Opinion
2015-10-21
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Omar JAMES, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Nao Terai of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Thomas M. Ross, and Diana Marmur of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Nao Terai of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Thomas M. Ross, and Diana Marmur of counsel), for respondent.
L. PRISCILLA HALL, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, and SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Balter, J.), rendered June 1, 2012, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of marijuana in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
“[E]vidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible where its purpose is only to show a defendant's bad character or propensity towards crime” (People v. Morris, 21 N.Y.3d 588, 594, 976 N.Y.S.2d 682, 999 N.E.2d 160; see People v. Kims, 24 N.Y.3d 422, 438, 999 N.Y.S.2d 337; People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553, 559, 942 N.Y.S.2d 416, 965 N.E.2d 918; People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d 16, 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263; People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286). However, “ ‘[w]hen evidence of uncharged crimes is relevant to some issue other than the defendant's criminal disposition, it is generally held to be admissible on the theory that the probative value will outweigh the potential prejudice to the accused’ ” (People v. Morris, 21 N.Y.3d at 594, 976 N.Y.S.2d 682, 999 N.E.2d 160, quoting People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 47, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 396 N.E.2d 735; see People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d at 560, 942 N.Y.S.2d 416, 965 N.E.2d 918; People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d at 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263).
In determining whether to admit such evidence, a court should first inquire whether the proponent of the evidence has identified “some material issue, other than the defendant's criminal propensity, to which the evidence is directly relevant” and, if this showing is made, should then “weigh the evidence's probative value against its potential for undue prejudice to the defendant” (People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d at 560, 942 N.Y.S.2d 416, 965 N.E.2d 918). “If the evidence has substantial probative value and is directly relevant to the purpose—other than to show criminal propensity—for which it is offered, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice and the court may admit the evidence” ( id.; see People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d at 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263). This determination lies within the discretion of the trial court ( see People v. Morris, 21 N.Y.3d at 595, 976 N.Y.S.2d 682, 999 N.E.2d 160; People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d at 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263; People v. Harris, 117 A.D.3d 847, 854, 985 N.Y.S.2d 643).
Here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in permitting the People to introduce the testimony of the defendant's friend that he had purchased marijuana from the defendant in the past. This testimony was relevant to demonstrate the defendant's knowledge that the bag he moved from the front to the rear of that witness's vehicle contained marijuana and that it belonged to the defendant. The defendant's contention that the court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding this testimony is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, any error in this regard does not require reversal.
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 57–58, 777 N.Y.S.2d 332, 809 N.E.2d 561; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Naranjo, 89 N.Y.2d 1047, 1049, 659 N.Y.S.2d 826, 681 N.E.2d 1272; People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 83, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675; see also People v. Sheehan, 106 A.D.3d 1112, 1113, 965 N.Y.S.2d 633; People v. Muniz, 12 A.D.3d 937, 939, 785 N.Y.S.2d 765; People v. Ward, 10 A.D.3d 805, 807–808, 782 N.Y.S.2d 158; People v. Hayes, 236 A.D.2d 738, 653 N.Y.S.2d 738).