Summary
pleading sufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of public urination in violation of antilittering provision prohibiting throwing, putting, or allowing noxious liquid to run or fall into any street or public place
Summary of this case from Commonwealth v. NarvaezOpinion
13-094
08-22-2014
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Herbert APONTE, Defendant–Appellant.
The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Lawrence T. Hausman and Scott A. Rosenberg of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Emily L. Auletta of counsel), for respondent.
The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Lawrence T. Hausman and Scott A. Rosenberg of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Emily L. Auletta of counsel), for respondent.
Present: SCHOENFELD, J.P., HUNTER, JR., LING–COHAN, JJ.
Opinion
PER CURIAM. Judgment of conviction (Charles J. Heffernan, Jr., J.), rendered February 3, 2012, affirmed. Observed by police urinating “in plain view” opposite a location identified as 2396 First Avenue in Manhattan, defendant was charged with “public urination,” in violation of the anti-littering provisions of 24 RCNY Health Code § 153.09, which, as here relevant, makes it unlawful to “throw or put any ... noxious liquid ... [or] allow any such matter to run or fall into any street [or] public place ...”. Defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced littering charge (see Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 16–118[b] ) and now appeals, challenging the facial sufficiency of the underlying accusatory instrument. We find that challenge to be unavailing. “[D]rawing reasonable inferences from all the facts set forth in the accusatory instrument” (People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d 738, 749, 944 N.Y.S.2d 715, 967 N.E.2d 1160 [2012] ), and giving “a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” (People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233 [2000] ) to the sworn police allegations that defendant was seen urinating in “public” and “in plain view” opposite a specified street address, we find the People's pleading sufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that defendant was guilty of the charged Health Code offense. While defendant correctly argues that the factual portion of the information does not specifically state that defendant “ put” or “allow[ed]” his urine “to run or fall into a street [or] public place,” a reasonable person could infer as much from the facts alleged (see generally People v. Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d 518, 992 N.Y.S.2d 672, 16 N.E.3d 1150 [2014] ; People v. Abdurraheem, 94 A.D.3d 569, 570, 942 N.Y.S.2d 90 [2012], lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 970, 950 N.Y.S.2d 353, 973 N.E.2d 763 [2012] ). Defendant does not question, nor do we doubt, the applicability of the cited Health Code ordinance to the facts of this case (see Matter of Daverus McQ., 309 A.D.2d 752, 752, 765 N.Y.S.2d 270 [2003], lv. denied 1 N.Y.3d 507, 776 N.Y.S.2d 539, 808 N.E.2d 859 [2004] ).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.