Opinion
2015–1389 K CR
04-06-2018
New York City Legal Aid Society (Jonathan Garelick of counsel), for appellant. Kings County District Attorney (Leonard Joblove, Seth M. Lieberman and Julian Joiris of counsel), for respondent.
New York City Legal Aid Society (Jonathan Garelick of counsel), for appellant.
Kings County District Attorney (Leonard Joblove, Seth M. Lieberman and Julian Joiris of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT: MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., MICHELLE WESTON, THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, JJ
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
The People charged defendant, in a misdemeanor complaint, with driving while intoxicated (common law) ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3 ] ), driving while impaired ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1 ] ), leaving the scene of an accident without reporting ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 [1 ] [a] ), and reckless driving ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212 ). On April 29, 2015, pursuant to a negotiated plea and sentencing agreement, defendant waived his right to be prosecuted by information and pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (common law) in satisfaction of the accusatory instrument, and was sentenced pursuant to the agreement. On appeal, defendant argues that the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient to allege the offense to which he pleaded guilty. We do not agree.
As defendant waived his right to be prosecuted by information, the accusatory instrument's legal sufficiency may be evaluated by the standards applicable to a misdemeanor complaint (see People v. Dumay , 23 NY3d 518, 524 [2014] ; People v. Jakubowski , 55 Misc 3d 136[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50502[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017] ). A misdemeanor complaint is sufficient on its face when it alleges facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charge (see CPL 100.15 [3 ] ), and provides reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime charged (see CPL 100.40 [4 ] [b]; People v. Dumas , 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986] ; People v. Vargas , 55 Misc 3d 136[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50501[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017] ).
An accusatory instrument alleging a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) "allows for a circumstantial showing of [an] inability to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol" ( People v. Litto , 8 NY3d 692, 705 [2007] ; e.g. People v. Williams , 55 Misc 3d 134[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50478[U], *3 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017] ), without the necessity of allegations that the defendant had been observed operating his vehicle see People v. Ramlall , 47 Misc 3d 141[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50621[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015] ) or that the vehicle had actually been operated in an erratic fashion (see People v. Fiumara , 116 AD3d 421 [2014] ); without a factual reference to the time between the accident and the officer's observations of the defendant's condition (see e.g. People v. Padmore , 44 Misc 3d 129[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50988[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014] ) or corroboration of the defendant's admission as to operation (id. , see People v. Suber , 19 NY3d 247, 254 [2012] ); and without facts precluding "possible innocent explanations for incriminating facts" ( Villalobos v. County of Nassau , 15 Misc 3d 135[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50751[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007] ).
Here, the allegations as to the indicia of alcohol consumption and defendant's admission as to his having operated a vehicle which had been involved in an automobile accident, in an intersection, that was so violent as to cause both vehicles involved to catch fire, were sufficient to inform defendant of the factual basis of the charge and with the requisite particularity to enable him to prepare a defense. The occurrence of a serious traffic accident involving an operator who exhibits signs of alcoholic beverage consumption militates in favor of an inference of driving while intoxicated (see People v. Booden , 69 NY2d 185, 188 [1987] ["The circumstances of (an) accident may have been capable of innocent explanation, but they (may) nevertheless support( ) an inference that a crime had been committed because the vehicle had been driven by a person under the influence of alcohol"] [emphasis added]; see e.g. People v. Thomas , 68 AD3d 482, 483 [2009] ; People v. Beauzyl , 56 Misc 3d 141[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51118[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]; People v. Maher , 52 Misc 3d 136[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51043[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016] ). Thus, as a matter of "common sense and reasonable pleading" ( People v. Davis , 13 NY3d 17, 31 [2009] ), the accusatory instrument sufficed to allege a violation of common-law driving while intoxicated.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ALIOTTA, JJ., concur.