Opinion
March 28, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Clabby, J., Linakis, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the identification procedures employed by the police in conducting the lineup from which he was selected were not unduly suggestive. The mere fact that a witness is told that a possible suspect is in custody or that a suspect who fit the description will be on view does not invalidate an otherwise fair lineup (see, People v. Rodriguez, 64 N.Y.2d 738, 740-741; People v. Hammond, 131 A.D.2d 876, 877, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 800). In any event, based upon the duration of the robbery wherein the victim had an extended opportunity to view the defendant under favorable conditions, it is evident that an independent basis existed for the victim's in-court identification (see, People v. Magee, 122 A.D.2d 227, 228; People v. Rudan, 112 A.D.2d 255, 256-257). Similarly, the defendant's statements, which were not made in response to police interrogation, were properly ruled admissible (see, People v Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d 476, rearg denied 57 N.Y.2d 775; People v Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302-303; People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139). The police are not required "to take affirmative steps, by gag or otherwise, to prevent a talkative person in custody from making an incriminating statement" (People v Rivers, supra, at 479). Additionally, the defendant's arrest was based upon probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that he was the person responsible therefor (see, People v. Carrasquillo, 54 N.Y.2d 248, 254). "[A]s a general rule, information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of the commission of a specific crime is sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest" (see, People v Sanders, 79 A.D.2d 688, 689; see also, People v. Crespo, 70 A.D.2d 661).
The defendant's contention that his identity as one of the perpetrators was not established by legally sufficient evidence is without merit. Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the conviction. All elements of the three counts of robbery in the second degree were clearly established.
Minor discrepancies between the testimony of witnesses are not sufficient to show that a witness's testimony was incredible as a matter of law (see, People v. Di Girolamo, 108 A.D.2d 755, lv denied 64 N.Y.2d 1133). Moreover, the jury heard the testimony, including defense counsel's extensive cross-examination, wherein these inconsistencies were aggressively pursued. Issues of credibility, and the weight to be accorded each piece of evidence presented are within the province of the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94; People v. Rosenfeld, 93 A.D.2d 872, lv denied 59 N.Y.2d 977).
The jury's determination is entitled to great weight on appeal (see, People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P.J., Kunzeman, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.