2014, and worked on his behalf from the preliminary examination until defendant's original sentencing on October 21, 2014.
Based on the record, the trial court incorrectly assessed defendant attorney fees. The trial court did not have a factual basis for assessing $400 in attorney fees to defendant. Lewis, 503 Mich. at 168. Because the trial court lacked a factual basis and statutory authority for assessing attorney fees, defendant has established that the trial court committed plain error and the outcome would have been different had the trial court properly calculated the costs and fees in this matter. Cunningham, 496 Mich. at 149; Carines, 460 Mich. at 763; MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv). Therefore, we vacate the portion of the judgment of sentence ordering defendant to pay $400 in attorney fees and remand with instructions to the trial court to correct the error. Cunningham, 496 Mich. at 149; Carines, 460 Mich. at 763; MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv).
VI. CONCLUSION
We affirm defendant's convictions and sentence but remand for the trial court to correct defendant's judgment of sentence regarding the statutory costs and fees as set forth in this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.