Opinion
No. 1-18-0504
09-25-2020
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK BETLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 02 CR 20584 Honorable Arthur F. Hill, Jr., Judge, presiding. JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hoffman and Cunningham concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: We reverse the denial of defendant's request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition and remand for further proceedings, where defendant satisfied the requisite cause-and-prejudice test under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act with respect to the challenge he sought to raise pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution. ¶ 2 Defendant-appellant, Patrick Betley, appeals from an order of the circuit court denying his pro se request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. ¶ 3 Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, with the jury also finding that defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense that proximately caused the victim's death. The shooting occurred in July 2020, when defendant was 22 years old. Defendant was then sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction, along with a consecutive term of 25 additional years' imprisonment for personally discharging the firearm, causing death. Defendant's conviction was affirmed upon direct appeal. People v. Betley, 376 Ill. App.3d 1136 (2007) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 4 Defendant thereafter filed several previous, unsuccessful collateral challenges to his convictions and sentences, including an initial postconviction petition filed pursuant to the Act in 2010. Finally, on September 27, 2017, defendant initiated the proceeding at issue here by filing a motion seeking leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Therein, defendant asserted that it was a violation of the eighth amendment of the federal constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11) for the trial court to impose a de facto life sentence upon defendant for crimes he committed when he was 22 years old. The circuit court denied such leave in a written order entered on January 12, 2019. Defendant thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal. ¶ 5 The Act "provides a statutory remedy to criminal defendants who claim that substantial violations of their constitutional rights occurred at trial" which "is not a substitute for an appeal, but rather, is a collateral attack on a final judgment." People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. The Act provides that "[o]nly one petition may be filed *** without leave of the court." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). Nevertheless, there are "two bases upon which the bar against successive proceedings will be relaxed." Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22. "The first basis for relaxing the bar is when a petitioner can establish 'cause and prejudice' for the failure to raise the claim earlier." Id. (quoting People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002)). The cause-and-prejudice test is now codified in the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). Second, a colorable claim of "actual innocence" will permit a successive postconviction petition. People v. Wideman, 2016 IL App (1st) 123092, ¶ 40 (citing Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 23). Thus, in order to file a successive petition, the defendant's petition must satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test or it must state a colorable claim of actual innocence. People v. Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 143025, ¶ 19. "This standard is higher than the normal first-stage 'frivolous or patently without merit' standard applied to initial petitions. [Citations.]" Id. ¶ 6 In this case, defendant asserts that he has satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test. "It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate both cause and prejudice for each claim raised in his successive petition." People v. Thompson, 383 Ill. App. 3d 924, 929 (2008). The Act provides that "(1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). ¶ 7 "[A] defendant's pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition will meet the section 122-1(f) cause and prejudice requirement if the motion adequately alleges facts demonstrating cause and prejudice." People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 33. "To meet the cause-and-prejudice test *** requires the defendant to submit 'enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination.' [Citation.] Id. ¶ 35. "[L]eave of court to file a successive postconviction petition should be denied when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petition fail as a matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings. [Citations.]" Id. A petitioner need only set out a prima facie case at the leave-to-file stage. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition de novo. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13. ¶ 8 In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005), the Supreme Court found that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to minors. In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide." Id. at 82. Then, in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), the Supreme Court concluded that the eighth amendment "forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders" convicted of homicide. In each case, the Supreme Court relied in part on the lesser moral culpability and greater rehabilitative potential of minors in support of its decisions, and "it is clear the United States Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller has provided juveniles with more constitutional protection than adults." People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, ¶ 68. ¶ 9 However, Miller itself did not impose an outright ban on the imposition of a life sentence upon a juvenile convicted of homicide, let alone a ban on lengthy term-of-years sentences imposed upon juveniles. See, Miller, 567 U.S. 479-80 (refusing to completely foreclose the possibility that a life sentence could be constitutionally imposed upon a juvenile convicted of homicide). Rather, the Supreme Court held only that such a sentence could not be mandated, and that before a life sentence could be properly imposed, "mitigating circumstances" such as "an offender's youth and attendant characteristics" must be considered. Id. at 483, 489. ¶ 10 The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that Miller applies to discretionary, as well as mandatory life sentences (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40), and also to de facto life sentences, or sentences "that cannot be served in one lifetime" and have "the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant's life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole" (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-10). ¶ 11 Thus, while a juvenile offender may be sentenced to a natural life or de facto sentence of life imprisonment, before doing so the trial court must:
"[D]etermine[ ] that the defendant's conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. The court may make that decision only after considering the defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited to, the following factors: (1) the juvenile defendant's chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant's family and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant's degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant's incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant's prospects for rehabilitation." Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46.¶ 12 Obviously, a number of these decisions involved analysis of the protections provided by the eighth amendment, while here we also address defendant's challenge brought pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution. However, as our supreme court has indicated, the proportionate penalties clause provides "a limitation on penalties beyond those afforded by the eighth amendment." People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 69. ¶ 13 Furthermore, defendant—aged 22 at the time of the crimes to which he plead guilty—was not a "juvenile" offender. "Because defendant was an adult, Miller [and its progeny] does not apply directly to his circumstances." People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45. ¶ 14 Nevertheless, our supreme court specifically considered Miller's applicability to a young adult defendant's proportionate penalties clause challenge in both People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, and Harris, 2018 IL 121932. It is true that, in neither case did our supreme court expressly accept the premise that the protections provided to juvenile offenders by Miller and its progeny should be extended to young adult offenders; however, the court did not explicitly reject that assertion either. Moreover, in both cases our supreme very explicitly did indicate that a postconviction proceeding would be an appropriate venue to address that very issue. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48. ¶ 15 More recently, another panel of this court concluded that a postconviction petition was improperly dismissed at the first stage, and explicitly concluded that a mandatory natural life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to a defendant who was 19-years-old at the time he committed murder, pursuant to Miller and its progeny. People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 65, appeal allowed, 140 N.E. 3d 231 (Ill. 2020). ¶ 16 From the above discussion, it is evident that defendant established cause where his original postconviction petition was filed and resolved before Miller and its progeny were ever decided. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42. (a defendant establishes cause when the legal basis for his claim was not available to him when he filed his initial petition). ¶ 17 Turning then to prejudice, it is also clear that defendant's request to file a successive petition asserting an eighth amendment challenge to his sentence was properly rejected below, as any such claim would fail as a matter of law. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ (foreclosing such challenges raised by young-adult offenders under the eighth amendment); People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 26 (recognizing same under similar circumstances). ¶ 18 Thus, we are left to consider whether defendant's pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition raising an as-applied challenge to his sentence under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution, along with the attached documentation, has adequately alleged a prima facie case of prejudice such that further proceedings on that claim are warranted. Supra, ¶ 5. ¶ 19 "Young adult defendants are not entitled to a presumption that Miller applies to them." People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 52. "[U]nder Harris, a young adult defendant must plead and ultimately prove, that his or her individual characteristics require the application of Miller." Id. The petition and accompanying documents must contain sufficient facts to justify further proceedings. To do so, "the defendant must show 'how the evolving science on maturity and brain development that helped form the basis for the Miller decision applies to defendant's specific facts and circumstances.' " Id. ¶ 52 (quoting Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46). ¶ 20 In defendant's motion and in his proposed successive petition, defendant asserted that he was born in Korea, was biracial, and an only child. Growing up in Chicago, where "gangs, drugs, and violence [are] ingrained," these factors led defendant's "immature, undeveloped mind [to be] easily influenced into the criminal activities." He did not finish high school, only later earning a G.E.D. while incarcerated for a prior conviction. Even at age 22, defendant still lived at home in his childhood bedroom. Defendant was also in a car accident two months before the shooting, in which he suffered a head injury requiring 22 stiches. As a result of all these factors, defendant contended that at the time of the shooting he "was not mature, [and] he lacked ability to extricate himself from a crime producing setting. As a young adult, [defendant's] psychological development and moral development was like a juvenile." Defendant also included extensive citation to and discussion of much of the relevant legal authority cited above. ¶ 21 In further support of these contentions, defendant attached numerous articles and scientific studies suggesting that the brains of young adults continue to mature well into their mid-twenties. Defendant specifically highlights the following quotation contained in one such article, where a former commissioner of probation for New York City and current senior research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management stated "[a]nyone who has a 22-year-old living in his childhood bedroom *** knows they aren't the same as older adults." Defendant also included an affidavit from his father, in which his father averred that defendant was still living in his childhood bedroom at the time of the shooting because "he was not mature and independent enough to live on his own." Defendant's father also asserted that the auto accident involving defendant two months before the shooting left defendant quick tempered, immature and unthoughtful in his decision-making. ¶ 22 As with an initial postconviction filing, in considering a motion for leave to file a successive petition, all well-pleaded facts and supporting affidavits are taken as true. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 25. Taken as a whole, we conclude that defendant's motion and supporting material satisfy the prima facie showing of prejudice prerequisites to the filing of a successive postconviction petition as to his proportionate penalties clause argument, and therefore his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition was improperly denied. Consequently, we reverse the order denying the defendant's motion to file a successive postconviction petition, and remand the matter with directions to grant the defendant's motion and advance the petition for a second-stage proceeding solely on the defendant's claim that his 50-year sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution. ¶ 23 Finally, we note that our finding in no way expresses an opinion on the ultimate merits of the factual and legal assertions contained in defendant's postconviction petition, or on whether defendant will ultimately prevail on his postconviction claim. See People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (2009). ¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. ¶ 25 Reversed and remanded with directions.
In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order stating with specificity why no substantial question is presented. --------