Opinion
December 18, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Zelman, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, we find that the police had probable cause to effectuate his arrest. The complainant, an identified citizen (see, People v McCain, 134 A.D.2d 623), had ample time and opportunity during the robbery to observe the defendant under reasonably good lighting conditions. Therefore, an independent basis for the in-court identification existed (see, People v Douglas, 138 A.D.2d 731). It further appears that the complainant recognized the defendant from having seen him numerous times prior to the incident. Under the circumstances, any identification made upon the viewing of the photograph was merely confirmatory in nature and "`suggestiveness' is not a concern" (People v Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 552; People v Jackson, 150 A.D.2d 491; People v Timmons, 138 A.D.2d 428). The hearing court, therefore, did not err in declining to suppress the eyewitness' prospective incourt identification testimony.
The identification procedure used by the police did not warrant suppression of the testimony concerning the pretrial identification. Although a photograph taken of the lineup was unclear due to the age of the camera, the detective who arranged the lineup testified that the fillers looked approximately similar to the defendant and that the lineup was fair and accurate. We find, under the circumstances, that any age, height and weight discrepancies did not present a substantial risk of misidentification (see, People v Gairy, 116 A.D.2d 733).
The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in rendering a compromise Sandoval ruling. It was proper to allow the prosecutor to inquire as to the number of the defendant's previous convictions of felonies and misdemeanors without permitting inquiry into the underlying facts or circumstances (see, People v Rivera, 135 A.D.2d 669).
Finally, contrary to the defendant's contention, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of the complainant. Under the circumstances of this case we decline to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court regarding the proper scope and extent of such cross-examination (see, People v Williams, 142 A.D.2d 310). Brown, J.P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.