Opinion
21070096
05-09-2022
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Kristen A. Costa, Defendant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Monroe County (Ryan Mulcahy of Counsel), for plaintiff. Fiandach & Fiandach (John Magistro of Counsel), for defendant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Monroe County (Ryan Mulcahy of Counsel), for plaintiff.
Fiandach & Fiandach (John Magistro of Counsel), for defendant.
Thomas J. DiSalvo, J.
Facts of the Case
The defendant was charged on July 19, 2021, with common law driving while intoxicated, VTL § 1192 (3), failure to dim headlights, VTL § 375 (3) and refusal to take breath test, VTL §1194 (1) (b). She was arraigned on August 18, 2021. Defense counsel submitted omnibus motions requesting, among other things, a probable cause hearing and a Huntley hearing. Those hearings were conducted on April 1, 2022. Webster Police Officer Ethan Parrish, the arresting officer, was the only witness for the People.
Such a charge was previously dismissed as same was determined not to be a cognizable offense. (People v. Adams, 201 A.D.3d 1311, 1312, 161 N.Y.S.3d 613, 614 [4th Dept 2022])
The officer testified that at about 11:24 P.M. on July 19, 2021, he was traveling northbound on Bay Road in the Town of Webster. At that time he observed a white SUV traveling southbound on the said Bay Road. He testified that the driver "failed to dim her headlights". In essence on cross-examination the defense counsel inquired as to how the officer knew the defendant was using her high beams.In response the officer indicated that the lights "were so bright they caused me to look away". The officer turned his vehicle around to follow the vehicle, whereupon he initiated a traffic stop. He approached the vehicle on the drivers side. He obtained a photo driver license from the driver, which permitted the officer to identify the driver as the defendant herein. While engaging the defendant in conversation, he was able to observe the odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from the vehicle and various indicia of intoxication displayed by the defendant. During that initial conversation, the defendant admitted having consumed an alcoholic beverage prior to operating her vehicle. The officer requested that the defendant exit her vehicle. The defendant complied with that request and performed various standardized field sobriety tests. Upon the completion of said tests the defendant was arrested for the above offenses.
Issue Presented
Did the failure of the defendant to dim her headlights violate VTL § 375 (3).
Was the traffic stop constitutionally justified because the officer observed what he reasonably believed to be a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law?
Legal Analysis
VTL § 375 (3) states in pertinent part as follows:
"Provided that, whenever a vehicle approaching from ahead is within five hundred feet, ... the headlamps, if of the multiple beam type, or the auxiliary front facing lamps, if the vehicle is so equipped, shall be operated so that dazzling light does not interfere with the driver of the approaching vehicle...."
In the instant case it must first be determined if the defendant violated the above statute. This court has dealt with this specific issue before. (See People v. Guinan, 40 Misc.3d 1236[A], 2013 NY Slip Op. 51436[U].) In that case the court held that the officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle. The officer in that case testified that as the defendant passed him from behind "... he was blinded by the defendant's high beams". In arriving at the conclusion that the officer did not have probable cause to stop the vehicle, this court held that
(Id. at *4)
(Id. at *1.)
"The failure to dim headlamps must cause more than a mere annoyance to the other driver, including a police officer. There must be an objective and specific adverse affect on the other driver's ability to proceed. Simply causing the other driver to squint or momentarily turn away would not be enough to violate this statute. Nor would a conclusory statement that the failure to dim high beams, without more, blinded the other driver be sufficient."
(Id. at *3.)
The officer in Guinan was apparently under the impression and belief that any failure to dim one's headlights was a violation of VTL § 3575 (3). That is simply not the case. For example "The Court of Appeals has indicated: "The mere flashing of lights, alone, does not constitute a violation of the statute (see People v. Meola, 7 N.Y.2d 391, 397 [1960]; People v. Hines, 155 A.D.2d 722, 724 [1989], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 736 [1990]; People v. Lauber, 162 Misc.2d 19, 20 [1994])." (People v. Garlock, 29 Misc.2d 1223[A], 2010 NY Slip Op. 51968[U] *5).
Since this courts's ruling in Guinan, the Court of Appeals has dealt with the issue of a traffic stop based on a mistake of law.
"In People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 123, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 239, 30 N.E. 3d 880 (2015), the Court of Appeals partially abrogated the mistake of law doctrine, holding that as long as 'the officer's mistake about the law is reasonable, the stop is constitutional.' In so doing, the Court reasoned that 'the relevant question before us is not whether the officer acted in good faith, but whether his belief that a traffic violation had occurred was objectively reasonable (emphasis added)." (Gerstenzang, Handling the DWI Case in New York, § 1:15 at 29 [2019-2020 ed]).
The Court of Appeals in Guthrie stated further in a footnote that "This distinction is significant in that a mistake of law that is merely made in 'good faith' will not validate a traffic stop; rather, unless the mistake is objectively reasonable, any evidence gained from the stop-whether based on a mistake of law or a mistake of fact-must be suppressed."
(Guthrie at 134, 241, 884. See also, Gerstenzang 1:15 at 29 [2019-2020 ed])
In Barr v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, 155 A.D.3d 1159, 1160, 63 N.Y.S.3d 599, 601 the Appellate Division found that the testimony of a New York State Trooper at an administrative refusal hearing established that there was probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle for a violation of VTL § 375 (3). The facts of that case were that
"At the hearing, the trooper testified that he was traveling westbound along Route 23A in Greene County, when he observed petitioner's vehicle approximately 500 feet away in the eastbound lane of travel with his high beams activated. The trooper testified that petitioner's high beams caused 'a glare to [his] vision' and affected his driving insofar as he had to 'adjust [his] eyes.' In our view, such testimony sufficiently established that he had probable cause to believe that petitioner had committed a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375[3]."
Id. at 1160, 601.
In People v. Hines, 155 A.D.2d 722, 724, l 547 N.Y.S.2d 435, 437 the court held that the trooper's "... testimony that defendant's headlights were very bright and dazzling and affected his vision supported a reasonable suspicion that a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3)."
In People v. Rorris, 52 A.D.3d 869, 870, 859 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 the court held that the vehicle of the defendant was properly stopped by the trooper. The facts set out in the court's decision were as follows:
"Here, a State Trooper testified at the suppression hearing that on the morning in question, he was on routine patrol heading east on a particular road. As a westbound vehicle came within 200 to 300 feet of his marked vehicle, it appeared that it was operating with its headlights on high beam. The glare was so strong that the Trooper had to squint his eyes, hold up his hand to block the glare and pull to the side of the road (emphasis added).The Trooper immediately turned around and initiated a traffic stop."
(Id.)
In People v. Allen, 89 A.D.3d 742, 743, 932 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143-144 the court held that
"Here... the proof adduced at the suppression hearing was insufficient to demonstrate that the defendant's use of his high beams affected the State Trooper's operation of his vehicle. Although the State Trooper was caused to squint, the defendant's high beams did not hinder or hamper the vision of the State Trooper so as to affect the operation of his vehicle (emphasis added)."
(Id. at 743, 144.)
In addition, the court stated that
"To establish a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3), the People must show (1) the use of high beams when an approaching vehicle is within 500 feet, and (2) interference with the vision of that driver by reason of such high beams (see People v. Meola, 7 N.Y.2d 391, 395, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851). We agree with the defendant's contention that in order to constitute interference, a defendant's use of high beams must 'hinder or hamper the vision of [the] approaching motorist' so as to actually have an effect upon the other driver's operation of his or her vehicle (id. at 395, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851). For example, in People v. Meola, the Court of Appeals found sufficient proof of interference where a State Trooper testified that the defendant's high beams caused the officer to reduce his speed (id. at 395-396, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851)."
(Id.)
By way of an additional example, in People v. Yankovich, 29 Misc.3d 133 [A], Slip Op. 50530[U] *1 the court held
" A police officer may lawfully stop a vehicle based upon probable cause to believe that there has been a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation (see People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 348-349 [2001]). The officer testified at a suppression hearing that, as the result of defendant's use of her high beams when her vehicle had passed his vehicle on the road, he 'had to take some evasive action,' he couldn't see, and 'it caused [him] to go off the road.' This testimony was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that there had been a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3), in that high beams were used within 500 feet of an approaching vehicle which usage had interfered with the vision of the driver of the approaching vehicle (see People v. Meola, 7 N.Y.2d 391, 395 [1960])."
Finally, it has been held that "The requirement of a tangible manifestation of interference is necessary to find probable cause for the vehicle stop." (People v. Langhorne, 59 Misc.3d 47, 74 N.Y.S. 3d 685 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists. 2018]) The court went on to say that
"In the case at bar, the officer merely testified that defendant's use of high beams created a glaring, blinding condition to oncoming traffic. As the record fails to establish that the police officer took any action in response to defendant's use of his vehicle's high beams, the officer lacked probable cause for the stop of defendant's vehicle."
(Id. at 51, 688.)
Not withstanding decisions in the Third Department, the general consensus of the cases is that there must be some objective and discernable affect on the driving of the officer's vehicle for a failure to dim headlights to be a basis to stop a vehicle. That affect must be demonstrated by some actual change in the course of the officer's driving, including but not limited to swerving, moving to another lane, slowing down or pulling off the road. It is not sufficient for the effect of the high beams to be merely bothersome. That is not enough to establish probable cause to justify a stop of a motor vehicle which is a "limited seizure" of a person's property.
(See People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 418, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 73 [1975])
Conclusion
In this case the officer indicated at the probable cause hearing that the defendant's high beams "were so bright they caused me to look away." As set out above, the officer believed in good faith that he had observed a violation of VTL § 375 (3). However, that belief would not be enough to justify the stop in question unless his actions in stopping the vehicle were determined to be objectively reasonable. In order to be objectively reasonable in such a case there must have been a discernable change in the operation of the officer's vehicle by the officer caused by the failure of the defendant to dim her headlights. That was not the case herein. It is for that reason that the police officer lacked probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle. As a result, the evidenced obtained from the stop of the vehicle is hereby suppressed. Therefore the charges herein are dismissed. This constitutes the decision and order of this court.