Opinion
2016–2281 S CR
04-05-2018
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christopher LANGHORNE, Appellant.
Ciarelli & Dempsey, P.C. (John L. Ciarelli of counsel), for appellant. Suffolk County District Attorney (Lauren Tan of counsel), for respondent.
Ciarelli & Dempsey, P.C. (John L. Ciarelli of counsel), for appellant.
Suffolk County District Attorney (Lauren Tan of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT: ANTHONY MARANO, P.J., JERRY GARGUILO, JAMES V. BRANDS, JJ
Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Riverhead, Suffolk County (Lori M. Hulse, J.), rendered August 22, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of driving while intoxicated per se. ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, and the accusatory instrument is dismissed.
Defendant was charged with, among other things, driving while intoxicated per se (Vehicle and Traffic § 1192 [2] ) and ultimately pleaded guilty to that offense. The sole issue on this appeal is whether the police had probable cause to stop the vehicle that defendant was driving for defendant's failure to dim the vehicle's headlights.
At a pretrial hearing "limited to the reasonable suspicion of the stop of the vehicle," Town of Riverhead Police Officer Timothy Murphy testified that he had been on routine patrol at approximately 1:50 a.m. on December 5, 2014 on Meeting House Creek Road. Murphy had been traveling in a southeasterly direction, when a vehicle drove by him "going in the opposite direction with the bright lights on, creating a glaring, blinding condition to the oncoming traffic; namely me." Murphy turned his vehicle around and stopped the vehicle, which was being driven by defendant, based on defendant's violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3). Defense counsel argued that "something in addition to glaring is required to be established in this type of case."
In a decision dated April 18, 2016, the Justice Court concluded "that the stop of defendant's vehicle was lawful," stating, among other things, that:
"The use of high beams must hinder the vision of the approaching motorist so as to actually have an effect upon the other driver's operation of his vehicle ( People v. Meola , 7 N.Y.2d 391 [198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851] [1960] ).
Testimony that high beams caused [a] State Trooper to squint was insufficient proof that the Trooper's visions [sic] was hindered to the extent that it affected the operation of his vehicle, therefore the stop of defendant's vehicle was improper ( People v. Allen , 89 A.D.3d 742 [2d Dept. 2011] ). Compare this to the facts in Meola ... at 395–396, where interference with the officer's vision from the high beams caused the officer to reduce his speed. The requirement of a tangible manifestation of interference is necessary to find probable cause for the vehicle stop.
A ‘glaring, blinding condition to the oncoming traffic’ satisfies the requirement that defendant's use of high beams could reasonably have interfered with the driver of an approaching vehicle. Defendant relies on Allen to support dismissal, however the distinction between the interference resulting in ‘squinting’ versus a ‘glaring, blinding condition’ is the difference between a lack of probable cause and a lawful stop based on a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3)."
On appeal, defendant contends that the officer lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle, as a vehicle using high beams must actually affect the approaching driver's operation of his or her vehicle; causing a glaring or blinding condition is insufficient. The People contend that defendant's use of his high beams affected Officer Murphy's vision, temporarily blinding the officer, thereby affecting the operation of his vehicle. Consequently, the People assert, they established the necessary interference with Officer Murphy's operation of his vehicle.
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3) provides, in pertinent part, that "whenever a vehicle approaching from ahead is within five hundred feet, ... the headlamps, ... shall be operated so that dazzling light does not interfere with the driver of the approaching vehicle, or the vehicle being approached."
In People v. Meola , 7 N.Y.2d 391, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851, the defendant was convicted of former Vehicle and Traffic Law § 15(3), which was substantially similar to current Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3) (both sections contain the words "shall be operated so that dazzling light does not interfere with the driver of the approaching vehicle"). In that case, a state trooper testified that, while he had been driving on the New York State Thruway, he observed that the high beams of the defendant's car were on, and that they "interfered with the Trooper's operation of his car, requiring him to reduce his speed, and he flicked his lights from high-low to high-low while approaching defendant" ( id. at 392, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851 ). The Court of Appeals, in response to a constitutional vagueness challenge to the statute, determined that the word interfere "plainly means to hinder or hamper the vision of an approaching motorist—a necessary element of the infraction" ( id. at 395, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851 ). The Court continued that the offense required proof of two elements—relating to the conduct of the accused and the effect of such conduct on the complainant. The conduct of the accused "which is proscribed is the operation of multibeam headlights so as to produce ‘dazzling light,’ and ‘the effect of such conduct upon the complainant’ is interference with his vision and hence with the operation of his car" ( id. ). The trooper's testimony "that he signaled defendant to dim her lights precisely because the high beams interfered with his operation of his car, requiring him to reduce his speed" constituted proof that the statute had been violated ( id. at 395–396, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851 ).
In People v. Hines , 155 A.D.2d 722, 724, 547 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1989), the Appellate Division, Third Department, determined that a state trooper had lawfully stopped the defendant's vehicle based upon his testimony "that defendant's headlights were very bright and dazzling and affected his vision," which "supported a reasonable suspicion that a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3) existed." Moreover, in a case involving the revocation of a driver's license, Matter of Barr v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles , 155 A.D.3d 1159, 63 N.Y.S.3d 599 (2017), the Appellate Division, Third Department, determined that there was probable cause for a trooper to stop the defendant's car for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3) where the petitioner's high beams had " ‘hamper[ed] or hinder[ed] [the] vision’ " of the driver of the approaching car ( id. at 1160, 932 N.Y.S.2d 142, quoting People v. Meola , 7 N.Y.2d at 397, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851 ) so as to cause "a glare to [his] vision and affected his driving insofar as he had to adjust [his] eyes" (Matter of Barr v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles , 155 A.D.3d at 1160, 63 N.Y.S.3d 599). In People v. Rorris , 52 A.D.3d 869, 870, 859 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2008), the Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the defendant's conviction of driving while intoxicated, where a state trooper testified at a suppression hearing that he had stopped the defendant's vehicle, which had its high beams on. The trooper indicated that the glare was so strong that the trooper had to squint his eyes, hold up his hand to block the glare and pull to the side of the road.
However, the Appellate Division, Second Department, has held that there must be some evidence that the officer's operation of his vehicle was actually affected. In People v. Allen , 89 A.D.3d 742, 932 N.Y.S.2d 142 (2011), a state trooper testified at a suppression hearing that, while he was on patrol in Dutchess County, the defendant's vehicle approached him from the opposite direction with its high beams on, which "caused the State Trooper to squint his eyes as he was driving. As a result, the State Trooper turned his vehicle around, followed the defendant's vehicle, and then pulled the defendant over" ( id. at 742, 932 N.Y.S.2d 142 ). After a hearing, the Dutchess County Court determined "that the defendant's high beams hindered the State Trooper's vision so as to provide probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3)" ( id. at 743, 932 N.Y.S.2d 142 ). The Appellate Division reversed the defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The Court initially stated that "[a] police officer may lawfully stop a vehicle based upon probable cause that there has been a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation" ( id. at 743, 932 N.Y.S.2d 142 ), citing People v. Robinson , 97 N.Y.2d 341, 348–349, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 (2001). The Court then continued:
"We agree with the defendant's contention that in order to constitute interference, a defendant's use of high beams must ‘hinder or hamper the vision of [the] approaching motorist’ so as to actually have an effect upon the other driver's operation of his or her vehicle [quoting People v. Meola , 7 N.Y.2d at 395, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851 ]. For example, in People v. Meola , the Court of Appeals found sufficient proof of interference where a State Trooper testified that the defendant's high beams caused the officer to reduce his speed.
Here, by contrast, the proof adduced at the suppression hearing was insufficient to demonstrate that the defendant's use of his high beams affected the State Trooper's operation of his vehicle. Although the State Trooper was caused to squint, the defendant's high beams did not hinder or hamper the vision of the State Trooper so as to affect the operation of his vehicle" ( People v. Allen , 89 A.D.3d at 743, 932 N.Y.S.2d 142 ).
In the case at bar, the officer merely testified that defendant's use of high beams created a glaring, blinding condition to oncoming traffic. As the record fails to establish that the police officer took any action in response to defendant's use of his vehicle's high beams, the officer lacked probable cause for the stop of defendant's vehicle (see People v. Allen , 89 A.D.3d 742, 932 N.Y.S.2d 142 ; cf. People v. Yankovich , 39 Misc.3d 133[A], 2013 NY Slip Op. 50530[U], 2013 WL 1456460 [App. Term, 2d Dept., 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2013] ). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the accusatory instrument is dismissed.
MARANO, P.J., and GARGUILO, J., concur.
BRANDS, J., taking no part.