Opinion
C.A. No. 06A-10-002.
Submitted: February 7, 2007.
May 7, 2007.
Diane Parsons, Lincoln, Delaware.
Joanne Ceballos, Esquire, Veronica O. Faust, Esquire, Bifferato, Gentilotti, Balick, LLC, Lewes, Delaware.
Dear Counsel and Ms. Parsons:
Diane K. Parsons ("Ms. Parsons") appeals the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("the Board") that denied Ms. Parsons' request for unemployment insurance benefits. The Board denied Ms. Parsons' request for benefits after concluding she voluntarily left her position of employment with Atlantis Industries, Inc. ("Employer") without good cause. For the reasons set forth herein, the Board's decision is affirmed.
Procedural Factual Background
On June 1, 2006, a Claims Deputy found Ms. Parsons voluntarily left her place of employment without good cause and was therefore disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits. After a hearing, and by way of written decision mailed July 7, 2006, the Appeals Referee agreed with the Claims Deputy's determination. Ms. Parsons appealed to the Board, which upheld the Appeals Referee's decision and denied Ms. Parsons' request for benefits by way of written decision mailed on September 28, 2006. Ms. Parsons timely filed an appeal in this Court.
The relevant facts are as follows. Ms. Parsons worked for Employer as a production operator from July of 2004 until May of 2006. On May 3, 2006, Ms. Parsons' mother was admitted to the hospital for congestive heart failure. In order to be with her mother during this crisis, Ms. Parsons requested emergency leave from work. This request was granted. Ms. Parsons missed a total of one work shift on this occasion. After her mother was discharged from the hospital, Ms. Parsons scheduled an out-patient follow up visit with a specialist for her mother. Unfortunately, the earliest available appointment time was during one of Ms. Parsons' scheduled work shifts on May 24, 2006. Ms. Parsons reported for work in the evening of May 15th and requested leave from work to attend her mother's doctor appointment on May 24th. Ms. Parsons' supervisor, Carol Orr, informed Ms. Parsons that she had not complied with Employer's requirement that an employee request vacation time at least two weeks in advance of the requested leave date and, therefore, Ms. Parsons' request would be denied. Moreover, Ms. Orr also reminded Ms. Parsons that she had accumulated eleven absentee "segments" pursuant to the company absentee policy and the accrual of a twelfth segment (the necessary outcome another missed work shift) would result in her termination. According to the absentee policy, an employee is charged two segments for each missed work shift. For each full calendar month with no attendance issues, the oldest two of the segments are deducted from the employee's segment tally. Ms. Orr testified before the Appeals Referee that the purpose of this policy is to eliminate the need for Ms. Orr, or any other supervisor, to make a judgment call as to what constitutes a "good" excuse for missing a scheduled work shift. In any event, M s. Parsons testified below that she told Ms. Orr that she would nevertheless request the day off and that "I might as well get my check now." In response to that statement, Ms. Orr asked Ms. Parsons if she was resigning. Ms. Orr replied in the affirmative. Ms. Parsons then signed a statement that she was resigning voluntarily and cleared out her locker.
The fact that Ms. Parsons' assistance was needed with the doctor's appointment due to her mother's health condition was not contested at either of the hearings below.
The date on the resignation letter is May 16, 2006, because Ms. Parsons signed the letter at the end of her shift, in the early morning hours of May 16th.
Discussion
When reviewing the decisions of the Board, this Court must determine whether the Board's findings and conclusions of law are free from legal error and are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265 (D el. 1981); Pochvatilla v. United States Postal Serv., 1997 WL 524062 (Del.Super. Jun. 9, 1997); 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) ("In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the [Board] as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to question s of law."). "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion". Gorrell v. Division of Vocational Rehab., 1996 WL 453356, at *2 (Del.Super. July 31, 1996). The Court's review is limited: "It is not the appellate court's role to weigh the evidence, determine credibility questions or make its own factual findings, but merely to decide if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings." McManus v. Christiana Serv. Co., 1197 WL 127953, at *1 (Del.Super. Jan. 31, 1997).In this case, the findings of the Board are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Delaware law states that an individual will be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if that individual left work "voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." 19 Del. C. § 3314(1). Claimant bears the burden for demonstrating good cause existed for voluntarily terminating the employment relationship. Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 287 A.2d 690 (Del.Super. 1971). An undesirable or unsafe situation does not constitute good cause. O'Neal's Bus Serv., Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 269 A.2d 247 (Del.Super. 1970). However, "[g]ood cause can include a substantial reduction in wages, work hours or a substantial deviation in the working conditions from the original agreement of hire to the detriment of the employee." Weathersby v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 1995 WL 465326, at * 5 (Del.Super. June 29, 1995). In order to qualify for benefits, an employee must do something comparable to exhausting administrative remedies by, for example, giving notice to the employer and seeking to have the situation remedied. Id.
The Board agreed with the Appeals Referee's finding that nothing prevented M s. Parsons from continuing to work for Employer after May 16th when she requested, and was denied, leave for May 24th. Moreover, the Board concluded that the Employer's insistence that Ms. Parsons abide by the Employer's known attendance policy did not constitute a change in Ms. Parsons' working conditions or agreement for hire. The record of the proceedings below reflects the following: (1) Ms. Parsons was aware of and understood the absentee policy; (2) Ms. Parsons had, in fact, received verbal and written warnings regarding her accumulation of segments in accordance with the policy, including a suspension from work without pay; and (3) Ms. Parsons understood that she did not request leave for vacation time two weeks in advance as required by the policy. Ms. Parsons does not attack the general nature of Employer's absentee policy but, rather, feels that it was unjust for her to lose her job due to the unfortunate personal circumstances. Ms. Parsons' predicament in this case was, indeed, unfortunate; however, as a matter of law, her legal argument is without merit. As this Court has previously noted, "There are times when people must quit work if they are to attend to pressing personal matters. But the Court must determine eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits based on statutory standards. Good cause to voluntarily terminate under the statute must be attributable to the job." Mifflin v. Polo Factory Store, 2001 WL 1 4899 07, at *3 (Del.Super. Oct. 18, 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Board's decision to deny Ms. Parsons unemployment compensation because she voluntarily terminated her employment with Employer to care for her mother is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Board's decision denying unemployment insurance benefits to Ms. Parsons is affirmed.